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This is the 15th edition of Employment in Europe. And, like the first 
edition, this one arrives at a difficult time. Europe recovers slowly from 
recession, after several years of strong economic growth and employ-
ment creation. However, there are major differences between the pres-
ent situation, and that of the past. 
The first difference – and this is the purpose of this report – is that we 
are now much better informed about the way Europe’s labour markets 
work than we were 15 years ago. We understand the factors driving the 
demand for labour, and its supply. We have learnt about the social and 
economic forces that determine the nature and form of the workplace. 
We are discovering the way in which our economies and labour mar-
kets interact.
The second difference is that employment policy is a key part of the 
European Union agenda. No longer do we hear the argument that 
employment is a national responsibility, to which Europe has at most a 
minor contribution to make.
We have come to appreciate the extent of the inter-dependence that 
exists between Member States. Reflecting the fact that two-thirds of 
each Member State’s external trade is with other EU members and 
reflecting the impact of the common currency. And reflecting the way 
national and EU-wide employment policies are now being developed 
in partnership.
The established EU labour law framework is an important feature of 
life, given that the commitment to maintaining a level playing field is 
as strong for the labour market, as it is for the markets for goods and 
services. However, the Treaty revisions of Maastricht and Amsterdam 
have dramatically raised the profile of employment policy, and in-
creased the political commitment to common action.
The new paradigm has shifted the focus towards greater co-operation 
between Member States, and within them. We have now developed the 
so-called ‘open method of co-ordination’ as a way of pursuing policy 
reforms – embracing a mixture of common goals and guidelines, tar-
gets, and follow-up performance assessment - across the entire range 
of active and passive labour market policies at national, European, and 
local and regional level.
This method works particularly well given the diversity of European 
systems. It conforms to a common European model – in that there 
is agreement on the need for balance between the private and public 
realm in ensuring economic and social equilibrium – while accepting 
considerable diversity of method in, say, the management of unem-
ployment insurance funds, or the organisation of training. The EU’s 
policy coordination accommodates very different methods of financ-
ing, from the use of direct taxes on labour, to more diversified forms 
of revenue raising.
This somewhat eclectic approach has proved extremely successful. 
Encouraging governments to be more innovative in policies, and more 
open in working with social partners. It also respects a Europe where 
the desire of citizens and States to pursue our futures together is always 
accompanied by a balancing wish to respect our individuality and dif-
ferences. 
Since these new policy processes started to be applied in the latter part 
of the 1990s, the momentum has been strong and accelerating. The 
processes now extend, not just across the employment field, but across 
social policies generally, including thorny issues like pension reform.
The momentum needs to be maintained. It is not enough for countries 
simply to shop for best practices. We need to dig deeper. To identify the 
root causes of success and failure in our economies and societies. To 
understand not only what works and does not work now, but the ways 
in which we can best meet new challenges in the future.
That is why the Employment in Europe report has been, and remains, 
so important for the development of employment policies. By promot-
ing rigorous analysis, and respect for evidence, it has discouraged 
governments from relying on pre-conceived notions or prejudice, and 
encouraged innovation. 
This year’s report is no exception in this respect. It investigates the link 
between employment specialisation and productivity. It assesses the 
real job creation needs that flow from the targets agreed at the Lisbon, 
Stockholm and Barcelona European Councils. It identifies the skills 
gaps that are emerging, not just from changing patterns of demand, 
but from the changing demographic composition of the workforce.
It reflects on the future nature of wage bargaining in an increasingly 
integrated and expanding Union. It considers success and failure in 
promoting more flexible work organisation and labour mobility. And 
looks into the consequences of adopting more up-to-date notions of job 
quality.
Last but not least, it considers the consequences of the ageing of the 
European workforce, and the extend to which immigration of foreign 
nationals can be seen as part of the policy response, or as a separate 
policy issue which needs to be addressed in its own terms.
This issue of Employment in Europe also provides, wherever possible, 
data and information about the future EU Members. The basic char-
acteristic of the labour market of the acceding countries is the lack of 
labour demand. In particular we should note the increase in the em-
ployment rate for women in contrast to the reduction of employment 
for men due to structural changes in the industrial sector.
Foreword by the Commissioner
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Foreword by the Commissioner
I strongly recommend this report to you. And I look forward to making 
maximum use of its findings to develop even stronger, and more effec-
tive, employment and social policies in the future.
Anna Diamantopoulou
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During 2002 Europe continued to feel the impact of the prolonged 
economic slowdown, with a lack of vigour in the economy exacerbated 
by geo-political tensions, continued low confidence and high oil prices. 
As a result, the EU economy ended 2002 on a very weak note, with this 
sluggishness continuing in the first half of 2003, but with a moderate 
recovery expected in the second part of the year. During the initial 
phase of the slowdown employment levels appeared fairly resilient, and 
the rise in unemployment remained quite limited, but the European 
labour market‘s resilience appears recently to have weakened some-
what. Recent data on the first quarter of 2003 suggest that employment 
has stagnated. The limited preliminary information available for the 
second quarter of 2003 is not conclusive but one cannot ecxclude that 
annual employment growth might turn out negative in particular if 
employment growth in the third and fourth quarters turns out to be 
negative. Nevertheless even under these difficult circumstances prog-
ress has continued towards meeting the employment targets set by the 
Lisbon, Stockholm and Barcelona Councils, albeit at a reduced pace 
compared to recent years. In contrast, due to strong domestic demand, 
the acceding countries and other candidate countries1 have, in general, 
experienced a more limited slowdown under the present economic cli-
mate, with growth slowing only moderately during 2002. Employment, 
though, declined in the acceding countries overall and for the candidate 
countries as a whole.
Against this background some important issues will be addressed in the 
following chapters. Chapter 1 provides a detailed overview of the situ-
ation in the European labour market, and in particular the impact of 
the current economic slowdown on employment. Chapter 2 examines 
the effects of employment specialisation on labour productivity growth. 
Chapter 3 reports on an initial approach to the analysis of wage for-
mation processes at various levels, concentrating firstly on analysing 
main determinants of earnings, pay and productivity and secondly 
on identifying major pay-related incentives and disincentives in Eu-
ropean labour markets. The following chapter addresses the issue of 
quality in work, considering new developments in the area of relevant 
indicators and examining longer-term transitions and labour market 
dynamics. Chapter 5 addresses the issue of employment and labour 
market participation of older workers, with a particular emphasis on 
the interactions between the Stockholm and Barcelona targets. Finally, 
chapter 6 discusses in some detail the potential that migration presents 
for European labour markets.
Introduction
1 The acceding countries group are Cyprus (CY), the Czech Republic (CZ), Estonia (EE), Hungary (HU), Malta (MT), Lithuania (LT), Latvia (LV), Poland (PL), Slovenia (SL) and Slovakia (SK).
Accession countries are Bulgaria (BG) and Romania (RO), and the group of candidate countries includes the previous 12 plus Turkey (TR).
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Executive summary
The main themes developed in this year‘s 
report: 
• productivity, skills and sectoral mobility
• wage structures and determinants in an 
enlarged Europe
• flexibility, security and quality in work
• ageing and the labour supply of older 
workers
• the contribution of immigration to la-
bour supply
Uncertainty about the timing of the eco-
nomic recovery persisted in 2003.
The resilience of the European labour mar-
ket appears to be weakening…
… with falling employment in some Mem-
ber States but still positive, although declin-
ing, growth in others.
The main reaction so far has been in 
productivity and in the reduction of hours 
worked, but the risk of a downturn in em-
ployment remains.
The resilience of the European labour mar-
ket to the weakness of economic activity 
concerns all sector. Employment growth in 
the services sector has continued although 
at a slower pace.
I. Employment issues for Europe
The new European Employment Strategy adopted by the Council in July pursues three overarch-
ing objectives: full employment; promotion of quality and productivity; and fostering cohesion 
and inclusive labour markets. This year’s report looks at several important issues of relevance 
to the new strategy. In the area of productivity, the relationship between productivity, skills, the 
sectoral composition of employment, and growth is examined. A separate chapter also presents 
evidence on the structure of wages across different sectors and the relationship to productivity. 
Quality in work is addressed in the context of labour market flexibility and dynamics. Finally, 
the ageing of the population and immigration are examined with regard to the implications for 
labour supply and employment.
II. Economic and employment context
During 2002 Europe continued to feel the impact of the prolonged economic slowdown, low 
confidence and the uncertainty about the timing and strength of the US recovery. As a result EU 
GDP growth averaged only around 1 % in 2002. The weakness of economic activity carried over 
to the first half of 2003, but growth is expected to resume moderately in the second half of the 
year and to accelerate in 2004. 
Between the first and the second half of 2002 EU employment growth declined from 0.5% to 
0.2%, and by the last quarter of 2002 had virtually reached a standstill. Meanwhile, by the first 
quarter of 2003 the unemployment rate had increased by 0.7 percentage points compared to its 
lowest leve reached in the second quarter of 2001, although, at 8.0 %, it was still lower than the 
levels observed over the second half of the 1990s. By July 2003 the unemployment rate for the EU 
had increased to 8.1 %.
The employment performance of the Member States in 2002 was somewhat mixed. In some em-
ployment growth had already become negative in the last quarter of 2001 while in several others 
it became so over the course of 2002. However, for most Member States average annual growth 
for 2002 still remained positive despite having slowed-down relative to 2001. 
EU employment has not declined under the current slowdown but may do so in the second 
quarter of 2003. The main adjustment has occurred in productivity and hours worked. For the 
EU as a whole there may not be much scope for containing the impact of the slowdown through 
further reductions in working hours if it continues. Also the decline in productivity growth can-
not continue unchecked for much longer. This raises the possibility of a more marked downward 
adjustment in employment levels in the course of 2003 unless a strong pick-up in the economy 
materialises soon.
The reaction of employment to the current economic slowdown has so far been more moderate 
than in the previous slowdown, reflecting a path of job creation and destruction different to that 
of the early 1990s. Smaller declines in employment have occurred so far in agriculture and indus-
try, while greater job creation has occurred in the services sector. This resilience has essentially 
been a consequence of the changes in the European labour market which occurred over the sec-
ond half of the 1990s, where the interaction between rising female and youth participation, the 
increasing educational level of the workforce and greater availability of new types of contracts 
facilitated the development of an employment-intensive macro-economic regime.
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Due to strong domestic demand the acceding countries have experienced a more limited economic 
slowdown than the EU, but despite this overall employment has continued to decline, essentially 
due to negative employment growth in Poland. Unemployment has declined over recent years for 
most of the acceding countries, except notably in Poland where the rate has risen to close to 20%. 
Similar to the EU, employment growth in the acceding countries as a whole is expected to stagnate 
in 2003, but should see a slight improvement in 2004 to around the 1% level.
Despite the weak economic growth, EU activity and employment rates have continued to increase, 
in particular for women, but at a much lower pace than in preceding years. In 2002 the overall 
employment rate rose by a modest 0.2 percentage points to 64.3%. This increase was driven by 
the rise in the female employment rate, which reached 55.6%, while the male employment rate 
declined slightly to 72.8%. The employment rate of older workers increased by about 1.4 percent-
age points to just above 40%, but still remains far below the 50% Stockholm target. Looking to the 
forthcoming enlargement, reaching the Lisbon employment target of 70% for an enlarged EU will 
require the creation of about 22 million jobs by 2010, equating to a net employment creation of 
around 3 million jobs per year. 
III. Productivity, skills and sectoral mobility
After 1995, the convergence of European productivity toward US levels reversed as productivity 
growth declined in the EU and accelerated in the US. The slowdown in EU productivity growth 
occurred in a period of strong job creation for high-skilled people, who should be more productive, 
while employment for the less skilled declined. 
The slowdown of EU productivity growth reflects a decline in productivity growth for all sectors, 
while in the US productivity growth was driven by strong gains in “Business sector services”. In the 
1980s and the first half of the 1990s, the change in the sectoral composition of employment helped 
Europe to catch up with US productivity levels. After 1995, further changes in the sectoral mix of 
employment avoided what would otherwise have been an even stronger decline of EU productivity 
growth relative to the US. 
There is evidence that the surge in US productivity growth over the second half of the 1990s was 
driven by strong improvements in ICT-using and ICT-producing sectors. In Europe productivity 
growth increased only in the ICT-producing sectors and to a lower degree than in the US. Produc-
tivity grew faster in Europe than in the US in ICT-producing services, in ICT-using manufacturing 
and in the non-ICT sectors, but much slower in the ICT-using services sector and consequently 
slower for the economy as a whole. The better performance of the US economy therefore suggests 
the importance of the diffusion of new technologies throughout the entire economy. 
The report shows that the distribution of skills in the entire economy can affect productivity 
growth. There is also evidence of advantages from concentration of high-skilled people in sectors 
characterised by intense patterns of innovation. Concentration of high-skilled people in such sec-
tors, in particular high-tech sectors, promotes productivity growth. Finally, the findings suggest 
that mobility across sectors of those with higher levels of education might benefit low- and me-
dium-skilled people. 
For both the existing Member States and the acceding countries, the main policy implications, 
are:
Technological progress is a process that makes old knowledge obsolete and requires the develop-
ment of new capabilities and new knowledge. Adaptability is a wide concept encompassing both 
real wages flexibility and flexible contractual arrangements as well as investment in knowledge 
and measures improving quality in work. They enhance the development of both formal and in-
formal skills and of workers’ adaptability. 
The employment situation in the acced-
ing countries as a whole has deterio-
rated, essentially due to developments in 
Poland. 
Progress towards the Lisbon and Stock-
holm employment rate targets requires 
stronger efforts, with employment rates 
for older workers requiring particular 
attention.
The European paradox: a slowdown in 
the EU productivity growth despite strong 
employment growth for skilled people. 
Sectoral productivity growth and 
structural change in employment help 
explain developments in productivity 
relative to the US.
The US experience points towards the im-
portance of diffusion of new technologies 
throughout the entire economy
Skills and sectoral mobility have a clear 
beneficial impact on productivity growth
Adaptability, wide diffusion of know-
ledge …
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Education and training policies that promote the wide diffusion of knowledge are important. 
For all skill groups, life-long learning becomes a central element of a strategy for productivity 
growth. The pervasiveness of knowledge is crucial to enhance and diffuse throughout the whole 
economy the use of new technologies and to prevent segmentation of the labour market between 
workers with different types of education. 
Sectoral mobility can also facilitate growth. Employment mobility across sectors can promote 
growth when it occurs for the highly educated or when it is associated with an upgrading of the 
knowledge base of the less well educated. With a stagnating working age population resulting 
from ageing and no significant pools of young, better educated people replacing older workers, 
reallocation of employment across sectors may require an increase in workers’ mobility between 
sectors.
IV. Improving productivity and wage structures 
Through their link with productivity, profits and consumption, labour costs and wages are key 
determinants of economic growth and overall employment performance. The new generation 
of Broad Economic Policy Guidelines and Employment Guidelines has highlighted the impor-
tance of wages, labour costs and productivity. One issue of particular importance is the role of 
non-wage labour costs, and notably of taxes and social security contributions, for employment 
performance and social cohesion. In particular the tax burden on low paid labour needs to be 
reduced to foster employment creation.
Non-wage labour costs are a crucial determinant of total labour costs. There is, however, no 
simple relation between the two, because the relative size of net wages, taxes and social security 
contributions differs significantly across countries. In fact, the two countries with the highest 
gross hourly labour costs in Europe – Sweden and Denmark – are respectively the countries with 
the highest and lowest share of non-wage labour costs. Hence, when interpreting variations in 
wage levels, differences in taxation structures and the financing of social security have to be 
taken into account.
Wage bargaining systems in current and future EU Member States allow wages to reflect produc-
tivity effectively taking into account differences in skills, but appear to do less so for local labour 
market conditions and in particular regional productivity and unemployment differences. In 
some Member States, wage growth has also been slow to adapt to productivity growth. There 
is further evidence of significant wage differentiation across skills, firms and industries, while 
wage differentiation across regions is much less pronounced. Given persistent unemployment 
disparities across regions wage bargaining systems should allow wages to reflect local labour 
market conditions.
In all EU countries, wages are generally higher among the high-skilled, and in high productivity 
industries and services. Wage structures in the acceding countries are similar, with the notable 
exception of the manufacturing sector where, in contrast to the EU, relative wages are signifi-
cantly below average. While generally more pronounced in the services sector, the extent of wage 
differentiation differs significantly across countries. In some cases, it seems that wage structures 
do not create appropriate incentives to attract people into economic activities that are key to 
productivity and economic growth such as research and business services. 
Productivity is not the only determinant of wages. Traditional seniority- and tenure-based pay 
schemes persist, indicative of internal labour markets that tend to offer long-term employment 
relationships and provide effective insurance against wage variations and employment risks. 
Furthermore, gender pay gaps which cannot be explained by differences in productivity persist 
in all EU labour markets. On the other hand, there is a considerable degree of flexibility in the 
way how European wage formation systems reflect differences in skills, but also factors as diverse 
as contract status, firm size, career interruptions, earnings risks and, although to a lesser extent, 
local labour market conditions.
… and sectoral mobility are important ele-
ments of a strategy for productivity growth
Further improvements in productivity and 
wage structures are key to increasing eco-
nomic growth.
 
In particular, the tax burden on low paid 
labour needs to be reduced to foster em-
ployment creation, but the relationship 
between non-wage labour costs and wages 
is complex.
Wage bargaining has reflected productiv-
ity developments, and there is evidence of 
significant wage differentiation across 
sectors and firms. Persisting high unem-
ployment disparities across regions indi-
cate that wage bargaining systems should 
reflect local labour market conditions. 
Nevertheless, wage structures may in some 
cases not create the right incentives for oc-
cupational choice or sectoral and regional 
mobility.
But productivity is not the only determi-
nant of wages: traditional seniority- and 
tenure-based pay schemes and gender 
gaps persist. Wages also reflect a variety of 
worker, job and firm characteristics.
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The extent to which these factors impact on remuneration levels differs considerably across the EU 
Member States. For example part-time or temporary work incurs strong wage reductions in some 
countries, most notably in the Netherlands. In other countries, notably France, Belgium and Aus-
tria, much lower, though still negative, wage effects on temporary employment go hand in hand 
with positive wage premia for part-time work.
There is little evidence of any effective compensation of employment risks by means of additional 
wage premia. Only in the UK do employment risks seem to be compensated for to some extent by 
higher wages. In other countries such as Denmark or Spain, no link can be established between 
wages and employment risks. This absence of any employment risk compensation mechanism 
could be explained either by high levels of social protection or by employment protection or both. 
Furthermore, in some Member States – notably France, Italy and Germany – there is evidence of 
quite strongly segregated labour markets, where those with the highest employment risk also face 
lower wages.
With the deepening of an enlarged single market and the EMU, there is a need for further labour 
market adjustments. Labour markets will have to increase their capacity to adapt and to manage 
structural change, including reforms of pay structures. Moving to more flexible labour markets 
could be facilitated by the further development of unemployment insurance systems and active 
labour market policies.
V. Flexibility, security and quality in work
Efforts to promote more flexible work organisation and facilitate labour mobility, both geographi-
cal and occupational, while taking into account the need for job security, is another key element 
of the Lisbon reform agenda. An appropriate balance between flexibility and security helps to 
support the competitiveness of firms, increase quality and productivity at work and facilitate the 
adaptation of firms and workers to economic change.
There is a wealth of flexible working arrangements in European labour markets, including 
contractual and working time arrangements. Many European employees work under temporary 
contracts or in part-time work. Many also work (unpaid) overtime or outside core hours. There is, 
furthermore, a considerable amount of movements between labour market states over time, both 
in the short- and long-term.
Up to a quarter of Europeans remain in jobs of relatively low quality. For some Member States, little 
or no significant changes in the dimensions of quality in work covered in the report can be found. 
And this is despite a relatively strong employment performance over the second half of the 1990s. 
In particular the share of low-skilled employees in comparatively low paying jobs continues to vary 
remarkably across EU Member States, ranging from less than 30% in the Netherlands, Finland and 
Italy to more than 50% in Germany.
On the other hand, there have been improvements in transition rates out of low quality employ-
ment in some Member States with quite favourable labour market transition patterns – notably 
Denmark, Ireland, Austria, Belgium and the Netherlands. While transition patterns also improved 
considerably in Spain and France, the overall career opportunities of people in low quality jobs in 
these countries remained largely below average. While persistence in low quality employment re-
mained highest in the UK, transition out of such work into unemployment was lower than in other 
Member States. Persistence in unemployment also remained strong in several Member States.
The balance between flexibility, on the one hand, and security, on the other - in combination with 
the need to improve the functioning of labour markets and quality in work - is a delicate one both 
for the existing and new Member States. Relatively high degrees of labour market flexibility seem 
to be consistent with major shares of employees in insecure employment relationships, as well as 
with high shares of employees in low paid, low productivity employment without access to train-
ing or career prospects.
Employees on part-time or temporary 
contracts face substantially lower wages, 
…
… and those employees at highest risk of 
losing their job incur significant wage 
penalties in some Member States, while 
social protection systems and active 
labour market policies compensate for 
employment risks. 
Necessary labour market adjustments 
could be facilitated by the further devel-
opment of unemployment insurance sys-
tems and active labour market policies.
The promotion of flexible work organisa-
tion and labour mobility, geographical 
and occupational, while taking into ac-
count the need for job security, is crucial.
There is a variety of flexible working 
arrangements, both in contractual and 
working time arrangements.
At the same time, many employees re-
main in low quality employment, with 
little evidence so far that quality in work 
improved over the second half of the 
1990s.
In some Member States quality dynam-
ics have clearly improved. In others, 
persistence in low quality employment or 
unemployment remains strong. 
The balance between flexibility and secu-
rity – in combination with the need to im-
prove the functioning of labour markets 
and quality in work – is a delicate one…
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Higher flexibility can improve quality in work and contribute to a better employment performance. 
Training, career development opportunities and other quality elements such as working time flex-
ibility and job security are for many people key inducements to take up work and to stay in the 
labour market. Low wage employment, less regulation and more flexible work organisation – such 
as greater opportunities for part-time work and flexible working hours – can make it easier both for 
people to join the labour force and for firms to take them on.
Active labour market policies with a view to strengthening transitional labour markets – unemploy-
ment insurance systems and investment in human capital in particular – are ways to compensate 
for increasing employment instability. Given the synergies between quality in work and overall 
employment performance, measures are needed to increase job creation and improve quality in 
work, while retaining an appropriate balance between flexibility and security. Social dialogue and 
worker involvement play an important role in this respect, notably for improving quality in work and 
productivity of low quality jobs.
VI. Ageing and the labour supply of older workers
The population of the EU is ageing rapidly. Employment among older workers (those aged 55-64) 
is low and many withdraw from the labour force at relatively early ages. With the baby-boomer 
generation reaching retirement age, the number of workers leaving the labour force and going into 
retirement will increase markedly over the coming years. This, together with low fertility rates and 
increasing life-expectancy, will negatively affect the ability to finance pension and health care sys-
tems. These developments also put increasing pressure on those in employment to be more produc-
tive in order to ensure rising living standards for the whole population.
In a context where people live for 20 years after withdrawing from active life, increasing participa-
tion and employment will become crucial. The EU has therefore set itself two important objectives to 
be achieved by 2010: To increase the employment rate of older workers to 50% (Stockholm target) 
and to delay by five years the age at which older workers stop working (Barcelona target). In 2002 
the employment rate for older workers in the EU15 stood at 40%, while in 2001 the average exit age 
from the labour force was 59.9 years.
Meeting the Stockholm target for the EU15 would require an increase in employment of those in the 
55-64 age group by 7 million between 2002 and 2010 (900,000 a year). It is thus crucial that those 
in the age group 55-64 in 2010 are retained in employment and do not retire early in the meantime. 
Although 2002 showed a marked improvement in employment for older workers, between 1997 and 
2001 the EU only managed a rate of about 250,000 a year. Nevertheless, this shows that it is possible 
to progress towards the ambitious 50% target and should encourage greater efforts, particularly from 
those Member States which are lagging behind.
The employment rates for older workers in acceding countries (30% on average) are generally much 
lower than in existing Member States (40%). Moreover, disparities in the employment rates between 
high- (56%) and low-skilled older workers (19%) are stark. Older workers in acceding countries also 
withdraw earlier from the labour force than in most of the existing EU Member States. Since labour 
force participation continues to decline their average exit age from the labour force is likely to fall 
further.
The employment rate for high-skilled older workers (61%) is twice that for the low-skilled (31%). 
Low-skilled workers leave the labour force earlier (some three years on average) than their high-
skilled counterparts. At EU level, the average exit age for the high-skilled was 62.3 years in 2001, 
compared to 58.7 years for low-skilled workers. This is due not to a shorter, more compressed employ-
ment career for the low-skilled but rather to a working life that starts a few years earlier than for the 
high-skilled.
Older workers today are not concentrated in declining sectors. Indeed, they are over-represented in 
knowledge intensive-sectors such as education. Moreover, sectoral employment growth for young 
…but quality in work and flexibility 
can mutually reinforce each other and 
induce employers to create jobs and 
employees to fill them and stay in the 
labour market.
Both government and social partners 
need to strengthen transitional labour 
markets in order to compensate for in-
creases in flexibility and employment 
instability.
Population ageing, low employment 
rates for older workers and early 
withdrawals from the labour force 
place an increasing burden on social 
protection systems.
As life expectancy increases, the EU 
acts to increase employment of older 
workers and encourage them to stay 
longer in the labour force.
Reaching the Stockholm and Barcelo-
na targets will require greater efforts.
The employment rates for older work-
ers in acceding countries are generally 
lower than in the EU.
The low-skilled start working life ear-
lier and withdraw from the labour 
force sooner
Older workers are not concentrated 
in declining sectors and complement, 
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and older workers moves in the same direction, which suggests that they are not employment substi-
tutes for one another but rather complement each other.
Firstly, work-related health problems increase with age. Musculo-skeletal disorders mostly concern 
low-skilled occupations, whereas the incidence of stress-related health problems is more predomi-
nant for high-skilled, non-manual occupations. This underlines the importance of measures to 
improve working conditions and to pay more attention to health and safety in the workplace.
Secondly, the increase in employment of older workers in recent years is related to the higher inci-
dence of part-time work. At the EU level, half the employment creation for older workers is accounted 
for by increases in part-time employment, which now represents about 22% of their total employ-
ment. This indicates that promoting more flexible working time arrangements may be a way of 
achieving good a balance between work and private life in line with the needs of older people. 
Thirdly, older workers receive significantly less training than prime-age workers, particularly so if 
they are low-skilled. This is partly because employers assume that they will not be in the labour force 
long enough to benefit from expected productivity increases. There is, however, a positive relation-
ship between older workers staying longer in the labour force and the provision of training. This 
implies that measures to increase training for older workers as well as to keep them in the labour 
force longer and measures on early retirement would need to go hand-in-hand.
VII. The contribution of immigration
to increases in labour supply
Over the last two decades, immigration of foreign nationals into the EU area has increased steadily, 
reaching an absolute annual level of immigration higher than that of the US. In Northern Europe 
the main reason for immigration is the re-uniting of families, while in the south it is the search for 
employment. There are important differences in the proportion of immigrants in EU Member States. 
A significant number of them are likely to be undeclared, as indicated by the numerous legalisation 
operations carried out by Member States. 
In 2002, the employment rate of non-EU nationals was about 14 percentage points lower than that for 
EU nationals (10 percentage points for men and 17 percent points for women). The gap was wider for 
prime-age workers than for the young and the older workers. The unemployment rate of non-EU na-
tionals was more than twice the rate for EU nationals. Non-EU nationals, particularly women, are also 
at a disadvantage in terms of wages. The whole distribution of migrant workers tends to be skewed 
towards low skills, which may help explain the over-representation of migrants in some sectors.
The relative situation of non-EU nationals has not improved after the deterioration experienced in 
the 1993/94 recession. It worsened even further for older and low-skilled workers. Migrant women 
are also lagging behind in terms of labour market integration, except in Southern Europe. While the 
high-skilled migrants reduced their employment gap with respect to EU nationals, it nevertheless 
remains higher than for any other educational group. The high percentage of early school leavers 
among non-EU nationals (35.1% versus 16.7% for young EU-nationals) is of particular concern as it 
hampers their adaptability to structural change and the integration of future non-EU national work-
ers.
The integration of non-EU nationals into the European labour market varies widely depending on 
the host country and the country of origin. On average, it is far from satisfactory. The Thessaloniki 
European Council stressed the need to explore legal means for third-country nationals to migrate to 
the Union, taking into account the reception capacity of the Member States, within the framework of 
an enhanced co-operation with the countries of origin that would prove beneficial for both sides. It 
also called for an accurate and objective analysis of these issues, to help develop and promote policy 
initiatives for more effective management of migration in Europe. These initiatives will contribute to 
promoting the integration of established migrants.
rather than substitute for, younger 
workers.
Promoting active ageing and elimi-
nating incentives for early exit from 
the labour market and early retire-
ment, are key dimensions. 
Better work-related health conditions, 
flexible working time arrangements,
training for older workers needs to be 
promoted.
EU immigration flows are becoming 
higher than in the US, with significant 
differences between Member States.
However, the integration of non-EU 
nationals into the labour market is 
unsatisfactory.
Over time, the relative position of non-
EU nationals has not improved.
There is a need for comprehensive in-
tegration policies and a forward-look-
ing approach to immigration.
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Chapter 1 Panorama of the European labour markets
Introduction
This chapter provides a detailed overview of 
recent developments in the European labour 
market and compares this with developments 
for certain other economic partners. The 
impact of the current economic slowdown 
on employment is reviewed and the reasons 
for the resilience experienced so far in the 
EU labour market are looked at in detail. The 
chapter also presents a review of sectoral 
employment trends, and in particular the 
variation across sectors in the creation or loss 
of employment over recent years. 
Recent labour market 
performance
While 2002 saw a continued decline in GDP 
growth in the EU (down to just above 1% in 
2002 from 1.6% in 2001), the US experienced 
a moderate recovery to around 2.5% growth 
(compared to 0.3% the year before). Despite 
the international economic slowdown and 
the weakness in the EU economy, strong 
domestic demand helped the acceding coun-
tries grow by 2.3% on average in 2002, down 
only marginally on 2001 (table 1). The situ-
ation for the candidate countries as a whole 
(including Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey) 
was also more positive, with growth for 2002 
being at a level of over 4%.
The EU economy ended 2002 on a very weak 
note. Although during the initial stage of the 
current economic slowdown EU employment 
remained quite resilient, with only a limited 
rise in the unemployment rate (up to 7.7% in 
2002 from 7.4% a year earlier), the situation 
weakened during the latter part of 2002. The 
initial resilience, which was due to such fac-
tors as the large share of employment in the 
relatively stable services sector and greater 
possibilities to reduce working hours rather 
than employment thanks to more flexible 
contracts, has diminished. This combined 
with expectations of only modest job creation 
and more sizeable rises in the labour force are 
expected to lead to further rises in unemploy-
ment. The Commission’s Spring Economic 
Forecasts foresees the annual unemployment 
rate to reach 8.0% in 2003. 
Nevertheless, for 2002 as a whole employ-
ment in the EU is estimated to have grown, 
albeit by a modest 0.4%, which is equivalent 
to a net employment increase of just over 0.6 
million jobs, after growing by 1.2% in 2001. 
Net job creation continued in several Member 
States despite the prolonged slowdown in 
economic activity. 
By contrast, and despite a moderate recovery 
in GDP growth, the US saw net employment 
continue to fall in 2002 (down by around 
0.6%, following on from the decline of the 
year before) and unemployment continue to 
rise, averaging 5.8% for the year as a whole. 
Meanwhile the situation in Japan deteriorated 
further with continued employment losses 
(charts 1 and 2). Despite the resilience of 
the acceding countries’ GDP growth, average 
employment declined by around 1.2% during 
2002. In line with this, average unemploy-
ment levels, already noticeably higher than 
for the EU, increased to just under 15% for the 
Chapter 1 Panorama of the European labour markets
Table 1 – International Comparison of Key Indicators (2002)
EU15 Acceding Countries EU25 USA Japan
 Population
(millions) 378.5 74.5 453 281 127
GDP
(in 1000 million PPS current prices) 9161 830 9991 9654 3174
GDP Growth at constant prices
(annual % change) 1.0 2.3 1.1 2.5 0.2
Employment Rate
(as % of working age population) 64.3 55.9 62.9 71.9 68.2
Employment  Growth
(annual % change) 0.4 -1.2 0.2 -0.6 -1.2
Unemploymend Rate
(as % of civilian labour force) 7.7 14.8 8.9 5.8 5.4
Source: GDP and employment growth frorn AMECO database, Commission Services. Employment rate based on an-
nual averages of LFS, Eurostat. Unemployrnent rate from the harmonised unemployrnent series, Eurostat. Population 
from demographic statistics, Eurostat.
Note: US ernployment rate refers to persons aged 16 to 64
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acceding countries as a whole, essentially due 
to the increase in unemployment in Poland.
The slowdown in EU employment growth, 
which began in the first half of 2001, con-
tinued into 2002. By the last quarter of 2002, 
the average annual growth in employment 
for the EU as a whole had virtually reached 
a standstill (table 2). Looking at develop-
ments at Member State level, employment 
contraction has been a feature of the labour 
markets in Germany since the last quarter of 
2001, in Austria and Denmark since the first 
quarter of 2002, and in Belgium, Finland, 
Portugal and Sweden since the latter half of 
2002. Employment growth stagnated in the 
UK over 2002. In nearly all the remaining 
Member States employment growth gener-
ally declined over 2001 and 2002 but still 
remained positive.
As a consequence of these developments, the 
employment growth for the year as a whole 
compared to 2001 has been somewhat mixed 
across Member States (chart 3). Most coun-
tries saw positive employment growth but 
at rates much below those of recent years. 
However, annual rates did remain above the 
1% level for Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg and 
Spain. On the other hand, annual growth 
rates in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany 
and Greece all became negative in 2002. For 
the acceding countries, only the Czech Repub-
lic, Estonia and Latvia saw noticeable positive 
employment growth, while the growth rate 
for Poland was markedly negative at around 
minus 3% (chart 4).
Table 2 – Annual  change  in  employment growth,  by quarter
2000ql 2000q2 2000q3 2000q4 2001ql 2001q2 2001q3 2001q4 2002ql 2002q2 2002q3 2002q4
B 1.6 1.8 2.1 2.0 1.9 1.8 1.4 0.7 0.1 0.0 -0.4 -0.5
DK 0.5 1.4 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.5 0.4 0.5 -0.8 -0.1 -0.7 -1.3
D 1.7 2.3 1.7 1.5 1.0 0.6 0.2 -0.1 -0.2 -0.5 -0.7 -0.9
EL -1.7 -0.4 0.4 1.1 0.7 0.3 -0.5 -1.9 -1.6 -0.5 0.0 1.3
E 2.9 3.5 3.6 3.6 3.6 2.3 1.9 1.8 1.3 1.5 1.3 1.0
F 2.4 2.6 2.7 2.6 2.3 1.9 1.5 1.2 1.1 0.9 0.8 0.7
IRL 6.1 4.9 4.0 3. 8 3.6 2.7 2. 8 2.5 2.1 1.9 0.5 1.0
I 1.1 1.5 2.2 2. 8 2.5 2.0 1.7 1.4 1.9 1.5 1.1 0.9
L 5.6 5.4 5.4 6.2 6.1 5.9 5.6 4.8 4.1 3.4 2.7 2.4
NL 2.1 2.3 2.3 2.2 2.2 1.9 1.8 1.7 1.2 0.9 0.7 0.5
A 1.2 1.1 0.0 0.7 0.6 0.5 1.0 0.4 -0.3 -0.4 -0.4 -0.5
P i.e i.a 2.2 2.3 1.9 1.4 1.1 1.2 0.5 0.9 0.5 -1.2
FIN 2.1 2.1 2.6 2.3 1.0 1.2 0.6 1.3 0.9 0.3 0.3 -0.2
S 2.1 2.6 2.3 2. 8 3.0 1.7 2.0 1.0 0.4 0.3 0.1 -0.1
UK 1.5 1.2 0.7 1.0 0.8 0.8 0.6 0.3 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.1
EU15 1.7 2.0 1.9 2.0 1.8 1.4 1.0 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.3 0.1
Source: Eurostat, QLFD
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Within the EU, the fall in the EU unemploy-
ment rate which began in the late 1990s 
bottomed out in the second quarter of 2001 at 
7.3% (chart 5). There then followed a period 
of moderate quarterly increases which saw 
unemployment climb to 8% by the first 
quarter of 2003, with Luxembourg and the 
Netherlands having the lowest unemploy-
ment rates (below 4%) at that time and Spain 
the highest (11.4%). In June 2003 the EU un-
employment rate stood at 8.1%. While the EU 
saw only moderate rises in unemployment, 
the US experienced a sharper adjustment 
from its low of 3.9% in the fourth quarter of 
2000 so that by the second quarter of 2002 the 
unemployment rate had reached 5.9%, where 
it then stabilised for the rest of 2002. Despite 
this development, the US unemployment rate 
still remains some 2 percentage points lower 
than that for the EU. In Japan, unemployment 
levelled off to a degree in 2002 following the 
rising trend of recent years, to stabilise at 
around 5.4%.
As foreseen by the Commission‘s Spring 
Economic Forecasts sluggishness in the EU 
economy continued in the first half of 2003. 
Recent indicators suggest disappointing 
GDP growth, at a rate lower than the 1.3 % 
foreseen by the spring forecasts. The delay in 
the arrival of the recovery will now shift the 
expected rebound of economic activity to the 
year 2004. The Spring Economic Forecasts 
expected a better situation in the acceding 
countries. For these countries as a whole GDP 
growth for 2003 is expected to be 3.1%, and to 
rise to 4.0% in 2004.
With the continued weakness in the economy, 
employment in the EU is not expected to grow 
in 2003, although it is forecast to increase by 
around 0.6% in 2004. For the accession coun-
tries employment growth is also expected to 
stagnate in 2003. However, a slight improve-
ment (growth of around 1%) is foreseen for 
2004, as employment losses due to enterprise 
restructuring are progressively compensated 
for by higher employment creation.
Against the background of these recent de-
velopments in labour market performance 
in Europe, a new, more operational European 
Employment Strategy has recently been ad-
opted to confront the new challenges arising 
from developments such as enlargement, 
faster economic change and ageing popula-
tions (box 1). 
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Labour market adjustments to 
the recent slowdown and the 
resilience of EU employment.
The EU and US have shown variations in the 
speed of their labour market adjustments to 
the recent economic slowdown (chart 6). 
In the US employment growth reacted in 
close synchrony with the slowdown in GDP 
growth, declining from the third quarter of 
2000 onwards and becoming negative from 
the last quarter of 2001 until the second 
quarter of 2002. It resumed only at the end 
of 2002. EU employment growth initially re-
mained quite stable following the slowdown, 
and only began to decline in the first quarter 
of 2001 onwards, and at a much more gradual 
rate than in the US.
Comparing the current slowdown with that 
of the late 1980s/early 1990s, the reaction of 
EU employment now appears more rapid in 
terms of time but more moderate in terms of 
magnitude (chart 7). 
Looking at employment behaviour between 
cyclical peaks and cyclical troughs - the 
timings of which are determined from the 
extremes in the output gap - it appears that 
employment continued to grow during the 
recent cyclical downturn (chart 8). This oc-
curred despite a decline in GDP growth for 
the first two years following the peak that 
was even stronger than that over the same 
period in the early 1990s (chart 9). Looking at 
sectoral developments, there is a significant 
difference between the two comparison peri-
ods with regard to the employment changes 
experienced across all sectors. There have 
been far fewer job losses in agriculture and 
industry during the current downturn than 
in the downturn of the early 1990s. In addi-
tion, the services sector has created far more 
jobs during the current slowdown than it did 
during that of the early 1990s (chart 10).
Contrary to the experience of the early 1990s, 
the EU unemployment rate continued to 
decline for about four quarters following 
the peak in growth of the second quarter of 
2000. Even though it then increased moder-
ately over the following quarters, only by the 
first quarter of 2003 had it reached the same 
level as that at the peak of the expansion 
(chart 11).
Box 1– The new European Employment Strategy and the 
streamlining of the policy coordination processes 
Following a review in 2002 of the first five years of the European Employment Strategy 
(EES), the European Commission adopted the outline of a revised EES in January 2003 
to confront new challenges such as faster economic change, ageing populations and 
enlargement. In April 2003 the Commission made a formal proposal for new employ-
ment guidelines and recommendations. These new employment guidelines and recom-
mendations were finalised and formally agreed by the Council in July, on the basis of the 
Commission’s proposal, following their endorsement at the 2003 Thessaloniki European 
Council.2
The new EES pursues three overarching objectives: 
• full employment, including meeting the Lisbon and Stockholm employment tar-
gets;
• the promotion of quality and productivity at work, reflecting the need for better jobs 
in a knowledge-based economy and the need to promote EU competitiveness; and
• the fostering of cohesion and inclusive labour markets, by reducing social and re-
gional disparities in relation to employment.
The new employment guidelines consist of a more concentrated set of priorities which 
follow the objectives of: active and preventative measures for the unemployed and inac-
tive; making work pay; fostering job creation and entrepreneurship; combating unde-
clared work; increasing labour supply and promoting active ageing; promoting adapt-
ability and mobility in the labour market; investment in human capital and lifelong 
learning; gender equality; supporting integration and combating discrimination in the 
labour market for people at a disadvantage; and helping address regional employment 
disparities. These are often supported by quantified targets.
Responding to the Barcelona Summit’s request for simpler and more effective guidelines, 
and the need to streamline EU policy coordination processes, the new guidelines cover 
a specific timeframe (2003-2010) and should remain stable until a mid-term review in 
2006. More emphasis is now put on the results to be achieved and monitoring the imple-
mentation of the guidelines by Member States, as well as streamlining of the EES with 
other EU policy coordination processes such as the broad economic policy guidelines. 
Governance of the strategy will be improved through more effective service delivery, 
strong involvement of social partners and civil society, mobilisation of all relevant actors 
and adequate financial support. 
2 Further information can be found on the DG Employment and Social Affairs website at http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment_
social/employment_strategy.
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The previous results indicate that employ-
ment now reacts less than in the past to 
weakness in economic activity but is more 
synchronised with it. A better understanding 
of the reasons for the current resilience can 
be gained by looking at some fundamental 
changes that took place in the second half 
of the 1990s and which affected the mecha-
nisms linking employment and participation 
with the economic cycle. These changes, 
which appear to have modified the trend 
component of employment, were:
• Increasing female participation 
 Between 1995 and 2001 female par-
ticipation rose by about 3.6 percentage 
points (from 56.6% to 60.2%) against 
an increase in the male rate of only 0.4 
percentage points (from 77.8% to 78.3%). 
The increase in female participation not 
only created the conditions to meet the 
labour demand during the growth phase 
of the economic cycle, but also increased 
employment as work traditionally done 
inside the home by women was trans-
formed into paid employment. 
• Increasing skills levels and youth partici-
pation
 The change in the skills structure of the 
working age population also contributed 
to the increase in employment and par-
ticipation rates. From 1995 to 2001 the 
share of low-skilled people in the work-
ing age population declined from 46% 
to 39% while that of the medium- and 
high-skilled rose from 38% to 43% and 
from 15% to 19% respectively. As shown 
in Employment in Europe 2002, the 
shift towards a more educated labour 
force drove up the employment rate, with 
rising skill levels contributing to a more 
employable and adaptable workforce. 
 The increase in both the level of educa-
tion and the participation of young peo-
ple (aged 15-24) was influenced by easier 
access to part-time jobs, and from 1997 
the activity rate for young workers began 
to rise. Between 1995 and 2001 the share 
of those employed part-time rose from 
19% to 23%. The share of young people 
who completed tertiary education (high-
skilled) also increased over time. The 
easier access to part-time jobs allowed 
them to combine work with education or 
training, resulting in more young people 
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joining the labour force without dropping 
out of education. 
• Extended use of new contractual ar-
rangements (part-time and fixed-term 
contracts)
 About 30% of the total employment 
growth over the period 1995-2001 was ac-
counted for by the increase in the number 
of fixed-term contracts. The increase in 
part-time jobs, mostly taken by women, 
represents more than 40% of all jobs cre-
ated in the same period. The availability 
of more flexible working hours arrange-
ments, that allowed a better balance 
between family life and working time, led 
to an increase in participation.
Altogether, the interaction between increas-
ing participation, a change in the skills and 
gender composition of the working age 
population and greater availability of new 
types of contracts facilitated the development 
of an employment-intensive macro-economic 
regime, which was also supported by more 
employment-friendly wage setting by the 
social partners and cuts in non-wage labour 
costs.
The employment behaviour observed at the 
current economic juncture could be seen as 
reflecting a combination of a still increasing 
trend, which reflects permanent or long-term 
changes in employment levels, and a falling 
cyclical component in employment. The 
structural changes which occurred in the 
labour market in the 1990s affected the long-
term employment trend, which, as shown in 
chart 12, is at least for the moment still grow-
ing at around the 1% level, despite the more 
marked current decline in actual employment 
growth. 
Notwithstanding the until now moderate 
reaction of the EU labour market to the world-
wide economic downturn, there are signs of 
an increase in the public’s perceptions of the 
risk of a deterioration in the employment 
situation. Apart from the effects of geo-politi-
cal uncertainties and of the falls in the stock 
markets, this worsening of perceptions may 
be partly due to the recent evolution of layoff 
announcements (box 2) and the reduced 
confidence arising from uncertainties in fu-
ture employment stability. Public confidence 
might also reflect a fundamental uncertainty 
that may have arisen out of labour market 
changes of the 1990s, which by increas-
ing labour market responsiveness may, as 
a result, have reduced public perceptions of 
employment and income protection. The 
deterioration in consumers’ unemployment 
expectations could anticipate a major nega-
tive response in employment in the forthcom-
ing quarters.
Looking at the recent development of key 
employment-related indicators (table 3), it is 
clear in terms of average annual growth rates 
that the reaction of the labour market during 
the current slowdown has been quite different 
to that in the 1991-1993 period. In the earlier 
slowdown there was a major adjustment in 
employment as well as a reduction in average 
hours worked, while productivity increased. 
During the present slowdown employment 
has not declined, although the rate of growth 
has slowed, and the main reaction has been 
in productivity and in an acceleration in the 
reduction of average working hours com-
pared to the immediately preceding period 
of economic expansion (1996-2000). For the 
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EU as a whole there may not be much scope 
for containing the impact of the slowdown 
through further reductions in working hours 
if it continues, and the decline in productivity 
growth cannot continue unchecked for much 
longer. This raises the possibility of a down-
ward adjustment in employment levels over 
the coming months unless the slowdown 
comes to an end soon and the long-awaited 
pick-up in the economy strongly materialises.
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Table 3 – Average annual growth rates in 
employment related indicators
(in % terms)
1991–
1993
1996–
2000
2000–
2002
Employment -1.42 1.59 0.84
Av. Annual Hours Worked -0.57 -0.37 -0.52
GDP 0.44 2.96 1.36
GDP/Employed person 2.05 1.40 0.58
GDP/Hour worked 2.49 1.75 1.02
Source: DG EMPL calculations based on data from 
AMECO database, Commission Services and Eurostat
Box 2 – Evolution of layoff announcements
The recent evolution in layoff announce-
ments (affecting European workers) by 
major companies (chart 13) indicates 
that total layoffs announced in Western 
Europe over the course of 2002 were not 
much down on the total for 2001 (around 
497,000 compared to 588,000), with an-
nouncements peaking in October for both 
years. Although the number of job cut an-
nouncements in early 2003 are down on 
the levels of autumn 2002, recent patterns 
indicate that this is generally a quiet pe-
riod of the year for layoff announcements, 
which tend to occur more often between 
June and November. 
Looking at the sectoral composition of the 
layoff announcements that have occurred 
since the start of 2002, it is clear that the 
sectors that were the main drivers of em-
ployment creation between 1995 and 2001 
have experienced the greatest number of 
announcements (table 4). This is especially the case for the finance 
and high technology and telecommunications sectors, which have 
been hit particularly hard during the current slowdown. In fact, 
these two sectors have continued to experience sizeable job cuts 
announcements into 2003, while most other sectors have shown 
a generally reduced level of announcements compared to those in 
2002. The “Transport” and “Leisure” sector and the “Metals and 
other manufacturing” sectors have also experienced sizeable recent 
layoff announcements, although the former seems most likely to 
have been a result of the impact on this sector of the Iraq war and 
the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) outbreak. 
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Table 4 – Sectoral composition of layoff announcements in Western Europe, thousands (2002 & early 2003)
Finance Tech/telco Media
Chemi-
cal/
pharma
Constrn. Metalsinc. steel Vehicles
Other 
manufac-
turing
Retail Utilities Energy Transport/leisure
Jan 02 3.1 7.9 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 7.3 2.8 1.6 1.0 4.4 1.1
Feb 4.8 5.9 0.3 5.8 2.5 1.8 4.3 3.3 0.0 3.5 1.3 5.8
Mar 2.2 6.7 2.1 0.9 0.4 0.0 3.0 1.9 2.0 12.2 0.0 0.0
April 8.7 21.5 1.4 0.5 1.6 0.0 1.7 2.1 0.0 0.0 0.4 1.3
May 2.8 29.9 3.2 2.5 3.7 0.0 3.0 2.1 1.0 3.2 0.0 1.4
June 7.8 14.9 1.2 0.2 0.0 0.8 3.7 4.7 0.0 24.0 0.0 0.0
Jul 3.9 11.8 1.3 1.2 0.0 1.4 0.1 2.0 0.0 0.0 2.1 1.2
Aug 5.7 11.0 0.6 5.1 0.0 0.9 1.1 2.7 2.0 0.0 0.0 0.3
Sep 12.4 20.7 1.8 4.4 0.0 0.4 3.5 3.4 0.2 2.3 1.5 0.0
Oct 21.7 18.4 0.9 0.5 0.4 2.1 10.2 13.8 0.4 2.7 0.1 0.5
Nov 5.4 30.9 1.0 4.5 0.0 0.0 6.1 4.2 0.3 0.4 0.1 2.3
Dec 5.1 3.7 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 4.3 0.0 0.5 0.4 0.0
Jan 03 8.3 3.3 0.8 0.2 0.7 8.4 0.2 9.5 2.2 3.2 0.4 1.0
Feb 9.2 4.1 0.3 4.2 0.0 0.0 1.1 1.9 0.5 0.4 0.0 2.3
Mar 10.0 1.7 0.2 2.2 0.4 3.2 2.9 3.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.4
April 2.7 19.8 0.0 1.2 0.1 0.8 0.0 4.3 0.3 0.9 0.0 7.8
May 2.7 9.1 0.0 1.7 0.6 0.1 0.7 1.1 0.1 3.3 0.0 0.3
Total 116.4 221.5 15.3 35.1 10.4 19.9 49.7 67.5 10.4 57.7 10.5 26.6
Source: CSFB based on media reports
In line with the continuing high level of layoff announcements 
and the experience of the last few years in this regard, consum-
ers’ unemployment expectations for the months ahead (chart 
14) remain high, with the associated index having returned to an 
upward trend following a slight decline over the first half of 2002. 
Meanwhile consumer confidence trailed off again from the middle 
of 2002 and remains very subdued (chart 15), raising concerns 
over both the timing and the strength of the awaited recovery.
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Unemployment
The average unemployment rate for 2002 as 
a whole was 7.7%, up from 7.4% one year ear-
lier and still some 2 percentage points higher 
than for the US and Japan. An increase in the 
annual unemployment rate occurred in all 
Member States except Finland and Sweden, 
where the rate remained unchanged from 
the year before, and Greece and Italy, where 
the rates actually declined slightly. Despite the 
progress of the immediately preceding years, 
unemployment rates remain particularly 
high in Finland, Greece, Italy and Spain, and 
especially so for women in the latter three 
countries (chart 16).
Unemployment levels in the acceding coun-
tries as a whole, already noticeably higher 
than for the EU, increased slightly to just 
under 15%. Unemployment rates remain 
particularly high in the three Baltic States, 
and especially so in Poland and the Slovak 
Republic where the rates are close to the 20% 
level. For the acceding countries as a whole, 
the rise in the average unemployment rate 
in 2002 was essentially due to the increase 
in unemployment in Poland (which accounts 
for some 52% of the working age population 
of all the acceding countries), where the rate 
rose by 1.4 percentage points. Indeed, almost 
all the other acceding countries either saw no 
change or, more commonly, a decline in the 
unemployment rate compared to one year 
earlier. 
Within the EU, the disparity in the average 
unemployment rate according to gender, 
although still significant, was slightly lower 
in 2002 than in 2001. The unemployment 
rate for men was 6.9% and for women 8.7% 
in 2002, compared to 6.5% and 8.6% respec-
tively in 2001, reflecting the greater impact 
of the current economic slowdown on male 
unemployment. A higher unemployment 
rate for women is found in all Member States 
except Finland, Germany, Ireland, Sweden 
and the UK. For the acceding countries as 
a whole, the gender disparity in 2002 was 
slightly lower than in the EU with unemploy-
ment rates standing at 14.2% for males and 
15.6% for females.
At just over 15%, youth unemployment in 
the EU remains around twice as high as the 
overall unemployment rate (chart 17) and is 
particularly high, at 20% or more, in Finland, 
France, Greece, Italy and Spain. While the 
overall EU unemployment rate increased by 
0.3 of a percentage point in 2002, the male 
youth unemployment rate increased by 
a whole percentage point compared to the 
previous year, although it remained fairly 
stable for young women. Indeed, between 
the second quarter of 2001 (when overall EU 
unemployment bottomed out) and the last 
quarter of 2002 male youth unemployment 
rose in all Member States except Greece, Italy 
and Luxembourg (chart 18). The increase 
was particularly strong (over 2 percentage 
points) in Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Ger-
many, Ireland, Portugal and Spain. For young 
women the picture was more mixed with the 
rate increasing particularly strongly in Lux-
embourg, Portugal and Sweden, and declin-
ing strongly in Denmark and Greece.
In the acceding countries the youth unem-
ployment rate of about 32% is around twice 
as high as in the EU15. Similar to the situa-
tion in the EU, the unemployment rate for 
youth is around twice as high as the overall 
unemployment rate, and ranges from about 
10% in Cyprus to as high as 42% in Poland. 
While overall there is little difference between 
male and female youth unemployment rates, 
there is quite a noticeable gap in certain ac-
ceding countries, notably Estonia and Latvia, 
although it is still less pronounced than in 
some existing Member States.
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Long-term unemployment affected around 
3% of the EU labour force in 2002, being 
marginally down on the year before. Within 
the EU15 it remains most common in Greece 
and Italy, where more than 5% of the labour 
force is affected (chart 19). These two Mem-
ber States, along with Spain, also have the 
greatest disparity between genders. For the 
EU as a whole, long-term unemployment 
rates are higher for women than for men, 
although in Finland, Ireland, Sweden and 
the UK the opposite applies. Within the ac-
ceding countries, long-term unemployment 
(at 8.1%) is almost three times the level in 
the EU15, and rose by 0.6 percentage points 
between 2001 and 2002. Almost half of the 
acceding countries have rates over 5%, with 
the highest being those for Poland (11%) and 
Slovakia (12%). For the group of acceding 
countries as a whole the gender disparity in 
long-term unemployment is slightly greater 
than that for the EU, although once again it 
is still less pronounced than in some existing 
Member States.
At the EU level, long-term unemployment has 
declined gradually from its peak level of 5.0% 
in 1994. The marginal improvement between 
2001 and 2002 reflects mixed developments 
at Member State level, with the rate rising 
slightly in Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg 
and Portugal and either declining (most 
noticeably in Italy) or holding stable in the 
remaining Member States. Several countries 
have seen long-term unemployment rates 
stabilise at around the 1% level over recent 
years. On the other hand, Greece, Italy and 
Spain have relatively high rates but these are 
declining fairly rapidly towards the EU aver-
age. For example, between 1998 and 2002 
Spain halved its long-term unemployment 
rate to just below the 4% level, while in Italy it 
decreased from 7.0% to 5.3%.
In the group of acceding countries, unlike 
in the EU, long-term unemployment has 
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increased substantially over recent years, ris-
ing from 6.5% in 2000 to 8.1% in 2002. The 
largest rises were seen in Poland (up from 
7.5% to 10.9%) and Slovakia (up from 10.1% 
to 12.1%), although by contrast rates have 
declined in the other acceding countries over 
this period. 
Activity rates
The activity rate for the EU has continued to 
increase slightly despite the recent economic 
slowdown. In 2002 the activity rate for the EU 
as a whole stood at just under 70%, up half 
a percentage point on one year earlier, and 
with the rates for individual Member States 
ranging from as low as 61% in Italy to as high 
as almost 80% in Denmark (chart 20). The 
difference between the activity rates for men 
(78.4%) and women (60.9%) stood at some 
17.5 percentage points. However, while activ-
ity rates for men have remained rather stable 
over the last decade (generally in a range 
between 78-79%) those for women continue 
to follow a rising trend (chart 21). Hence, 
while male activity rates remained essentially 
unchanged from last year, those for women 
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rose by 0.7 percentage points, and have risen 
some 5 percentage points in total over the last 
decade. 
As a result the difference in participation rates 
for men and women at the EU level continued 
to decline in 2002 (down 0.6 percentage 
points). This development was reflected in 
almost all Member States, with Austria show-
ing the greatest reduction in the gender gap 
in that year. Nevertheless, the gap in activity 
rates remains substantial in several Member 
States - Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg 
and Spain all have differences in excess of 20 
percentage points.
Participation rates in the acceding countries 
are generally at only slightly lower levels than 
those of existing EU Member States, rang-
ing from 60% in Hungary to 71% in Cyprus 
and the Czech Republic. For the acceding 
countries as a whole the average activity 
rate declined slightly in 2002 to just under 
66%. This rate is slightly below that of the EU, 
but the difference between the activity rates 
for men and women is lower, at just under 
13 percentage points. This is due to a lower 
overall activity level for men in the acceding 
countries (72.3%) compared to that in the EU, 
while female rates are very similar. Unlike the 
development in the EU, the activity rates for 
women in the acceding countries grouping 
have remained broadly stable over recent 
years, while those for men have declined 
(chart 22).
In 2002 the strongest increases in female 
labour market participation within the EU 
occurred in Spain and Austria, where rates 
rose by around 2 and 3 percentage points 
respectively. Rates also rose noticeably (over 1 
percentage point) in Belgium, Greece, Luxem-
bourg and the Netherlands. For male partici-
pation, developments were somewhat mixed 
across Member States, with the rate falling by 
0.7 percentage points in Ireland but rising by 
the same degree in Spain. Finland, Germany, 
Ireland and the UK all saw male activity rates 
decline while those for females increased by 
similar amounts. Within the acceding coun-
tries, participation rates for men declined in 
all countries except the Czech Republic and 
Hungary, where rates remained unchanged, 
and Latvia where the rate rose slightly. Rates 
generally fell for women also, especially in 
Estonia and Poland which both saw declines 
of over one percentage point.
The EU activity rate for the youth age group 
(chart 23) at just below 48% is substantially 
lower than the overall activity rate for the 
EU, but the gender gaps in participation for 
this age group are narrower. The difference 
between the activity rate for young men and 
young women is 7 percentage points. By con-
trast, while the older age group has an even 
lower overall activity rate (just under 43%), 
the gender gap is even more pronounced 
(over 20 percentage points) than for the 
EU as a whole, essentially due to very low 
participation by older women (chart 24). 
One consequence of this should be a natural 
reduction over time in the gender gap in the 
EU activity rate as the current older age group 
gradually passes beyond the age bounds of 
the working age population. Interestingly, 
while the youth activity rate at the EU level 
showed no improvement in 2002 compared 
to one year earlier, that for the older age 
group showed a substantial rise of 1.3 per-
centage points, spread fairly evenly between 
men and women.
Youth activity rates are generally quite 
low and fairly similar across the acceding 
countries, ranging from 31% in Lithuania to 
around 43% in Slovakia. All acceding coun-
tries have rates that are lower than the EU av-
erage. For the acceding countries as a whole, 
youth activity rates have declined over recent 
years (down 3 percentage points since 1997), 
mainly driven by a drop of almost 5 percent-
age points in the average male youth activity 
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rate and a large decrease between 2001 and 
2002 of close to 2 percentage points. Gender 
disparities in youth participation rates are 
similar to those in the EU. 
Participation rates for older workers vary 
markedly across the acceding countries 
and standing at 33% on average are much 
lower than in the EU. Rates are very low 
(below 30%) in Hungary, Poland, Slovenia 
and Slovakia but fairly high (over 45%) in 
Cyprus and the three Baltic States, especially 
Estonia (56%). For the acceding countries as 
a whole activity rates for older people rose 
slightly between 2001 and 2002, although 
they have changed little from the levels in 
1997. Gender disparities in activity rates 
among older workers are just as pronounced 
in the acceding countries as in the existing EU 
Member States.
Employment rates and the 
Lisbon and Stockholm targets
Notwithstanding the recent slowdown in 
global economic activity the EU has contin-
ued to make progress towards reaching the 
Lisbon and Stockholm targets (box 3) as 
far as current Member States are concerned 
(table 5), although at a much reduced rate 
compared to recent years. For 2002 as a whole 
the employment rate in the EU is estimated to 
have grown, albeit by a modest 0.2 percentage 
points, to reach a level of 64.3%. The employ-
ment rate for women rose more noticeably 
(by 0.6 percentage points) to 55.6%, while 
for men it fell very slightly (by 0.2 percentage 
points) to 72.8%. The employment rate of 
workers aged 55-64 changed more signifi-
cantly from the year before, rising by some 
1.4 percentage points to just above 40% and 
indicating a substantial improvement over 
2002 in the progress towards achieving the 
Stockholm target for older workers.
Continuing the long-term increases in activity 
for women and the older population observed 
in many Member States is essential to achieve 
the employment growth needed to meet the 
Lisbon and Stockholm targets. Continuing 
structural reforms aimed at keeping older 
workers in the labour force longer, removal 
of disincentives to female participation in 
the labour force and raising skill levels in the 
labour force, in particular for the less-skilled, 
are, therefore, crucial. 
In the context of the forthcoming enlarge-
ment, the employment rate in 2002 for an 
EU25 would have been just under 63% and it 
is estimated that some 22 million jobs would 
need to be created within the enlarged EU 
in order to achieve the Lisbon total employ-
ment rate target for 2010. This poses a real 
challenge for EU and national employment 
policies, even more so since zero employment 
growth is forecast for the EU25 as a whole for 
2003. This means that in the remaining seven 
years a net employment creation rate averag-
ing over 3 million per year will be required to 
reach the overall Lisbon target. This equates 
to the level achieved by the EU15 in 2000, the 
best year for employment creation in recent 
years. 
Large variations remain between Member 
States in terms of the level of employment, 
with employment rates in 2002 ranging from 
just above 55% in Italy to more than 75% 
in Denmark (chart 25). Despite the overall 
improvement in the employment rate at EU 
level, declines in the rate compared to 2001 
were experienced in several Member States, 
most notably in Germany, Ireland, Portugal 
and Sweden. By contrast, Austria, Greece, 
Italy and Spain saw useful increases in their 
- 29 -
Chapter 1 Panorama of the European labour markets
employment rates, ranging in magnitude 
from 0.7 to 1.2 percentage points. 
Among the acceding countries employment 
rates in 2002 ranged from around 52% in Po-
land to over 65% in Cyprus and the Czech Re-
public. For the acceding countries as a whole 
the average employment rate declined slightly 
(by around 1%) during 2002, essentially due 
to the negative employment growth in Po-
land. For all other acceding countries apart 
from Slovenia the employment rates either 
rose or remained stable compared to 2001. 
Noticeable disparities persist within the EU 
with regard to the employment rates within 
different age groups (table 6). For the EU as 
a whole the employment rate for the youth 
age group (15-24 years) stood at 40.6% in 
2002, ranging from below 30% in Belgium, 
Greece and Italy to as high as 70% in the Neth-
erlands. The rate has increased in most Mem-
ber States since 1996, and especially strongly 
in Finland, France, Ireland, the Netherlands, 
Spain and Sweden. In the acceding countries 
low youth employment persists, with all 
countries having youth employment rates 
well below the EU average, and as low as 22% 
in Poland. The rates are declining, having 
fallen over recent years and quite markedly 
so in the Czech Republic, Estonia, Lithuania, 
Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia. Among the 
remaining candidate countries, Bulgaria has 
an extremely low youth employment rate of 
under 20%.
For the older age group (55-64) the employ-
ment rate for the EU as a whole stood at 
just over 40%, with Belgium recording the 
lowest rate (at just under 27%) and Sweden 
the highest (68%). The marked variation in 
employment rates for this age group reflects 
Box 3 – Lisbon and Stockholm employment rate targets
Table 5 – Progress towards the Lisbon and Stockholm targets
Total employment rate Female employment rate Older workers employment rate
2002
Gap below
2010 
target
Change
2001-
2002
Change
1997-2002 2002
Gap below
2010 
target
Change
2001-
2002
Change
1997-2002 2002
Gap below
2010 
target
Change
2001-
2002
Change
1997-2002
B 59.9 10.1 -0.1 3.0 51.4 8.6 0.4  4.9 26.7 23.3 1.6 4.7
DK 75.9 : -0.3 1.0 71.7 : -0.3 2.6 57.8 : -0.1 6.1
D 65.3 4.7 -0.5 1.7 58.8 1.2 0.0  3.5 38.4 11.6 0.5 0.3
EL 56.7 13.3 1.2 1.6 42.5 17.5 1.6  3.2 39.7 10.3 1.8 -1.2
E 58.4 11.6 0.7 9.1 44.1 15.9 1.2  9.7 39.7 10.3 0.5 5.6
F 63.0 7.0 0.3 3.5 56.7 3.3 0.7  4.3 34.8 15.2 2.9 5.9
IRL 65.3 4.7 -0.4 7.8 55.4 4.6 0.5  9.5 48.1 1.9 1.2 7.7
I 55.5 14.5 0.8 4.2 42.0 18.0 0.9  5.6 28.9 21.1 1.0 1.0
L 63.7 6.3 0.6 3.8 51.6 8.4 0.7  6.3 28.3 21.7 2.7 4.4
NL 74.4 : 0.3 5.9 66.2 : 0.9 0.2 42.3 7.7 2.0 10.3
A 69.3 0.7 0.8 1.5 63.1 : 2.4  4.5 30.0 20.0 1.0 1.7
P 68.2 1.8 -0.5 2.6 60.8 : -0.2 4.3 50.9 : 0.9 2.7
FIN 68.1 1.9 0.0 4.8 66.2 : 0.8  5.9 47.8 2.2 2.1 12.2
S 73.6 : -0.4 4.1 72.2 : 0.0  5.0 68.0 : 1.3 5.4
UK 71.7 : -0.1 1.7 65.3 : 0.2  2.1 53.5 : 1.2 5.2
EU15 64.3 5.7 0.2 3.6 55.6 4.4 0.6  4.9 40.1 9.9 1.4 3.7
2010 
Target 70% More than 60% 50%
Source: Eurostat, QLFD
Note: The column “Gap below 2010 target” is for illustrative purposes only, since the 2010 target is for the EU overall and not individual Member States
The Lisbon European Council of 2000 set as a new strategic goal 
for the EU over the 2000-2010 decade “to become the most competi-
tive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable 
of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and 
greater social cohesion”. It specifically stated that the overall aim of 
employment and economic policies should be to raise the employ-
ment rate to as close as possible to 70% by 2010 and to increase the 
employment rate for women to more than 60% by the same year, 
not least in order to reinforce the sustainability of social protection 
systems.
In addition to the 2010 Lisbon targets, the Stockholm European 
Council of 2001 set intermediate targets for employment rates in 
the EU in 2005 of 67% overall and 57% for women. It also set a new 
target for raising the average EU employment rate for older men 
and women (aged 55-64) to 50% by 2010.
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large differences across Member States 
mainly in the proportions of retired persons 
and of persons who are inactive due to illness 
or disability in this age group. Over recent 
years the employment rate for older people 
has risen substantially in all Member States 
except Austria, Germany, Greece and Italy. 
Employment rates for older workers also vary 
quite considerably in the acceding countries, 
ranging from 52% in Estonia to as low as 23% 
in Slovakia. In general acceding countries 
have not experienced the same trend towards 
increasing employment rates for older work-
ers as most EU Member States in recent years, 
and in fact rates have fallen considerably in 
Poland. However, the Czech Republic, Hun-
gary and Latvia are exceptions, their rates 
having risen substantially since 1998. 
The difference between the overall employ-
ment rates for men and women in the EU nar-
rowed further during 2002, as male rates fell 
slightly and those for females rose. Neverthe-
less, large gender differences of between 27 
and 29 percentage points remain in Greece, 
Italy and Spain (where female employment 
rates are all below 45%). In the acceding 
countries as a whole there is a smaller gap be-
tween employment rates for men and women 
than in the EU, although it is above 15% in 
Cyprus and the Czech Republic.
Recent trends in employment 
creation according to form of 
employment
In 2002, 18% of workers in the EU were in 
part-time employment (only slightly higher 
than in 2001), although this form of employ-
ment accounted for as much as 44% of total 
employment in the Netherlands (chart 26). 
- 31 -
Chapter 1 Panorama of the European labour markets
The rate for the Netherlands is much higher 
than for any other Member State and is essen-
tially due to the fact that almost three-quar-
ters of female employment in that country 
is part-time. Indeed, part-time work remains 
predominantly a feature of female employ-
ment, with a third of women in employment 
having a part-time job compared to only 6.5% 
for men. While the share of part-time jobs 
changed little at the EU level in 2002, quite 
noticeable increases (of the order of 2 per-
centage points) occurred in Austria and the 
Netherlands, continuing the rapid rise in the 
share of this form of employment observed in 
these countries over recent years.
Fixed-term contracts were held by around 
13% of EU employees in 2002, ranging from 
31% in Spain to only around 5% in Ireland 
and Luxembourg (chart 27). Unlike part-time 
work, fixed-term employment is shared fairly 
evenly between men and women at EU level. 
Compared to the previous year, the share 
of fixed-term contracts declined in many 
Member States and moderately for the EU as 
a whole, with Austria and Greece seeing the 
largest declines. Indeed, the prevalence of this 
form of employment in the EU seems to have 
peaked in 2000 and its share has declined 
slightly over subsequent years.
The recent evolution in the growth rates 
for permanent, fixed-term, full-time and 
part-time employment of the working age 
population (table 7) show that at the EU level 
all forms of employment have experienced 
either a slowdown or a decline. Between the 
second quarter of 2001 and that of 2002 there 
was a slowdown in the creation of permanent 
employment compared to the previous 12-
month period, but growth for this form of 
employment remained positive. On the other 
hand, fixed-term employment declined with 
the growth rate turning noticeably negative. 
Employment growth in terms of both full-
time and part time employment also declined 
relative to one year earlier but still remained 
positive overall. 
Examining the evolution in net employment 
creation between the years 1997 (the year 
the European Employment Strategy was 
launched) and 2002 for those aged 15-64, 
reveals that for the EU as a whole net employ-
ment creation involving full-time employment 
was over twice that for part-time employment 
(table 8a and chart 28). Only Austria, Belgium 
Table 6 – Employment Rate by Gender an Age Classes, 2002
Male
employment rate
Female
employment rate
Youth (15-24) 
employment rate
Older people (55-64) 
employment rate
B 68.2 51.4 29.4 26.7
DK 80.0 71.7 63.5 57.8
D 71.7 58.8 45.6 38.4
EL 71.4 42.5 26.5 39.7
E 72.6 44.1 33.3 39.7
F 69.5 56.7 30.1 34.8
IRL 75.2 55.4 47.9 48.1
I 69.1 42.0 25.8 28.9
L 75.6 51.6 32.3 28.3
NL 82.4 66.2 70.0 42.3
A 75.7 63.1 51.8 30.0
P 75.9 60.8 42.1 50.9
FIN 70.0 66.2 40.7 47.8
S 74.9 72.2 42.8 68.0
UK 78.0 65.3 56.3 53.5
EU15 72.8 55.6 40.6 40.1
CY 78.8 59.2 36.4 49.2
CZ 74.0 57.1 32.3 40.8
EE 66.5 57.9 28.2 51.6
HU 63.5 50.0 30.1 26.6
LT 62.7 57.2 23.8 41.6
LV 64.3 56.8 31.0 41.7
PL 56.9 46.2 21.7 26.1
SI 68.2 58.6 30.6 24.5
SK 62.4 51.4 27.0 22.8
AC10 61.8 50.2 25.4 30.5
BG 53.7 47.5 19.4 27.0
RO 63.6 51.8 28.7 37.3
Source: Eurostat, QLFD
Note: AC10 figure does not include Malta
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Table 7 – Recent evolution in annual employment growth rates in the EU15 between 2000 and 2002 according to form of employment
Annual growth rates (as %) in permanent and fixed-term employment of employees 
between 2000 and 2002
Annual growth rates (as %) in full-time and part-time employment between 2000 and 
2002
Permanent Fixed-term Full-time Part-time
2000Q2-2001Q2 2001Q2-2002Q2 2000Q2-2001Q2 2001Q2-2002Q2 2000Q2-2001Q2 2001Q2-2002Q2 2000Q2-2001Q2 2001Q2-2002Q2
2.1 1.3 0.4 -1.6 1.9 0.5 2.4 1.5
Source: Eurostat, LFS
Table 8a – Net employment creation 1997-2002 (full-time and part-time employment, for those aged 15-64, in 1000s)
Member State Full-time Fixed-term Total (net)
Total Men Women Total Men Women Total Men Women
B -5 -7 2 218 60 158 213 53 159
DK 92 10 82 -46 -25 -21 51 -13 64
D -389 -362 -27 1311 274 1037 922 -88 1010
EL 115 26 90 3 -5 8 119 21 98
E 2830 1601 1229 226 -2 229 3042 1587 1454
F 1756 911 845 179 -3 183 1935 908 1027
IRL 260 161 100 114 17 97 374 177 197
l 1228 633 594 457 75 383 1685 708 977
L 12 6 5 8 1 7 20 7 12
NL 150 134 16 831 257 574 966 387 579
A -39 -3 -36 166 22 144 127 19 108
P 490 274 216 62 26 37 552 299 253
FIN 234 119 115 56 14 42 286 131 155
S 450 180 270 -55 50 -105 412 209 202
UK 1186 641 545 373 159 214 1550 791 759
EU15 8370 4324 4046 3904 919 2985 12252 5197 7055
Source: Eurostat, LFS
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and in particular Germany saw a fall in full-
time employment levels over this period, and 
part-time employment levels declined only in 
Denmark and Sweden. Although net full-time 
employment creation was fairly evenly split 
between men and women, the vast majority 
of net employment creation involving part-
time work (over three quarters) was related 
to the employment of women. Most of the 
increase in female part-time employment was 
accounted for by employment developments 
in Germany, Italy and the Netherlands. 
Looking at changes in relative terms, the 
annual growth rates in full-time and part- 
time employment over the period 1997-2002 
(charts 29 and 30) indicate the variation 
in developments across Member States. For 
example, in Belgium the annual growth rate 
for part-time employment averaged around 
7% while that for full-time employment 
was around zero. In Austria and Germany 
negative growth in full-time employment was 
countered by growth in part-time employ-
ment, while in Denmark and Sweden the 
reverse occurred. Finally, all other Member 
States saw positive growth rates for both 
forms of employment, with both rates being 
high in Ireland. At EU level growth rates for 
part-time employment were superior to those 
for full-time employment.
Table 8b – Net employment creation 1997-2002 (permanent and fixed term employment, employees only, aged 15-64, 1000s)
Member State Permanent Fixed-term Total (net)
Total Men Women Total Men Women Total Men Women
B 188 66 122 61 22 40 249 87 162
DK 109 35 74 -49 -44 -5 66 -6 72
D 746 -149 896 194 44 150 763 -139 902
EL 228 117 111 38 7 31 266 124 142
E 2346 1315 1031 699 253 446 3031 1557 1474
F 1658 862 796 521 175 346 2203 1050 1153
IRL 287 123 164 -30 -11 -19 349 157 192
l 1069 400 669 381 137 244 1451 537 913
L 16 4 11 4 2 2 20 7 13
NL 568 176 392 303 162 141 908 355 553
A 122 8 115 -4 2 -5 119 9 110
P 144 82 63 422 206 216 496 248 248
FIN 251 147 104 55 10 45 304 156 149
S 251 134 117 185 80 105 412 201 211
UK 1972 1020 952 -182 -73 -109 1710 905 805
EU15 9957 4339 5617 2598 972 1626 12346 5247 7098
Source: Eurostat, LFS
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Looking at net employment creation between 
the two reference years 1997 and 2002 in 
terms of permanent and fixed-term employ-
ment reveals that net employment creation 
involving permanent employment was 
almost four times that for fixed-term em-
ployment (table 8b and chart 28), and with 
net employment creation higher for women 
than for men in both forms of employment. 
While all Member States experienced a rise 
in employment involving permanent jobs, 
the level of fixed-term employment declined 
in Austria, Denmark, Ireland and the UK. 
Much of the rise in permanent employment 
was due to the large increases in this form 
of employment in France, Spain and the UK, 
which together accounted for some 6 million 
new jobs of this type.
Skills and employment
In 2002, low-skilled people represented close 
to 38% of the working age population in the 
EU while the high-skilled accounted for some 
19% (table 9). The low-skilled still account 
for large proportions of the working age 
population in most of the southern European 
countries, the share being as high as 78% in 
Portugal. With regard to the proportion of 
high-skilled, this was largest in Finland (27%) 
and the UK (26%) and lowest in Portugal and 
Italy (both around 8% to 9%). 
The largest gender difference in the propor-
tion of the working population according to 
skills level relates to the low-skilled group, 
which accounts for 36% of men and 39% of 
women. The largest differences at Member 
State level were those between low- skilled 
men and women in Austria, Germany and 
Luxembourg. Similarly, large differences ex-
ist in the proportion of high-skilled men and 
women in Germany and Luxembourg, with 
fewer high-skilled women than men, and in 
Finland and Sweden, where the opposite situ-
ation is found.
Among the acceding countries Lithuania has 
the highest proportion of high-skilled in the 
working age population (36%), while for 
the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia it 
is below 10%. In terms of gender differences 
in the skills breakdown of the working age 
population, the Czech Republic, Hungary and 
Latvia show the largest differences for men 
and women in the low skills group, while 
in the high skills group the differences are 
particularly strong for the three Baltic States, 
where the proportion of high-skilled women 
is much higher than that for men. In fact the 
proportion of the high skilled is greater for 
women in all the acceding countries except 
Cyprus and the Czech Republic. 
The employment rate is generally greater the 
higher the educational level (table 10). In 
Table 9 – Share (as %) of the working age population (15-64) by educational attainment levels in 2002
Total Men Women
Low Medium High Low Medium High Low Medium High
B 41.2 34.1 24.7 41.6 34.6 23.8 40.9 33.5 25.6
DK 27.8 48.9 23.4 26.6 51.9 21.5 28.9 45.8 25.3
D 24.1 56.9 18.9 20.8 56.7 22.5 27.5 57.2 15.3
EL 47.0 38.1 14.9 46.2 38.2 15.6 47.7 38.0 14.3
E 57.2 20.3 22.5 57.4 20.2 22.4 56.9 20.4 22.6
F 38.3 40.2 21.5 36.7 42.9 20.4 39.9 37.5 22.6
IRL 40.8 37.2 22.0 43.3 36.1 20.5 38.3 38.3 23.4
I 56.0 35.2 8.8 56.0 35.2 8.8 56.0 35.2 8.7
L 41.2 42.6 16.2 37.2 44.2 18.6 45.3 41.0 13.7
NL 36.0 42.6 21.4 33.6 43.2 23.3 38.4 42.1 19.5
A 26.4 58.9 14.7 21.6 62.7 15.7 31.3 55.1 13.6
P 78.0 14.1 8.0 80.4 13.5 6.0 75.6 14.6 9.8
FIN 30.1 43.0 27.0 32.1 43.9 24.0 28.0 42.0 30.0
S 22.5 54.3 23.2 24.3 55.8 19.9 20.7 52.8 26.5
UK 17.6 56.1 26.2 15.9 57.3 26.8 19.5 54.9 25.7
BG 33.5 49.0 17.4 34.5 51.8 13.7 32.6 46.4 21.0
CY 36.2 38.1 25.7 34.5 39.2 26.3 37.7 37.2 25.1
CZ 18.8 71.4 9.9 15.3 73.5 11.2 22.2 69.2 8.5
EE 21.5 54.3 24.1 23.7 58.0 18.3 19.6 51.0 29.5
HU 31.6 56.4 12.0 28.2 60.4 11.4 34.9 52.6 12.5
LT 24.0 39.7 36.2 25.5 44.8 29.7 22.7 35.0 42.3
LV 25.8 57.9 16.3 30.2 56.0 13.8 21.8 59.6 18.6
PL 25.8 64.3 9.9 25.0 66.5 8.5 26.5 62.2 11.3
RO 34.8 57.1 8.1 30.5 61.0 8.6 39.1 53.3 7.6
SI 27.3 60.8 11.9 24.5 65.1 10.4 30.2 56.4 13.4
SK 20.9 70.5 8.6 18.1 73.6 8.3 23.6 67.5 8.9
EU15 37.8 43.0 19.2 36.3 43.9 19.8 39.2 42.2 18.6
EU25* 35.6 46.5 17.9 34.2 47.5 18.3 37.0 45.4 17.6
Source: Eurostat, LFS
Note: *EU25 figure does not include Malta
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2002, the employment rate at EU level for the 
high-skilled (tertiary education completed) 
was 83% and for the medium-skilled (upper 
secondary completed) just above 70%. In con-
trast, the rate for the low-skilled (below upper 
secondary education) was under 50%. Within 
skills bands, the variation in employment 
rates across Member States is most noticeable 
for the low-skilled, where rates vary from 41% 
in Belgium to 67% in Portugal. For the high-
skilled the variation in the employment rate is 
much less, ranging from about 78% in Spain 
to 89% in Portugal.
Among the acceding countries, employment 
rates for the low-skilled are generally ex-
tremely low, being mainly concentrated in 
the range 20-30% but going as low as 16% 
for Slovakia. In contrast, employment rates 
for the high-skilled are at levels comparable 
to those of the existing Member States. For 
the EU and acceding countries activity rates 
follow broadly similar patterns as those for 
employment rates, being generally a few 
percentage points higher than the latter. 
However, for the medium- and low-skilled in 
Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Slova-
kia there is a wide gap between activity rates 
and employment rates.
Unemployment rates in the EU for the low-
skilled are more than double those for the 
high-skilled. Among the current Member 
States the greatest difference in the unem-
ployment rate for the low- and high-skilled is 
found in Finland, where it is almost five times 
higher for the low-skilled. Austria, Belgium, 
France, Germany and the UK also have con-
siderable differences between unemployment 
rates for the high- and low-skilled. Differences 
in some acceding countries are even more 
pronounced, the most extreme case being 
Slovakia where the unemployment rate for 
low-skilled is 46% compared to only 4% for 
the high-skilled.
Sectoral employment structure 
and trends, and employment 
creation/loss across sectors 
over recent years
At EU level, the sectoral employment struc-
ture of the working age population within 
Europe in 2002 (table 11 and chart 31) is 
characterised by a dominant services sector 
(accounting for around 68% of total employ-
ment), a still sizeable industry sector (28% of 
employment) and a fairly minor agriculture 
sector in terms of employment (some 4% of 
total employment). Nevertheless, some no-
ticeable differences remain between Member 
States in terms of the relative importance of 
these sectors within the national economies. 
For example, in Greece the agriculture sector 
still accounts for close to 15% of total national 
employment of the working age population, 
compared to as little as 1.3% in the UK. The 
Table 10 – Employment, unemployment and activity rates by education levels in 2002 (age group 15-64)
Total, irrespective of education level High Medium Low
ER  UR  AR  ER  UR  AR  ER  UR  AR  ER  UR  AR
B  59.7%  6.9%  64.1%  82.8%  3.5%  85.7%  65.7%  6.6%  70.3%  40.8%  11.3%  46.0%
DK  76.4%  4.3%  79.9%  87.0%  3.7%  90.3%  80.6%  3.6%  83.6%  60.4%  6.7%  64.8%
D  65.4%  8.6%  71.5%  83.0%  4.3%  86.8%  69.8%  8.7%  76.5%  43.6%  13.5%  50.4%
EL  56.9%  9.8%  63.1%  80.2%  6.8%  86.1%  57.2%  12.8%  65.5%  49.2%  8.5%  53.7%
E  58.4%  11.1%  65.8%  77.5%  8.7%  84.9%  58.2%  11.4%  65.7%  52.8%  12.4%  60.3%
F  62.9%  8.7%  69.0%  79.2%  5.5%  83.8%  69.8%  7.7%  75.7%  46.6%  13.0%  53.6%
IRL  65.0%  4.3%  67.9%  84.8%  2.3%  86.8%  71.2%  3.8%  74.0%  48.1%  7.0%  51.8%
I  55.4%  9.3%  61.0%  81.8%  5.6%  86.6%  64.8%  8.8%  71.0%  45.3%  10.8%  50.7%
L  63.6%  2.6%  65.3%  83.6%  1.7%  85.0%  69.1%  1.5%  70.2%  50.8%  4.7%  53.3%
NL  74.5%  2.6%  76.5%  86.8%  1.7%  88.4%  79.8%  2.1%  81.5%  61.7%  3.7%  64.0%
A  68.2%  4.9%  71.7%  85.0%  1.8%  86.6%  72.9%  4.8%  76.6%  48.2%  8.3%  52.6%
P  68.6%  4.8%  72.1%  88.6%  4.0%  92.3%  64.7%  5.3%  68.4%  67.3%  4.8%  70.7%
FIN  69.1%  10.5%  77.2%  85.5%  4.1%  89.2%  72.8%  10.4%  81.3%  48.9%  19.1%  60.5%
S  74.0%  5.0%  78.0%  86.2%  2.7%  88.6%  79.6%  4.8%  83.6%  58.2%  8.1%  63.3%
UK  71.5%  5.1%  75.3%  87.3%  2.6%  89.7%  77.3%  5.0%  81.3%  50.9%  10.1%  56.6%
BG  51.1%  18.3%  62.5%  75.7%  8.2%  82.5%  58.5%  17.7%  71.1%  27.5%  30.6%  39.6%
CY  68.5%  3.4%  70.9%  87.3%  2.4%  89.5%  71.5%  3.6%  74.1%  52.1%  4.2%  54.4%
CZ  65.6%  7.1%  70.6%  86.4%  1.8%  88.0%  73.1%  6.4%  78.1%  26.1%  20.6%  32.9%
EE  61.7%  9.6%  68.3%  80.1%  4.7%  84.1%  67.4%  10.3%  75.1%  26.6%  20.0%  33.3%
HU  56.5%  5.7%  59.9%  81.8%  1.7%  83.2%  66.4%  5.1%  70.0%  29.2%  11.5%  33.0%
LT  60.6%  13.2%  69.8%  78.4%  9.0%  86.2%  65.2%  16.0%  77.7%  26.2%  19.2%  32.4%
LV  60.5%  13.4%  69.8%  80.7%  6.6%  86.4%  67.3%  13.0%  77.4%  32.4%  24.0%  42.6%
PL  51.7%  20.2%  64.9%  82.4%  6.6%  88.2%  57.8%  21.2%  73.3%  25.0%  28.1%  34.8%
RO  58.6%  8.8%  64.2%  82.0%  4.1%  85.5%  64.3%  10.0%  71.5%  43.8%  7.6%  47.5%
SI  64.3%  6.1%  68.5%  86.4%  2.5%  88.6%  69.5%  6.1%  74.0%  41.8%  9.4%  46.1%
SK  56.5%  18.7%  69.5%  85.8%  3.9%  89.4%  65.0%  17.8%  79.1%  15.5%  46.1%  28.8%
EU15  64.2%  7.7%  69.6%  82.8%  4.6%  86.8%  70.5%  7.3%  76.1%  49.4%  10.8%  55.3%
EU25*  62.8%  8.9%  69.0%  82.8%  4.7%  86.8%  68.7%  9.2%  75.7%  46.6%  11.8%  52.8%
Source: Eurostat, LFS
Note: *EU25 figure does not include Malta
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proportion of national employment in the 
industry sector ranges from 20% in Luxem-
bourg to about 36% in Portugal, while em-
ployment in the services sector ranges from 
56% in Portugal to over three quarters of total 
national employment in Luxembourg and the 
Netherlands.
For the acceding countries as a whole, the 
services sector accounts for a lower propor-
tion of employment of the working age 
population compared to the EU, at less than 
60% for the majority of these countries. Most 
also have a greater proportion of employ-
ment in the industry sector, which accounts 
for as much as around 40% of employment in 
the Czech Republic, Slovenia and the Slovak 
Republic. Agriculture remains an important 
source of employment in several acceding 
countries, accounting for over 18% of employ-
ment in Lithuania and Poland. In all acceding 
countries the proportion of the working age 
population employed in agriculture is above 
the average for the EU15. 
While the sectoral make-up of employment 
of the working age population in Bulgaria 
seems broadly similar to that of the acced-
ing countries, the employment structure for 
Romania differs markedly, with each of the 
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three main sectors accounting for roughly 
a third of total national employment of those 
aged 15 to 64.
The relative importance of the high technol-
ogy sector3 with regard to total employment 
varies considerably across countries (chart 
32). For the EU15, the average proportion of 
employment of the working age population in 
the high technology sector is 11%. The highest 
proportion is found in Germany (almost 15% 
of all employment of those aged 15-64), which 
has a large proportion of people employed in 
high technology manufacturing (close to 
12%). Sweden has the highest proportion 
employed in the high technology services 
sector. Greece, Luxembourg and Portugal all 
have relatively low employment in the high- 
tech sector. Several of the acceding countries 
- the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia and 
the Slovak Republic - have employment levels 
within the high technology field proportion-
ally similar to those for the EU as a whole.
Between 2001 and 2002, the services sector 
was once again the most dynamic sector 
for employment growth in the EU, showing 
continued resistance to the ongoing eco-
nomic slowdown (chart 33) and with growth 
remaining positive. By contrast, employment 
in the agriculture and industry sectors con-
tinued to contract in 2002. The agriculture 
sector in particular continued to experience 
a decline in employment levels, although the 
rate of decline stabilised somewhat following 
the acceleration in negative employment 
growth seen over the course of 2001. For 
the services sector, employment continued 
to grow over 2002, although at a slower rate 
than in the immediately preceding years.
In France the loss of jobs in agriculture ac-
celerated over the course of 2002. Employ-
ment growth in the industry sector turned 
negative at the start of the year, with the rate 
of employment contraction increasing in 
the following quarters, while in the services 
sector growth remained positive and stable 
at around the level seen at the end of 2001. 
In Germany, employment continued to con-
tract in agriculture and more noticeably in 
industry, with the rate of decline in the latter 
picking up strongly compared to the previous 
year. In addition, employment growth in the 
services sector slowed over the course of the 
year and had virtually ground to a halt by the 
last quarter. 
Meanwhile, in the UK both the agriculture 
and industry sectors saw continued heavy 
employment losses over 2002, while growth 
in services remained positive and fairly stable 
at around the level seen at the end of 2001. 
Developments in Italy were generally more 
positive, apart from in agriculture where the 
contraction seen at the end of 2001 continued 
more strongly into 2002. The services sector 
saw continued growth, although the rate 
declined over the course of the year. Unlike 
the other large Member States, employment 
in Italy’s industry sector grew in 2002 with 
momentum increasing over the course of the 
year, in contrast to the stagnation in employ-
ment witnessed at the end of 2001. 
Within the services sector (Chart 34), 
“Transport, storage and communication” and 
“Financial intermediation, real estate, rent-
ing and business activities” experienced the 
largest declines in employment growth since 
the start of the current economic slowdown. 
The decline in growth in the former has 
been particularly marked, exarcebated by the 
impact on the aviation sector of the events of 
11 September 2001. As a result, growth in this 
area has fallen dramatically from around 5% 
in the first quarter of 2001 to become nega-
tive in the second half of 2002. By contrast, 
employment growth in “Wholesale and retail 
trade, repair of motor vehicles, and hotels 
and restaurants” and “Public administration 
and defence, social and health services etc.” 
has remained quite stable over the last two 
years at around the 1% level. Developments in 
these sectors account to a large degree for the 
employment resilience in the services sector 
discussed earlier in the chapter, and reflect 
in particular the impact of rising female 
participation on employment growth in the 
services sector. 
Looking at the longer term changes in sec-
toral employment in the EU between 1997 
and 2002 (table 12 and chart 35), it is clear 
that the vast majority of employment growth 
over recent years has occurred due to develop-
ments in the services sector. Net employment 
creation in this sector between 1997 and 2002 
amounted to an increase of over 11 million 
employed persons (or growth of around 
12%), while for industry as a whole it was 
only about 1.5 million (or about 3% growth). 
Meanwhile, employment in the agriculture 
sector decreased by around 0.9 million (or 
13%) for the EU as a whole, with all Member 
States registering a decline.
3 For the definition of the sub-sectors included in this sector, see Employment in Europe 2001
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Within the services sector, the largest increase 
in employment has been in “Real estate, rent-
ing and business activities” (an increase of 
some 3.7 million) and in “Health and social 
work” (up 1.7 million). Employment increas-
es in “Wholesale, retail trade and repair of 
motor vehicles” and “Transport, storage and 
communication” have also been large, at 
around the 1.1 million level. While develop-
ments in employment in the services sector 
as a whole have been positive for all Member 
States, there have been some decreases in 
employment within specific areas in certain 
countries. The most notable exceptions to the 
general growth in employment in services 
were the declines in employment levels in 
“Hotels and restaurants” in Denmark, “Fi-
nancial intermediation” in Italy and Portugal, 
“Education” in Belgium and Portugal, and 
“Other community services, social and per-
sonal activities” in Portugal. Most noticeable, 
however, was a decline in employment of al-
most a quarter of a million (or 8%) in “Public 
administration, defence and social security” 
in Germany. 
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In the industry sector, there have been mixed 
developments across Member States. While 
employment in this sector increased for the 
EU as a whole, there were marked declines 
in corresponding employment levels in Den-
mark, Germany and the UK. While the decline 
in Denmark and the UK was essentially driven 
by job losses in “Manufacturing”, those in Ger-
many were a result of the marked decline in 
employment in “Construction” of some 0.5 
million, or 16%. These overall decreases were, 
however, more than offset by the 1 million 
increase in employment in the industry sec-
tor in Spain together with noticeable rises in 
France, Italy and Portugal, essentially due to 
large rises in employment in the manufactur-
ing and construction industries.
All Member States except Luxembourg saw 
employment levels in the high technology 
sector rise between 1997 and 2002, leading 
to an increase of almost 2 million for the EU 
as a whole and with employment in high-tech 
services accounting for 1.4 million of this to-
tal. However, while all countries experienced 
increases in employment in high technol-
ogy services, employment in high technology 
manufacturing declined in Belgium, Luxem-
bourg, the Netherlands, Sweden and espe-
cially the UK. By contrast, it rose substantially 
in Germany, Italy and Spain, which together 
accounted for a rise in employment of 0.6 mil-
lion. Employment in “Knowledge intensive 
services”4 has increased substantially, rising 
by almost 7.5 million since 1997, with Ireland 
and Spain seeing particularly large relative 
growth in this area.
Looking at the sectoral employment trends in 
terms of the relative growth in employment 
between 1997 and 2002 (i.e. the changes as 
a percentage of the 1997 sectoral employment 
levels, table 13) reveals that “Real estate, rent-
ing and business activities” and “High tech-
nology services” are the areas with the great-
est employment growth rates - both showed 
increases of the order of one third. Within the 
service sector, growth has also been above 
average in “Transport, storage and com-
munication”, “Health and social work”, “Air 
transport” and “Other community, social and 
personal services”.
All Member States have seen rises in em-
ployment in the service sector. The greatest 
relative increases occurred in Ireland and 
Spain (up 37% and 25% respectively on 1997 
4 For the definition of the sub-sectors included, see Employment in Europe 2001
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levels), while Austria, Denmark and Germany 
saw the lowest relative growth at around 7%. 
Together with Portugal, Ireland and Spain 
also saw large relative employment growth 
in the industry sector, with all three recording 
especially large relative increases in the con-
struction industry. Employment in industry 
on the other hand contracted in Denmark 
by around 8% and by between 4% and 5% in 
Germany and the UK. Belgium, Luxembourg 
and Sweden also saw some negative adjust-
ment in employment levels in this sector. In 
agriculture, most Member States experienced 
major downward adjustments in employ-
ment levels. Belgium saw the largest decline 
with employment dropping by about 29% on 
1997 levels, followed by the UK, Ireland and 
Finland with declines of the order of 20%. By 
contrast, relative declines in employment in 
agriculture have been fairly limited in France, 
Luxembourg and Portugal. 
Employment in high technology services 
grew spectacularly in Ireland (up 133%) and 
Spain (up 79%). Significantly above average 
growth in this area also took place in Austria, 
Finland, the Netherlands and Sweden. A sim-
ilar pattern generally holds for developments 
in “Knowledge intensive services”, although 
in this case Italy and Luxembourg also saw 
significantly above average growth while for 
Austria it was below average. 
The strong overall employment growth in 
Ireland and Spain is reflected by above aver-
age growth in almost all areas apart from 
agriculture, the exceptions being “Air trans-
port” for Spain and “Other community, social 
and personal activities” for Ireland (chart 
36), and relates more to general economic 
trends in these Member States rather than 
specific changes in the sectoral structure of 
their economies. In contrast, Denmark and 
Germany, which have experienced the lowest 
overall employment growth relative to 1997 
levels, witnessed more mixed development 
across sectors compared to the EU average 
(chart 37). For example, employment growth 
in Germany was generally below the EU aver-
age for most sectors, and even negative for 
“Industry” as a whole, “Construction” and 
“Public administration, defence and social se-
curity”, for which there was positive growth 
for the EU as a whole. It was, though, above 
the average for “High technology manufac-
turing”, “Financial intermediation”, “Health 
and social work” and “Other community, 
social and personal activities”.
The labour market situation in 
an enlarged EU of 25 Member 
States
In the context of the coming enlargement, it 
is clear that the overall economic and employ-
ment indicators for an EU with 25 members 
will continue to be dominated by the situation 
in the group of existing Member States, which 
will still represent more than 80% of the 
population of the future EU25 (table 14). The 
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total population in an EU with 25 members 
will be some 20% larger than it is now in the 
EU of 15 members, while total employment 
will increase by about 18% and total GDP (in 
PPS terms) by 9%. Apparent labour productiv-
ity in acceding countries is just above 50% of 
that for the EU15, while GDP per capita is less 
than half the EU15’s. Because of the relatively 
small total population of these 10 countries 
in comparison with the total population for 
the EU15, labour productivity and per capita 
GDP in an EU25 will be only 7% and 9% lower 
respectively than in the EU15. 
Employment levels are significantly different 
between the group of existing Member States 
and the group of acceding countries. In 2002 
the employment rate for the EU15 stood at 
64.3%, compared to only 55.9% for the group 
of acceding countries. However, since the 
working-age population in the acceding coun-
tries represents less than 20% of the EU25’s, 
some 80% of the employment rate in the new 
EU25 will be determined by the existing EU15 
Member States. In light of this, in 2002 the 
employment rate for an EU25 would have 
equated to 62.9%. As mentioned previously, 
reaching the overall Lisbon employment tar-
get of 70% for an enlarged EU will require the 
creation of about 22 million jobs from 2002 
to 2010. This would normally mean an aver-
age net employment creation of 2.8 million 
per year, but with zero employment growth 
forecast for the EU25 as a whole for 2003 the 
required rate is more likely to be around the 3 
million per year level from 2004 onwards. 
Demographic trends
In 2002 the total population of the EU in-
creased by around 1.3 million, slightly down 
on last year’s increase of 1.5 million, to reach 
an overall level of 378.5 million (table 16). 
This is equivalent to an annual growth rate 
of 0.35%. Most of this increase was accounted 
for by net migration flow into the EU, esti-
mated at just over 1 million in 2002 and also 
slightly down on 2001’s figure of 1.15 million. 
Natural population growth (live births minus 
deaths) decreased to around 0.31 million, re-
flecting a post-war low of 3.99 million in the 
number of live births and a slight increase in 
the number of deaths.
As in 2001, the natural increase in the popula-
tion was the main component of population 
change during 2002 in Finland, France, Ire-
land and the Netherlands. For all the remain-
ing Member States net migration accounted 
for by far the largest share of the net increase 
in population. In Germany, Greece and Italy 
the natural increase was negative - there were 
more deaths than births - but this was more 
than offset by the much larger increases in 
net migration which led to net increases in 
their populations. In terms of net migration 
per 1000 population, migration was highest 
in Ireland, Luxembourg, Portugal and Spain; 
these four Member States also had the highest 
overall relative increase in population.
For the acceding countries, total population 
declined during 2002 by some 0.14 million 
to reach a level of 74.5 million. The decrease 
was mainly due to negative natural growth, 
although negative net migration also played 
an important role. However, in the Czech 
Republic and Poland, negative net migration 
was noticeably higher than the natural de-
crease in population. In terms of changes per 
1000 population, the largest net decreases oc-
curred in the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia 
and Lithuania.
Table 14 – The impact on key indicators of enlargement from EU15 to EU25, based on 2002 data
EU15 ACC10 EU25
As % of EU15
EU15 ACC10 EU25
Total Population (millions, as at 1.1.2003) 378.5 74.5 453 100.0 19.7 119.7
GPD (1000 million euros) 9,161 428 9,590 100.0 4.7 104.7
GDP (IOOOmillionPPPs) 9,161 830 9,991 100.0 9.1 109.1
GDP per capita (1000 euros) 24.0 5.7 210 100.0 23.9 87.6
GDP per capita (1000 PPPs) 24.0 11.1 21.9 100.0 46.4 912
GDP per person in ernployment (1000 euros) 55.1 14.6 49.1 100.0 26.6 89.0
GDP per person in ernployment (1000 PPPs) 55.1 28.4 51.1 100.0 51.5 92.7
Ernployment 15-64 (1000 persons) 161,038 28,228 189,266 100.0 17.5 117.5
Working age population 15-64 (1000 persons) 250,623 50,497 301,120 100.0 20.1 120.1
Ernployment rate 15-64 (%) 64.3 55.9 62.9 100.0 87.0 97.8
Unernployrnent Rate (%) 7.7 14.8 8.9 100.0 192.2 115.1
Source: Eurostat, demographic statistics, LFS and harmonised series on unemployment; Commission Services, AMECO database for GDP indicators based on current prices
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Table 15 – Population change in 2002 (first estimates)
Country
Population 
1.1.2002 Natural increase Net migration Total increase
Population 
1.1.2003 Natural increase Net migration Total increase
(1000) per 1000 population
EU15 377128 315 1028 1342 378471 0.8 2.7 3.5
B 10310 6 30 36 10346 0.6 2.9 3.5
DK 5368 5 14 19 5388 1.0 2.6 3.6
D 82440 -115 230 115 82555 -1.4 2.8 1.4
EL 10988 -5 35 30 11018 -0.4 3.2 2.8
E 40409 47 227 274 40683 1.2 5.6 6.7
F 59341 235 60 295 59637 3.9 1.0 5.0
IRL 3883 28 20 48 3931 7.1 5.1 12.2
I 56332 -18 150 132 56464 -0.3 2.7 2.3
L 444 2 3 5 449 3.6 6.7 10.3
NL 16105 61 29 90 16195 3.7 1.8 5.5
A 8139 3 17 20 8159 0.4 2.1 2.5
P 10336 3 70 73 10409 0.3 6.7 7.0
FIN 5195 7 6 12 5207 1.3 1.1 2.4
S 8909 0 33 33 8943 0.0 3.7 3.7
UK 58928 55 104 159 59088 0.9 1.8 2.7
AC10 74670 -84 -52 -136 74534 -1.1 -0.7 -1.8
CY 706 3 4 7 712 4.4 4.9 9.3
CZ 10206 -15 -48 -62 10144 -1.5 -4.7 -6.2
EE 1361 -5 -1 -6 1355 -3.9 -0.7 -4.6
HU 10175 -36 16 -20 10155 -3.6 1.6 -1.9
LT 2346 -12 -5 -17 2329 -5.3 -2.0 -7.3
LV 3476 -11 -5 -16 3460 -3.1 -1.6 -4.6
MAL 395 1 1 2 396 1.8 2.3 4.0
PL 38633 -6 -17 -23 38609 -0.2 -0.5 -0.6
SK 5379 -2 1 -1 5378 -0.3 0.1 -0.2
SI 1994 -1 3 2 1996 -0.5 1.5 1.1
BG 7845 -44 : -44 7801 -5.6 : -5.6
RO 22392 -62 : -62 22330 -2.8 : -2.8
Source: Eurostat, demographic statistics
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Introduction 
Three years ago the Lisbon European Council 
drew up a broad policy framework aimed at 
enhancing competitiveness and achieving full 
employment. In the context of the three over-
arching objectives of full employment, qual-
ity and productivity and social cohesion and 
inclusion, the new European Employment 
Strategy, fully consistent with the BEPGs and 
both integrated with the Lisbon agenda, has 
put more emphasis on employment policies 
that may contribute to reverse the decline in 
labour productivity growth.5 
After years of jobless growth, the second half 
of the 1990s saw the performance of the Euro-
pean labour market characterised by a rapid 
increase in employment and participation 
rates and a decline in the number of unem-
ployed in the labour force. Employment in the 
EU recorded the highest growth rates over the 
last three decades, gradually reducing the gap 
with the US (table 16). The analysis carried 
out in Employment in Europe 2002 showed 
that these improvements are, at least in part, 
structural, as witnessed by the decline in the 
structural rate of unemployment, the positive 
effect of skills upgrading on the evolution of 
the employment rate and the rapid increase 
in female participation. 
As already documented in previous reports, 
European employment dynamics reflected dif-
ferent growth patterns according to levels of 
educational attainment. Employment growth 
appeared particularly buoyant for those with 
upper secondary and post-secondary educa-
tion (the medium and high-skilled), while 
it declined for the less educated groups (the 
low-skilled). During the period 1995-2000, 
the employment growth for medium- and 
high-skilled workers was positive and stood 
at about 4% and 5% per annum respectively, 
while for the low-skilled it was negative at 
–2.6% per annum. This contrasts with a posi-
tive growth for the low-skilled in the US with a 
rate similar to that of the medium-skilled but 
lower than that of the high-skilled.6 
Despite the higher level of education inher-
ent in the workforce, European GDP growth 
increased by less than total employment, 
which implied a decline in the rate of labour 
productivity growth (table 16). The opposite 
occurred in the US, it being widely reported 
that the Information Communications 
Technology (ICT) revolution led the surge 
in the US labour productivity growth during 
the second half of the 1990s.7 The pick-up in 
productivity growth was not only confined 
to the ICT sector but also occurred in services 
where meagre and stable growth rates were 
traditionally found. However, as shown in 
chapter 1, the gap between the EU and the US 
productivity growth is much smaller when 
productivity is based on hours worked rather 
than on the number of employed. 
A simple explanation of the weak economic 
expansion associated with the strong em-
ployment increase in Europe would relate 
the modest GDP growth to the type of jobs 
created - mainly low productivity jobs in the 
service sector. Nevertheless, while it is true 
that most of the jobs created were in services, 
it was high-skilled people, and high-skilled 
women in particular, who took these jobs. 
The slowdown in the European productivity 
growth associated with a rising level of educa-
tion embedded in the workforce is a paradox, 
as the work of better educated people should 
also be more productive. This chapter tries 
to identify the relevance of the sectoral 
concentration of employment - referred to 
henceforth as employment specialisation - to 
productivity growth. 
Section 1 will identify the sectoral contribu-
tion to the overall productivity growth, as 
well as the contribution of structural change. 
Section 2 will map some theoretical links 
between innovation, skills, employment 
specialisation and growth. Section 3 will 
describe the characteristic of the employment 
structure looking at the pattern of specialisa-
tion by total employment levels and by level of 
education, followed by an empirical analysis 
of the effects of employment specialisation on 
sectoral productivity growth. 
Structural change and 
productivity growth
It might be believed that high employment 
growth would naturally lead to lower pro-
Table 16 – Employment, GDP and Productivity growth
Employment GDP Productivity
EU US EU US EU US
1970-1979 0.3 2.3 3.2 3.6 2.8 1.4
1980-1989 0.6 1.9 2.3 3.3 1.8 1.4
1991-1995 -0.5 1.6 1.5 3.1 2.0 1.5
1995-2000 1.4 2.0 2.7 4.1 1.3 2.1
2000-2002 0.9 -0.3 1.3 1.4 0.4 1.7
Source: Commission Services, Ameco database
Note: to avoid a jump in the series in the EU growth rates for the 1990s due to the German reunification, the average 
rate is computed for the period 1991-1999.
5 Council Decision on guidelines for employment policies for the Member States.
6 Data for the US are available from the OECD only since 1997. Between 1997 and 2000 employment respectively for low, medium and high skilled grew at 0.6%, 0.9 and 3.1% on average. For the EU for the 
same groups the growth rate was –5.3%, 4.3%, and 4.4%. 
7 See for example Jorgenson D.W. (2001) Information Technology and the US Economy, American Economic Review, vol.91, no1, pp. 1-32.
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ductivity growth. The strong acceleration of 
labour productivity in the US accompanied by 
strong job creation, however, challenges this 
view. Chart 38 reports on the horizontal and 
on the vertical axis respectively employment 
and productivity growth. The dotted lines 
show the combination of employment and 
productivity growth consistent with different 
rates of GDP growth and represent the trade-
off between employment growth and produc-
tivity growth. In the 1980s the increase in the 
average employment growth was not enough 
to compensate for the reduction in the aver-
age productivity growth in the EU. Thus, the 
rate of GDP growth implied by the different 
rates of employment and productivity growth 
declined from about 3% in the 1970s to about 
2.5% in the 1980s. The restructuring of the 
European economies of the first half of the 
1990s allowed productivity gains but at the 
expense of employment growth and was 
consistent with a growth rate of 1.5%. Pro-
ductivity growth declined after 1995 but the 
increase in employment growth brought GDP 
growth towards the average rate experienced 
in the 1970s. In the US, the deceleration of 
employment growth with no or small pro-
ductivity gains until 1995 reduced the rate of 
GDP growth implied by the dynamics of em-
ployment and productivity. However, in the 
second half of the 1990s the pick up in the US 
productivity growth was coupled with strong 
employment growth, and the implied average 
GDP growth went above 4%. 
Table 17 shows productivity growth for the 
EU and the US for different sectors and pe-
riods. In the 1980s, productivity grew faster 
in Europe than in the US with all sectors but 
“Agriculture” and “Manufacturing” having 
higher growth rates than the US. Within 
“Business sector services”, Europe performed 
better than in the US in “Transport and com-
munication” and in “Finance, insurance and 
real estate”, which absorbed about 6% and 
8% respectively of total European employ-
ment (table 18). In the first half of the 1990s, 
Europe kept the average productivity growth 
of the 1980s through labour shedding in all 
sectors except “Business sector services” and 
social services, which, nevertheless, both 
absorbed less employment than in the 1980s 
and less than the US in the same period. By 
contrast, in the US, total labour productivity 
growth remained unchanged with negative 
growth only in “Agriculture” and “Finance 
insurance and real estate” and social services. 
Employment continued to grow at positive 
rates in all sectors but “Manufacturing” and 
“Electricity, gas and water supply”. In the 
second half of the 1990s productivity growth 
accelerated in the US and declined in Europe. 
The widespread pick-up in US productivity 
growth was particularly strong in the “Busi-
ness sector services”, whose employment ex-
panded at 2.8% per year. In the case of Europe, 
8 It is important to stress that the definition of structural change used in the text is a pure quantitative one. Structural change in reality involves more than a simple change in the sectoral employment shares 
of the economy, as it has to do with the expansion of the variety of goods and improvements in their quality. 
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in the second half of the 1990s productivity 
growth declined in all sectors except “Electric-
ity, gas and water supply”, while employment 
grew less than in the US. 
At first sight one might be tempted to overlook 
the effect of structural change8 on labour pro-
ductivity, focusing only on aggregate macro-
economic performance with strong assump-
tions on the homogeneity of the economic 
structure. However, the recognition of variety 
in the economic structure highlights the role 
of dynamic change due to, for example, the 
relocation of employment from sectors with a 
low level of productivity to sectors with a high 
level of productivity. Moreover, structural 
change influences productivity growth when 
it enhances the cumulative aspect of knowl-
edge. Finally, specialisation and structural 
change may affect productivity growth when 
it entails a broad change in demand towards 
more sophisticated goods which may lead to 
efficiency gains in the production process in-
sofar as the size of the market for these goods 
increases.9 
Although there are different views on the 
mechanisms of economic growth, the poten-
tial role of composition effects for aggregate 
performance is undeniable.10 The diverging 
developments between the US and the EU 
may be explained by a shift of resources from 
low productivity to high productivity sectors 
or vice versa. Since sectors differ in terms 
of productivity growth, a shift of factors 
across sectors with different characteristics 
could explain aggregate labour productivity 
dynamics. Moreover, employment shifts to-
wards sectors with high or low productivity 
growth may affect the evolution of aggregate 
productivity even when productivity growth 
does not change at the sectoral level. Changes 
in the composition of employment from low 
to high productivity activities may have an 
effect on the overall productivity growth that 
is stronger the higher the share of employ-
ment in high productivity activities. Finally, 
aggregate productivity growth declines when 
the relative employment share increases in 
those sectors with low or declining productiv-
ity levels. 
Productivity growth can be decomposed 
in such a way that structural change may 
be isolated. It is then possible to determine 
whether labour productivity growth has been 
due to a structural change effect; a productiv-
ity growth effect; or an interaction effect.11 
When positive and increasing over time, the 
Table 17 – Sectoral productivity and employment growth
Sectoral productivity growth1
(annual compounded growth rates)
Sectoral employment growth
(annual compounded growth rates)
European Union2 United States European Union United States
1980-
1989
1991-
1995
1995-
1999
1980-
1989
1991-
1995
1995-
1999
1980-
1989
1991-
1995
1995-
1999
1980-
1989
1991-
1995
1995-
1999
Agriculture 3.5 4.8 4.4 5.8 -1.5 5.9 -2.3 -4.1 -1.8 -0.8 1.9 -0.1
Manufacturing, mining 3.0 3.5 1.7 3.9 4.7 4.1 -1.3 -2.8 -0.1 -0.6 -0.1 0.0
Electricity, gas and water supply 3.0 4.2 5.1 1.2 2.6 1.5 0.2 -2.8 -2.5 1.4 -1.2 -1.3
Construction 2.6 1.3 -1.5 0.0 0.7 0.5 -1.0 -1.4 1.5 2.0 2.0 4.8
Business sector services 1.9 1.4 0.8 0.8 1.1 3.3 1.5 0.5 2.7 3.1 2.3 2.8
- Wholesale and retail trade 1.6 1.0 0.4 2.0 1.7 5.9 0.9 0.1 1.8 2.6 1.9 1.7
- Transport and communication 3.3 4.1 4.4 1.6 2.8 1.9 0.3 -1.2 1.3 1.1 2.0 2.9
- Finance, insurance and real estate 0.4 0.2 -1.0 -1.3 -0.1 0.9 3.5 2.0 4.7 4.9 3.0 4.6
Social and personal services 0.2 1.2 -0.2 0.1 -0.8 -0.3 1.7 0.4 1.6 2.1 1.6 1.6
Total 2.1 2.1 1.0 1.4 1.4 2.0 0.4 -0.6 1.5 1.9 1.6 2.0
Source: OECD Stan Database.
Note: 1 Productivity growth is calculated on the basis of the gross value added at constant prices. Thus, figures for productivity growth might not coincide with those of based on 
GDP at constant prices. 
 2 Due to the lack of data for Luxembourg and Ireland the EU productivity growth and employment shares figure exclude these countries. Due to rounding errors the rows 
and columns might not add exactly to 100.
 To avoid a jump in the series in the EU growth rates for the 1990s due to the German reunification, the average rate is computed for the period 1991-1999. 
Table 18 – Employment share (as a % of total employment)
European Union United States
1980 1991 1999 1980 1991 1999
Agriculture 9.9 7.1 5.4 3.3 2.6 2.5
Manufacturing, mining 24.4 20.5 17.7 20.4 15.5 13.3
Electricity, gas and water supply 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.6
Construction 7.9 7.0 6.8 5.3 5.0 5.6
Business sector services 31.0 35.1 38.6 39.7 43.8 46.3
- Wholesale and retail trade 17.2 18.3 19.1 23.9 24.8 24.7
- Transport and communication 6.0 5.9 5.8 5.1 4.8 5.1
- Finance insurance and real estate 7.8 10.9 13.7 10.7 14.1 16.5
Social and personal services 26.0 29.5 30.9 30.5 32.4 31.7
Source: OECD, STAN database
9 By contrast the relation between productivity growth and the changing sectoral composition of employment may lead to a slowdown in the growth rate of aggregate productivity if the demand pattern is 
biased towards those sectors or industries which display low productivity growth.
10 In a growing economy changes in the sectoral composition of employment do not involve necessarily a reduction of employment in some sectors, the only condition for change being that the sectoral rates 
of employment growth differ.
11 Annex 1 describes the methodology, identifies the contribution of each effect accounted by different sectors. Annex 2 determines the relevance of the employment structure and of sectoral productivity 
growth for the EU-US total labour productivity growth gap.
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first effect reflects the ability of a country 
to grow as resources are shifted from low 
to high productivity sectors. It also suggests 
that the change in employment specialisa-
tion is occurring in the “right” direction. The 
second term represents the growth rate of 
productivity in absence of structural change 
(i.e. within sector productivity growth). 
Finally, the interaction effect represents the 
dynamic component of structural change and 
when positive signals the complementarities 
between structural change and productivity 
growth (positive productivity growth in ex-
panding sectors and/or negative productivity 
growth in contracting sectors). 
Table 19 and chart 39 show the outcome of 
the decomposition of productivity growth 
into these components. Within each period, 
the sectoral labour productivity growth ac-
counts for the major part of total EU pro-
ductivity dynamics - (about 80% and 90% of 
aggregate growth in the 1980s and in the first 
half of the 1990s respectively). Therefore, to-
tal productivity growth was mainly driven by 
sectoral productivity dynamics rather than by 
structural change, with a declining contribu-
tion in the 1995-1999 period.
However, when we compare the change in 
average productivity growth between the 
1980s and early 1990s (the first two columns 
of table 18) with the deceleration of the sec-
ond half of the 1990s (columns 2 and 3) it 
becomes apparent that different effects played 
a role. Indeed, in the 1991-1995 period the re-
structuring of the economy limited European 
productivity growth, while the rate of produc-
tivity growth within sectors accelerated with 
respect to the 1980s average.12 In contrast, 
after 1995 the sharp decline in the sectoral 
productivity growth constrained total labour 
productivity dynamics, while the increase in 
the structural change effect avoided an oth-
erwise stronger decline. Without any change 
in the structure of employment the European 
productivity growth would have declined 
from about 2% in the 1991-1995 period to 
about 0.6 in the 1995-1999 period. 
Therefore, between the 1980s and the first 
half of the 1990s, the relocation of employ-
ment from manufacturing to services and the 
respective rise and fall in productivity growth 
of these two sectors drove the pick-up of total 
labour productivity growth. By contrast, in 
the second half of the 1990s a change in the 
structure of employment was not enough to 
offset the deceleration of sectoral productivity 
growth. The contribution to total productivity 
growth of “Manufacturing“ and “Business sec-
tor services“ strongly declined, and in the last 
sector was even negative for “Finance, insur-
ance and real estate“ (chart 45 of annex 2.1). 
In the US the productivity growth due to 
structural change, which stood at about 0.5% 
per annum in the 1980s, fell drastically in the 
first half of the 1990s, but increased slightly 
after 1995 (chart 39). As in the EU, between 
1991 and 1995 the US sectoral contribution to 
total productivity growth picked up. Thus, the 
gap between the EU and the US productivity 
growth rose from about 0.6 percentage points 
in the 1980s to about 1 percentage point in 
the first half of the 1990s. After 1995, the 
rapid increase of productivity growth of US 
industries reversed the situation. For the first 
time since the 1970s, productivity dynamics 
were more buoyant on the other side of the 
Atlantic than in Europe. The rapid surge in 
productivity growth in the Business sector 
services and in particular in “Wholesale and 
retail trade“ (chart 46 of annex 2.1) contrib-
uted greatly to the change towards a new 
pattern of productivity growth. 
The small contribution of structural change to 
total labour productivity growth does not im-
ply that changes in the employment structure 
of the economy are irrelevant. The previous 
results show only that, on average, productiv-
ity growth is not driven to any large degree 
by changes in the structure of the economy, 
with underlying sectoral contributions of op-
posite sign reducing the contribution of each 
other (see charts 45-46 in annex 2.1). The 
importance of the structure is shown by table 
20 comparing the effective growth rate of the 
EU and the US with the hypothetical rates ob-
tained assuming for each country the employ-
ment structure of the other. It clearly emerges 
that the US would have higher productivity 
12 The contribution of structural change to productivity growth was relatively small because the increase in productivity growth occurred in sectors with a declining employment share. This implied that, 
broadly speaking , the productivity gains in specific sectors operated on a declining share of workers in these sectors.
Table 19 – Labour productivity: structure and growth
European Union United States
Contribution to total growth of: 1980-1989
1991-
1995
1995-
1999
1980-
1989
1991-
1995
1995-
1999
Productivity growth effect 1.6(79.5%)
1.94
(90.5)
0.64
(67%)
1.19
(87%)
1.25
(103%)
2.40
(93.7%)
Structural change effect 0.5(26.2%)
0.31
(14.3%)
0.41
(42.8%)
0.48
(35.1%)
0.04
(3.3%)
0.22
(8.6%)
Interaction effect -0.12(-5.7%)
-0.10
(-4.9%)
-0.09
(-9.8%)
-0.30
(-22.2%)
-0.08
(-6.3%)
-0.06
(-2.26%)
Total labour productivity growth1 2.1(100%)
2.1
(100%)
1.00
(100%)
1.4
(100%)
1.2
(100%)
2.5
(100%)
Source: Calculations on OECD Stan Database
Note: 1 Productivity growth is calculated on the basis of the gross value added at constant prices. Thus, figures for 
productivity growth may not coincide with those based on GDP at constant prices. EU productivity growth excludes 
Luxembourg and Ireland. Due to rounding errors the rows and columns might not add exactly to 100. 
In parentheses percentage of aggregate productivity growth. To avoid a jump in the series in the growth rates for the EU 
for the 1990s due to the German reunification, the average is computed for the period 1991-1999
Table 20 – The impact of structure on productivity growth
European Union United States 
1980-
1989
1990-
1999
1991-
1995
1995-
1999
1980-
1989
1990-
1999
1991-
1995
1995-
1999
With structure of 
European Union : : : : 1.8 1.1 1.2 0.6
United States -1.3 -1.5 -2.4 -0.6 : : :
Source: OECD, STAN database
Note: The figures represent the productivity gains (if positive) or losses (if negative) from adopting the structure of the 
country in the row 
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growth had its structure been that of the EU 
while the opposite would occur in the case of 
Europe. Furthermore, the US gains in terms 
of the effective productivity growth would 
decrease over time. In contrast, the EU gap 
would have reached the highest value in the 
1990s, but would have declined after 1995. 
Thus, structural change can play a role in 
the international differences in productivity 
performance. When the EU-US total produc-
tivity growth is decomposed to account for 
the different sectoral composition of employ-
ment and of productivity of the two areas 
(annex 2.2) it turns out that the intra-sectoral 
productivity differences were in all periods in 
favour of the US. By contrast, the sectoral relo-
cation of employment in Europe contributed 
to reduce the productivity gap with the US. 
These findings suggest that in the last decades 
structural change (i.e. changes in the sectoral 
composition of employment) in Europe has 
contributed to a catching-up with the US pro-
ductivity levels. This effect was stronger in the 
1980s than in the 1990s, a period character-
ised by a change in the sectoral composition 
of employment that was more intense than 
in the US (chart 41).13 In the late 1990s the 
contribution to EU productivity growth stem-
ming from structural change was higher than 
that of the first half of the 1990s. In the same 
years, the degree of change in the economic 
structure was as important as in the US. After 
1995, changes in the EU sectoral productivity 
growth were not sufficient to reduce the gap 
with the US.
The low contribution that stems from struc-
tural change associated with a decline in 
productivity growth within sectors has two 
major consequences. Firstly, it puts a limit 
on European growth opportunities, at least 
without further “pure” productivity gains 
(i.e. coming from an increase in the sectoral 
rate of productivity growth). This implies that 
the European economy should enter into the 
new technological regime, which emerged in 
the US thanks to the diffusion of ICT into the 
entire economy. As documented by several 
authors, despite the evidence on diffusion of 
ICT in Europe, its effects on productivity have 
been disappointing.14 The negative contribu-
tion of productivity growth in “Finance, 
insurance and real estate“ and the declining 
effect stemming from “Manufacturing“ also 
highlights the importance of diffusion and 
creation of knowledge.
Secondly, it shifts the attention from the quan-
titative aspects of structural change to the 
more qualitative ones. If economic growth is 
a process of continuous transformation, also 
changes in the employment structure might 
contribute to growth. However, not all types 
of relocation of employment across sectors 
are necessarily beneficial for growth. With 
13 The chart shows the dynamics of the structure computed with an index of dissimilarity, summing up over all sectors the absolute values of the change in the share between the initial and the final year of 
each period appearing on the horizontal axis. It ranges from 0 (perfect stability in the structure) to 100 (perfect mobility) in the structure. 
14 For example F. Daveri (2002) The New Economy in Europe in Oxford Review of Economic Policy vol. 18 no. 3; Bart van Ark, Robert Inklaar, Robert McGuckin and Marcel Trimmer (2002). The next sub-sec-
tion will report evidence on the productivity performance across ICT industries for the EU and the US.
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the emergence of a new technological para-
digm, the more cumulative the innovation 
process embedded in new systems of produc-
tion, the less an “old” or immutable pattern of 
specialisation may be able to capture entirely 
the potential unleashed by these systems of 
production. Moreover, it is undeniable that 
deepening European integration and eco-
nomic and monetary union add a further 
dimension to competitiveness. Non-price 
factors such as knowledge and innovation 
also affect the quality of goods and services 
produced and, therefore, expand the growth 
opportunities of a country. 
In open and well-integrated economies, the 
structure of comparative advantage made 
possible by particular relative endowments 
of resources or knowledge may promote 
growth if it bestows a cumulative nature to 
the production process. Thus, it is not simply 
the particular employment structure of the 
economy - for example, how many people in 
one country are employed in knowledge-in-
tensive sectors - that may hamper or promote 
growth. Rather, the relative representation of 
a country’s employment in one industry com-
pared to the average representation of that in-
dustry in total EU employment (e.g. the share 
in one country of employment in knowledge-
intensive sectors compared to the average 
share) could give a comparative advantage 
to the country . In this case the employment 
specialisation would matter for growth. The 
relevance of employment specialisation for 
productivity growth at the sectoral level will 
be discussed after the description in the next 
section of the contribution of ICT sectors to 
productivity growth. 
The emergence of new technology has cre-
ated an opportunity that will not last forever 
but should be exploited while it lasts.15 The 
Lisbon and Barcelona European Councils 
have clearly set priorities that favour in-
novation and diffusion of innovation. The 
focus has been put on measures which ensure 
mobility for all those involved in education, 
research and innovation; aim to lower regula-
tory barriers to professional recognition and 
barriers that result from failure to recognise 
formal qualifications and non-formal learn-
ing; and guarantee access for all citizens to 
new technologies. The Barcelona European 
Council also called for a significant boost to 
the overall R&D and innovation effort in the 
Union, emphasising in particular frontier 
technologies, with an increase in the overall 
spending on R&D and innovation aimed at 
approaching 3% of GDP by 2010. 
The role of ICT  
Using a different aggregation of the data 
it is possible to analyse the contribution of 
ICT technologies to total labour productiv-
ity growth. Van Ark et al. (2003)16 show that 
during the 1995-2000 period, productivity 
growth in the ICT-producing industries ac-
celerated in the EU as strongly as in the US 
(table 21 columns 1-4). The similarity of EU 
and the US performance in these industries 
reflects different trends for manufacturing 
and services. The rapid surge of productivity 
in ICT-producing manufacturing was stron-
ger in the US than in Europe and it was only 
partly reduced by a declining productivity 
growth in the ICT-producing services after 
1995. In the latter sector productivity growth 
accelerated in Europe from 4.4% to 6.5%. In 
the ICT-using sectors the rate of growth of 
productivity remained basically stable in the 
EU while it picked up strongly in the US due 
to the acceleration of output per employed 
person in the ICT-using services. By contrast, 
ICT-using manufacturing performed better in 
Europe than the US, albeit less so after 1995. 
Finally, in the non ICT-industries productivity 
growth declined in Europe, in particular in 
the non-ICT manufacturing sector, and in-
creased in the US as the productivity growth 
switched to a positive trend in the non-ICT 
services. Therefore, the European advantage 
of the first half of the 1990s faded away in the 
second half of the decade (see table 21). 
The increase in the US productivity growth 
occurred along a long-run trend of high em-
ployment growth while in Europe the intense 
job creation was associated with a decline of 
labour productivity growth. Despite the nega-
tive relationship between European produc-
tivity and employment growth, data for in-
dustries show that in some expanding sectors 
employment and productivity did actually 
rise together. Furthermore, in the US in some 
industries a positive relationship between 
employment growth and productivity growth 
emerged. For example, between the first and 
the second half of the 1990s, the productivity 
growth of the ICT-using services rose in the 
US from 1.9% to 5.4% and employment from 
0.7% to 2.0%. For the EU the relatively lower 
increase in productivity growth was matched 
by a stronger pick-up in employment growth 
(see table). By contrast, productivity growth 
in the ICT–producing services declined from 
3.1% to 1.8% while employment growth rose 
from 2.2% to 6.9%. In the same industries 
European productivity growth accelerated 
from 4.4% to 6.5% while employment, which 
had been stable in the early 1990s, rose in the 
1995-1999 period at an annual rate of 3.9%. 
The initial sectoral employment structure of 
the US allowed it to benefit from the increase 
in productivity in all sectors, and in particular 
in those sectors enjoying a wide diffusion of 
new technologies. In Europe, the rising em-
ployment share in “Business sector services“ 
and the slowdown in the productivity growth 
in this sector exacerbated the slowdown in 
the overall productivity growth. Further-
more, within this sector the productivity 
performance of the ICT-using industries was 
particularly disappointing while the ICT-pro-
ducing industries “Telecommunications and 
computer services” did better in the EU than 
in the US. Van Ark et al. (2003) also show 
the existence of a major difference between 
Europe and the US in the way in which new 
technologies have been absorbed by the two 
economies, in particular in the ICT-produc-
ing industries. Indeed, between the first and 
the second half of the 1990s the proportions 
of industries with a positive relationship be-
tween productivity and employment growth 
declined in the US and increased in Europe. 
This difference might partly reflect the labour 
saving nature of new technologies introduced 
in the US which, as widely reported by other 
studies, greatly contributed to its boost in 
productivity. It also reflects the limited diffu-
sion in Europe of new technologies in using 
services, and non-ICT services in particular 
15 For example  European Commission (2000) EU Economy Review 2000; F. Daveri (2002) The New Economy in Europe in Oxford Review of Economic Policy vol. 18 no. 3; Bart van Ark, Robert Inklaar, Robert 
McGuckin and Marcel Trimmer (2002), Changing gear, Productivity, ICT and service industry: Europe and the United States, GGGD Research Memorandum No. GD-60. The next sub-section will report 
evidence on the productivity performance across ICT industries for the EU and the US. Verspagen B. (2000) Growth and Structural change: Trends, patterns and policy options, Research Memoranda no 15, 
Maastricht Economic Research Institute on Innovation and Technology (MERIT).
16 Bart van Ark, Robert Inklaar, Robert McGuckin and Marcel Trimmer (2003) The employment Effects of the “New Economy”. A comparison of the European Union and the United States, National Institute 
Economic Review No. 184 April 2003, NIESR.
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the difficulties in Europe of diffusion of new 
technologies in ICT-using services and non-
ICT services.18
Innovation, skills, 
employment 
specialisation and 
growth
Growth opportunities are related to the 
existence of several constraints on the avail-
ability of resources and on their efficient 
and effective use. There is wide consensus 
that innovation and technological progress 
are the engines of growth. With a common 
monetary policy, the innovative capacity of 
a country, its competitiveness and potential 
growth depends even more than in the past 
on the production and diffusion of knowl-
edge. Learning and the diffusion of learning, 
innovations and skills are among the key 
factors that drive technological progress and 
growth. These factors are all crucial for the 
production and dissemination of knowledge 
and depend on the level and pervasiveness of 
education, training, learning on the job and 
R&D. The stock of human capital accumula-
tion contributes to overall growth.19
There are important interactions between 
different learning and innovation processes. 
Innovations are the outcome of costly invest-
ments that require specialised knowledge 
and accumulated skills and experience as 
well as adequate physical infrastructures. 
Technological innovations expand the set 
of production possibilities and generate the 
incentives for acquiring the new skills needed 
to implement such technologies. In addition, 
the acquisition of skills reduces the cost of 
implementation of existing technologies and 
generates the incentives for new technolo-
gies to be developed. Through the Structural 
Funds, the Commission promotes investment 
in innovation and skills development in re-
gions lagging behind and those undergoing 
structural adjustment. This emphasis has 
been strengthened for the current 2000-
2006 funding period and it recognises the 
important role innovation and skills have in 
stimulating economic growth.  
When innovations are general purpose tech-
nologies (GPT) in the sense that they have 
universal and far-reaching applications, the 
lag between their invention and their use may 
lead to a decline in labour productivity growth 
as resources devoted to their discovery are not 
immediately profitable. Nevertheless, innova-
tors engage in production in the expectation 
of profits accruing in the future. The benefits 
of more advanced GPT manifest themselves 
when enough complementary inputs have 
been developed, increasing the adoption of 
new GPT in the production of final goods. 
The longer the lag between the invention of 
GPT and their adoption in “mass production”, 
the higher is the period during which produc-
tivity growth declines. Therefore, both the 
production of complementary inputs and the 
rate of diffusion of GPT affect the length of the 
phase during which advanced GPT are not yet 
profitable. When there are complementarities 
between technological innovations and skills, 
the potential gains from an increasing level of 
education are constrained by the set of exist-
ing technologies and vice-versa.
The existence of lags between the invention 
of GPT and their adoption points towards 
the importance of measures that reduce the 
cost of adoption. Measures that foster the dif-
fusion of new technologies and learning in 
general are therefore crucial. And if there are 
significant costs of learning, a highly skilled 
workforce offers obvious advantages. Skills 
are important not only because educated 
people adapt to change. But also because 
highly skilled people speed up the diffusion of 
technological progress by helping less skilled 
people get involved with it. The higher the 
rate of innovation the higher is, therefore, 
the demand for skilled relative to unskilled 
people. As new technologies become estab-
17 Through the Structural Funds, the Commission promotes investment in innovation and skills development in re-gions lagging behind and those undergoing structural adjustment. This emphasis has been 
strengthened for the current 2000-2006 funding period and it recognises the important role innovation and skills have in stimulating economic growth.
18 Between the first and the second half of the 1990s, the EU proportion of industries in the non-ICT services with a positive relation between employment and productivity growth rose by 16% while in the US 
it grew by more than 100% (Van Ark et al. (2003)).
19 A recent report by Professors Angel de la Fuente and Antonio Ciccone examined the rationale for putting investment in human capital at the forefront of policies aimed at promoting economic growth and so-
cial cohesion. The report shows that investment in human capital contributes significantly to productivity growth; there is also clear evidence that human capital plays a role in fostering technological change 
and diffusion. Human capital investments appear attractive relative to alternative assets, both from the individual and from the aggregate perspectives. The findings of the report suggest that investment in 
people is both a crucial growth factor, particularly in the context of rapid technological change, and a key instrument for enhancing social cohesion. Angel de la Fuente and Antonio Ciccone (2003) Human capi-
tal in a global and knowledge-based economy, European Commission, Employment and Social Affairs. The report can be downloaded from DG Employment and Social Affairs website at the following address
http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/employment_analysis/conference_en.htm
Table 21 – Productivity and employment growth in ICT  and non ICT industries
Productivity 
growth
GDP
Share
Employment
growth
Employment 
Share
1990-1995 1995-2000 2000 1990-1995 1995-2000 1990-1995
EU US EU US EU US EU US EU US EU US
Total Economy 1.9 1.1 1.4 2.5 100 100 -0.6 1.1 1.2 2.0 100 100
ICT-producing 
industries 6.7 8.1 8.7 10.1 5.9 7.3 -1.7 0.6 2.8 4.9 3.9 4.9
ICT-producing 
manufacturing 11.1 15.1 13.8 23.7 1.6 2.6 -4.5 -1.6 0.4 1.5 1.2 1.6
ICT-producing 
services 4.4 3.1 6.5 1.8 4.3 4.7 0.0 2.2 3.9 6.9 2.7 3.3
ICT-using(a) 
industries 1.7 1.5 1.6 4.7 27.0 30.6 -0.7 0.3 1.3 1.6 27.3 28.7
ICT-using 
manufacturing 3.1 -0.3 2.1 1.2 5.9 4.3 -3.8 -1.6 -0.6 -0.8 6.1 4.2
ICT-using 
services 1.1 1.9 1.4 5.4 21.1 26.3 0.3 0.7 1.9 2.0 21.2 24.5
Non ICT 
Industries 1.6 0.2 0.7 0.5 67.1 62.1 -0.5 1.5 1.1 2.0 68.8 66.4
Source van Ark et al. (2003), op. cit.
Note: (a) Excluding ICT-producing
 (b) EU includes Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden 
and the United Kingdom 
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lished in the economy, labour demand also 
rises for the less educated.20 
These considerations highlight the impor-
tance of flexibility in the sense of capability 
and propensity to accept new technologies. 
The process of internationalisation of produc-
tion is increasing the competitive pressures 
coming from developing countries. This will 
require firms in developed countries to divert 
resources from industries and sectors produc-
ing traditional goods and services, which usu-
ally have a low elasticity of demand to world 
income, towards sectors and industries with 
higher technology and knowledge content, 
usually with a high elasticity of demand to 
world income. 
In this context, also the demand side matters. 
Indeed, by incorporating new technolo-
gies, investments contribute to productivity 
growth and output potential. Moreover, new 
technologies enhance the role of learning ac-
cumulated through experience, so that an ini-
tial increase in GDP growth stimulated by in-
vestments spurs further productivity growth 
(increasing returns to scale), improves price 
competitiveness and triggers further GDP 
growth. However, the composition of output 
may put a limit to the benefits accruing from 
GPT.21 
The sectoral composition of employment also 
matters. There are strong advantages and 
disadvantages from sectoral employment 
concentration, which invite testing. Firstly, 
one would expect that countries endowed 
with relatively more labour than capital 
would specialise in the production of goods 
that are more labour-intensive.22 However, 
when the skills composition of employment 
differs across countries, each of them might 
specialise in the production of goods and 
services requiring a more intensive use of 
the specific skills they are more endowed 
with. In this case, not only the share of high-
skilled people would be relevant but also the 
share of skilled people relative to the average 
share of its main competitors. If productivity 
growth depends on innovation and diffusion 
of technologies, then the high-skilled employ-
ment structure of a particular country could 
promote growth more than in another coun-
tries if domestic factors are in that country are 
comparatively more able to reap the benefits 
of innovation and diffusion. In this case, its 
concentration of high-skilled employment 
and thus its employment specialisation would 
matter for growth.23 
Secondly, if countries are more or less 
specialised in industries that require new 
technologies and specific skills or both, differ-
ences in the employment structure impinge 
upon the long-term effects of innovation on 
growth. Countries with better technologies 
and human capital employed in industries 
that use both technologies and human capital 
more intensively (referred to henceforth as 
key industries) have also higher growth po-
tential. A changing endowment structure can 
change the learning capability of a country 
and lead to a changing pattern of catching 
up in sectoral productivity levels. In addition, 
specialisation by opening the possibility for 
further specialisation might lead to productiv-
ity growth via learning effects. This process of 
locking in enhances the existing differences 
between countries where the diffusion of 
knowledge is smaller.24 For this reason it is 
important that people with different levels of 
education can manage new technologies and 
knowledge.
Thirdly, there is an important externality re-
lated to knowledge and knowledge spill-overs. 
For the low- and the medium-skilled, employ-
ment concentration in certain industries may 
not by itself be a sufficient condition for high 
rates of innovation and growth. For example, 
sectors where the low- or medium-skilled are 
over-represented and knowledge spill-overs 
are limited might perform worse than sec-
tors where there is a widespread diffusion 
of learning. However, when there are strong 
links between employed people with different 
levels of education (i.e. favourable framework 
conditions to develop a “cultural proximity”), 
a high concentration of employment for the 
less educated might contribute positively to 
productivity growth. Thus, accumulation of 
human capital may have an impact on techno-
logical capability and on the ability of a poorer 
country to catch up with richer countries.25 
This becomes more likely the more developed 
are the links between the most and the least 
educated in the production process. This 
can occur when then employment sectoral 
mobility is high for those with higher levels 
of education. This is because people with 
higher levels of education, when chang jobs 
and move into different industries bring with 
them knowledge acquired in previous jobs, 
stimulate a more rapid diffusion of knowledge 
to those with lower levels of education. 
On the basis of these considerations, table 
22 summarises the expected effects on pro-
ductivity growth of different employment 
specialisation variables. Industries with 
relative high concentration of high-skilled 
employment are expected to perform better 
than industries with a low concentration. 
For the low- and medium-skilled, one can 
distinguish between direct and indirect effects 
on productivity growth. For the low-skilled, 
the direct effect on productivity growth is 
likely to be negative as they lack the required 
level of competence to adopt and implement 
new technologies quickly.26 In the case of 
the medium-skilled, the expected direct ef-
fect of a high concentration of employment 
20 It cannot be excluded that during the phase of diffusion of new technologies, a partial substitution of high-skilled with less expensive low-skilled occurs. Nevertheless, this should not be seen as a problem if 
production processes are flexible enough to develop new products and processes (i.e. if the economy grows).
21 When the structure of demand is dominated by sectors with a low income elasticity to overall world demand usually sectors that are intensive users of less advanced technologies and low-skilled workers 
- the incentives to adopt a new technology are small (i.e. the adoption costs are high), the pace of innovation is modest and the benefits from high-skilled small.
22 Under very restrictive hypotheses (among them perfect competition in all markets, free trade, no transport costs, same technologies), the Hecksher-Ohlin framework predicts that countries specialise in the 
production of goods they are relatively more endowed with. The basic idea is that countries differ in their relative stock of the different factors of production, and that this differential factor supplies influ-
ences the cost of producing particular goods. 
23 See for example Grossman G. M. and Helpman E.(1989) Comparative advantage and long-run growth, NBER Working Paper No. 2809.
24 Technically, this effect might occur in the presence of dynamic scale effects due to increased specialisation, learning effects, embodied technological process or static increasing returns. See for example Krug-
man P. (1987) The Narrow Moving band, the Dutch Disease and the competitive consequences of Mrs. Thatcher: Notes on trade in the presence of Dynamic Scale Economies in Krugman P. Reconsidering 
Trade Theory.
25 Landesmann M. and Stehrer R. (2000) Potential switchover in comparative advantage: Patterns of Industrial Convergence, Working Paper No 14 Johannes Kepler University of Linz. Landesmann M. and 
Stehrer R. (2002) Industrial specialisation trade and labour market dynamics in a multi-sectoral model of technological progress, Working Paper No 15 
26 For example, Caselli and Coleman show that for a number of OECD countries the educational level of workers is among the determinants of the investment in computers. Caselli F. and Coleman II J. (2001) 
Cross-country technology diffusion: the case of computers, American Economic Review, 91(2), pp. 328-335.
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on productivity is uncertain and depends 
on how binding “routinised”(i.e. repetitive) 
production processes are for the adoption of 
new technologies. 
The indirect effect works when people 
with lower levels of education benefit from 
interaction with those with higher levels of 
education. In this case the diffusion of new 
technologies would be speeded up by the 
exposure of the least educated to those with 
higher levels of education. This might occur 
when people with lower educational levels 
“climb-up the ladder”, which means that their 
employment share increases in sectors where 
the adoption and use of technology is at a 
more advanced stage. In this case, one would 
expect productivity growth to be higher when 
the relative share of less educated people rises 
in the most dynamic industries. Alternatively, 
technological diffusion and adoption might 
occur when, in spite of an unchanged sectoral 
concentration, there is intense sectoral mobil-
ity for those with a higher level of education. 
In this case, one would expect that produc-
tivity growth would be higher in industries 
dominated by low- or medium-skilled employ-
ment when there is a significant change in 
the composition of employment for those 
with a higher level of education. 
The structure of 
European employment 
specialisation
Before testing for the significance of these 
effects, this section describes the employment 
specialisation variables used in the economet-
ric analysis and provides a characterisation of 
the pattern of employment specialisation for 
total employment and the three formal levels 
of education. A country is highly specialised 
when only a few sectors account for a large 
share of total employment compared to what 
is observed for the EU as a whole. In this case 
the country is considered to have a compara-
tive advantage in a few sectors only. Does this 
specialisation pattern reflect a similar struc-
ture of employment at all level of education? 
or does a specific educational level affect it 
more than others? 
A highly aggregate description of the employ-
ment specialisation (i.e. of the potential gains 
or losses of competitiveness due to differences 
in the relative composition of employment) 
could hide relevant characteristics and 
changes over time of the comparative advan-
tage occurring at a lower level of aggregation. 
Even though a sector as a whole absorbs a 
relative low share of total employment (i.e. 
with a share of employment lower than the 
respective share in the EU), it might be that 
at least one of its industries has a high level 
of specialisation. Using a classification of 56 
Table 22 – Expected effects on productivity 
growth of different employment 
specialisation variables
Specialisation
Relative high concentration of low-skilled -
Relative high concentration of medium-skilled ?
Relative high concentration of high-skilled +
Specialisation in key industries
Relative high concentration of low-skilled in 
medium- or high-tech industries
+
Relative high concentration of medium-skilled 
in medium- or high-tech industries
+
Specialisation and structural change
Relative high concentration of low-skilled in 
countries with a rapid transformation of the 
structure for medium- and high-skilled
+
Relative high concentration of medium-skilled 
in countries with a rapid transformation of the 
structure for high-skilled
+
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industries, this section analyses the character-
istics of employment specialisation by levels 
of education. 
From a dynamic perspective, chart 42 con-
firms the importance of the characteristics 
of employment specialisation for different 
levels of education. The chart shows for each 
Member State the mobility of the employ-
ment structure for total employment and 
for the three levels of education. The index, 
widely used in regional analysis, indicates the 
speed of employment structural change (i.e. 
the intensity of the relocation of employment 
across different industries - see box 4). If for 
a country the index is equal to zero, then it 
undergoes no structural change in the period 
1995-2002; if the index is equal to one then 
the country undergoes complete structural 
change in the same period. 
For total employment, the relative small 
values for France, the UK and Belgium sug-
gest that no important changes occurred in 
the employment composition. In a relatively 
short period of time Ireland, Luxembourg and 
Italy transformed their structures by more 
than 10%. In terms of high-skilled, Austria, 
Luxembourg and Finland changed the most, 
by at least 15%. Finally, in six Member States 
the intensity of change appears smaller for 
low-, and medium-skilled employment than 
for high-skilled employment. 
The measure of mobility of the employment 
structure gives no indication of the type of 
specialisation (i.e. which industry absorbs 
more employment). To characterise the ex-
tent of employment specialisation an index 
of sectoral employment concentration has 
been calculated for each sector and country. 
For each country, the index is defined as the 
ratio between the share of employment in a 
specific industry in the country and the share 
of the same industry in the EU aggregate 
(see box 4). The index provides information 
on the pattern of employment comparative 
advantage in so far as it evaluates a country’s 
employment share in a certain sector with 
a benchmark (the country’s employment 
share in total employment in the EU). The 
index measures the relative representation 
of a country’s employment in one industry 
compared to the average representation of 
that industry in total EU employment. A value 
of the index greater/lower than 1 signals an 
above/below average specialisation in an 
individual sector. The closer to 0 the index is 
the lower is the sectoral share of the country’s 
employment in terms of the country’s share 
of total employment. A value around 1 for sev-
eral countries in a particular sector suggests 
the similarity of the employment structure 
across countries. For each sector, the index 
has been constructed for total and low-, me-
dium- and high-skilled employment. It is then 
possible to identify the patterns of specialisa-
tion of each country and its persistence over 
time for total employment and for the three 
educational groups. 
Box 4 – How to measure specialisation 
Measures of specialisation are usually based on sectoral production or exports (K. 
Laursen (2000) Specialisation, trade and growth, Routhledge). Using employment 
shares highlights the specialisation from the input side while the former variables focus 
more on the output side. The Balassa index (BI) is one of the most widely used indicators 
in the analysis of trade specialisation. It is usually based on sectoral export and is defined 
as the sectoral relative export share in terms of a share of world exports. The index has 
also been used to define the technological specialisation. This index has several short-
comings: (i) its maximum value attainable changes over time and across countries and 
is equal to the ratio of world exports (employment) over each country exports (employ-
ment); (ii) the index is not symmetric. Therefore, its mean is a poor synthetic indicator 
of the average degree of specialisation while its median is more appropriate (see L. De 
Benedictis and M. Tamberi (2001), A note on the Balassa index of revealed comparative 
advantage). In this section we use the as measure of specialisation the relative sectoral 
employment share of country c in terms of its employment share over the EU aggregate. 
This is defined in symbols in the following way:
BIcs =
share of employment in country c and sector  s over total  EU employment in sector  s
share of employment in country c over total EU employment
To avoid non-normality of the residuals, the econometric analysis of the next section 
adopts as measure of specialisation the Laursen normalisation of
 
BIcs  
(Laursen (2000), 
op. cit.):
 
BI
BI
cs
cs
−
+
1
1
Describing the indices of specialisation for 56 industries, three levels of skills and 15 
Member States might be extremely cumbersome. To characterise the structure of spe-
cialisation, we will look at the distribution of the
 
BIcs  
index of specialisation. Charts 
43 and 44 shows an approximation of the density function of the index. The density 
function are estimated by Gaussian kernel smoothing with an automatic bandwidth 
choice  proposed by Silverman. In order not to modify artificially the shape of the dis-
tribution the non-negativity constraint has not been imposed on the kernel estimation. 
This implies that negative values are possible on the horizontal axis of the charts when 
the empirical distribution is skewed to the left despite only positive values of the index 
being observed.
 For a specific sector, the index is not a simple average of the indices for low-, medium- 
and high-skilled. It depends also on the country’s share of each educational group with 
respect to the relative EU aggregate, on the EU sectoral share of each educational group, 
and on the country share of total employment in the EU. Thus, a country with a sec-
tor-specific comparative disadvantage with respect to total employment can also have a 
comparative advantage in a certain educational group. 
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A simple way to provide an empirical descrip-
tion of the regularities of the distribution of 
employment specialisation is represented in 
charts 43-44. The values of the specialisation 
index appear on the horizontal axis. On the 
horizontal axis 1 represents the demarca-
tion value between de-specialisation and 
specialisation. A value higher/lower than 
1 corresponds to a sector specialised/de-
specialised. The height of the curve is an 
approximation of the relative number of sec-
tors with a value of the index around that on 
the horizontal axis. The area below the curve 
between 0 and 1 represents the total number 
of de-specialised sectors (or the probability 
of having a de-specialised sector). When the 
density is symmetric and centred around 1, 
the distribution of the comparative advantage 
across sectors is not polarised, with no sectors 
being more specialised than others. When 
the distribution is asymmetric with a long 
right tail and with the median lower than 1, 
a large part of industries are de-specialised. 
The opposite occurs when the distribution is 
asymmetric with a long left tail.
A closer look at the density for total employ-
ment (chart 43) reveals a fairly symmetric 
distribution centred around 1 for France 
and - ignoring for the moment the long tails 
- for Belgium, Denmark, Ireland (but only 
in 1995), Italy and the UK. This implies that 
the number of less specialised sectors is more 
or less the same as that of more specialised 
sectors. Within this group France and the UK 
have less heterogeneity in terms of compara-
tive advantage of total employment  - the dis-
tribution is “peaked“ and “narrow“).27 With 
the exception of Spain, where the number of 
sectors de-specialised prevails but the degree 
of de-specialisation is fairly distributed across 
industries, the remaining countries have a 
skewed distribution. In the case of Germany 
this signals the presence of a relatively larger 
number of specialised sectors, while for Aus-
tria it is related to the smaller number of very 
de-specialised sectors and a larger number of 
sectors with structures of employment that 
are close to that prevailing in the EU. 
In the remaining countries a majority of sec-
tors are de-specialised. This is shown by the 
large part of the distribution being below 1. 
All countries except France, the Netherlands 
and Germany have a very high maximum 
value of the index of specialisation, implying 
a very high relative concentration of employ-
ment in specific industries. For these coun-
tries there is a strong dispersion in the model 
of specialisation. This is also evident from the 
very high maximum value of the index - (in 
countries such as Greece, Finland, Luxem-
bourg, Belgium, Ireland, Italy, Spain and the 
UK)28 - and reflects the co-existence of sec-
tors with extremely high and extremely low 
levels of specialisation. For the Netherlands 
the distribution has a clear hump pointing to 
the co-existence of a segmented specialisation 
model. Some industries tend to cluster around 
a high concentration of employment and the 
remaining around low levels of specialisation. 
Ireland is the only country that in the second 
half of the 1990s experienced an increase in 
the number of sectors with high specialisa-
tion. 
For some Member States, the distribution 
of comparative advantages for total employ-
ment hides heterogeneous patterns of special-
isation by levels of education. Chart 44 shows 
the density of the index of specialisation for 
total employment and the three educational 
groups for 1995. For all countries, except 
Germany and France, the shapes of these 
distributions are not centred around 1, imply-
ing that at all levels of education it is common 
to find few sectors with a high specialisation. 
The charts for Austria and, in particular for 
Italy, also show humps for the high-skilled, 
indicating the existence of polarisation in 
the specialisation which is not present for the 
medium- and the low-skilled and disappears 
for total employment (see chart 44).29 Thus, 
in these countries the high-skilled employed 
are likely to be in sectors clustered around 
27 The UK, however, also has sectors with relatively high comparative advantage - Extraction of crude petroleum and natural gas, Manufacture of coke, Activities auxiliary to financial intermediation and 
Renting of machinery and equipment without operator and of personal and households goods.
28 The maximum is achieved in different sectors of the economy. For Belgium and Luxembourg this is observed for the sub-sector Extra-territorial organisations and bodies; for Denmark by Water transport; 
for Greece by Manufacture of tobacco products and for Finland by Forestry.
29 However, the “island” of sectors with high comparative advantage in high-skilled disappeared in the 2002 distribution.
The indices of specialisation are based on the EU Labour Force Statistics, with a break-
down of data up to 2-digit according to the NACE rev. 1 classification and the ISCED stan-
dard classification of education. Data at this level of aggregation for all Member States 
is available from 1995. However, for the UK there was a reclassification of the codes as-
signed to medium- and low-skilled in 1999. For this reason, there is a break in the series 
and comparisons for these educational groups over time should be viewed with caution. 
Furthermore, to build the index of specialisation for different sectors the “no answers” 
not being attributed to any sector or skill level have not been considered in the totals. For 
the Netherlands ISCED data are available since 1996. Thus for this country the employ-
ment structure of this year is considered. 
Intensity of change of employment specialisation (index of mobility of the employment 
structure)
To evaluate the mobility of the structure in a given country the following index 
is calculated using a 2-digit aggregation of employment data (56 sub-sectors):
 N
N
t
N
N
ti i
i
1 0 2( )− ( )∑ / . The index ranges from zero to one, and indicates a complete 
mobility in the specialisation structure if the index is close to 1 and little change if the 
index is close to zero. It only gives an indication of the intensity of change and not of its 
direction. 
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two different levels of specialisation (a very 
low and a very high) rather than around a 
common average. A significant polarisation 
is observed in the case of the low-skilled in 
the Netherlands (see chart), which also has a 
very dispersed and de-specialised structure of 
its employment specialisation model in high-
skilled more than any other educational level. 
Denmark has a relatively higher number of 
sectors with low specialisation in low- and 
high-skilled, while in Sweden this is true for 
all educational levels. 
France and Germany, despite having a distri-
bution centred on 1 - a pattern of specialisa-
tion less uneven than the other countries, 
have different degrees of heterogeneity in 
employment structure. In Germany, this 
diversity is the highest for the low-skilled 
and the lowest for the medium-skilled. This 
implies that compared with the EU bench-
mark, sectors with a very high share of the 
total numbers of the low-skilled employed 
in the country co-exist with sectors with an 
extremely low share.30 For France the distri-
bution for the medium-skilled is more concen-
trated across industries than for the high- and 
the low-skilled, with industries where the 
least educated are employed displaying a very 
high level of specialisation (as shown by the 
long right tails).31 Finally, Italy and Austria 
have a larger number of de-specialised sectors 
in high-skilled than in  medium-skilled, while 
for Portugal the number of sectors de-spe-
cialised in medium-skilled is greater than the 
number of sectors de-specialised in the other 
levels of education. 
The effect of 
specialisation on 
productivity growth: 
econometric analysis
The previous sections showed that total 
labour productivity growth hides quite dif-
ferent dynamics of productivity growth at the 
sectoral level. Also the employment structure 
varies between countries and within coun-
tries the composition of employment by 
educational level differs across sectors. This 
section explores whether, and how, the diver-
sity of employment specialisation is reflected 
in the productivity growth of industries. The 
analysis also takes into account a series of 
factors considered to be among the deter-
minants of productivity growth. It describes 
first the variables used in the econometric 
estimates.32
The effects of employment specialisation have 
already been discussed but it is important to 
stress that an increase in sectoral employ-
ment concentration has a positive impact on 
productivity when it affects competitiveness 
through its effect on non-price factors such 
as innovation, knowledge and diffusion of 
knowledge, learning-by-doing, education 
and skills. Clearly the skills composition of 
the workforce and, its distribution across 
different sectors as explained earlier is central 
to verify the effect of a certain employment 
structure on productivity growth. 
The sectoral ratio of investment to output is 
included as a measure of propensity to invest 
out of income but also of the technical prog-
ress embodied in new capital. The intensity 
of expenditures in R&D represents a proxy 
for the innovation effort. The estimates also 
consider the effect of a technological catch-
up, defined as the ratio between each sector’s 
R&D intensity relative to the maximum value 
for that sector in the sample of EU countries. 
The change of each industry share of value 
added in the EU captures variation in the com-
position of output common to all Member 
States.33 Finally, the initial level of productiv-
ity determines the speed of convergence of 
productivity level across industries. 
Results
Firstly, the simple hypothesis that the relative 
structure of employment in the initial year 
influenced the rate of productivity growth 
for the following five years (table 23 column 
1) was tested. Columns 2-7 replicate the 
same estimate of column 1 but controlling 
also for other relevant variables. The role of 
technological catch-up was then investigated. 
Table 24 reports the outcome of a similar es-
timation, but includes a variable that reflects 
technological catch-up rather then the inten-
sity of R&D expenditure. The basic idea is that 
differences between followers and the leader 
in R&D intensity may benefit those behind 
the technological frontier because of the ef-
fects of imitation and diffusion by the leader 
(the advantage of “relative backwardness”).34 
However, the advantage of backwardness 
does not lead to an automatic catch-up and 
requires the development of an adequate set 
of factors (a high level of “social capability”) 
that allow a country to “import” the tech-
nologies of the leader. Thus, the technologi-
cal gap might lead to either convergence or 
divergence. Moreover, countries closer to the 
technological frontier depend more on the 
development of “new” knowledge than those 
lagging behind.35 The effects of the variables 
not related to the employment structure are 
discussed first. 
30 These sectors are R&D for the maximum value and Fishing for the minimum. For the medium-skilled the least and the most specialised sectors are Recycling and Fishing.
31 The maximum value for low-skilled is in Recycling. In 2002 the distribution for France moves rightward  - more industries with high specialisation in high skilled employment – but also presents two humps 
for extreme values, implying the emergence of three clubs of specialisation. The first with low levels of comparative advantage, the second with a structure similar to that of the EU and the third with sub-
stantial specialisation in high skilled. Using the classification based on the ICT intensity, the first group gathers non-ICT industries (Land Transport, Personal and Social services, Agriculture, Mining and 
Construction) and one ICT-using industry (Recycling). The third group includes one industry of the ICT-producing services (Computer services), two of the ICT-using services (R&D and Wholesale trade and 
commission trade), one of non-ICT manufacturing (Manufacture of tobacco products) and two of the non-ICT services (Air transport and Extra-territorial organisation).
32 For the US comparable data on employment by educational attainment and industries are not available. For this reason the analysis is limited only to the European countries.
33 Since this variable is endogenous, its inclusion may lead to a biased estimate of its effect on productivity growth. However, the effects of the remaining explanatory variables are statistically different from 
zero when this variable is not included among the determinants of labour productivity growth.
34 Authors such as Gerschenkron, Baumol and Abramowtiz, developed this idea. See Fagerberg J. (1994) for a survey on growth and technology, Technology and International differences in the growth rates 
in Journal of Economic Literature vol. XXXII pp1147-1175 and for an application Fagerberg J. (1988) International Competitiveness in Economic Journal vol 98, pp 355-374 and Fagerberg J. and Verspagen 
B. (2002), Technological-gaps, innovation- diffusion and transformation: an evolutionary interpretation, in Research Policy vol. 31 pp1291-1304.
35 The rationale for including R&D to the squared and to the cube is the following. Since R&D is a costly it might have a positive impact on productivity growth only when a certain threshold of expenditure is 
achieved (i.e. a too low expenditure might not be enough to trigger a cumulative learning process that favours growth). The non-linear terms allow the learning effects of R&D to be taken into account.
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Effects of non-structural 
variables 
The effect of the initial productivity level on 
productivity growth is negative, implying 
convergence across industries and countries. 
Industries that were under-performing in 
1995 have been growing faster and, therefore, 
“catching up” with the others. The speed of 
convergence is generally low when the effects 
of specialisation alone are taken into account. 
When the intensity of R&D expenditure is 
allowed to play a role, the speed of conver-
gence increases but it falls to virtually zero 
(no convergence) when the effort of R&D 
requires a minimum threshold to be achieved 
before having positive effects on productivity. 
Convergence increases when investment rate 
influences productivity growth. One also no-
tices positive effects on productivity growth 
of the investment output ratio and of the 
change in the sectoral share of the EU value 
added. The gap in the technological intensity 
is always positive, in particular when the ef-
fect of investment output ratio is considered. 
This implies that the lagging behind industry 
of one country could benefit from techno-
logical diffusion from the leading industry 
of another country. Moreover, it cannot be 
excluded that the advantage of backwardness 
tends to disappear and even become negative 
in industries that are close to the technologi-
cal frontier. Therefore, without an appropri-
ate development of their own technology, 
the dynamics of diffusion of knowledge can 
lock industries and countries in their initial 
position.
Effects of employment 
specialisation
Productivity growth always correlates posi-
tively with specialisation in high-skilled em-
ployment. This implies that industries where 
most of the skilled people were concentrated 
in 1995 performed, in the following five years, 
better than industries with a relatively low 
specialisation at this educational level. Being 
specialised in high-skilled is good for produc-
tivity growth. High specialisation in medium-
skilled is associated with low productivity 
growth while for low-skilled the relation is 
either insignificant or negative.
Effects of employment 
specialisation in specific 
sectors
The relationship between specialisation and 
growth may work through complex links 
between low- medium- and high-skilled em-
ployment that promote growth only when 
there are strong complementarities between 
people with different levels of education and 
between them and the type of production 
process in which they are involved. These 
considerations suggest looking for different 
effects of specialisation by level of education 
in industries sharing common characteris-
tics. This hypothesis is tested in table 25. Eco-
nomic activities have been reclassified adopt-
ing the OECD classification in low-, medium-, 
and high-tech industries36 for “Manufacturing 
and mining“, while all activities belonging to 
services are pooled. Since this classification 
is based on a very detailed aggregation (not 
available for the variables needed to compute 
productivity) each industry in the database 
is mapped in one of the low-, medium-, and 
high-tech categories when at least one activ-
ity classified as such appears in the more 
aggregate classification. Estimates similar to 
those in table 16 have been repeated, but test-
ing for different effects of employment spe-
cialisation on productivity growth in “low“, 
“medium“, “high-tech industries“, “Services” 
and “Agriculture“.
The positive contribution to productiv-
ity growth of specialisation in high-skilled 
is confirmed. Productivity growth depends 
positively on the relative sectoral concentra-
tion of high-skilled employment. A necessary 
condition to have an increase of high-skilled 
concentration in all sectors is for each sector 
to have a growth rate for high-skilled employ-
ment that is higher than the growth rate 
of each sector’s total employment. A closer 
look at the different impacts for each of the 
five typologies of industries reveals that the 
highest contribution is obtained in the case of 
“Agriculture” and “high-tech industries” while 
it is the lowest for “low-tech” and “Services” 
industries. Specialisation in medium-skilled 
is significant but negatively correlated with 
productivity growth in “Services” and “high-
tech industries”. Finally, sectors with high 
specialisation in low-skilled perform better 
in medium-tech industries than in any other 
industry.
The negative impact on productivity growth 
of the specialisation in medium-skilled may 
be related to the statistical classification of 
people employed with an intermediate level 
of education, which is too broad to account 
for the heterogeneity -and implicitly for dif-
ferent productivity - of the group with an 
intermediate level of education. Alternatively, 
the effect of a high specialisation in medium-
skilled may be positive when associated 
with a transformation of the economy as a 
response to technological innovation and 
organisational change. As pointed out by Met-
calfe J.S. Foster J. and Ramlogan R. (2002): 
“Transformation or adaptation is the way the 
economy responds to novelty in the form of 
innovation... Transformation in the form of 
structural change, and the shifting balance 
of resource allocation and creation is the pro-
cess that generates growth whether we look 
within industries or between industries.” This 
effect is investigated next and the results are 
shown in Table 26. 
Effects of employment 
specialisation and of structural 
change 
Table 26 reports the effects on sectoral pro-
ductivity growth when the complementarities 
between change in the employment structure 
and employment specialisation by level of 
education are taken into account. The last 
column of the table verifies the significance 
of the relative employment structure and of 
structural change in industries classified on 
the basis of their technological intensity. First 
36 See Hatzichronoglou T. (1997) Revision of the high-technology sector and product classification, OECD – STI working paper no.2. Ideally, it would be more appropriate to classify the different activities in 
ICT-using, ICT-producing and non-ICT. However, this classification would require a high level of detail available in the standard database used here.
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the effect on sectoral productivity growth of 
employment concentration for the low-skilled 
is discussed distinguishing its impact in coun-
tries experiencing high employment sectoral 
mobility for this educational level as well as 
for the medium- and the high-skilled. 
• High sectoral concentration of low-skilled 
workers correlates with positive produc-
tivity growth in countries where there 
is high sectoral mobility of low-skilled 
employment. The same result applies in 
countries where the sectoral mobility 
for the medium-skilled is high, but in this 
case the effect on productivity growth is 
stronger. These finding seem to confirm 
the hypothesis that high sectoral mobility 
of those with higher levels of education is 
the vehicle through which knowledge is 
Table 23 – Regressions results for the effect of specialisation on productivity growth SURE estimates on a cross section of 13 Member States
Dependent variable productivity growth 95-99 Equation 1 Equation 2 Equation 3 Equation 4 Equation 5 Equation 6 Equation 7
Productivity level 95 -0.23(-1.07)
-0.49
(-3.42)
-1.11
(-7.9)
-0.03
(-0.13)
-0.14
(-0.56)
-0.75
(-3.92)
-0.89
(-5.00)
Change in the EU share of sectoral value 
added
0.15
(5.8)
0.13
(7.95)
0.11
(5.15)
0.12
(4.72)
0.13
(5.08)
0.08
(4.02)
0.10
(4.90)
Specialisation – low-skilled -0.002(-0.45)
-0.009
(-4.10)
-0.025
(-7.21)
-0.001
(-0.35)
0.00
(0.00)
-0.017
(-3.71)
-0.016
-3.86
Specialisation – medium-skilled -0.02(-2.60)
-0.015
(3.9)
-0.02
(-4.10)
-0.024
(-3.33)
-0.02
(-3.38)
-0.019
(-3.07)
-0.021
(-3.64)
Specialisation – high-skilled 0.015(5.2)
0.024
(16.27)
0.03
(8.48)
0.02
(4.52)
0.02
(5.86)
0.017
(7.02)
0.023
(5.07)
R&D intensity 0.32(4.56)
0.50
(4.56)
-1.39
(7.25)
-0.07
(-0.23)
-1.37
(-7.02)
0.16
(0.48)
(R&D intensity)2 0.27(11.72)
-0.21
(-2.74)
0.29
(7.16)
-0.22
(-2.67)
(R&D intensity)3 0.04(7.32)
0.04
(6.97)
Log (share of investment in value added)1 1.43(11.25)
1.32
(7.16)
1.25
(7.63)
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
0.12 0.16 0.18 0.26 0.26 0.29 0.29
Number of observations 234 208 180 208 208 180 180
Source: Eurostat and OECD
Note: 1 Spain excluded due to insufficient data on investment for the industries
t-statistic in parentheses
Table 24 – Regressions results for the effect of specialisation on productivity growth SURE estimates on a cross section of 13 Member States
Dependent variable productivity growth 95-99 Equation 8 Equation 9 Equation 10 Equation 11 Equation 12 Equation 13
Productivity level 95 -0.59(-8.79)
-0.98
(-5.80)
-0.63
(-5.86)
-0.62
(-4.76)
-1.00
(-5.67)
-0.96
(-5.97)
Change in the EU share of sectoral value 
added
0.16
(15.07)
0.16
(8.98)
0.16
(8.55)
0.16
(8.01)
0.16
(8.52)
0.16
(8.74)
Specialisation – low-skilled -0.007(-7.23)
-0.017
(-5.46)
-0.007
(-4.52)
-0.008
(-3.93)
-0.017
(-5.26)
-0.02
(-5.70)
Specialisation – medium-skilled -0.019(-10.06)
-0.029
(-5.99)
-0.02
(-7.87)
-0.02
(-6.50)
-0.03
(-5.99)
-0.03
(-6.79)
Specialisation – high-skilled 0.02(38.9)
0.028
(10.68)
0.02
(20.7)
0.03
(18.22)
0.03
(10.56)
0.03
(10.78)
Gap in R&D intensity 0.0001(1.76)
0.005
(2.13)
0.016
(3.63)
-0.016
(-1.61)
0.015
(1.75)
-0.04
(-2.28)
(Gap in R&D intensity)2 -0.015(-4.05)
0.07
(3.89)
-0.001
(-1.36)
0.13
(3.23)
(Gap in R&D intensity)3 -0.055(-4.39)
-0.09
(-3.56)
Log (share of investment in value added)1 0.90(6.94)
0.93
(6.71)
0.97
(7.99)
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13
Number of obs. 208 180 208 208 180 180
Source: Eurostat and OECD
Note: 1 Spain excluded due to insufficient data on investment for the industries.
t-statistic in parentheses;
In bold values significantly different from zero.
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diffused to those with a lower educational 
level. The finding that sectoral mobility of 
the most educated does not represent an 
advantage for industries - both with a low 
or high - specialisation of employment 
in low-skilled, signals the importance 
of “cultural” proximity for people with 
different levels of education. To take 
advantage of the sectoral mobility of the 
high-skilled it is therefore important to 
upgrade the knowledge and the compe-
tencies of the least educated. 
• High sectoral concentration of medium-
skilled workers is positively correlated 
with sectoral productivity growth only 
in countries where there is a rapid trans-
formation of the sectoral employment 
share for the high-skilled. In contrast, 
high sectoral concentration of medium-
skilled workers is negatively correlated 
with sectoral mobility of the low- and the 
medium-skilled. This result confirms the 
hypothesis that those with an intermedi-
ate level of education may benefit from 
the dynamism of the most educated. The 
negative correlation between concentra-
tion of medium-skilled employment and 
sectoral productivity in countries with a 
certain degree of sectoral mobility for the 
low- and the medium-skilled may depend 
on the mobility for these two groups not 
being the key mechanism through which 
relevant knowledge is transferred to 
those with an intermediate level of edu-
cation. Thus, their dynamism does not 
help the performance of industries with 
a relatively high share of medium-skilled 
employed.
• High sectoral concentration of high-
skilled workers is positively correlated 
with sectoral productivity growth only in 
countries with a relatively high sectoral 
mobility of high-skilled employment 
- in particular in the case of “high-tech” 
industries. In contrast, an intense change 
in the sectoral structure of employment 
for the low- and the medium-skilled does 
not represent an advantage for industries 
specialised in high-skilled. 
The results of the econometric estimates 
suggest that specialisation, but not any type 
of specialisation, matters for sectoral produc-
tivity growth. Sectoral concentration of high-
skilled always promotes productivity growth. 
For any specific industry, in particular for the 
most technologically advanced sectors, the 
benefit of certain specialisation in high-skilled 
employment is strong in countries with a 
high dynamism of the employment share for 
the most educated workers. Nevertheless, the 
advantage of being specialised in high- skilled 
is reduced when changes in the sectoral 
composition of low- and medium-skilled are 
high. In contrast, the empirical evidence sug-
gests that high specialisation for the lowest 
level of education contributes positively to 
productivity growth when the relative share 
of low-skilled is high in medium-tech sectors 
only. Alternatively, productivity growth is 
high when the relative share of both low- and 
medium-skilled is high in countries with a 
changing sectoral structure for those with the 
higher level of education. 
Conclusions
The recent slowdown in the EU’s productivity 
growth occurred when the structure of em-
ployment by level of education was changing. 
More jobs were created for high-skilled people 
Table25 – Regressions results for the effect of specialisation on productivity growth SURE 
estimates on a cross section of 13 Member States
Dependent variable productivity growth 95-99 Equation 14 Equation 15 Equation 16 Equation 17
Productivity level 95 -0.07(-0.29)
-0.17
(-0.75)
0.36
(1.47)
0.21
(0.94)
Change in the EU share of sectoral value 
added
0.18
(6.50)
0.13
(6.12)
0.14
(6.15)
0.14
(6.81)
Low skilled * low-tech 0.005(0.37)
-0.004
(-0.43)
-0.004
(-0.39)
-0.002
(-0.19)
Low skilled *  medium-tech 0.009(0.77)
0.02
(1.84)
0.02
(1.74)
0.02
(1.94)
Low skilled * high-tech -0.04(-4.68)
-0.00
(-0.03)
-0.019
(-1.38)
-0.003
(-0.24)
Low * agriculture -0.011(0.76)
-0.03
(1.83)
-0.012
(-0.94)
-0.02
(1.32)
Low * services 0.00(0.07)
0.006
(0.90)
0.012
(1.93)
0.01
(2.11)
Medium skilled * low-tech 0.004(0.30)
0.001
(0.14)
-0.002
(-0.30)
-0.003
(-0.37)
Medium skilled * medium-tech -0.02(-0.90)
-0.03
(-1.29)
-0.03
(-1.42)
-0.03
(-1.52)
Medium skilled *  high-tech -0.06(-4.72)
-0.01
(-9.30)
-0.05
(-3.46)
-0.06
(-4.99)
Medium * agriculture 0.015(1.21)
-0.002
(-0.10)
0.001
(0.083)
-0.004
(-0.18)
Medium * services -0.035(-3.19)
-0.025
(-2.84)
-0.05
(-4.58)
-0.40
(-4.47)
High skilled * low-tech 0.009(1.40)
0.02
(3.10)
0.013
(2.12)
0.12
(2.39)
High skilled * medium-tech 0.03(2.53)
0.03
(4.07)
0.035
(4.82)
0.33
(4.29)
High skilled * high-tech 0.07(13.44)
0.03
(5.05)
0.026
(3.78)
0.034
(4.74)
High * agriculture 0.07(3.99)
0.08
(5.97)
0.083
(5.68)
0.08
(6.26)
High * services -0.006(-0.95)
0.02
(2.34)
0.02
(2.03)
0.015
(1.99)
R&D intensity 0.77(5.92)
-1.35
(-7.21)
0.03
(0.11)
(R&D intensity)2 0.28(12.78)
-0.19
(-2.48)
(R&D intensity)3 0.04(6.84)
Country dummies yes yes yes Yes
0.15 0.18 0.26 0.26
Number of obs. 234 234 234 234
Source: Eurostat and OECD
Note: t-statistic in parentheses;
In bold values significantly different from zero.
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while the number of low-skilled in the work-
force declined. While these dynamics could be 
a manifestation of skill-biased technological 
change, one would expect different contri-
butions to production from heterogeneous 
workers, with the high-skilled being more 
productive than the low-skilled.37 
This chapter has shown that the overall pro-
ductivity growth reflects different sectoral 
productivity dynamics and different contri-
butions of the change in the sectoral mix of 
employment. The relevance of these different 
components of productivity growth tends to 
be more pronounced in some periods than 
in others. For example, in the 1980s, changes 
in the composition of employment explained 
20% of total labour productivity growth, 
while the contribution of productivity growth 
within sectors accounted for the remaining 
80%. In the 1990s the proportion explained 
by the former declined while that due to the 
latter increased. Nevertheless, a closer look at 
the data reveals that these patterns occurred 
essentially in the first half of the 1990s; after 
1995 the component of productivity growth 
due to change in the sectoral composition of 
employment accounted for about 30% of total 
productivity growth. When looking over a 
longer period the sectoral composition of the 
workforce explains a relatively low propor-
tion of total productivity growth. Moreover, 
compared to the US, Europe had higher 
productivity growth in the ICT producing 
services while the rate of productivity growth 
was lower in the ICT-using industries, which 
suggest the limited diffusion in Europe of new 
technologies in using services.
These findings have two major consequences. 
Firstly, the total productivity growth is limited 
without “pure” gains of productivity within 
sectors, in particular in those activities with 
production processes likely to be affected 
by the introduction of technologies with 
universal and far-reaching applications 
(general purpose technologies). Secondly, 
it shifts the attention from the quantitative 
effects of structural change to its qualitative 
nature. New technologies expand the role 
of knowledge in the production process, 
and, more importantly, make its diffusion 
a key component of growth. A high-skilled 
workforce, not only contributes to reducing 
the implementation costs of new methods of 
production but also accelerates their adoption 
by the less educated. 
Productivity growth not only depends on the 
level of human capital, as pointed out by the 
studies on human capital and growth38, but, 
as shown by this chapter, also on the distri-
bution of skills in the entire economy. The 
findings of this chapter suggest that there 
are clearly advantages from concentration of 
high-skilled people in industries characterised 
by intense patterns of innovation. In this con-
37 This view might be too simplistic as high levels of education are necessary but not sufficient for sustained productivity growth, as when complementarities between human capital and technological progress 
limit potential growth when their impact is constrained by the level of the each other.
38 See for example Angel de la Fuente and Antonio Ciccone (2003), op. cit., and OECD (2003), The sources of economic growth in the OECD countries.
Table 26 – Regressions results for the effect of specialisation on productivity growth SURE 
estimates on a cross-section of Member States
Dependent variable productivity growth 95-99 Equation 18 Equation 19 Equation 20
Productivity level 95 -0.44-1.66
-0.58
(-2.67)
-0.41
(-2.01)
Change in the EU share of sectoral value added 0.11(5.17)
0.12
(5.35)
0.09
(4.23)
Low skilled* mobility of low-skilled employment structure 1.00(2.17)
1.18
(4.48)
0.94
(2.83)
Low skilled* mobility of medium-skilled employment structure 2.89(5.12)
3.01
(6.08)
3.59
(7.58)
Low skilled* mobility of high-skilled employment structure 0.17(0.64) :
Medium skilled* mobility of low-skilled employment structure -1.70(-1.96)
-2.10
(-4.25)
-1.85
(-3.09)
Medium skilled* mobility of medium-skilled employment 
structure
-2.45
(-3.76)
-2.43
(-4.32)
-2.02
(-4.20)
Medium skilled* mobility of high-skilled employment 
structure
0.94
(2.67)
1.09
(4.99)
0.77
(3.87)
High skilled* mobility of low-skilled employment structure -0.25(-0.75) :
High skilled* mobility of medium-skilled employment 
structure
-0.32
(-0.69)
-0.72
(-2.18)
High skilled* mobility of high-skilled employment structure 0.33(1.69)
0.28
(1.94)
High skilled* mobility of high-skilled employment structure in 
all sectors but high-tech
-0.43
(-2.59)
High skilled * mobility of high-skilled employment structure in 
high-tech sectors
1.59
(8.51)
High skilled* mobility of medium-skilled employment 
structure in high-tech sectors
-2.88
(-7.33)
Low skilled -0.22(-6.17)
-0.23
(-8.43)
-0.24
(-7.76)
Medium skilled 0.15(2.56)
0.17
(3.88)
0.15
(3.32)
High skilled 0.02(0.78)
0.03
(1.79
0.04
(3.34)
R&D intensity 0.50(1.54)
0.45
(1.66)
0.62
(2.27)
(R&D intensity)2 -0.29(-3.37)
-0.27
(-3.62)
-0.24
(-3.27)
(R&D intensity)3 0.04(7.46)
0.04
(8.09)
0.04
(7.62)
Log(share of investment in value added)1 1.06(6.47)
1.10
(8.88)
1.05
(8.41)
Country dummies yes Yes yes
0.28 0.29 0.30
Number of obs. 180 180 180
Source: Eurostat and OECD
Note: 1 Spain excluded due to insufficient data on investment for the industries t-statistic in parentheses;
In bold values significantly different from zero.
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text, industries with strong growth opportuni-
ties, such as high-tech industries, which have 
a significant concentration of high-skilled 
people should perform better than others. 
However, important knowledge spillovers 
may also occur for those activities with less 
specialised applications where the scope of 
the application of knowledge is broad, in 
particular in the services sector. This chapter 
showed that both technologically advanced 
and less technologically intensive sectors may 
benefit from both an increasing number and 
high mobility of high skilled people. 
Thus, employment specialisation matters for 
productivity growth, but not every kind of 
specialisation is always good for growth. For 
the low-skilled there are clear advantages 
from “climbing up the ladder”, which means 
that their share rises in sectors with a higher 
technological intensity (the medium-tech 
sector). This result may be related to the com-
plexity of the production processes in high-
technology sectors, which limit the diffusion 
of knowledge spill-overs to those with the 
lowest level of education employed in these 
sectors. Furthermore, both low- and medium-
skilled people might benefit from an intense 
process of relocation across sectors for those 
with higher level of education. Continuous 
transformation and adaptation occurring 
for those with the higher levels of education 
might facilitate the diffusion of knowledge 
among those with lower levels of education. 
The policy implications are threefold.
Firstly, adaptability does not imply only 
higher real wage flexibility and or flexible 
contractual arrangements but also the devel-
opment of new capabilities and new knowl-
edge. Technological progress is basically a 
process of structural change. It opens win-
dows of opportunities, which if exploited can 
favour growth. Nevertheless, this change also 
makes old knowledge obsolete and requires 
the development of new capabilities and new 
knowledge. According to B.A. Lundvall: “The 
learning economy indicates an economy 
where the success of individuals, firms, re-
gions and national economies reflect their 
capability to learn (and to forget which is 
often a pre-requisite for learning new skills). 
The learning economy is an economy where 
change is rapid and where the rate at which 
old skills get obsolete and new ones become 
in demand is high”.39 
The characteristics of new technologies have 
accentuated the importance of “intangible 
capital deepening”40 but also modified the 
relationships between inputs of production 
and increased the need for flexible produc-
tion processes. As far as the first element is 
concerned investment in knowledge (educa-
tion, training, life-long-learning, R&D) and 
measures improving quality in work are 
fundamental to develop both formal and 
informal (i.e. firm-specific) skills and to pro-
mote social inclusion. Life-long learning, not 
only confined to the high-skilled, becomes a 
central element of a strategy for productiv-
ity growth. Flexibility reflects the need to 
respond to new technologies with new forms 
of work organisations, reduced division of 
labour within firms, the development of 
entrepreneurial skills.41 As highlighted by the 
new employment guidelines the design and 
dissemination of innovative and sustainable 
forms of work organisation, which support 
productivity and quality at work, is a key ele-
ment of employment policies.
Secondly, educational and training policies 
that promote a wide diffusion of knowledge 
are important. In the context of the process 
of European integration and globalisation, 
this issue is related to that of international 
competitiveness. International competitive-
ness, observable in trade dynamics, is shaped 
by the ability of a country to compete in the 
global market, which reflects its innovative 
capacity and the quality of its institutions 
and workforce. Changes in the employment 
structure of the economy might modify its 
ability to compete and, thus, its growth oppor-
tunities. A general upgrading of the skills and 
competencies of people is necessary to avoid 
a situation where the existing structure of 
the economy hampers growth opportunities. 
The existence of complementarities between 
the employment structure for different levels 
of education may or may not have positive 
effects depending on the intensity and the 
quality of the links between people with 
different levels of education. In other words, 
in a given sector the presence of different 
people with different skills levels may ben-
efit productivity growth when the interaction 
between heterogeneous workers generates 
knowledge spillovers.42 Some characteristics 
of the interaction between specialisation and 
change in the employment structure may 
favour productivity growth more than others 
do. With this respect, an important role can 
be played by institutions bridging the knowl-
edge gap between different type of industries 
and, within them, between different levels of 
skills.43
Thirdly, sectoral mobility may facilitate 
growth. The chapter has demonstrated that 
a sectoral relocation (sectoral mobility) of 
employment might promote growth when it 
occurs for the most educated or when it is as-
sociated with an upgrading of the knowledge 
base of the less educated. In an expanding 
economy this relocation does not necessar-
ily require a physical shift of workers across 
sectors. When employment grows, people 
entering in the workforce contribute to a 
modification of the structure. With a stagnat-
ing working age population resulting from 
ageing, a sectoral relocation of employment 
may require an increase in the mobility be-
tween sectors of workers as there are no huge 
pool of cohorts of young, better educated 
people replacing older workers. Moreover, it 
would also imply mobilisation and training of 
the domestic potential labour supply as well 
a contribution of skilled people from third 
countries. 
39 Lundvall B.A. (1996) The Social Dimension of the Learning Economy, DRUID (Danish research Unit of Industrial Dynamics) Working Paper No. 1 
40 Abramovitz M. and David P. A. (1995), Technological change and the Rise of Intangible Investments: The US Economy’s Growth-Path in the Twentieth Century in Foray D. and Lundvall B.A. (eds.) Employ-
ment and Growth in the knowledge-based economy.
41 Lindbeck A. and Snower D. (2000) The division of labour and the Market of Organisations.
42 The importance for the growth generating process of the interaction between heterogeneous workers is developed also by L.C. Keely (2003), but only in the case of skilled workers. L.C.Kelly (2003) Exchang-
ing good ideas in Journal of Economic Theory.
43 On the links between education and growth see Zilibotti, F. and Storesletten, K. (2000), Education, educational policy and growth in Swedish Economic Policy Review vol. 7  pp-39-70.
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Competitiveness and structural change have 
been at the top of the European policy debate 
since Delors’ White Book on Growth and 
Competitiveness. The run up to EMU not only 
spurred the process of European integration, 
but also made it clear that nominal conver-
gence, while necessary, was not sufficient to 
achieve both higher potential output growth 
and convergence in real variables. Against 
this background, the Lisbon agenda aimed 
to change the economic policy regime. The 
strategy aimed at bridging the gap between 
nominal and real convergence by creating the 
conditions for long lasting and sustainable 
growth and by accelerating the transition to a 
knowledge-based economy, while preserving 
the European Social model.
Clearly investing in human capital is a 
central requirement to attain the Lisbon 
objective of becoming the most competitive 
knowledge-based economy. The increasing 
share of services in the economy, the pace 
of technological change, the increase in the 
knowledge/information share of the value 
of production, and the scale of economic and 
social restructuring all strengthen the case for 
such investment. The pervasiveness of knowl-
edge is crucial to enhance and spread the use 
of new technologies over the whole economy 
and to prevent segmentation of the labour 
market between workers with different types 
of education. 
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Annexes to chapter 2
Annex 2.1 – Shift-share 
analysis
Aggregate productivity is the weighted 
average of sectoral productivity levels, with 
weights equal to each sector’s employment 
share. Over time aggregate productivity 
growth reflects both the rate of growth of pro-
ductivity at the sectoral level and the change 
in the sectoral composition of employment. 
Shift-share analysis allows decomposing 
algebraically labour productivity growth 
between two periods into a between- and a 
within-sector component and in a residual. 
The first effect is the contribution to total 
labour productivity growth of relocation of 
employment from low- to high productiv-
ity industries. This effect tends to be positive 
when the economy is expanding and con-
tributes to an increasing total productivity 
growth when the expanding industries are 
those with a high level of productivity. It 
represents the productivity growth attribut-
able to changes in the employment structure 
assuming that productivity is the same in the 
two periods. The second component repre-
sents the contribution to labour productivity 
growth of within-sectors productivity growth 
weighted by the share of employment in these 
industries on the total employment. This ef-
fect represents the growth of labour produc-
tivity had the structure remained the same 
between the two periods. Finally, the residual 
measures the importance of the interaction 
of positive/negative productivity growth in 
expanding/contracting sectors. 
In formal terms, the decomposition applies 
the following expression
with πt productivity level at time t; πit 
productivity level of industry i at time t; qit 
share of employment in industry i at time t. 
Productivity is calculated as value added at 
constant prices divided by total employment. 
The total productivity growth calculated in 
this way might differ with the more common 
measure based on the rate of growth of GDP 
per person employed as GDP and value added 
for the all economy differs for the net taxes on 
products. 
Data description 
Data are respectively for the period 1970-
1979 and 1980-2001 from the OECD ISDB 
and the new STAN database for Industrial 
Analysis. The industry classification used 
in the ISDB database corresponds to that of 
ISIC classification Rev. 2. To avoid problems 
of comparability, due to possible differences 
in the classification of detailed activities, the 
comparison over the three decades is limited 
only to one digit level (See OECD, STAN data-
base 2002). 
The new version of STAN is based on the ISIC 
classification Rev. 3. In STAN, value added at 
constant prices is expressed, for all countries 
except the United States, as index number 
with 1995 base year. For the US the base year is 
1996. Since value added data are presented as 
index numbers, employment data have been 
transformed in index number with the same 
base as the value added index. The formula 
above has been adapted to the case of data 
being in index form. Basically, this amounts 
to multiplying the term in the square brackets 
by the ratio between the productivity index in 
each industry and the productivity index for 
the total economy. 
In the case of the EU, the decomposition 
required to construct EU wide aggregates for 
the value added at current and constant prices 
from national series available in STAN. In 
STAN data are expressed in the national cur-
rency, which corresponds to “national euro” 
for euro-zone countries. For these countries, 
data are in euro from 1999 onwards (2001 for 
Greece) and converted at the irrevocably fixed 
conversion rates between the former national 
currencies and the euro for pre-EMU years. 
Data expressed in this way cannot be used for 
aggregation. The aggregation is economically 
meaningful after national series are convert-
ed in “euro/ECU”1. Therefore STAN national 
series are converted in “euro/ECU” using the 
conversion table available in the NewCronos 
database. For non EMU-countries conversion 
rates are respectively in ECU for pre-EMU and 
in euro for the EMU years. After conversion, 
the EU value added at constant prices at the 
sectoral and aggregate level is calculated as a 
weighted average of the respective national 
series. Since data for Ireland and Luxembourg 
are not available the EU aggregates exclude 
these countries. The EU employment is the 
sum of the countries’ figures. In the case of 
the Netherlands the value added at constant 
prices for respectively “Finance, insurance, 
real estate“ and “Community social and per-
sonal services“ is not available for the years 
up to 1985. For these years, the value added 
at constant prices for these sectors is calcu-
lated from the sectoral value added at current 
prices using the implicit price deflator of total 
gross value added.
Results 
Charts 45 and 46 show that for the EU and the 
US the total labour productivity growth (the 
solid lines) the overall contribution of the 
structural, the productivity and the interac-
tion effects (the dotted lines). The charts also 
highlight the part of each effect attributable 
to sectors. 
For both the EU and the US the productivity 
growth effect explains the largest fraction of 
total labour productivity growth. As concerns 
the structural change effect, its contribution 
to total EU productivity growth was in all 
periods almost constant and small. How-
ever it should be noted that since productivity 
growth declined in the EU after 1995, the frac-
tion of total productivity growth accounted 
by the structural change effect increased. In 
the US the relocation of employment across 
sectors was high in the 1980s and fell to zero 
during the 1990s. Finally, the interaction is 
significant and negative only for the 1980s 
and in the case of the US. 
In the case of Europe in the 1980s and in 
the first half of the 1990s, it is the pick-up in 
the contribution of “Manufacturing“ and the 
Social services that drives the increase in 
total labour productivity growth (see panel 
productivity effect). By contrast in the second 
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half of the 1990s a widespread decline in 
productivity growth in all sectors except “Ag-
riculture“ and “Electricity“ led to the decline 
in total productivity growth. In particular, 
one also notices that between the first and the 
second half of the 1990s the contribution to 
total productivity growth of manufacturing 
almost halved while that of the “Business sec-
tor services“ and social services was around 
zero. The respectively increasing and declin-
ing share of employment in the “Business 
sector services“ and in “Manufacturing“ led 
to a positive contribution of the former and 
a negative of the latter to total labour pro-
ductivity growth. The substantial job losses 
occurred in “Manufacturing“ in the first half 
of the 1990s constrained productivity growth 
but were slightly compensated for by the in-
crease in employment in business and Social 
services. 
Annex 2.2 – Decomposing the 
EU-US productivity growth 
differential
The expression in annex 1 shows that  the 
contribution to total labour productivity 
growth of one sector can be higher than that 
of another sector because: a) its productivity 
growth is higher; b) its employment share is 
high; c) its productivity level is high; d) its 
employment share is expanding. Because of 
the existing differences in the sectoral pro-
ductivity growth rates and levels and in the 
employment shares (levels and changes), it 
is not possible to identify the source of these 
changes by simply taking the differences of 
the effects in which total labour productivity 
growth can be decomposed. Thus, cross-coun-
try comparisons of each of the four effects 
can be made after controlling for the different 
values of the remaining effects.
The methodology elaborated by Van Ark et 
al.44 (2002) identifies the components and 
the contribution attributable to either differ-
ences in each industry’s productivity growth 
or to differences in their levels relative to the 
average productivity of each country. The 
procedure, based on a counterfactual shift-
share analysis, decomposes the EU-US growth 
differential in four effects. 
Firstly, the employment share of the EU is 
imposed on the US and vice versa. Secondly, 
the effect of differences in sectoral productiv-
ity growth is identified comparing for the 
two countries the productivity growth effect 
(within component of productivity growth) 
44 Bart van Ark, Robert Inklaar, Robert McGuckin and Marcel Trimmer (2002) “Changing gear” Productivity, ICT and Services Industries: Europe and the United States, Research Memorandum GD-60, Gron-
ingen Growth and Development Centre.
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using sectors of comparable employment 
structure (i.e. the same employment shares 
for both the EU and the US). The gap between 
the effective difference in the productivity 
growth effect and the counterfactual one rep-
resents the component of total productivity 
growth differential attributable to different 
employment shares. Analogously, by compar-
ing the structural change effect with the same 
employment shares isolates the contribution 
of different productivity levels to the total pro-
ductivity growth gap. The gap between the 
effective difference in the structural change 
effect and the counterfactual one represents 
the component of total productivity growth 
differential attributable to different changes 
in the employment share. 
The counterfactual shift-share analysis gives 
for each country two “virtual” economies: the 
EU with the EU employment structure; the EU 
with the US employment structure; the US 
with the US employment structure; the US 
with the EU employment structure. The total 
effects displayed in the charts are the average 
of each effect under EU and the US employ-
ment structure. 
The analysis thus identifies the following 
components of the EU-US labour productivity 
growth differential:
1. The first component represents the contri-
bution to the EU-US gap due to differences 
in productivity growth (i.e. it answers the 
question: “Is the US growing more than 
the EU because its industries are growing 
faster in terms of productivity, indepen-
dently of the levels and changes of the 
employment structure?”). 
2. The second component represents the 
contribution to the growth differential 
due to the specific characteristics of the 
structure. In this case the relevant ques-
tion is: “Is the US growing more than the 
EU because of a certain sectoral composi-
tion of employment whatever the rate of 
productivity growth?“ 
3. The third component defines the con-
tribution to the differential productivity 
growth explained by the existence of a 
gap between industries’ productivity 
levels relative to the average productivity 
level of each country - “Is the US growing 
more than the EU because the sectoral 
productivity levels are higher than in the 
EU?“ 
4. The fourth component identifies the dif-
ference in the EU-US productivity growth 
due to the change in the economic struc-
ture. It answers the question: “Is the US 
growing more than the EU because of 
faster increase of the employment share 
of any given industry?”
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Results
Charts 47-49 show the outcome of the decom-
position for the 1980s, the 1990s and the sec-
ond half of the 1990s. Also shown in brackets 
is the total EU-US productivity growth gap for 
each industry. The charts do not consider the 
interaction effect. Therefore the figures in 
bracket do not sum up to the total differential 
in the productivity growth but only to the 
sum of the structural change effect and the 
productivity growth effect
In the 1980s the component of the total pro-
ductivity growth gap due to differences in the 
employment structure always played a role 
in favour of the EU in particular in “Finance 
insurance and real estate“, “Retail trade“ and 
“Manufacturing“. Europe also had an advan-
tage in terms of changes of this structure in 
“Social and personal services“, “Manufactur-
ing“, “Finance“, and “Transport and Commu-
nication“. In the US, the faster productivity 
growth in “Retail trade“ and “Manufacturing“ 
contributed negatively to the EU-US produc-
tivity growth differential, while the contribu-
tion of “Finance“ was positive but not enough 
to compensate for the negative effects coming 
from these two industries. When the decom-
position for the 1990s (chart 48) is examined, 
the structural components, both in levels 
and changes, continued to have a positive 
contribution, increasing, therefore, the EU ad-
vantage in the productivity differential with 
the US.45 However, this effect was counter-
balanced by the negative contribution due to 
the differences in the levels and in the growth 
rate of sectoral productivity. The only relevant 
exception is that of the Social services with a 
positive contribution.46 While for the years af-
ter 1995 the results of the decomposition are 
qualitatively analogous to those observed for 
the previous periods, the order of magnitude 
is very different. Indeed, the positive contribu-
tion stemming from the structure is smaller 
(0.58% against 1.5% for the 1980s and 1.6% 
for the 1990s) while the negative contribution 
deriving from productivity is higher (-2.16%, 
against, –1.22% and 2.01% respectively for the 
1980s and 1990s), in particular for “Trade“, 
“Finance“ and “Manufacturing“.
As far as the contribution of “Business 
services“ to total productivity growth is con-
cerned, the difference between the EU and 
the US might be representative of an effec-
tive divergent performance of the industries 
classified in this sector but also reflect dif-
ferent treatment of quality improvements in 
services. Many experts have recognised that 
unmeasured quality improvements are ap-
plied unevenly across countries, with perhaps 
45 For Construction and, to a less extent, Transport and Communication and Agriculture changes in the employment shares contributed negatively to the gap as employment shares declined in the EU while 
they increased in the US. Since the rate of US increase was higher than that of the EU decline the average effect was negative.
46 The well known difficulties in the measurement of output in these services (i.e. based on input and the compensation of employees) should make one cautious in interpreting this result as an indication of 
a greater efficiency in the EU rather than in the US.
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more adjusting by US than by the European 
statistical institutes. Nevertheless, the un-
derestimation of productivity growth when 
quality improvements are not considered is 
likely to be small (see Schreyer P. (2001) Com-
puter prices indices and international growth 
comparisons, Growth project background pa-
pers OECD). Thus, these results clearly point 
towards the importance of productivity gains 
within each of the industry. 
Annex 2.3 – Classification of 
industries used in the analysis 
of the specialisation patterns 
(NACE Rev. 1) 
Statistical Classification of economic activities 
in the Community Labour Force Survey
01 Agriculture, hunting and related service 
activities
02 Forestry, logging and related service 
activities
05 Fishing, operation of fish hatcheries 
and fish farms; service activities 
incidental to fishing
10-14 Mining and Quarrying
15 Manufacture of food products and 
beverages
16 Manufacture of tobacco products
17 Manufacture of textiles
18 Manufacture of wearing apparel; 
dressing and dyeing of fur
19 Tanning and dressing of leather; 
manufacture of luggage, handbags, 
saddlery, harness and footwear
20 Manufacture of wood and of products 
of wood and cork, except furniture; 
manufacture of articles of straw and 
plaiting materials
21 Manufacture of pulp, paper and paper 
products
22 Publishing, printing and reproduction 
of recorded media
23 Manufacture of coke, refined petroleum 
products and nuclear fuel
24 Manufacture of chemicals and chemical 
products
25 Manufacture of rubber and plastic 
products
26 Manufacture of other non-metallic 
mineral products
27 Manufacture of basic metals
28 Manufacture of fabricated metal 
products, except machinery and 
equipment
29 Manufacture of machinery and 
equipment n.e.c.
30 Manufacture of office machinery and 
computers
31 Manufacture of electrical machinery 
and apparatus n.e.c.
32 Manufacture of radio, television 
and communication equipment and 
apparatus
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33 Manufacture of medical, precision and 
optical instruments, watches and clocks
34 Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers 
and semi-trailers
35 Manufacture of other transport 
equipment
36 Manufacture of furniture; 
manufacturing n.e.c.
37 Recycling
40 Electricity, gas, steam and hot water 
supply
41 Collection, purification and distribution 
of water
45 Construction
50 Sale, maintenance and repair of motor 
vehicles and motorcycles; retail sale of 
automotive fuel
51 Wholesale trade and commission 
trade, except of motor vehicles and 
motorcycles
52 Retail trade, except of motor vehicles 
and motorcycles; repair of personal and 
household goods
55 Hotels and restaurants
60 Land transport; transport via pipelines
61 Water transport
62 Air transport
63 Supporting and auxiliary transport 
activities; activities of travel agencies
64 Post and telecommunications
65 Financial intermediation, except 
insurance and pension funding
66 Insurance and pension funding, except 
compulsory social security
67 Activities auxiliary to financial 
intermediation
70 Real estate activities
71 Renting of machinery and equipment 
without operator and of personal and 
household goods
72 Computer and related activities
73 Research and development
74 Other business activities
75 Public administration and defence; 
compulsory social security
80 Education
85 Health and social work
90 Sewage and refuse disposal, sanitation 
and similar activities
91 Activities of membership organization 
n.e.c.
92 Recreational, cultural and sporting 
activities
93 Other service activities
95 Private households with employed 
persons
99 Extra-territorial organizations and 
bodies
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Annex 2.4 – Classification 
of industries used in the 
econometric analysis
AGRICULTURE, HUNTING, FORESTRY AND 
FISHING
MINING AND QUARRYING
FOOD PRODUCTS, BEVERAGES AND TO-
BACCO
TEXTILES, TEXTILE PRODUCTS, LEATHER 
AND FOOTWEAR
WOOD AND PRODUCTS OF WOOD AND 
CORK
PULP, PAPER, PAPER PRODUCTS, PRINTING 
AND PUBLISHING
COKE, REFINED PETROLEUM PRODUCTS 
AND NUCLEAR FUEL
CHEMICALS AND CHEMICAL PRODUCTS
RUBBER AND PLASTICS PRODUCTS
OTHER NON-METALLIC MINERAL PRODUCTS
BASIC METALS AND FABRICATED METAL 
PRODUCTS
MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT, N.E.C.
ELECTRICAL AND OPTICAL EQUIPMENT
TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT
MANUFACTURING NEC; RECYCLING
ELECTRICITY, GAS AND WATER SUPPLY
CONSTRUCTION
WHOLESALE AND RETAIL TRADE; RESTAU-
RANTS AND HOTELS
WHOLESALE AND RETAIL TRADE; REPAIRS 
HOTELS AND RESTAURANTS
TRANSPORT AND STORAGE AND COMMUNI-
CATION
FINANCE, INSURANCE, REAL ESTATE AND 
BUSINESS SERVICES
FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION
REAL ESTATE, RENTING AND BUSINESS 
ACTIVITIES
COMMUNITY Social AND PERSONAL SER-
VICES
PUBLIC ADMIN. AND DEFENCE; COMPUL-
SORY Social SECURITY
EDUCATION
HEALTH AND Social WORK
OTHER COMMUNITY, Social AND PERSONAL 
SERVICES
PRIVATE HOUSEHOLDS WITH EMPLOYED 
PERSONS
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Introduction
The structure and evolution of labour costs 
and wages are important features of the 
labour market. They are closely linked to 
both firms’ labour demand decisions and 
individuals’ labour supply decisions. Through 
their link with productivity, profits and 
consumption they are key determinants of 
economic growth and overall employment 
performance.
The new generation of Broad Economic Poli-
cy Guidelines (BEPG) and Employment Guide-
lines (EGL) have accordingly highlighted the 
importance of wages and productivity by 
focussing on the following points (see box 5): 
• the link between wages and productivity, 
their evolution over time and their impact 
on employment creation; 
• the role of non-wage labour costs, mainly 
taxes and social contributions, for em-
ployment performance and social cohe-
sion; 
• the need for increased wage flexibility 
and differentiation (across skills, firms, 
industries and regions) and their role 
for employment performance and labour 
mobility;
• the impact of remaining pay gaps and 
other imbalances in work incentives, in-
cluding direct discrimination, by gender 
or nationality on labour market partici-
pation and career progression; and 
• the role of social partners, industrial rela-
tions collective agreements and wage set-
ting mechanisms for quality in work and 
employment performance.
Chapter 3 Wage structures and determinants
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Box 5 – Wage-related policy guidelines 2003
In the 2003 versions of both, the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines (BEPG) and the 
Employment Guidelines (EGL), there has been a strengthening of guidelines related to 
wages, productivity, non-wage labour costs and work incentives.
While acknowledging that the “maintenance of sound macroeconomic conditions de-
pends on the policies pursued by central banks and governments, and the wage develop-
ments resulting from settlements concluded by social partners” the BEPG 200347 request 
that “wage developments should contribute to stable macroeconomic conditions and to 
an employment-friendly policy mix”. To this end, “Member States should promote the 
right framework conditions for wage negotiations by social partners”, ensuring in par-
ticular that “nominal wage increases are consistent with price stability and productivity 
gains. In particular, wage developments should remain moderate in the context of a 
possible cyclical recovery in productivity or oil-price-hike-induced increases in inflation 
to allow for a restoration of profit margins so as to underpin job-creating investment 
growth”.
With a view to raising Europe’s growth potential, the BEPG request in particular that 
“wage bargaining systems allow wages to reflect productivity, taking into account pro-
ductivity differences across skills and local labour market conditions”. While recognising 
that wage growth in 2002 “has been slow to adapt to low productivity growth” they 
repeatedly call for changes in the wage bargaining and wage formation system both 
to ensure that wages reflect productivity and skill differentials and differences in local 
labour market conditions and to allow greater wage differentiation across firms and 
regions. In some instances, they explicitly encourage a move to more decentralised wage 
setting mechanisms.
With respect to the low-skilled, in particular, the BEPG recognise “the need both to 
improve the quality of education and training (…) and to allow wages to better reflect 
productivity”. In this context, they call for reductions in labour costs, especially for low 
wage earners. Action is called for to improve incentives to make work pay, to facilitate job 
creation and to improve the functioning of the labour market to tackle the root causes 
of high unemployment and low labour force participation in the EU. Member States are 
asked in particular, to “improve the combined incentive effects of taxes and benefits, re-
duce high marginal effective tax rates in order to eliminate unemployment and poverty 
traps, cut the tax burden on low-paid labour, improve the administration of eligibility 
criteria for benefits whilst preserving an adequate level of social protection, and ensure 
the efficiency of job search assistance for benefit recipients”.
47 European Council (2003), Council recommendation of 26 June 2003 on the broad guidelines of the economic policies of the Member States and the Community (for the 2003-2005 period), 2003/555/EC, 
Official Journal of the European Union, 01.08.2003, L195/1-54
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Section 4 then turns to an analysis of the 
link between wages and productivity at the 
sectoral level. It also examines the relative 
importance for wages of institutional vari-
ables, and employment protection legislation 
in particular. Furthermore, recent wage and 
productivity developments are discussed.
After a brief review of wage distributions and 
the extent of low wage earners in the EU sec-
tion 5 presents empirical results on the main 
wage determinants, based on individual-level 
wage regressions. It also examines variations 
in wage determinants across the wage distri-
bution. The section compares wage determi-
nants and wage profiles across EU Member 
States with particular attention to: returns 
to education and training; age-earnings 
profiles and seniority wages; wage effects of 
career interruptions; wage effects of working 
time arrangements and contract type; the 
compensation of earnings and employment 
risks; and wage effects of local labour market 
conditions.
Wage formation in 
Europe: key features and 
institutions
The key elements of national wage formation 
systems in the EU Member States and the ac-
cession countries include: co-ordination, cov-
erage and extension of collective bargaining 
agreements regarding pay, working time and 
other working conditions; minimum wages 
and low pay regulation; firms’ compensation 
policies and variable pay schemes; tax/benefit 
systems and making work pay; and employ-
ment protection legislation.50
Co-ordination and coverage of 
collective bargaining 
Wage formation systems are to a large extent 
systems of collective bargaining, involving 
social partners and individual employers 
and employees. The design and functioning 
of such systems of collective bargaining vary 
Against the backdrop of these guidelines and 
policy recommendations, this chapter pres-
ents evidence on relative wage structures and 
the extent of wage differentiation across sec-
tors, firms and regions in Europe. It explores, 
the link between wages and productivity, 
taking into account the various institutional 
settings in Member States and accession 
countries49, and evidence on the main wage 
determinants, both at individual and sectoral 
level, is provided. A particular focus is given 
to an analysis of wage effects of employment 
protection and employment risks.
As a starting point, section 2 briefly reviews 
some key features of the wage formation 
systems in the EU and the acceding and 
accession countries.49 Section 3 provides a 
descriptive portrait of relative wage structures 
and wage differentiation across sectors, firms 
and regions in Europe.
The EGL 200348, in addition, focus on two issues related to wages - the gender pay gap 
and “making work pay”. With respect to the former they state that “[gender gaps in the 
labour market need to be progressively eliminated, if the EU is to deliver full employ-
ment, increase quality in work and promote social inclusion and cohesion. This requires 
both a gender mainstreaming approach and specific policy actions to create the condi-
tions for women and men to enter, re-enter, and remain in the labour market. (…) The 
underlying factors of the gender gaps in unemployment and in pay should be addressed 
and targets on the reduction of such gaps should be achieved as a result, without calling 
into question the principle of wage differentiation according to productivity and labour 
market situation”. Member States are requested, “through an integrated approach, com-
bining gender mainstreaming and specific policy actions, [to] encourage female labour 
market participation and achieve a substantial reduction in gender gaps in employment 
rates, unemployment rates, and pay by 2010”.
With respect to “making work pay”, Member States are asked to “reform financial incen-
tives with a view to making work attractive and encouraging men and women to seek, 
take up and remain in work. In this context, Member States should develop appropriate 
policies with a view to reducing the number of working poor. They will review and, 
where appropriate, reform tax and benefit systems and their interaction with a view 
to eliminating unemployment, poverty and inactivity traps, and encouraging the par-
ticipation of women, low-skilled workers, older workers, people with disabilities and 
those furthest from the labour market in employment. Whilst preserving an adequate 
level of social protection, they will in particular review replacement rates and benefit 
duration; ensure effective benefit management, notably with respect to the link with 
effective job search, including access to activation measures to support employability, 
taking into account individual situations; consider the provision of in work benefits, 
where appropriate; and work with a view to eliminating inactivity traps. In particular, 
policies will aim at achieving by 2010 a significant reduction in high marginal effective 
tax rates and, where appropriate, in the tax burden on low paid workers, reflecting 
national circumstances”.
In this context, “social partners at national level should be invited to ensure the effective 
implementation of the guidelines and to report on their most significant contributions 
in all areas under their responsibility, in particular concerning the management of 
change and adaptability, synergy between flexibility and security, human capital de-
velopment, gender equality, making work pay and active ageing as well as health and 
safety at work”.
48 European Council (2003), Council Decision on guidelines for the employment policies of the Member States, Common guidelines, 10567/03, 22.07.2003
49 For the sake of simplicity these are referred to from now on as the „accession countries“.
50 Although the latter are not directly part of wage formation, they will be reviewed in brief since their impact on labour supply decisions, wages and wage structures will beis analysed in this chapter. Most 
of the listed elements are also treated in detail in other reports on which this section draws heavily, including the bi-annual Industrial Relations in Europe report and the various reports by the European 
Industrial Relations Observatory (EIRO).
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considerably across countries, both within the 
current EU and between EU Member States 
and accession countries. Main differences 
concern the degree of centralisation and the 
co-ordination of bargaining at various levels, 
including the national (or inter-sectoral), 
sectoral and company level.51 There are also 
important differences across countries in the 
coverage rates of collective bargaining, not 
least because of differences in provisions for 
extending these agreements to other firms 
or sectors. The frequency of wage bargaining 
also varies, normally between annual and 
multi-annual bargaining. Finally, countries 
differ considerably in the evolution of bar-
gaining structures over time (see table 27).
Most EU Member States have a mixed, 
multi-level wage bargaining structure, with 
centralised bargaining at the national, sec-
toral or regional level in the first stage and 
subsequent bargaining at the company level. 
In three EU Member States – Belgium, Ireland 
and Finland – wage formation is highly cen-
tralised, with the inter-sectoral level being the 
dominant bargaining level. In the majority of 
Member States – Austria, Germany, Greece, 
Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and 
Sweden – wage bargaining takes place pri-
marily at the sectoral level. In Denmark and 
Luxembourg, the sectoral level is one of the 
bargaining levels, but not the only one. In the 
UK, and to a lesser extent in France and Lux-
embourg, the company level is the dominant 
bargaining level. Single level wage bargain-
ing is prevalent only in the UK.52
Over the past decade the trend in most EU 
Member States has been towards more de-
centralisation of wage determination. This 
tendency has been observed, for example, 
in Belgium, Austria, Germany, the UK and 
the Nordic EU Member States.53 Wages are 
increasingly set at local or company levels, 
and variable pay schemes – including perfor-
mance related pay and bonuses – have recent-
ly become more important. Particular strong 
examples of this trend are Italy and Denmark. 
In the former, although national agreements 
on contractual earnings have only been al-
lowed to negotiate within targeted inflation 
rates, negotiations at the company level have 
more than made up for this gap, giving rise 
to average earnings increases well above 
inflation. In Denmark there has been a move 
away from centralised wage negotiations to 
a decentralised and individualised system 
where collective bargaining only provides a 
minimum guaranteed earnings level. 
In some other countries, however, a trend 
towards increasing degrees of centralisation 
could be observed, notably in Ireland. In oth-
ers, the trend towards decentralisation has 
been halted by macroeconomic requirements. 
In Finland and Belgium, for example, in the 
1990s there was a marked shift back towards 
more centralised and indeed national level 
wage negotiations related to the perceived 
need to control overall wage increases. This 
shift was to some extent the consequence 
of an increased focus on the effects of wage 
formation on competitiveness, taking into 
account country interdependencies notably 
within the euro zone. In this context, trade 
unions from several EU Member States (Ger-
many, France, Belgium, the Netherlands and 
Luxembourg) launched the so-called “Doorn 
initiative” which – through information ex-
change and peer pressure – aims at avoiding 
competition between different national col-
lective bargaining systems.  To this aim, the 
initiative has launched a “wage co-ordination 
formula” which defines the room for nominal 
wage increases, the so-called “distributive 
margin”, as the sum of (expected) inflation 
and productivity growth.54
Despite the general trend towards more 
decentralisation in wage bargaining in the 
EU Member States, the collective bargaining 
structure in the EU is, according to EIRO, 
comparatively more centralised than in the 
accession countries. In all except Slovenia, 
Slovakia and Cyprus, the company level 
is the dominant level of wage bargaining. 
Multi-level, inter-sectoral bargaining does not 
exist in any country except Slovenia - the only 
accession country with a highly centralised 
bargaining structure - and, to a lesser extent, 
Hungary and Latvia. Sectoral bargaining 
dominates only in Slovakia and Cyprus and is 
also important in Slovenia, Hungary and the 
Czech Republic.
Coverage rates and provisions 
for extensions of collective 
agreements
Provisions for extending collectively agreed 
bargaining results to other firms, sectors or 
regions are quite common in most EU Mem-
ber States as well as in the accession countries. 
With the exception of Sweden and the UK, all 
countries foresee an extension of collective 
bargaining agreements. In most countries, 
collective agreements are binding not just on 
the bargaining parties but also on all employ-
ees and employers within the particular sec-
tor or region concerned. In some countries, 
including Austria, Germany, Ireland, Italy and 
Slovenia, legal provisions on public procure-
ment further require contractors to comply 
with the terms of any relevant collective 
agreements. In Italy, collectively agreed, mini-
mum wages are also used by courts as a point 
of reference when assessing whether wages 
conform with constitutional requirements for 
fair pay. In Austria and Slovenia, membership 
of the bargaining organisation is compulsory 
for employers.
In contrast to most accession countries, the 
formal coverage of collective bargaining 
systems remains high in the majority of EU 
countries (chart 50). In the EU countries, 
51 There are also recent examples of some ‘bargaining’ between social partners at EU-level in the form of agreements on issues such as parental leave, part-time work, fixed-term work and telework. The agree-
ments on parental leave, part-time work and fixed-term work are implemented in the form of a EU directive, while that on telework is being implemented through collective agreements and other national 
practices. Since concrete pay and working conditions are not subject to collective agreement at European level, this chapter will not cover EU-level collective bargaining. See European Commission (2002), 
Industrial Relations in Europe 2002, DG Employment and Social Affairs, for more information on this issue.
52 Independent of the degree of centralisation of wage bargaining, however, issues other than pay, such as working time and working conditions, are negotiated at company level in many countries.
53 See e.g. Boeri et al. (eds) (2001), The role of trade unions in the twenty-first century, Oxford University Press.
54 See also European Commission (2003), Wage formation and European integration, by Torbern M. Andersen, DG Economic and Financial Affairs, Economic Paper No. 188, for an evaluation of these types 
of initiatives: „While the current status of these initiatives is open to discussion, they are interesting in the sense that they reflect the recognition of increased interdependencies in wage formation. While 
transnational wage bargaining at present is an unlikely response, the initiatives are a way of trying to minimise the possible externalities involved in wage setting.“
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systems of national and or sectoral / occupa-
tional bargaining, coupled with the extension 
of agreements to non-signatories, ensure that 
the overwhelming majority of employees are 
covered by collective bargaining agreements. 
Again, though, national systems differ widely 
in terms of levels, content and nature of bar-
gaining.
Coverage rates of collective bargaining – i.e. 
the proportion of workers that have their pay 
and working conditions set, at least to some 
extent, by collective agreements - are highest 
in Slovenia, Belgium, France, Sweden, Austria, 
Finland, Spain, the Netherlands, Germany, 
Cyprus, Portugal, Denmark and Ireland. In 
all these countries two thirds or more of the 
employed are covered by collective bargaining 
agreements. Most have a system of collective 
agreements at the sectoral or inter-sectoral 
level. In some cases, collective agreements at 
the sectoral level are extended to employers 
and employees that are not members of the 
relevant signatory organisations (France, 
Germany, Austria, Netherlands) or by means 
of inter-sectoral agreements (Slovenia, Bel-
gium, Finland and Ireland).
Coverage rates are considerably lower, on 
the other hand, in Luxembourg and the UK 
as well as in most accession countries. In 
Luxembourg, the coverage rate amounts to 
60%, and small firms in the service sectors 
particularly are not covered by collective bar-
gaining. In the UK, coverage rates have fallen 
to levels below 40%. Similarly, collective bar-
gaining coverage rates have been declining in 
all accession countries except Slovenia in the 
recent past. Many of the accession countries, 
including Poland, Hungary, the Czech Repub-
lic and the Baltic States, today have coverage 
rates similar to - or below - those of the UK.
In parallel to the decline in collective bar-
gaining coverage rates, the trade union 
density – the share of unionised workers in 
total employment – has also been decreasing 
over the last decade. This is most noticeable 
in many of the accession countries since the 
practice of compulsory union membership 
was abolished. Current trade union density 
rates vary between around 80% or more in 
the three Nordic Member States to 20% or less 
in Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Spain, Estonia 
and France. Despite the simultaneous decline 
in union density and coverage rates, however, 
there is not necessarily a clear relationship 
between the two (chart 51). Three groups of 
countries can be distinguished: first, countries 
with both comparatively high trade union 
density and high coverage rates (Belgium, Cy-
prus and the three Nordic EU Member States); 
second, countries with comparatively low 
trade union density rates, but high collective 
bargaining coverage (France, Spain, Austria, 
Germany, the Netherlands and Slovenia as 
well as, although with more intermediate 
trade union and coverage rates, Portugal, Ire-
land and Luxembourg); and third countries 
with both low trade union density and low 
bargaining coverage rates (the UK, Poland, 
Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and 
the three Baltic States).
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Minimum wages and low pay 
regulation
Nine EU Member States and almost all of the 
accession countries (except Cyprus) foresee a 
minimum wage. While France, the Benelux 
countries, Spain, Portugal and Greece have a 
long tradition of protecting pay at the bottom 
of the labour market, Ireland and the UK only 
introduced national minimum wage systems 
in the late 1990s. In the remaining six EU 
Member States – Germany, Austria, Italy and 
the three Nordic Member States – as well 
as in Cyprus, collective agreements are the 
main mechanism used for regulating low pay 
(table 27).
Minimum monthly wages are set at 1,000 
euro or more in the Benelux countries, 
France, the UK and Ireland; between 400 
and 600 euro in the three southern Member 
States as well as in Malta and Slovenia; and 
between 50 and 200 euro in the remaining 
accession countries. Corrected for purchasing 
power parities (see section 3 below), they are 
between 1,100 and 1,300 euro in the Benelux 
countries and France; between 900 and 1,000 
euro in the UK and Ireland; between 550 
and 750 in the current southern EU Member 
States, Malta and Slovenia; between 300 and 
400 euro in Hungary, Poland and the Czech 
Republic; and around 200 euro in the remain-
ing accession countries (chart 52).
Minimum wages range from 60% of the 
overall full-time median wage in France to 
32% in Spain, equivalent to, between 47% and 
33% of average wages. The countries appear 
to divide into three groups; those that set 
relatively low minima – at or below 40% of 
the median wage – namely Spain, Portugal 
and the UK; those that set minimum wages 
at around 50% of median earnings - the Neth-
erlands, Belgium, Luxembourg and Greece 
- and those setting relatively high minimum 
earnings – up to 60%, namely Ireland and 
France. Minimum wages are between 40%-
50% of average wages in France, the Benelux 
countries and Ireland, but only 30%-40% in 
the three southern Member States with mini-
mum wages (Greece, Portugal and Spain) and 
the UK. In the accession countries, minimum 
wages vary between 25% and 40% of average 
wages.
Table 27 – Summary characteristics of national wage formation systems in EU Member 
States and accession countries
Trade 
union 
density 
2000
Collective 
bargaining 
coverage 
2000
Predominant 
duration of 
agreements
Bargaining 
level
Bargaining 
co-
ordination
Extension 
practice
Low pay regulation 
mechanism
B 69 96 2 years 
national***
sectoral*
company*
medium high National minimum wage
DK 88 69 4 years 
national**
sectoral**
company*
strong none Collective agreements
D 30 79 2 years sectoral*** company*
medium
- strong moderate Collective agreements
EL 33 2 years
national*
sectoral*** 
company*
medium
- strong high National minimum wage
E 15 83 3 years sectoral*** company*
medium
- weak high National minimum wage
F 9 95 1 year sectoral* company*** medium high National minimum wage
IRL 45 66 2 years 
national***
sectoral*
company*
medium
- strong high National minimum wage
I 35 varying sectoral*** company* medium high Collective agreements
L 50 60 varying sectoral** company** medium high National minimum wage
NL 27 82 varying sectoral*** company* medium moderate National minimum wage
A 30 92 1 year sectoral*** company* medium high Collective agreements
P 40 70 1 year sectoral**company* strong high National minimum wage
FIN 79 83 2 years 
national***
sectoral*
company*
medium
- strong moderate Collective agreements
S 79 92 3 years sectoral*** company* Strong none Collective agreements
UK 29 39 varying sectoral* company*** weak none National minimum wage
BG 40 National minimum wage
CY 70 65-70 sectoral**company* Collective agreements
CZ 30 25-30 sectoral* company*** weak moderate National minimum wage
EE 15 29 sectoral* company*** National minimum wage
HU 20 34 
national*
sectoral** 
company***
National minimum wage
LT 15 10-15 sectoral* company*** National minimum wage
LV 30 < 20 
national*
sectoral* 
company***
National minimum wage
MT 65 company*** National minimum wage
PL 15 40 sectoral* company*** National minimum wage
RO National minimum wage
SI 41 100 sectoral**company* National minimum wage
SK 40 48 sectoral*** company** National minimum wage
Source: Commission Services, EIRO
Notes: Trade union density for Portugal refers to 1998, for Germany and Italy to 1999; collective bargaining coverage 
for Ireland and Luxembourg based on estimates from national experts; with respect to the bargaining level, *** indicates 
the dominant form, ** other important forms, and* present but not very important forms of bargaining.
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The evolution of absolute and relative 
minimum wages has been different in the 
EU Member States and accession countries. 
In five out of the seven EU Member States that 
have minimum wages, the relative value of 
the minimum wage has declined throughout 
the 1990s, most notably in Spain and Greece. 
Spain in particular started the decade with 
the lowest relative value of the minimum 
wage and saw a decline in both real and rela-
tive values over the decade. Only France and 
Luxembourg maintained or improved the 
relative value of the minimum wage.
It is more difficult to establish what has 
been happening to the relative level of mini-
mum wages set under collective bargaining 
systems. In the 1990s in Italy contractual 
minima set by national collective bargain-
ing declined in real terms between 1993-96 
and rose only slightly in real terms between 
1996 and 2001. However, in both periods 
contractual earnings levels declined relative 
to actual earnings. In the three Nordic coun-
tries there has also been a move towards 
more wage dispersion but this has been 
from a position of relatively high minimum 
pay levels. In Finland there has even been 
a rise in the relative value of minimum pay 
levels due to ‘equality supplements’ paid at a 
time of severe wage restraint imposed by the 
government in the early 1990s. In Germany 
and particularly in Austria, there has been no 
such commitment to a higher common floor 
to minimum pay levels and the minima set 
by the collective agreements vary markedly 
across sectors and occupations, with female 
dominated segments the least likely to have 
high minima. In Austria minimum pay levels 
rose in relative terms in the 1980s but fell in 
the 1990s, reflecting a change in trade union 
policy. Similarly, in Germany an emphasis on 
lower minimum pay levels has been driven by 
the agenda of job creation.
There are also clear differences in the extent 
to which either minimum wages or collec-
tive bargaining has established a common 
floor to the labour market. In France and 
Luxembourg, for example, the minimum 
wage affects the relatively high share of 13% 
of the employed (nearly 20% of women and 
10% of men), and in Portugal some 6% of 
the employed (around 5% of men and 10% of 
women) are covered. In other countries such 
as Spain, the Netherlands and the UK, the 
minimum wage does not affect many work-
ers at all. Among those Member States setting 
minimum wages by collective bargaining, the 
wage floor remains relatively high in the Nor-
dic countries while in Austria and Germany in 
particular there is a very wide range of mini-
mum wage levels set by collective bargaining. 
In fact - along with Denmark, the UK and Ire-
land - Germany and Austria are among the EU 
Member States with the highest share of low 
wage earners among the low-skilled.55
Compensation policies and 
variable pay
While wage bargaining and low pay regula-
tion remain the central elements of collective 
bargaining, there are various other issues 
which are relevant in the context of wage 
formation and which are sometimes subject 
to collective bargaining. These include work-
ing hours, working conditions, training and 
apprenticeship issues and the overall level of 
employment. Collective bargaining also plays 
a role in determining compensation poli-
cies and variable pay schemes at sectoral or 
company level. This issue is reviewed in brief 
below, while issues related to working time, 
working conditions and quality in work are 
discussed in more detail in chapter 4.
In the context of the recent trend towards 
more decentralised bargaining structures, 
variable pay schemes, such as profit sharing 
or performance-related pay, are increasingly 
used to complement, or as an additional fea-
ture of, government pay policies and wage 
bargaining between social partners.56
Bargaining over variable pay may occur at 
national, sectoral and company level. While 
covered by national pay agreements or col-
lective agreements in Ireland, Austria and the 
Nordic EU Member States, in most countries 
it takes place predominantly at the company 
level. In the particular case of Germany, vari-
able pay schemes are more often governed 
by works agreements (between manage-
ment and works councils) than by collective 
agreements (signed by trade unions). In a 
substantial number of companies variable 
pay is determined neither by collective nor 
works agreement, but by other forms of ac-
cord such as individual or group agreements 
or unilateral management declarations.
55 See section 4 on wage distributions and low wage earners below.
56 For a definition and more evidence of variable pay schemes, see the report EIRO (2001), Variable pay in Europe, Dublin, on which this section draws substantially.
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Across all countries, variable pay schemes 
have gained importance and, in line with 
various policy initiatives at the European 
level,57 performance-related systems of wage 
determination have been increasingly pro-
moted since the 1990s, providing more scope 
for managerial discretion, higher pay rises 
for the higher-skilled and for pay variations 
between companies and sectors for similar 
categories of labour. Both the extent to 
which such changes have taken place and the 
incidence of new variable pay schemes vary 
between Member States.
While some form of variable pay exists in a 
number of EU Member States, there are large 
variations in the incidence and form of vari-
able pay schemes across countries. While in 
Germany, for example, many sectoral agree-
ments have opening clauses which allow 
downward pay variations under unfavourable 
economic conditions, some countries such as 
France and Austria foresee quasi-compulsory 
profit sharing components in pay.
In France, profit sharing (participation) is a 
statutory requirement for companies with a 
workforce of over 50 employees. Under this 
mechanism companies set aside at least a 
statutorily defined percentage of their profits 
for distribution to their employees. Voluntary 
profit sharing (intéressement), although not 
a statutory requirement, further ties a per-
centage of workers’ pay to company perfor-
mance in the form of profits or productivity, 
for example.
In Austria, the so-called “distribution option” 
(Verteilungsoption) splits pay increases 
into two components: a general percentage 
increase in actual pay to be applied to all em-
ployees; and a percentage increase which can 
be distributed flexibly among a company’s 
employees on the basis of an agreement 
between the management and the works 
council. The decision as to whether to apply a 
standard option of a flat-rate percentage pay 
increase, or to use the distribution option, is 
57 In 1991, the European Commission published its so-called PEPPER I report on the Promotion of Participation by Employed Persons in Profits and Enterprise Results (PEPPER). The Council of Ministers 
subsequently adopted a recommendation on the subject in July 1992 (92/443/EEC), inviting Member States “to acknowledge the benefits of a wider use of schemes to increase the participation of employees 
in profits and enterprise results by means of profit-sharing, employee share-ownership and a combination of both”. The European Commission’s PEPPER II report (COM(96) 697 final), published in 1996, 
concluded that there was more diversity than unity in the use of financial participation schemes across the EU. Further empirical research on the application of the different schemes was presented in a 
report in 2001 by Erik Poutsma for the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions on Recent trends in employee financial participation in the European Union. The Social 
Policy Agenda (2000-2005) identified financial participation as an important means of promoting social dialogue and employee involvement. As a response, the European Commission in 2002 published 
a Communication on a Framework for the promotion of employee financial participation (COM(2002) 364 final) which sets out a framework for action at Community level to promote a greater use of 
employee financial participation schemes across Europe and to address transitional obstacles which currently impede the introduction of European-wide financial participation schemes.
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left to the individual company. Under the 
distribution option, the flexible component 
may be used to reward specific groups of 
staff. While it may be applied to low income 
groups, it could also be applied to high-per-
forming groups, thus meeting the definition 
of variable pay.
Overall, bonuses alone - including profit-shar-
ing and other incentive payments, but exclud-
ing payments relating to overtime hours - ac-
count for some 11% of total remuneration on 
average, ranging from more than 15% in the 
Czech Republic, Portugal, Austria and Italy, 
to less than 5% in Denmark, Greece, Poland 
and the Baltic States (chart 53). Bonuses are 
generally more common in certain sectors 
and occupations, notably in “new economy” 
sectors and financial intermediation, in 
larger firms and among professionals and 
employees in supervisory positions. In Ger-
many and Italy in particular, there is also a 
strong regional discrepancy in the provision 
of variable pay schemes, with them being 
more common in the west of Germany than 
in the east, and in northern Italy rather than 
in the south.
Non-wage labour costs, 
tax rates and employment 
protection
In combination with the above key elements 
of wage formation systems in Europe, various 
other institutional settings are important to 
understand wage formation processes. With a 
view to the empirical analysis on wage deter-
minants presented later in this chapter, three 
of these institutional variables are briefly 
summarised here: non-wage labour costs; tax 
rates, in particular on labour; and provisions 
for employment protection. All are important 
determinants of both labour demand and sup-
ply decisions and wage formation in Europe.
Non-wage labour costs
Non-wage labour costs, including employ-
ers’ actual and imputed social contributions, 
so-called unfunded employee social benefits 
and any taxes payable by the employer on 
the wage and salary bill, are a crucial deter-
minant of labour demand decisions by firms. 
While wages and salaries clearly make up 
for the biggest part, non-wage labour costs 
also contribute to explaining variations in 
total labour costs across countries and sec-
tors (chart 54). Expressed as a share of total 
labour costs, non-wage labour costs exceed 
30% of total labour costs in Sweden, Romania, 
Hungary, France and Italy, while constituting 
less than 15% of total labour costs in Ireland 
and Denmark, and between 15% and 20% in 
Cyprus, Luxembourg, the UK and Slovenia 
(chart 55).
In this context, it is interesting to note that 
the two countries with the highest gross 
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hourly labour costs in Europe – Sweden and 
Denmark – are the countries with the high-
est and lowest share of non-wage labour 
costs, respectively. While this is related to the 
financing of the social security system, which 
in Denmark is mainly financed out of general 
taxation and not via social contributions, the 
differences in the share of non-wage labour 
costs in total labour costs, together with 
differences in the tax burden on labour, will 
have to be borne in mind when interpreting 
the results on differences in wages and sala-
ries presented below.
Within countries, there is furthermore an 
important variation in the share of non-
wage labour costs by sectors. The share of 
non-wage labour costs in industry exceeds 
the average considerably, in the Netherlands, 
Luxembourg, the UK and Cyprus for example, 
while remaining notably below average in 
Denmark. In services, this share is found to 
be highest relative to the average in Denmark 
and Greece, while considerably below average 
in Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, 
Ireland and, most notably, in the UK and 
Cyprus.
At a more disaggregate level, in Denmark 
sector-specific shares range from around 7% 
of total labour costs in predominantly low-
skilled, low-productivity service sectors such 
as “Hotels and restaurants” and “Renting of 
machinery and equipment” to more than 
20% in “Financial intermediation, insurance 
and pension funding”. Similarly, in Cyprus 
non-wage labour costs vary from around 10% 
of total labour costs in ”Education”, “Land and 
water transport” and “Hotels and restaurants” 
to up to 30% in “Post and telecommunica-
tions” and ”Electricity, gas and water supply”.
Tax burden on labour
The implicit tax rate on labour has been 
steadily rising since the early 1970s in most 
Member States, while that on capital and 
business income has been decreasing.58 Since 
the mid-1990s, however, a number of Member 
States have implemented measures to lower 
58 Implicit tax rates are defined for each economic function (labour, capital, consumption). They are computed as the ratio of total tax revenues of each of these categories to a proxy of the potential tax base 
defined using the production and income accounts of the national accounts. The implicit tax rate on labour, in particular, is defined as the ratio of direct and indirect taxes and actual social contributions on 
employed labour income to the compensation of employees plus payroll taxes. It is calculated for employed labour only, excluding the tax burden on social transfers and pensions. It measures the effective 
average tax burden on labour (incl. social contributions) with national account data. For further information and the relevant definitions, see European Commission (2003), “Structures of taxation systems 
in the European Union”, DG TAXUD and Eurostat. See also Employment in Europe (2000), chapter 5 “Taxes, benefits and employment”, and the Joint Employment Report 2002.
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the tax burden on labour income. It now 
appears that this general trend towards an in-
creasing tax burden on labour has stabilised 
or reversed slightly for most Member States.
This notwithstanding, the average effective 
tax burden on labour in the EU still remains 
relatively high by international standards.59 
By the year 2001, labour income appears to 
be most heavily taxed in Sweden, Finland, 
Belgium, France, Italy and Denmark, with 
average implicit tax rates well above 40% 
of the total wage bill in the economy (social 
contributions included). On the other hand, 
Spain, Ireland and the United Kingdom stand 
out with average implicit tax rates below 30% 
of the total wage bill.
Important differences between countries 
remain in the relative taxation of labour, 
capital, capital income and consumption 
(chart 56). In Germany, Italy and Belgium, 
for example, above average (implicit) tax 
rates on labour contrast with below average 
(implicit) tax rates on capital and, in the case 
of Germany and Italy, also on consumption. 
On the other hand, in Ireland, Luxembourg, 
the Netherlands and the UK, the (implicit) 
tax rates on labour are below the EU average, 
while those on capital or consumption are 
above the EU average.
In the majority of the Member States, the 
implicit tax rate on labour largely reflects 
the important role played by wage-based 
contributions in financing the social secu-
rity system (chart 57). On average, somewhat 
more than 60% of the implicit tax rate on 
labour consists of social contributions paid by 
employees and employers. Only in Denmark, 
Ireland and the United Kingdom, do personal 
income taxes constitute more than half of the 
total charges paid on labour income.
The tax burden on labour is a crucial deter-
minant of labour supply decisions, notably 
for low-income earners, people starting their 
working career and members of single earner 
households with children. The tax wedge 
– defined as the share of total income tax and 
employer and employee social security contri-
butions in gross wage earnings - ranges from 
more than 45% in Belgium, Germany and 
Sweden to less than 20% in Malta, Cyprus and 
Ireland for low-income earners. Belgium and 
Sweden, together with France,  also have the 
59 It should be recognised, however, that the evolution of the implicit tax rate on labour refers to an ex-post trend without disentangling cyclical, structural and policy elements. In some Member States, for 
example, the development of the implicit tax rate on labour seems to be clearly influenced by the economic upswing in the late 1990s. More generally, the relationship of the implicit tax rates to the respective 
European average also depends on the overall level of taxes and social contributions in the different Member States. The implicit tax rate on capital (and capital and business income) is furthermore sensi-
tive to the business cycle and witnessed an increasing trend in the expansionary phase up to 2000. The comparability between countries is affected by the fact that 2001 was the turning point in economic 
performance in some (but not all) countries. For further information and the relevant methodological caveats, see European Commission (2003), “Structures of taxation systems in the European Union”, 
DG TAXUD and Eurostat.
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highest marginal tax rates in the EU on single 
earner families with children. At the other 
end, Luxembourg, the UK and Ireland have a 
relatively low tax wedge which, at under 20%, 
is below that of the US (chart 58).
Employment protection
Provisions for employment protection also 
vary considerably across countries in Europe. 
Standard - but controversial - measures of 
the strictness of employment protection are 
the related OECD indicators, both of overall 
strictness of employment protection and of 
particular provisions for regular employ-
ment, temporary employment and collective 
dismissals. These indicators translate into val-
ues ranging from 0 where there is no employ-
ment protection and 5 for strict employment 
protection.60
According to these indicators, overall employ-
ment protection throughout the 1990s was 
comparatively strict in France and the south-
ern EU Member States, but relaxed in Ireland, 
Denmark and most of the accession countries. 
In most countries, except Belgium, France and 
the southern EU Member States, employment 
protection is relatively less strict with regard 
to temporary employment. This applies 
notably to Ireland, the UK and Denmark, all 
countries where temporary employment, ac-
cording to the relevant OECD indicator, is less 
regulated than in the US. On the other hand, 
collective dismissals are in general considered 
more regulated than individual dismissals, 
with the notable exception of France. In the 
latter as well as in Ireland, Finland and the 
Netherlands, collective dismissals are less 
regulated than in the US, while in all other 
EU Member States as well as in most acces-
sion countries, it is relatively more difficult to 
achieve collective dismissals (table 28).
60 For a definition of the OECD indicators, see OECD (1999), Employment Outlook 1999, chapter 2, Employment protection and labour market performance, Paris; and Nicoletti et al. (2000), Summary indica-
tors of product market regulation with an extension to employment protection legislation, Economics Department Working Papers No. 226, OECD, Paris. 
 It should be noted, however, that alternative indicators and concepts for the measurement of labour market flexibility, security and adaptability have been developed. These include in particular the concepts 
of “flexicurity” and “adaptability”. See e.g. Boeri et al. (2001), Adaptability of labour markets: a tentative definition and a synthetic indicator, Fondazione Rodolfo Benedetti, contribution to a study commis-
sioned by the European Commission, DG Employment and Social Affairs, on the construction of an index of labour market adaptability for EU Member States: “To date, most of the theoretical and empirical 
efforts have been devoted to the analysis of flexibility, which in the international policy debate is often referred to in terms of a country’s Employment Protection Legislation (EPL). Yet, (…) there are a 
number of reasons why the notion of adaptability can be more meaningful and useful than flexibility in assessing labour market performance.” See also Bertola et al. (1999), Employment protection and 
labour market adjustment in some OECD countries: evolving institutions and variable enforcement, Employment and training papers No. 48, ILO.
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Non-wage labour costs and tax rates as well 
as employment protection are likely to affect 
labour demand by firms and labour supply 
by individuals - without necessarily having a 
direct effect on wage levels. The direction of 
these effects, however, is a priori unclear. 
With regard to employment protection one 
could, for example, expect wages to be higher 
on average in countries or sectors with lower 
degrees of employment protection, with wag-
es compensating for actual employment risks. 
According to this argument, higher levels of 
employment protection induce risk-averse 
workers to accept relatively lower wages – as 
some sort of premium for employment insur-
ance – and hence lead to lower wages and 
labour costs. On the other hand, if employ-
ment protection ensures bargaining power of 
employed ‘insiders’ compared to unemployed 
‘outsiders’, also the opposite effect could pre-
vail.61 Whether higher wages need to account 
for employment risks will further depend on 
the provision of unemployment benefits and 
active labour market policies. Similar to the 
compensation of employment risks, more-
over, wages might also compensate for the 
higher earnings risk in countries with more 
dispersed wage distributions. As shown in the 
later empirical analysis, there is evidence that 
some types of risk compensation are at work 
in European labour markets.
Wage differentiation 
across sectors, firms and 
regions
This section provides a descriptive portrait of 
wage differentiation across sectors, firms and 
regions in Europe.62 There are important in-
ter-industry wage differentials and, although 
61 For a recent critical review of theoretical arguments and empirical evidence on the link between employment protection legislation and employment performance, see also European Commission (2003), 
Employment protection legislation: its economic impact and the case for reform, by David Young, DG Economic and Financial Affairs, Economic Paper No. 186. The paper concludes that “[t]here is a clear 
theoretical case for at least a limited degree of EPL, and there is little conclusive empirical evidence on negative side effects.” While highlighting potential risks in case of stringent EPL, the paper also reports 
many fairly mainstream economists’ reproaching policy-makers (e.g. the OECD Jobs Study) for undue concern.
62 The section is based on data from the 2000 Labour Cost Survey (LCS). See annex 3.2 for more detail on statistical information on earnings and labour costs in the EU and the accession countries. No data 
are available from this source for Belgium, Malta and Turkey. For Slovenia, only information at broad sectoral level (NACE-1) is available. For some EU Member States, notably Italy, as well as for the acces-
sion countries no regional information is provided. In this section, EU15 therefore refers to the current EU (excluding Belgium), and EU25 and EU27 to the enlarged Union including the accession countries 
(excluding Malta).
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to a lesser extent, firm-size wage differentials 
in European labour markets, while wage 
variation across regions is generally less 
pronounced.
Wage differentiation by sector
In both EU Member States and accession 
countries, average wages in the services sector 
generally exceed those in industry, although 
this wage premium is much more developed 
in the accession countries, with wages in 
services exceeding average wages on average 
by 10%. The only countries without a service 
sector wage premium are Spain, Ireland, 
Austria, the Netherlands and, in particular, 
Germany – in all these countries the average 
wages in the services sector (excluding public 
administration) are considerably lower than 
in industry. In Germany, wages in the services 
sector are, on average, 13% lower than in in-
dustry. This is in stark contrast with relative 
wages in most other EU Member States and 
in all accession countries. In France and Italy, 
gross hourly wages in services exceed average 
Table 28 – OECD indicators of employment protection
Overall
(version 1)
Overall
(version 2)
Regular
employment
Temporary
employment
Collective
dismissals
B 2.1 2.5 1.5 2.8 4.1
DK 1.2 1.5 1.6 0.9 3.1
D 2.5 2.6 2.8 2.3 3.1
EL 3.6 3.5 2.4 4.8 3.3
E 3.1 3.1 2.6 3.5 3.1
F 3 2.8 2.3 3.6 2.1
IRL 0.9 1.1 1.6 0.3 2.1
I 3.3 3.4 2.8 3.8 4.1
NL 2.1 2.2 3.1 1.2 2.8
P 3.7 3.7 4.3 3 3.6
A 2.2 2.3 2.6 1.8 3.3
FIN 2 2.1 2.1 1.9 2.4
S 2.2 2.6 2.8 1.6 4.5
UK 0.5 0.9 0.8 0.3 2.9
CZ 1.7 2.1 2.8 0.5 4.3
HU 1.4 1.7 2.1 0.6 3.4
PL 1.6 2 2.2 1 3.9
p.m.:
JAP 2.4 2.3 2.7 Na 1.5
NZL 1 0.9 1.7 0.4 0.4
US 0.2 0.7 0.2 0.9 2.9
Source: OECD
Notes: data refer to 1990s; higher values indicate stricter employment protection according to the respective OECD 
indicator; version 1 of the ‘overall indicator’ is an average indicator for regular and temporary employment; version 2 of 
the ‘overall indicator’ is an average of the indicators for regular and temporary employment as well as collective dismiss-
als; no data provided for the other accession countries.
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wages by 10%, in Portugal and Luxembourg 
by up to 30% (chart 59).
There is further strong wage variation within 
both sectors. Wages are generally above aver-
age in “Financial intermediation” and “Real 
estate and business services”, but also in 
“Energy and electricity” and some selected 
manufacturing sectors (notably “Metals”, 
”Tobacco”, and “Fuel and petroleum”). On the 
other hand, wages tend to be lower than aver-
age in “Manufacturing of textiles and wood”, 
“Construction”, “Wholesale and retail trade” 
and “Hotels and restaurants”. The more com-
prehensive data which are available for the 
accession countries further indicate above av-
erage wages in “Public administration”, and 
below average wages in “Health and social 
services”. While these sectoral wage differ-
ences are common to both the current EU and 
the accession countries, there are differences 
in three sectors: while in “Manufacturing”, 
above average wages in the EU contrast with 
significantly lower wages in the accession 
countries, the opposite is found for “Trans-
port and communication” and, in particular, 
“Mining and quarrying” (chart 60). 
Within both, industry and services, there is 
further a strong variation in wage structures 
across countries in general and in the relative 
earnings position of specific sectors in par-
ticular. Inter-sectoral wage variation seems 
somewhat larger in the accession countries, 
with average wages in low paying sectors 
standing at only 50% or less of the country 
average, and those in high paying sectors 
two to three times higher than the average. 
Among the EU Member States, the highest in-
ter-sectoral wage variation is found in the UK, 
France and the southern EU Member States. 
The countries with the lowest inter-sectoral 
wage variation, on the other hand, are Den-
mark and Slovenia. In most countries, inter-
sectoral wage variation is more pronounced 
in the service sector than in industry (table 
29, charts 61-62 and annex 3.3).
There are, however, notable exceptions to 
the above relative wages in sectors between 
the various countries. The positive wage pre-
mium in industry in Spain, Ireland, Austria, 
the Netherlands and, in particular, Germany 
are mainly due to higher than average wages 
in manufacturing. Wages in manufacturing 
are, by contrast, considerably below average 
in Portugal and in all the accession countries 
– with wage penalties of up to 15% in Roma-
nia and Cyprus.
In Germany, Ireland, Spain and the Neth-
erlands the wage premia for working in 
“Financial intermediation” or “Transport 
and communication” are also lower than in 
the other EU Member States and notably the 
accession countries. In the latter, average 
wages in “Transport and communication” 
exceed the average by 10% or more, and those 
in financial intermediation by 50% or more. 
Among the EU Member States, similar wage 
premia for working in these sectors are only 
observed in the UK and the southern Member 
States. Despite these differences, “Financial 
intermediation” is among the sectors with 
the highest average wages in all countries.
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In “Real estate and business activities”, the 
picture is less clear. Strong positive wage 
premia in Ireland, the UK and France as well 
as in Slovenia and Lithuania contrast with 
considerably lower than average wages in 
Luxembourg, Italy and Spain as well as in 
Bulgaria and Romania.
The relative wage position of “R&D” also 
varies considerably between countries: while 
being among the best paid sectors in France, 
Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Austria and 
the UK, it does not command particularly 
large wage premia in Germany, Spain, Greece 
and the Nordic countries. The same finding 
applies to the accession countries. In none of 
them does “R&D” figure among the high pay-
ing sectors. There is thus possibly an impor-
tant lack of incentives to work in the “R&D” 
field, notably in countries with relatively 
dispersed wage distributions and much larger 
wage premia for other sectors such as “Finan-
cial intermediation”, “Business services” and 
“Telecommunications”.
Wage penalties in “Construction” are largest 
in Luxembourg, Greece and Germany and, 
among the accession countries, in Hungary 
and Romania. On the other hand, there is 
hardly any wage penalty in “Construction” 
in Austria, the Netherlands, the UK, Ireland, 
the Nordic Member States or in the Czech Re-
public and Slovakia where average wages in 
“Construction” broadly match overall average 
wage levels.
Finally, wage penalties in low-skilled, low 
productivity services such as “Wholesale and 
retail trade” and “Hotels and restaurants” are 
found to be largest in Luxembourg, the UK 
and Germany. Germany is found to offer the 
lowest relative earnings position for those 
employed in “Hotels and restaurants”. Greece 
and the Czech Republic are the only coun-
tries, on the other hand, in which “Hotels 
and restaurants” and “Wholesale and retail 
trade”, respectively, pay wages above aver-
age. Wage penalties in these two sectors are 
generally found to be lowest in countries with 
more compressed wage distributions, notably 
Denmark, Slovenia and Cyprus, as well as in 
the Italy, Spain and Portugal.
Wage differentiation by firm 
size
Both in the EU and the accession countries, 
wages in larger firms are, on average, higher 
than in smaller firms. Firm size wage differ-
entials are more important – and up to three 
times higher - in the current EU Member 
States than in the accession countries. In the 
EU, average wages in companies with more 
than 1,000 employees exceed total average 
wages by almost 25%, while average wages 
in companies with 10-49 employees are 15% 
Table 29 – Inter-industry wage differentials in industry and services (deviations from country-specific average in %) in the EU and the acces-
sion countries, 2000
Industry Services
Mining and 
quarrying
Manufac-
turing
Electricity, 
gas and water 
supply
Construction Wholesale and 
retail trade
Hotels and 
restaurants
Transport, 
storage and 
communi-
cation
Financial 
interme-
diation
Real estate, 
renting and 
business 
activities
DK 21 -3 14 -2 -5 -22 3 12 11
D 10 8 22 -19 -16 -45 26
EL 14 -7 58 -21 -26 4 21 56 12
E 24 6 75 -17 -14 -29 19 88 -15
F -23 -3 26 -13 -11 -15 -20 37 13
IRL 7 0 64 -7 -19 -36 6 39 24
I 11 -5 43 -15 -11 -32 10 70 -5
L -20 -10 45 -33 -30 -45 4 71 -9
NL 69 4 39 -1 -13 -37 -5 42 1
P -4 -15 67 -14 0 -29 32 141 1
A 17 3 40 -1 -10 -38 -8 40 8
FIN -3 -1 15 -5 -1 -34 1 28 5
S 9 -1 9 -8 -6 -31 -1 46 7
UK 26 -3 31 -5 -18 -41 -5 72 15
BG 59 -10 82 -19 -27 -34 21 84 -13
CY 14 -15 48 -12 -6 -17 11 49 -1
CZ 20 -8 23 -7 1 -23 4 76 7
EE 30 -6 14 -10 -11 -39 16 113 -1
HU 30 -3 35 -23 -19 -40 12 94 6
LT 20 -4 28 -12 -15 -34 7 86 13
LV -7 -10 48 -17 -26 -35 27 105 10
PL 68 -12 28 -12 -9 -32 10 54 6
RO 65 -16 54 -26 -26 -33 38 173 -11
SI 27 -9 22 -14 -2 -16 13 58 24
SK 26 -1 -10 -4 -14 -22 5 55 10
Source: Eurostat, LCS
Notes: no data available for Belgium, Malta and Turkey
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below the average. Firm-size wage differen-
tials are also generally larger in industry than 
in services. In the latter, sizeable wage premia 
are found only in the case of large companies 
of 1,000 employees or more. Such wage dif-
ferentials related to firm size, though, are in 
general much smaller than the inter-industry 
wage differentials discussed above (chart 63).
As for inter-industry wage differentials, there 
are important differences in the wage struc-
tures by firm size between the various coun-
tries. Wage penalties of working for small em-
ployers are larger in industry than in services 
in all countries except Luxembourg, Italy, 
Greece, Portugal, Cyprus, Latvia and Estonia. 
These wage penalties among the EU Member 
States reach up to 30% in Greece, Germany, 
Spain, Portugal and Ireland, and, among the 
accession countries, up to 50% in Bulgaria, 
Romania and Poland. Together with Cyprus, 
Bulgaria, Romania and Latvia, wage premia 
of up to 50% for working in large companies 
are found in Spain, Portugal and Greece. It is 
also these latter countries which show the 
highest firm-size differentials in both industry 
and services. Firm-size wage differentials are 
not only small in the Nordic Member States 
and the Czech Republic and Slovakia – coun-
tries with also low inter-industry differentials 
– but also in the UK, France, Austria, the 
Netherlands and, in the service sector, Poland 
(charts 64-65 and table 30).
Wage differentiation across 
regions
Scarce data means it is not possible to do a full 
comparison of wage differentiation across re-
gions as for inter-industry and firm-size wage 
differentials above. But there is evidence of 
relatively large regional differentiation of 
wages in industry in Germany, France, Spain, 
Greece, Portugal and the UK, as opposed to 
relative low variation in Austria. In Germany, 
the downward variation is mainly due to the 
wage levels in east Germany which remain 
significantly lower than in the west.
In services, a relatively large regional varia-
tion in wages can be found in the UK, Ger-
many, France, Spain and Portugal - a contrast 
with low wage differentiation across regions 
in Greece, Austria and the Netherlands. In line 
with the findings on inter-industry wage dif-
Table 30 – Firm-size wage differentials (deviations from country-specific average)
in the EU and the accession countries, 2000
Industry Services
10-49 50-249 250-499 500-999 1000+ 10-49 50-249 250-499 500-999 1000+
DK -6 -2 -1 6 5 -3 3 6 5 -2
D -27 -14 -2 6 29 -19 -5 8 9 11
EL -28 -18 -8 27 59 -28 -2 5 -12 29
E -23 -3 21 36 51 -16 -2 2 8 16
F -13 -11 3 7 15 -7 2 13 13 -5
IRL -23 -5 8 8 24 -12 0 34 11 0
I -15 -6 2 19 32 -17 -6 4 2 12
L -18 -7 19 -18 -3 18 -5 23
NL -15 -1 6 11 14 -9 3 1 13 4
A -14 -6 3 4 20 -9 2 1 9 4
P -23 -4 27 31 52 -25 4 -3 -24 33
FIN -12 -3 2 1 6 -7 0 1 -2 4
S -13 -3 0 4 9 -5 4 3 5 -1
UK -11 -6 -1 1 15 -1 9 13 10 -6
BG -51 -23 1 20 60 -34 -8 14 41 45
CY -19 8 18 23 72 -17 0 6 -14 41
CZ -11 -10 2 2 15 -2 7 -10 -9 2
EE -15 3 4 12 7 -15 1 0 11 48
HU -40 -10 4 13 30 -29 11 -4 10 17
LT -27 -12 2 13 30 -13 -5 25 21 14
LV -34 -10 7 27 55 -32 5 34 64 19
PL -39 -22 -16 -10 15 3 -3 -5 0 2
RO -42 -28 -19 -12 33 -41 -16 -11 4 48
SI
SK -2 -12 -3 -9 7 26 -2 7 -5 -7
EU -17 -8 3 9 24 -12 1 8 9 4
AC -4 -5 -4 -2 8 -3 -1 -1 2 5
Source: Eurostat, LCS 
Notes: no data available for Belgium, Malta and Turkey
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ferentials above, relative wages are found to 
be particularly low (around 70% of average 
wages) in the services sectors in east German 
regions. Furthermore, regional wage differ-
entiation, too, is in most countries more pro-
nounced in high paying services sectors such 
as “Financial intermediation” and “Business 
activities”, while generally more restricted in 
low paying services sectors (chart 66).
The above wage differentials across regions 
notwithstanding, the question remains as to 
whether these wage differentials sufficiently 
reflect differences in labour market condi-
tions, and notably unemployment, across 
regions. Results from a more detailed analysis 
of wage determinants at the individual level 
presented later in this chapter show that, in 
particular in the case of Germany and Greece, 
there is in fact little evidence that wage levels 
account for differences in regional unemploy-
ment rates.
Wages and productivity: 
structures and recent 
trends
Following on from the above descriptive 
differences in average wages across sectors, 
firms and regions, two important questions 
emerge: first, do these differentials just rep-
resent variations in labour productivity and 
workforce characteristics across sectors, firms 
or regions or do they, instead, still prevail 
when controlling for such variations? Second, 
what is the role of cross-country differences in 
labour market institutions, and employment 
protection in particular, on wages?63 To an-
swer these questions, the link between wages 
and productivity - measured as gross value 
added per hour worked - both overall and at 
the sectoral level has to be examined.
Wage and productivity levels
Within the EU, average monthly gross wages 
in industry and services in 2000 ranged be-
tween 950 euro in Portugal and 3,000 euro 
or more in the UK and Denmark. Average 
monthly wages also exceeded the EU average 
of 2,390 euro by more than 10% in Luxem-
bourg, Germany and Sweden. On the other 
hand, wages lagged behind the EU average 
by 10% or more in Italy, Spain, Portugal and 
Greece. In the accession countries, wages 
ranged from around 150 euro in Bulgaria and 
Romania and around 300 euro in the Baltic 
States and Slovakia to 1,050 euro in Slovenia 
and 1,390 euro in Cyprus (chart 67).
Clearly, the above comparisons of gross 
monthly nominal wages need to be inter-
preted with great caution. In particular dif-
ferences in working hours across countries, 
63 The section is based on data from the 2000 Labour Cost Survey (LCS) (see footnote 1619) and the 1995-2000 Structure of Earnings (SES) time-series data. It should be noted that this data is unlikely to include 
information on wages from undeclared work. In the sequel, the terms “wages”, “pay” and “earnings” are used interchangeably to denote “wages and salaries”. In the empirical analysis, in order to ensure 
comparability of the results, the focus will be on either gross hourly wages or relative wage structures more than on absolute wages, thus avoiding problems due to distortions caused by tax/benefit systems 
and differences in average working hours. See annex 3.1 for a detailed definition of the underlying statistical concepts.
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and differences in both productivity levels 
and relative price levels need to be taken 
into account to give an appropriate picture 
of variation in wage levels across countries. 
Furthermore, differences in non-wage labour 
costs and income taxes also need to be taken 
into account.
As discussed in detail in chapter 4, there 
are large variations in working hours 
across countries in Europe. Variations in 
hourly wages across countries, however, are 
similar to those in monthly wages (chart 68). 
Within the current EU, gross hourly wages 
in industry and services (excluding public 
administration) range between 6.50 euro in 
Portugal and 24.19 euro in Denmark. Gross 
hourly wages also exceeded the EU average of 
16.74 euro by more than 10% in Luxembourg, 
Germany, the UK and Sweden. On the other 
hand, wages trailed the EU average by 10% or 
more in Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece, as 
well as in Ireland.
Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, France 
and Germany – all countries with average 
working hours below EU average – show 
higher relative hourly wages compared to 
monthly wages. Countries with longer work-
ing hours, in particular Ireland and the UK, 
on the other hand, have a less favourable 
position in terms of hourly wages, with 
hourly wages in Ireland significantly below 
the EU average, while monthly wages are at 
EU level. 
There are also important differences in 
the price levels across countries in Europe 
(chart 69), with price levels exceeding the EU 
average by 10% or more in the UK, Denmark 
and Sweden, and price levels of more than 
10% below EU average in the four southern 
EU Member States, Spain, Italy, Greece and 
Portugal.64
When correcting the above wage data for 
these differences in price levels – i.e. when ex-
pressing wages in purchasing power parities 
(PPP) - the gap in average gross wages, both 
monthly and hourly, within the EU is reduced 
by some 40 percentage points, with average 
gross monthly wages and gross hourly wages, 
respectively, in PPP ranging from 1,300 and 
8.89 in Portugal (equivalent to 54% of the 
EU average) to 2,760 and 19.91 in Denmark 
(115%-120% of EU average).
Similarly, the gap in wages between the ac-
cession countries and the current EU Member 
States is reduced, on average, by some 20 
percentage points when correcting for pur-
chasing power parities. Average wages in PPP 
reach two thirds or more of the EU average 
64 Purchasing power parities (PPP) and relative price level indices are calculated for the ESA95 aggregates on the basis of final consumption expenditure (SNA approach). The PPP are calculated on the basis 
of average price levels for a large number of goods and services, taking into account differences in consumption behaviour across countries.
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in Cyprus and Slovenia, around 35%-42% in 
the Slovak and Czech Republics, Hungary and 
Poland, 25%-30% in the Baltic countries, and 
20% in Romania and Bulgaria. As a whole, 
average wages in purchasing power parities 
in the accession countries reach around 40% 
of the average wage level in the current Union 
(charts 67 and 68).
Labour productivity, measured as GDP per 
person employed, also varies significantly 
within the EU and between the current EU 
and the future Member States (chart 70). Pro-
ductivity levels in Finland, France, Belgium, 
Sweden, Denmark and, notably, Luxembourg 
exceed the EU average by 10% or more. On the 
other hand, productivity levels in Portugal, 
Greece and Spain remain at or below 75% of 
the EU average. In terms of PPP, the productiv-
ity levels are highest in Luxembourg, Ireland, 
Belgium, France and Italy, while those of 
Denmark, Sweden and the UK fall below EU 
average. Productivity levels in the accession 
countries vary between less than 20% of the 
EU average in the Baltic States, Romania and, 
notably, Bulgaria and around 50% or more 
in Slovenia, Malta and Cyprus. Corrected for 
purchasing power parities, productivity levels 
in the accession countries reach, on average, 
almost 50% in the acceding countries, and 
around 30% in Bulgaria and Romania.
When comparing relative wages and labour 
costs with relative productivity levels, it can 
be seen that, unsurprisingly, wage differences 
across countries in Europe reflect productiv-
ity differences to a large extent (chart 71). 
In interpreting these differences, however, 
variations in non-wage labour costs, together 
with differences in the tax burden on labour 
and the financing of social security need to be 
taken into account. In the following section, 
the link between wages and productivity at 
the sectoral level will be explored in more 
detail.
The link between wages and 
productivity
When comparing the relative distributions 
of both hourly wages and labour productiv-
ity across sectors, a relatively strong link 
between wages and productivity can also be 
found at the sectoral level. Despite some sec-
tors with productivity well above the average 
- particularly in the UK, Germany, France, 
Ireland, the Netherlands, Spain, Finland, Italy 
and Luxembourg - there is generally a high 
concentration of hourly labour productivity 
around the mean, and the spread of wages 
across sectors roughly matches that of rela-
tive labour productivity. This link is less clear-
cut, though, than the one at aggregate level. 
In particular in the Nordic EU Member States, 
Ireland, Hungary and Estonia, relative labour 
productivity is more spread across sectors 
than wages. Altogether, a significant match 
between wages and labour productivity can 
be observed in a number of countries, notably 
in the five big EU Member States: Germany, 
France, the UK, Italy and Spain (chart 72).
The looser relationship between wages and 
productivity at the sectoral level is in part 
due to the fact that there are many other 
potential factors, in addition to differences  in 
labour productivity across firms, sectors and 
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regions that might impact on wage levels. 
These include: differences in the workforce 
composition, notably with respect to gender, 
age, nationality and education; differences 
in job characteristics such as contract type, 
overtime hours, working conditions and 
accident rates; differences in the use of vari-
able pay schemes; as well as differences in 
the institutional setting, including collective 
bargaining coverage and employment protec-
tion legislation.
There are in particular a number of theo-
retical reasons why these differences in the 
workforce composition may have a system-
atic impact on wages even when controlling 
for labour productivity (box 6). In addition, 
despite similar levels of labour productivity, 
sectors may remunerate certain personal and 
job characteristics differently. In particular 
labour-intensive firms in research and devel-
opment or in knowledge-intensive services 
sectors may offer significantly higher rewards 
for human capital and skills as compared to 
Box 6 – Theories of wage determination and 
the link between wages and productivity
In the standard neo-classical model of the labour market firms 
equate, under perfect competition, the value of the marginal prod-
uct of labour (productivity) with its marginal cost (wages). Stan-
dard theories predict that a worker‘s wage varies with his or her 
characteristics that affect/reflect productivity, such as for example 
age or experience and education (human capital theories). Age or 
labour market experience - i.e. the time an individual has been in 
the labour market - are considered measures of general human 
capital acquired throughout the working career. Job tenure – the 
time the individual has been with a specific employer – is seen as 
a measure of firm-specific human capital. Since productivity can 
be assumed to increase with both general and firm-specific human 
capital, these models therefore predict a positive link between age, 
labour market experience and tenure, on the one hand, and wages 
on the other. In economic parlance, productivity increases due to 
general and specific human capital investments lead to upward 
sloping wage-seniority. Human capital models thus provide a pro-
ductivity-based rationale for seniority-related pay schemes.
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There are, however, some problems with this interpretation. First, 
such competitive wage models are incompatible with persisting 
industry or firm-size wage premia, once worker and job charac-
teristics have been taken into account. Second, there is not much 
empirical evidence that the positive link between seniority and pay 
is due to productivity. It has long been recognised in economics lit-
erature that “objective“ measures of productivity do not dominate 
“subjective“ performance rankings or ratings due to the inherent 
difficulties in finding objective measures that convincingly quantify 
“the true value of a worker to his or her firm“.65 There is also more 
recent evidence that, “within hierarchical levels, productivity is not 
the driving force of the observed upward sloping wage-seniority 
profiles“.66 Thirdly, there are numerous alternative theories that 
could explain seniority wages equally as well. The upward sloping 
wage-seniority profiles could, for example, be due to the selection 
of more productive workers into longer employment relationships. 
Wage increases could also be deferred for incentive, insurance or 
institutional reasons, with wages of younger workers remaining 
below their productivity levels. While such a wage deferral for 
incentive, insurance or institutional reasons seems well placed in 
internal labour markets, providing long-term employment rela-
tionships between the employer and the employed, it is not neces-
sarily sustainable in more flexible labour markets with higher job 
turnover and shorter employment relationships. 
There is, finally, a whole range of more elaborate models than that 
discussed above that do not just focus on worker characteristics, 
but also take account of job and firm characteristics or institutional 
settings that are likely to influence wages. These alternative mod-
els attempt to provide theoretical arguments to explain why wages 
65 James L. Medoff and Katharine G. Abraham (1981), Are those paid more really more productive? The case of experience, Journal of Human Resources 
66 Luca Flabbi and Andrea Ichino (2001), Productivity, seniority and wages, Labour Economics
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more capital-intensive sectors. Certain char-
acteristics such as firm size, moreover, may 
be related to productivity differences across 
firms within one sector. Finally, as in the 
case of gender, they may also reflect, to some 
extent, differences in the social valuation of 
economic activities.
Econometric analyses of wage determinants 
at the sectoral level make it possible to 
identify the role of the sectoral workforce 
composition and of institutional variables, 
while controlling for both sectoral differences 
in labour productivity and cross-country dif-
ferences in price levels. Cross-section wage 
equation models at both EU and national 
level have been estimated, with regressors 
including: sector-specific hourly labour pro-
ductivity; country-specific price levels; various 
variables on the workforce composition (em-
ployment shares by gender, age, nationality 
and educational attainment); major employ-
ment characteristics (employment shares 
of temporary employees and self-employed, 
as well as importance of overtime hours, 
atypical working arrangements and work-
related accidents); employer characteristics 
(sector, firm size, high-tech and knowledge 
intensity); and the key institutional variables 
presented in section 2 above, notably: an 
indicator of the dominant wage bargaining 
level, coverage rates, trade union density, 
minimum wage and the OECD measures of 
employment protection reviewed above. The 
models have been estimated on the samples of 
all sectors for which the respective variables 
are available.
EU-level estimation results are presented 
in table 31. Most importantly, inter-sectoral 
and firm-size wage differentials persist even 
after controlling for differences in labour 
productivity and workforce and employment 
characteristics. The estimation results further 
corroborate the significant link between 
wages and productivity. Labour productivity 
and price levels alone actually explain more 
than 80% of the wage variation across sectors 
and countries (table 31, column (1)).
Workforce and employment characteristics, 
when added to the respective estimation equa-
tion, contribute to wage levels in a significant 
way (column (2)). While higher sectoral 
employment shares of women, low-skilled, 
employees of small and medium-sized firms, 
self-employed and temporary employees are 
correlated with lower wage levels, the op-
posite holds true for higher sectoral employ-
ment shares of older workers, high-skilled 
and employees in larger establishments. This 
also highlights other important features of 
wage formation in Europe, notably the pres-
ence of skills differentials in wages, wage gaps 
by gender and seniority pay. Although no de-
tailed sectoral information on work-related 
health risks and work accidents is available 
unfortunately, there is some evidence that the 
incidence rate of work accidents is positively 
correlated with wage levels, after control-
ling for other differences in the workforce 
composition, thus indicating the presence of 
compensating wage differentials.
When regressing, for each country, wages at 
the sectoral level on labour productivity and 
the main characteristics of the workforce, 
including gender, age, skills level and nation-
might exceed the so-called “equilibrium wage“, i.e. the wage which 
equals (marginal) productivity. One standard explanation refers to 
the fact that individual perceptions of job-related risks will entail 
supply reactions that lead to a “compensating” wage premium. Not 
only should wages compensate for unfavourable job characteristics 
such as accident and health risks, poor working conditions or the 
lack of regional amenities to attract and keep suitable workers 
(risk compensation theories) but also they must compensate for 
other job-related risks such as the variation in expected earnings 
at the time when individuals make educational and occupational 
choices and expected unemployment risks. This latter type of risk 
compensation clearly is of increasing importance in less regulated 
and more flexible labour markets. It fits with the observation that 
employees on temporary or fixed-term contracts, with low job 
security and shorter expected tenure on the job, have the highest 
probability of receiving performance-based pay.67
It is also possible that it is in firms‘ own interest to pay “higher-
than-normal wages“ in addition to the compensating wage dif-
ferentials mentioned above. Reasons include: first, the difficulty to 
screen all relevant worker characteristics such as motivation and to 
supervise their work effort (efficiency wage and incentive compen-
sation theories); second, the firms‘ bargaining position relative to 
workers and their joint rent-seeking behaviour (rent sharing and 
bargaining theories); and thirdly, the search for reciprocity and 
stable “gift exchange practices” as a basis of a long-term relation-
ship between employer and employee (gift exchange and fair wage 
effort theories). 
In all of these cases, non-compensating wage differentials can be 
seen as a devices to increase worker effort, performance and com-
mitment and hence firm performance, productivity and profitabil-
ity by reducing shirking, limiting employee turnover and attracting 
higher quality labour and more skilled workers. In turn the costs to 
the employer recruitment and training of new workers, applicant 
screening, worker supervision and performance measurement 
would be reduced. Following this logic, these theories – while 
acknowledging the basic link between worker productivity and 
wages – provide a rationale for why it might be in the firm’s own 
interest to pay wages above market-clearing or risk compensating 
wages.
67 See e.g. Mark Cowling (1998), Fixed wages or productivity pay: Evidence from 15 EU countries, based on the Second European Survey of Working Conditions 1996.
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ality, while controlling for firm size, varying 
results are obtained (table 32). A significant 
positive link between hourly productivity and 
wages is found for all countries except the 
Nordic Member States, France, Luxembourg 
and Slovakia. Higher employment shares 
of women are negatively correlated with 
wages in most EU Member States, except 
Luxembourg, Sweden and some of the acces-
sion countries, confirming the persistence of 
important gender pay gaps in all EU Member 
States.
Significant age effects in the form of higher 
wages in sectors with higher employment 
shares of older workers can be found in 
France and, in the form of lower wages in sec-
tors with higher shares of young employees, 
in Italy, the Netherlands, Austria and the UK. 
The employment share of non-EU nationals at 
the sectoral level is generally not correlated 
to wage levels. Only in Spain and Austria, 
significant negative effects can be found. In 
most countries, moreover, strong negative 
wage penalties are found for working in small 
firms. Wage premia in large firms, moreover, 
are found in particular in Germany, Italy, 
Spain and Portugal.
These results may be somewhat sensitive to 
the addition of further employment charac-
teristics at the sectoral level such as the share 
of temporary employees, the share of em-
ployees with atypical work arrangements or 
the incidence rate of work-related accidents. 
Unfortunately, some of these variables are 
only available for a sub-set of countries, thus 
making meaningful comparisons impossible. 
There is some evidence, though, that higher 
shares of temporary employees are related to 
lower wage levels, notably in Spain, Portugal, 
Germany, the Netherlands and Ireland. A 
positive relation between accident rates and 
wage levels at the sectoral level could only be 
established for Germany and Ireland. In the 
particular cases of the Netherlands, Ireland 
and the UK, adding in these variables seems 
to show up  an insignificant, though nega-
tive, effect of female employment shares on 
wages.
It should be noted, however, that higher sec-
toral employment shares of women in partic-
ular are found to be negatively, and strongly, 
correlated to lower wages at the sectoral level 
across all specifications, indicative of persist-
ing large gender pay gaps in European labour 
markets and a potential under-valuation of 
the work in female-dominated sectors and 
occupations.68
Finally, a significant correlation between 
institutional variables and wage levels can be 
found, based on various regression specifica-
tions which, in addition to labour productiv-
ity and price levels, include either only insti-
tutional variables (columns (3a) and (3b)) or 
variables on the sectoral workplace composi-
tion and on job and employment characteris-
tics as well as institutional variables (columns 
(4a) and (4b) and (5a) and (5b), the latter 
also including sector dummies). Across all 
specifications, central bargaining levels and 
bargaining coverage rates correlate positively 
with wage levels, while trade union density is 
found to be negatively correlated with wages. 
The effect of employment protection is less 
clear-cut. While wage levels are in general 
lower in countries with stricter employment 
protection - after controlling for differences 
in labour productivity and other sectoral 
employment characteristics - various types of 
employment protection are seen to have off-
setting effects on wage levels. The regulation 
of collective dismissals is found to have a posi-
tive effect on wages, while the opposite holds 
true for employment protection of regular 
and temporary jobs at the level of the indi-
vidual worker, with wage levels significantly 
lower in countries with stricter employment 
protection.69 No clear-cut results on the effect 
of minimum wages on overall wage levels 
could be obtained.
Recent wage and productivity 
developments70
As stated in the BEPG 2003 (see box 5) and as 
reflected in the “wage coordination formula“ 
discussed above, nominal wage increases 
should be consisten with price stability and 
produktivity gains30. While wage and pro-
ductivity levels have been found to be closely 
related, the question therefore remains as to 
whether the recent evolution of wages has 
been in line with productivity developments.
In the EU as a whole as well as in most EU 
Member States, there has been a steady – but 
slow – acceleration in nominal pay increases 
since 1999. After average nominal wage in-
creases of below 3% in the years 1997-1999, 
nominal wages in the EU increased by 3% 
in 2000 and 3.5% in 2001. This acceleration 
came to a halt since 2002, in part reflecting 
the recent downturn in economic activity, 
with average nominal wage increases of 3.6% 
in 2002. Real wage increases, on the other 
hand, fell from 2% at the end of 1999 and 
beginning of 2000 to levels of 1-1.5% through-
out the 2000-2003 period (chart 73).
According to the Conventional Earnings 
Index (CEI), nominal pay increases in the pe-
riod 2000-2002 were strongest in Ireland, the 
UK and the Netherlands, with average annual 
nominal wage increases of more than 5%. 
For Ireland they were up to more than 8% in 
2001 alone. On the other hand, nominal pay 
increases in the euro zone as a whole, and in 
Germany, Austria, Italy and France in particu-
lar, remained at 3% or below. The outcomes of 
pay bargaining in 2002 and 2003 have contin-
ued the trend towards greater wage modera-
tion. In fact, the most recent wage increases 
have remained below those in 2000/2001 in 
most EU Member States (chart 74).
Averaging the annual increases over the 
four-year period 2000-2003, the EU Member 
States can arguably be divided into three 
groups. The “low” nominal pay increase 
countries are those where pay increases have 
averaged 2-3% and include Germany, Austria, 
France and Italy. “Medium” nominal pay 
increase countries - Belgium, Luxembourg, 
Spain, Denmark, Finland, Sweden – have 
seen pay increases averaging 3-5%. Finally 
in “high” nominal pay increase countries 
68 For further information on the gender pay gap and factors related to it, see also: European Commission (2002), Employment in Europe 2002, section on „Analysing gender pay gaps in the European Union“; 
and European Commission (2003), Gender pay gaps in European labour markets, Measurement, analysis and policy implications, Working Paper of the Commission Services, DG Employment and Social 
Affairs, SEC(2003) 937.
69 See also the next section for further empirical results on the link between employment risks and wages, based on an analysis of wage determinants at the individual level.
70 See also the ECFIN Wage Monitor and EIRO (2003) report on “Pay developments 2002”.
71 Note that, since the BEPGs not only refer to prices and productivity, but also to the restoration of profit margins and to job-creating investment growth, this could imply that real wage increases should remain 
below productivity growth rates.  
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Table 31 – Wage determinants at sectoral level, summary of estimation results from joint regressions for all countries
(EU and accession countries)
(1) (2) (3a) (3b) (4a) (4b) (5a) (5b)
Labour productivity .0023441(.0001712)
.0011154
(.0001113)
.0019547
(.0001289)
.0019608
(.0001274)
.0010016
(.000111)
.0009942
(.0001113)
.0006621
(.0002023)
.0006624
(.000202)
Price level 2.98107(.0266282)
2.482939
(.0286362)
2.652345
(.1347619)
2.609219
(.1399533)
2.749006
(.0509229)
2.215251
(.1173728)
2.574896
(.1126995)
2.470123
(.1186527)
Workforce composition
Women -.3113674(.0236032)
-.31791
(.0304663)
-.312372
(.0304418)
-.2496889
(.0739537)
-.1791995
(.0742072)
Young workers (15-24) ~ -.1816536(.0899305) ~ ~
Older workers
(55-64)
-.1697173
(.0876092)
.2736
(.1467341)
.3400079
(.1507438)
Older workers
(65+)
-.4115864
(.1287753)
-.5071889
(.2823898) ~ ~
Low skilled -.2315574(.0441909)
-.2463987
(.0566632)
-.2974292
(.0565462) ~ ~
High skilled .5574296(.0440954)
.5501871
(.0601941)
.5005414
(.0621167)
.223953
(.0716627)
.177372
(.0863878)
Job characteristics
Self-employed -.3480227(.0531706)
-.3503781
(.0685068)
-.37359
(.0680234) ~ ~
Temporary employees -.4686471(.0884163)
-.3405939
(.0878219)
-.3516855
(.0991976) ~
-.2164924
(.1012418)
Employer characteristics
Firm size 10-49 -.150474(.0125392)
-.1332159
(.0152851)
-.1369878
(.0151639)
-.1338129
(.0139584)
-.1343727
(.0138136)
Firm size 50-249 -.0355088(.0124889) ~
-.0299747
(.0150584)
-.0280101
(.0138593)
-.0281657
(.0137155)
Firm size 250-499 .0268277(.0137944) ~ ~ ~ ~
Firm size 500-999 .0532445(.0148605)
.0468458
(.0168083)
.0425785
(.0166763)
.0453166
(.0153827)
.0442065
(.0152411)
Firm size 1000+ .0844369(.0153458)
.0897111
(.0170692)
.0854215
(.0169403)
.0895265
(.0156459)
.0889182
(.015509)
High-tech sector .023548(.0105389) ~ ~
.1357852
(.0588928)
.1437727
(.0614435)
Knowledge intensive .0927442(.0134998)
.0612824
(.0154613)
.0569472
(.0157961)
.3279222
(.147595)
~
Sector dummies no no no no no no yes yes
Country dummies no yes no no no no no no
Institutional variables no no yes yes yes yes yes yes
National bargaining .5513429(.0426386)
.7057361
(.0953548)
.5873531
(.0329662)
.7333758
(.0420145)
.4862681
(.0348885)
.7842192
(.0804789)
Sectoral bargaining .3588267(.0279722)
.3955612
(.0471156)
.4183238
(.0194265)
.3087943
(.039112)
.3530628
(.0222686)
.3252051
(.047386)
EPL (overall, version 2) -.0966511(.0217445) ~
-.1114587
(.0205116)
EPL (regular employment) -.1372768(.0205412)
-.0639515
(.0155825)
-.1307749
(.0164403)
EPL (temporary 
employment) ~
-.047718
(.0176143)
-.0772568
(.0236453)
EPL (collective 
dismissals) ~
.17548
(.0348516)
.2103423
(.0676767)
minimum wage ~ ~ ~ .0726652(.0271378)
-.0505613
(.0266686)
.0990654
(.0411549)
coverage rate .0034682(.0007249)
.0069453
(.0024392)
-.0109423
(.0005703)
-.0139637
(.000904)
.0041875
(.0006694)
.011165
(.0022079)
trade union density -.0117717(.0007505)
-.0137164
(.0018916)
.0014862
(.0006524)
.0068053
(.0012857)
-.011146
(.0005915)
.0160053
(.0017125)
N 2,598 2,587 1,624 1,624 1,624 1,624 1,624 1,624
R² 0.86 0.99 0.64 0.65 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
Source: Eurostat, LCS, SBS and LFS; EIRO and OECD for institutional variables
Note: Observations refer to the sectoral level. Most variables (labour productivity, price level, firm size and institutional variables) have been introduced in earlier sections of this 
chapter. Information on average gross hourly earnings and on the firm size is from the LCS. The variables related to the workforce composition and to job characteristics as well as 
information on whether a sector is a high-technology or knowledge intensive sector is based on the LFS. The variables related to the workforce composition and to job characteristics 
report the share of the respective category in the given sector, while the variables “high-tech sector” and “knowledge intensive” are dummy variables. Institutional variables are from 
EIRO and OECD. All data refer to the year 2000, with the exception of the OECD indicators of employment protection which refer to the 1990s.
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such as Ireland, the UK, the Netherlands and 
Luxembourg pay increases have averaged 
over 5%. In comparison with the four-year 
period 1996-1999, nominal wage increases 
in the period 2000-2003 were more than 
one percentage point higher on average in 
the Benelux countries and in Ireland , and 
more than half a percentage point higher 
in the UK, Germany and Finland. Nominal 
wage increases decelerated in Sweden and 
Italy. In most other Member States nominal 
wage increases remained stable between the 
two periods.
In all accession countries except Lithuania, 
nominal wage increases in the period 2000-
2002 were considerably higher than in the 
EU Member States, by a factor of three on 
average. While wage increases in the Czech 
Republic, Bulgaria and Latvia reached 7%, 
on average, and thus were of the same order 
as in Ireland, they exceeded 10% in Slovenia, 
Estonia, Hungary and, notably, Romania. 
In some of the accession countries, notably 
Bulgaria and Poland, there has not been any 
clear trend in wage developments since 2000, 
with high growth rates of more than 10% 
in 2001 being followed by very low or even 
negative nominal wage increases a year later. 
Lithuania – one of the countries with the 
lowest rates of both, trade union density and 
collective bargaining coverage - is the only ac-
cession country with nominal wage increases 
below those in the EU Member States, with 
wages actually stagnating over the period 
2000-2002.
Clearly, changes in the price level have to 
be taken into account when interpreting 
the above differences in wage developments 
across countries, and between EU Member 
States and accession countries in particular. 
Although inflation rates – as measured by 
the harmonised index of consumer prices 
(HCPI) – declined between 2000 and 2002 in 
most countries, with the notable exceptions 
of Ireland, the Netherlands, Spain and Greece, 
sizeable differences do remain in particular 
between the current EU Member States and 
the accession countries (chart 76).
Despite the generally higher inflation rates, 
real wages also increased more strongly 
in the accession countries than in the EU, 
with growth rates nearly six times higher 
(chart 77). The increase was strongest in 
Estonia, Romania and Hungary where real 
wages grew, on average, by more than 6% 
per year over the period 2000-2002. Among 
the current EU Member States, the highest 
growth rates in real wages were observed in 
Ireland and France, with real wages increas-
ing by more than 2% per year on average. At 
the other extreme, real wages have declined 
over the period 2000-2002 in Bulgaria, Lithu-
ania and Spain.
Averaging the annual real pay increases over 
the period 2000-2002, both EU Member States 
and accession countries divide roughly into 
four groups. The “negative” real pay-increase 
countries, where pay increases have averaged 
below zero, are Bulgaria, Lithuania and Spain. 
The “low” real pay-increase group where pay 
increases have averaged less than 2% per year 
encompass the Benelux countries, Austria, 
Germany, Italy, Sweden, Finland and Slova-
kia; In “medium” real pay-increase countries 
- Slovenia, France, Ireland, Poland, the Czech 
Republic and Latvia -  pay increases have av-
eraged 2-4%. Finally Hungary, Romania and 
Estonia can be classified as  “high” real pay-in-
crease countries with pay increases averaging 
4% or over .
While the average wage increases described 
above tend to be generally higher than 
those of collectively agreed wages - with the 
exception of Germany in 2001/2002 and the 
Netherlands in 2002 - wage developments 
are largely in line with productivity devel-
opments. There are also signs of a sensible 
reaction of wage developments to the recent 
economic downturn. This suggests that the 
EU‘s key broad economic guidelines on pay 
- that increases in nominal wages should 
be consistent with price stability and that 
increases in real wages should not exceed 
growth in labour productivity - are largely 
being observed in most Member States.
In fact, both wage bargaining outcomes and 
actual wage increases in most EU Member 
States remain very much within the limits 
described by the so-called “distributive mar-
gin formula“ in most Member States. This 
formula foresees that nominal wage increases 
should not exceed the margin provided for by 
labour productivity growth and inflation. 
Many recent wage agreements clearly dem-
onstrate such wage moderation, with a view 
Table 32 – Wage determinants at sectoral level, summary of estimation results from
country-specific regressions
Hourly labour 
productivity Women
Young 
workers
Older 
workers Low skilled High skilled N (adj. R
2)
DK 0 -- 0 0 0 ++ 184 (0.39)
D ++ -- 0 0 -- ++ 148 (0.80)
E ++ -- 0 -- 0 0 230 (0.66)
F 0 -- 0 ++ 0 ++ 196 (0.38)
IRL ++ -- 0 0 -- 0 101 (0.67)
I ++ -- -- 0 -- 0 206 (0.57)
L 0 0 0 0 0 ++ 47 (0.54)
NL ++ - -- 0 -- 0 132 (0.76)
P ++ -- 0 0 0 ++ 112 (0.66)
A ++ -- -- 0 -- 0 144 (0.52)
FIN 0 - 0 0 0 ++ 167 (0.42)
S 0 0 -- 0 -- 0 72 (0.59)
UK ++ - -- 0 -- ++ 239 (0.72)
BG -- -- 0 -- 0 203 (0.44)
CY 0 -- 0 -- ++ 154 (0.41)
CZ -- -- 0 -- ++ 210 (0.34)
EE ++ -- + -- 0 ++ 83 (0.54)
HU ++ 0 0 0 0 ++ 161 (0.60)
LT ++ 0 0 0 - ++ 106 (0.66)
LV ++ 0 0 0 0 ++ 97 (0.69)
RO -- -- 0 -- ++ 226 (0.39)
SK 0 - 0 0 0 ++ 162 (0.26)
Source: Eurostat, LCS
Notes: ++: positive and significant at 5 level; +: positive and significant at 10 level; --: negative and significant at 5 
level; -: negative and significant at 10 level; 0: insignificant; no data available for Belgium, Greece, Malta, Poland 
and Slovenia; for Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic and Romania, no information was available on hourly labour 
productivity at NACE-2 level.
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to preserve and enhance competitiveness 
(table 33).
In the EU as a whole, average annual nominal 
wage increases of 2.8% in the period 1997-
1999 and 3.4% in the period 2000-2002 com-
pare with average inflation rates of around 
1.4% and 2.1%, respectively, and average 
labour productivity growth of 1.3% and 0.9% 
per employed and 1.6% and 1.3% per hour 
worked, respectively. Nominal wage increases 
are thus broadly in line with the above for-
mula, although, in some Member States, they 
have recently slightly exceeded the margin as 
defined by the sum of inflation and labour 
productivity, and this despite the weakening 
of the labour market and the slight increase in 
unemployment in most EU Member States.
In particular in the Netherlands, Luxembourg 
and the UK, recent wage increases seem to 
have exceeded the distributive margin. In 
some Member States, the relative position 
of nominal wage increases with respect to 
the “distributive margin“ turned unfavour-
able in the period 2000-2002. For Germany, 
France and Sweden, contradictory results 
are obtained depending on the choice of the 
indicator used as a measure for nominal wage 
increases. A tendency towards wage modera-
tion can be observed in Denmark, Spain, Ire-
land, Italy and Austria. Among the accession 
countries, recent wage increases exceeded 
productivity increases and inflation in the 
Czech Republic, Estonia and Hungary. After 
a period of considerable excess between 1997-
1999, Bulgaria, Lithuania and Poland stayed 
largely within the “distributive margin“ in 
2000-2001. In Latvia, Slovenia and Slovakia, 
real wage increases continued to remain sig-
nificantly below productivity growth.
According to the Commission Spring 2003 
forecasts, this trend of moderate pay in-
creases will prevail in the near future.72 The 
annual growth of average compensation per 
head in the EU is estimated at 3.25% in both 
2003 and 2004, slightly up from 3% in 2002. 
At the same time, a modest recovery in labour 
productivity growth is expected in 2003. 
Indeed, evidence tentatively suggests that 
wage growth may be slightly weaker than 
the forecast projections for 2003, thereby con-
tinuing the recent negative real unit labour 
cost growth in the near future.
72 See the May 2003 issue of the DG ECFIN Wage Monitor. 
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Wage determinants and 
incentives
Given the multitude of theoretical arguments, 
there is scope for an empirical analysis of the 
main wage determinants73 in the EU Member 
States identified by means of both, EU-level 
and country-specific augmented wage regres-
sions (cross-sectional pooled regressions and 
panel data analysis).
Data and methodology
Given the focus on risk compensation and 
local labour market conditions, measures of 
earnings and employment risks as well as re-
gional unemployment rates have been added 
to the standard model specification.
The dependent variable is gross hourly wages 
in euro (in logarithmic form), where hourly 
wages are derived by dividing the current 
gross monthly earnings by four times the 
usual weekly working hours. Observations 
of employed individuals with zero earnings or 
with missing information on weekly working 
hours are deleted from the sample.
A broad range of variables have been includ-
ed: personal and family characteristics; job 
characteristics; employer characteristics; and 
country- and region-dummies. Personal char-
acteristics include gender, age, education, 
nationality (EU national or non-EU national), 
marital status and presence of children as 
well as information on the individual‘s labour 
market history, notably the tenure in his or 
her current job and nature and duration of 
previous career interruptions. Job charac-
teristics include the job status (not available 
for Germany), working time (part-time or 
full-time) and the contract type (temporary 
or permanent). Employer characteristics 
include the firm size, ownership (private or 
public sector), as well as detailed information 
on the occupation (ISCO-2) and the sector 
(NACE-2; not available for Germany).
Furthermore, for each combination of sec-
tor and occupation, the share of employees 
losing their job in the following years was 
calculated. This observed frequency of future 
job loss in sector-occupation cells is used as 
a proxy of employment risks. Earnings risks 
73 This section provides evidence on wage determinants on the basis of individual-level data. The focus is – as in the section above - on gross hourly wages. Evidence is based on individual-level data from the 
European Household Panel (ECHP) for the EU Member States for the years 1995-2000 (no comparable individual-level data are available for the accession countries), thus complementing the above findings 
on the basis of enterprise-based information at sectoral level.
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and opportunities are proxied by measures of 
the variance and skewness of wages in educa-
tion-occupation cells.74 National or regional 
labour market conditions are considered 
through the regional unemployment rate and 
country- or region-dummies (see tables 34 
and 35 for descriptive statistics).
The augmented wage regressions allow 
important earnings patterns to be identified 
such as age-earnings profiles, tenure-earn-
ings profiles, returns to education, and in-
dustry and firm-size differentials. They also 
qualify the wage differentials across regions 
(see above), industries and firm sizes, correct-
ing the above unadjusted wage differences 
for differences in personal, job and employer 
characteristics. They, finally, make it possible 
to analyse whether wages account for differ-
ences in regional labour market conditions 
and to what extent they compensate for em-
ployment or earnings risks. 
The analyses presented in this section add 
to a vast amount of published material on 
wage determinants in three ways. Firstly they 
provide cross-country comparisons based 
on harmonised individual-level panel data. 
Secondly they analyse variations in wage de-
terminants across the earnings distribution; 
and thirdly – and most importantly - they test 
additionally for employment and earnings 
risk compensation.75 As the results on wage 
differentiation by sector, region and firm size 
set out above are corroborated by the analyses 
at the individual level, they are not further dis-
cussed in the sequel.
Wage distributions and low 
wage earners
With regard to both, wage distributions and 
the incidence of low wage employment, clear 
differences can be observed across the EU 
Member States. Relatively compressed wage 
distributions in Denmark, Finland, Belgium, 
Italy, and Austria contrast with a significantly 
larger wage dispersion in Greece, Spain, 
Portugal, the UK, Ireland and Germany. In 
74 As suggested in Hartog and Vijverberg (2002) this means it is possible to test simultaneously for both, ‘risk aversion’ and ‘skewness affection’ – the latter referring to individuals preference for education-oc-
cupation groups in which the earnings distribution is skewed to the right and hence, compared to more compressed wage distributions, offers a chance, albeit small, of very high earnings. Contrary to the 
work of Hartog and Vijverberg, the measures used in this analysis are calculated as average across education-occupation cells and are not themselves predicted on the basis of wage regressions.
75 For related work on the relationship between earnings and employment risks, see also Luigi Guiso et al. (2001), An empirical analysis of earnings and employment risk”, Università di Salerno, Centre for 
studies in economics and finance (CSEF), Working Paper no. 8, and Mario Padula and Luigi Pistaferri (2001), Education, employment and wage risk”, Università di Salerno, Centre for studies in economics 
and finance (CSEF), Working Paper no. 67. The first paper studies the evolution of individual income and employment risk over the life-cycle, using individual-level information on perceived risks of unem-
ployment and expected future income. The second paper estimates the returns to education, taking into account differences in wage and unemployment risks. In yet another paper, the above authors show 
that firms provide substantial insurance for their employees against shocks to the firm’s performance, thus reducing the variation of employees’ wages over time.
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particular in Germany and the Netherlands, 
there is a large downward variation of 
hourly wages, with wages at the first decile 
in Germany amounting to only to 44% of the 
median wage. On the other hand, the wage 
distribution is strongly skewed to the right in 
the UK, Ireland, Greece, Spain and, most nota-
bly, Portugal, with wages at the ninth decile 
up to 300% of the median wage (table 36). 
The share of low wage earners - employees 
with gross hourly earnings of more than 25% 
below the country-specific average - amounts 
to 24% in the EU as a whole, 18% of men and 
32% of women. It is also generally higher 
among non-EU nationals (29%) and among 
low-skilled (34%) as opposed to high-skilled 
(13%). The share of low wage earners is 
highest in Ireland, the UK, Germany and the 
Netherlands, and notably among low-skilled 
in Germany, Austria, Denmark, Ireland and 
the UK (table 37).
Wage determinants at EU-level
The regression results (table 38) confirm 
some standard findings on wage determi-
nants. Firstly, important wage gaps prevail by 
gender and nationality even after controlling 
for differences in personal, job and firm char-
acteristics. Women’s wages are 13-15% lower 
than those of men with otherwise similar 
characteristics. There is also evidence of wage 
gaps by nationality, with EU nationals work-
ing in a country other than their home coun-
try earning, on average, 3-5% more, while 
non-EU nationals earn 2% less. Wage gaps 
between nationals and non-EU nationals are 
considerably higher for high-skilled and for 
women as opposed to low-skilled and men.
Secondly, higher levels of educational at-
tainment and job-specific training tend to 
increase wages. High-skilled employees earn, 
on average, some 17-19% more than their 
low-skilled counterparts, and medium-skilled 
employed still enjoy wage premia of up to 6-
7%. Job-specific training in a given job further 
increases wages by up to an additional 4-8%. 
Furthermore, supervisory functions increase 
wages by up to 16%.
Thirdly, wages are strongly linked to both age 
(or labour market experience) and tenure. 
Age-earnings profiles are upward sloping 
until the late 40s. The subsequent decline is 
found to be stronger for low-skilled employed 
and for women. The only group for which the 
age-earnings profile seems to be upward slop-
ing across all ages are the high-skilled. For 
them, the effects of age (or, equivalently, la-
bour market experience) on wages are found 
to be strongest.
Similarly, wages increase with the accumula-
tion of job-specific human capital as measured 
by the tenure in the job. Tenure-earnings pro-
files are particularly steep at the beginning of 
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the career and again after long careers of 15 
years or more. The tenure effect on wages is 
strongest, too, for the high-skilled employed, 
and also stronger for men than for women.
Career interruptions, on the other hand, tend 
to have a negative effect on wages. The sheer 
fact of having been unemployed before can 
lower wages by some 3-4%. This effect is the 
more negative the longer is the duration in 
unemployment. Each additional month in 
unemployment is lowers wages, on average, 
by up to an additional 1%. Estimates of the ef-
fect spells of inactivity, on the other hand, are 
generally inconclusive.
Fourthly, working time and contract type 
matter. Part-time work, on average, increases 
wages slightly, while temporary contract 
work carries a considerable negative wage 
penalty of up to 12%.
Fifthly, there is strong evidence of the com-
pensation of employment and earnings risks 
by means of higher wages. Risk of job loss in 
the intermediate probability range of 0.4 to 
0.8 is compensated for through wage increas-
es of up to 5%, while almost certain job loss 
seems to go hand-in-hand with significant 
wage reductions. This finding seems in line 
with the general finding of a so-called earn-
ings dip just before dismissal, possibly indica-
tive of unobservable characteristics related to 
wage reductions, such as low motivation or 
low productivity.
With regard to the education/occupation-
specific wage distribution, the results also 
indicate both “risk aversion” and “skewness 
affection”, i.e. wages are positively correlated 
to the relative variance of the earnings distri-
bution and negatively correlated to its relative 
skewness.76 This means that the risk inherent 
in the choice of education/occupation groups 
that are characterised by a large variation of 
earning is being compensated for by higher 
wages, while the prospect of very high wages 
in the future leads, on average, to lower wages 
at present.
Finally, the analysis shows that higher 
regional unemployment rates significantly 
reduce wages, demonstrating that wages 
reflect local or regional labour market condi-
tions. Controlling for country differences in 
the overall unemployment rate, a 1% higher 
76 See also footnote 20.
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regional unemployment rate tends to reduce 
wages by up to half a percentage point.
All of the above results are robust with respect 
to varying model specifications, and most no-
tably when taking account of unobserved het-
erogeneity (through panel data models) and 
selection into the labour market (through 
selection corrections in the form of standard 
Heckman selection models).
Variation in wage determinants 
across the wage distribution
The results described above apply to the 
average and hide in some cases important 
differences in wage determinants across 
the wage distribution. To identify such dif-
ferences, quantile wage regressions have 
been estimated at EU-level, using the same 
set of variables as above (see table 39 for an 
overview of the estimation results). Gender 
wage gaps are most prevalent in the upper 
part of the wage distribution, reaching 15% 
in the highest decile as opposed to 8% in 
the lowest one. Wage gaps for EU nationals 
working in another EU country with respect 
to that country‘s nationals are also highest in 
the upper part of the wage distribution, while 
the wage gap between nationals and non-EU 
nationals is found to be of equal size across 
all the wage distribution with the exception 
of the lowest decile where this wage gap is 
almost non-existent. 
The wage effect of education, job-specific 
training and job status is generally similar 
across the whole wage distribution, with 
somewhat stronger wage premia at the 
higher end of the wage distribution.
With regard to age-earnings profiles, wages 
tend to increase in a similar way with age 
across the whole distribution. While the high-
est wages increase across all age groups, how-
ever, the effect of age on lower wages is found 
to decline at the end of the career. This decline 
is strongest in the lower part of the wage dis-
tribution. With respect to tenure in the job, 
the opposite finding seems to hold true. While 
tenure-earnings profiles are upward sloping 
across the whole wage distribution, the wage 
Table 33 – Overview of average nominal wage increases relative to the so-called „distributive margin“ in the EU Member States
and the Accession Countries, 1997-2002
nominal wage 
increase (LCI)
nominal wage 
increase (CEI)
inflation
(HCPI)
hourly labour 
productivity growth
labour productivity 
growth
wage increase (LCI) 
relative to “distributive 
margin”
wage increase (CEI) 
relative to “distributive 
margin”
1997-
1999
2000-
2002
1997-
1999
2000-
2002
1997-
1999 2000-2002
1997-
1999
2000-
2002
1997-
1999
2000-
2002
1997-
1999
2000-
2002
1997-
1999
2000-
2002
B 2.3 3.8 1.6 3.1 1.2 2.2 2.5 1.2 1.6 0.7 -1.4 0.4 -1.2 0.2
DK 4.2 4.0 4.1 3.9 1.8 2.5 0.6 3.3 1.3 1.9 1.8 -1.8 1.0 -0.5
D 1.7 2.4 2.1 2.8 0.9 1.5 1.6 1.5 1.1 0.7 -0.8 -0.6 0.1 0.6
EL 8.3 4.0 3.5 2.3 4.7 2.4 4.3 1.9
E 3.1 2.7 2.5 3.1 2.0 3.3 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.5 -1.2 -0.1 -0.8
F 2.5 4.4 1.8 2.3 0.9 1.8 1.7 2.0 1.7 0.6 -0.1 0.6 -0.8 -0.1
IRL 4.8 7.5 4.8 6.8 1.9 4.7 6.2 4.5 3.4 4.1 -3.3 -1.7 -0.5 -2.0
I 2.2 2.8 2.9 1.9 1.9 2.5 1.2 0.4 1.2 0.3 -0.9 -0.1 -0.2 -0.9
L 2.7 4.2 2.7 4.2 1.1 2.8 3.9 -1.0 3.6 -1.0 -2.3 2.4 -2.0 2.4
NL 1.6 4.8 4.0 5.1 1.9 3.8 2.2 0.0 1.2 0.2 -2.5 1.0 0.9 1.1
P 2.8 3.3 4.1 2.1 3.6 2.6 1.4 1.9 0.8 -1.9 -1.7 0.1 -4.4
A 2.5 2.9 2.2 2.4 0.8 2.0 2.7 1.9 1.7 1.4 -1.0 -1.0 -0.3 -1.0
FIN 3.3 4.8 3.1 4.2 1.3 2.6 2.4 1.7 2.3 1.3 -0.4 0.5 -0.5 0.3
S 3.8 4.0 4.2 4.2 1.1 2.0 2.5 2.3 2.8 0.9 0.2 -0.3 0.3 1.3
UK 4.7 3.8 4.9 5.3 1.6 1.1 1.7 1.8 1.4 1.5 1.4 0.9 1.9 2.7
EU 2.7 3.4 2.9 3.4 1.4 2.1 1.6 1.3 1.3 0.9 -0.3 0.0 0.2 0.4
BG 19.1 7.3 10.7 7.8 2.3 5.6 6.1 -6.1
CY 2.2 3.2 3.0 2.2
CZ 10.4 7.3 6.5 3.3 1.0 2.5 2.9 1.5
EE 12.9 11.7 7.1 4.4 7.0 6.2 -1.2 1.1
HU 15.2 14.5 14.2 8.1 2.8 3.6 -1.8 2.8
LT 15.9 0.2 4.8 0.9 5.3 5.2 5.8 -5.9
LV 5.2 6.5 4.8 2.4 4.6 6.1 -4.2 -2
MT 4.1 1.1
PL 21.0 8.6 11.3 5.8 4.4 4.2 5.3 -1.4
RO 66.8 40.7 86.6 34.2 -0.5 7.0 -19.3 -0.5
SI 10.4 10.6 7.4 8.3 4.6 3.8 -1.6 -1.5
SK 10.5 9.2 7.7 7.5 4.4 2.7 -1.6 -1
Source: Eurostat, LCI, CEI, HCPI, national accounts
Note: LCI data refer to gross hourly earnings, CEI data to monthly earnings; LCI data for Denmark, Portugal, the UK and the EU average refer to total labour costs; for accession 
countries, no data on nominal wage increases (CEI) and on hourly labour productivity growth are available; the wage increase (LCI) in relation to the ‚distributive margin‘ is calculated 
by comparing real wage increases according to the Labour Cost Index with hourly labour productivity growth (in case of the EU Member States) and labour productivity growth (in 
case of the accession countries); the wage increase (CEI) in relation to the ‚distributive margin‘ is calculated by comparing real wage increases according to the Conventional Earn-
ings Index with labour productivity growth per employed; see annex 3.2 for the data sources and their limitations.
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premia related to tenure are strongest among 
the lower deciles. 
An interesting result concerns the varying 
wage effects of career interruptions and un-
employment. While previous unemployment 
incidence has a stronger negative wage effect 
in the upper part of the wage distribution, the 
opposite holds true for the wage effects of the 
duration of career interruptions in general, 
and unemployment in particular. Wage penal-
ties for a longer duration in unemployment in 
the lowest decile are three times as large as in 
the highest decile. A possible reason for these 
results might be that unemployment among 
those with relatively high wages has less of a 
negative signalling effect, although the loss of 
firm- and job-specific experience weighs more 
heavily on them than is the case for low wage 
earners.
Also the wage effects of part-time work and 
temporary contract work vary significantly 
across the wage distribution. In the lower part 
of the wage distribution, both part-time work 
and temporary contract work have strong 
negative wage effects, reducing wages by up 
to 5% and 19%, respectively. In the upper part 
of the wage distribution, temporary work car-
ries a smaller, though still negative wage pen-
alty of up to 10%. Part-time work, on the other 
hand, leads to considerable wage increases of 
more than 11 % in the highest decile.
Furthermore, the wage premia for working in 
the public sector are much more pronounced 
among low wage earners, with wage premia 
reaching up to 12% in the lowest decile as op-
posed to 3% in the highest decile. Contrary to 
this, wage effects of working in small firms 
(negative) or in large firms (positive) are 
less favourable among low wage earners. In 
particular when working in small firms, wage 
reductions among low wage earners are three 
times as large as for high wage earners.
The patterns of compensation for employ-
ment risks seem similar across the wage 
distribution: insignificant for low risk of job 
loss, positive and increasing for intermediate 
probabilities of job loss, and decreasing for 
very high probabilities of job loss. Neverthe-
less, among low wage earners, a high risk of 
job loss effectively leads to wage reductions 
while, in the upper part of the wage distri-
bution, there is some evidence that even a 
very high risk of job loss is still compensated 
Table 34 – EU-level descriptive statistics
Variable Mean St. Dev. minimum Maximum
Gross hourly wage (in Euro) 10.39 8.45 0.25 826.51
Personal characteristics
Gender (women=1) 0.44 0.50 0 1
Non-national (EU national) 0.01 0.12 0 1
Non-national (non-EU national) 0.02 0.14 0 1
Age (in years) 37.91 11.47 13 90
Education and skills
High-skilled 0.25 0.43 0 1
Medium-skilled 0.36 0.48 0 1
Low-skilled 0.39 0.49 0 1
Job-specific training 0.61 0.49 0 1
Family background
Marital status (married=1) 0.61 0.49 0 1
Presence of children 0.34 0.47 0 1
Labour market history
Tenure in the job (in years) 8.39 7.12 0 23
Previous unemployment 0.25 0.43 0 1
Previous inactivity 0.18 0.38 0 1
Duration of career previous career interruption (in 
months) 0.76 2.40 0 40
Job characteristics
Supervisory job status 0.11 0.32 0 1
Intermediate job status 0.16 0.37 0 1
Non-supervisory job status 0.73 0.45 0 1
Part-time employed 0.12 0.33 0 1
Temporary contract 0.15 0.36 0 1
Employer characteristics
Public sector 0.31 0.46 0 1
Small firm 0.01 0.09 0 1
Medium-sized firm 0.51 0.50 0 1
Large firm 0.37 0.48 0 1
Very large firm 0.12 0.33 0 1
Occupation (ISCO-1)
Managers 0.06 0.23 0 1
Professionals 0.13 0.33 0 1
Technicians 0.15 0.36 0 1
Clerks 0.16 0.37 0 1
Service workers 0.14 0.34 0 1
Skilled agricultural workers 0.02 0.13 0 1
Craft and related trades workers 0.16 0.36 0 1
Plant and machine operators 0.09 0.29 0 1
Elementary occupations 0.11 0.31 0 1
Earnings and employment risk
Risk of job loss 0.07 0.07 0 1
Variance 0.51 0.36 0.01 15.94
Skewness 3.05 3.51 -1.48 21.38
National or regional labour market conditions
Regional unemployment rate 9.39 5.12 1.5 31.9
Source: Eurostat, ECHP, UDB version June 2003, waves 2-7 (1995-2000)
Notes: In all wage regressions also sector dummies (at NACE-2 level) were included. The respective descriptive statis-
tics on sectoral employment shares, however, are not presented in the table above.
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Table 35 – Number of observations and descriptive statistics by Member State
Country Sample size Gross hourly wage Unemployment risk Earnings variance Earnings skewness R2 pooled regression model
B 7,041 13.29(5.71)
0.04
(0.20)
0.41
(0.21)
2.20
(3.07) 0.47
DK 8,791 18.71(7.55)
0.06
(0.24)
0.32
(0.12)
1.13
(1.34) 0.43
D 18,262 13.01(9.27)
0.08
(0.28)
0.63
(0.45)
4.33
(4.30) 0.48
EL 9,702 6.18(3.66)
0.08
(0.27)
0.50
(0.37)
1.81
(1.81) 0.57
E 18,950 8.10(5.64)
0.13
(0.33)
0.48
(0.24)
1.87
(1.44) 0.63
F 16,725 11.98(8.09)
0.07
(0.25)
0.52
(0.41)
2.97
(3.16) 0.53
IRL 8,728 12.10(8.68)
0.05
(0.22)
0.47
(0.30)
1.41
(1.07) 0.60
I 20,067 9.46(4.74)
0.05
(0.22)
0.38
(0.25)
2.12
(2.47) 0.55
NL 16,581 15.13(11.79)
0.04
(0.20)
0.75
(0.51)
7.19
(4.55) 0.36
P 16,273 4.59(4.19)
0.07
(0.26)
0.55
(0.40)
3.15
(3.00) 0.63
A 11,540 11.00(5.20)
0.06
(0.23)
0.41
(0.16)
1.47
(1.64) 0.37
FIN 10,640 12.43(7.67)
0.07
(0.26)
0.41
(0.24)
2.28
(3.64) 0.48
UK 8,007 14.32(8.91)
0.04
(0.19)
0.55
(0.35)
3.65
(3.79) 0.51
EU 155.416 12.05(8.49)
0.07
(0.25)
0.54
(0.39)
3.36
(3.70) 0.74
Source: Eurostat, ECHP, UDB version June 2003, waves 2-7 (1995-2000)
Notes: gross hourly earnings refer to wave 7 (2000)
Table 36 – Wage distribution statistics, 2000
mean st. dev. median p10 p25 p75 p90 p75/p25 p90/p10 p90/p50 p50/p10
B 13.29 5.71 12.06 63 80 131 171 1.6 2.7 1.7 1.6
DK 18.71 7.55 18.13 59 80 120 150 1.5 2.5 1.5 1.7
D 13.01 9.27 12.06 44 70 133 177 1.9 4.0 1.8 2.3
EL 6.18 3.66 5.2 57 72 143 208 2.0 3.6 2.1 1.8
E 8.1 5.64 6.58 57 75 144 215 1.9 3.8 2.2 1.8
F 11.98 8.09 10.29 57 74 142 192 1.9 3.4 1.9 1.8
IRL 12.1 8.68 10.02 60 72 141 208 1.9 3.5 2.1 1.7
I 9.46 4.74 8.41 65 81 126 171 1.6 2.6 1.7 1.5
NL 15.13 11.79 13.68 53 75 130 170 1.7 3.2 1.7 1.9
P 4.59 4.19 3.12 64 77 156 292 2.0 4.6 2.9 1.6
A 11 5.2 10.04 61 78 130 172 1.7 2.8 1.7 1.6
FIN 12.43 7.67 11.21 64 81 128 167 1.6 2.6 1.7 1.6
UK 14.32 8.91 12.32 54 72 142 195 2.0 3.6 2.0 1.8
Source: Eurostat, ECHP, UDB version June 2003, wave 7 (2000)
Notes: mean, standard deviation and median are expressed in euro; quantiles are expressed as percentage of the country-specific median wage; no information available for Lux-
embourg and Sweden.
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for by wage increases. As a conclusion, the 
compensation of employment risks thus seem 
effective among the high-skilled and high 
wage earners, while the opposite applies to 
the generally low-skilled, low wage earners 
who see themselves confronted by lower 
wages and higher job insecurity at the same 
time (chart 78).
The difference between the various earn-
ings groups is much more pronounced with 
regard to the compensation of earnings risks. 
A higher relative earnings variance leads to 
much higher wage increases for high wage 
earners (54%) as opposed to low wage earn-
ers (6%). At the same time, “skewness affec-
tion” is found to be significantly stronger in 
the higher wage groups. The wage effects of 
regional labour market conditions, finally, 
seem to be similar across the whole wage 
distribution. 
Wage determinants in the 
Member States
In addition to the above differences in wage 
determinants across the wage distribution, 
important differences prevail between Mem-
ber States. While no attempt is made here to 
present all country-specific results, some com-
mon features of wage determination in the 
Member States are highlighted (table 40).
Wage gaps by gender (in unadjusted form) 
amount to 16% on average, ranging be-
tween less than 10% in Italy and Portugal 
to more than 20% in Germany and the UK 
(and, when using national data sources, the 
Netherlands). Even when adjusting for differ-
ences in the workforce composition, sizeable 
gender wage gaps continue to exist, reaching 
up to 15% in Germany, Austria, Finland and 
the UK.77 In some Member States, moreover, 
important wage gaps exist between nationals 
and non-EU nationals.78
In all countries, there is evidence of an up-
ward sloping age-earnings profile until 40-50, 
with age effects strongest in the Netherlands, 
the UK, Denmark and Ireland. Wage increases 
at the beginning of the career are particularly 
pronounced in the UK and the Netherlands. 
While generally declining towards the end of 
the working career, age-earnings profiles con-
tinue to increase over the whole age range in 
Austria and France.
There is also evidence of increasing wages 
with longer tenure, most notably in France 
and Germany, but also in Austria, Finland, 
Greece and the Netherlands. In other coun-
tries, tenure effects seem considerably small-
er. Denmark and the UK have decreasing 
earnings profiles in older age groups and they 
are even estimated to become negative after 
very long careers of 25 years or more.
Returns to education are generally high in 
all countries, and especially so in Portugal. 
In Germany and Austria in particular, aver-
age wages of the high-skilled furthermore 
amount to around twice as much as those 
of the low-skilled. Controlling for different 
characteristics, wages of the high-skilled 
exceed those of the low-skilled by 20% or 
more in Portugal, but also in Ireland, Italy, 
France and Belgium, all else equal, and by 
10% or more in all other Member States. In 
the Nordic Member States, Germany, Austria 
and the Netherlands, however, there do not 
seem to be any sizeable wage premia for the 
medium-skilled. The returns on job-specific 
training are most pronounced in Portugal, 
the UK and Germany.
Wage premia for supervisory functions are 
most pronounced in Portugal, but also above 
EU average in the other southern Member 
States, the UK and the Netherlands. On the 
other hand, they are much less pronounced in 
Finland, Denmark and Austria. (There are no 
data for Germany.) The wage premia for hold-
ing a supervisory job generally exceed those 
for an intermediate job by a factor of three to 
four. The only exception is the Netherlands, 
were wage premia for intermediate supervi-
sory functions are basically non-existent, and 
contrast with relatively high wage premia in 
supervisory functions of around 18%. 
With respect to the effect of the working 
time status on wages, the findings are mixed. 
While – with the exception of Greece - average 
(gross hourly) wages of part-time workers 
remain considerably below those of full-time 
employees in all Member States, notably in 
Ireland, Denmark and the Netherlands, the 
picture is somewhat changed after control-
ling for workforce characteristics. Wage 
penalties for part-time workers in Portugal, 
Ireland, Denmark, Germany and the Nether-
lands contrast with considerable wage pre-
mia of around 10% or more in France, Spain, 
Table 37 – Share of low wage earners (in %), 2000
Total Men Women Non-EU nationals High skilled Low skilled
B 22 16 28 48 10 33
DK 21 18 24 22 4 50
D 26 18 36 27 12 54
EL 25 19 34 46 7 37
E 23 18 30 19 11 33
F 25 21 30 49 15 30
IRL 29 22 37 10 43
I 17 15 20 17 3 24
NL 27 20 35 62 19 27
P 22 14 31 35 3 28
A 21 13 30 45 5 41
FIN 18 12 23 31 8 29
UK 28 19 36 25 18 40
EU 24 18 32 29 13 34
Source: Eurostat, ECHP, UDB version June 2003, wave 7 (2000)
Note: no information available for Luxembourg and Sweden; low wage earners are defined as those employees with 
gross hourly earnings of more than 25% below the country-specific average.
77 See Employment in Europe 2002, chapter 1, section “Analysing factors related to the gender pay gap”.
78 See also chapter 6 of this report.
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Greece and Italy and, to some extent, Belgium 
and Austria. 
The findings on the wage effects of temporary 
work are less ambiguous.79 In all Member 
States, there are important wage penalties 
for temporary contract work, both in unad-
justed and adjusted form. Average wages of 
temporary contract workers are more than 
one third below those of permanent con-
tract employees in the Netherlands, Ireland, 
Greece, France and Spain. Corrected for 
workforce characteristics, the difference is 
still found to be negative in all Member States, 
ranging from around 5% in France, Austria, 
Germany, Belgium and Denmark to more 
than 10% in Greece, Spain and, most notably, 
the Netherlands.
In addition to the above personal and job 
characteristics, firm-related characteristics 
play an important role for wage determina-
tion. Firstly, in all Member States, there are 
important firm size effects, with wages in 
small firms, on average, 18% below those in 
medium-sized firms, and wages in large firms 
6% above. Firm-size differentials are found to 
be smallest in Austria and Italy. On the other 
hand, there are particularly large wage penal-
ties for working in small firms in Germany, 
the Netherlands and Ireland. Secondly, there 
are significant wage premia for working in 
the public sector in all Member States except 
Denmark, Finland, Germany and Austria. 
These public sector wage premia, which are 
most pronounced in the four southern Mem-
ber States and Ireland, amount to up to 16%, 
all else equal. Thirdly, both sector and occupa-
tion have an important impact on wages, as 
discussed in section 3 above.
With regard to the compensation for earnings 
and employment risks, the results are mixed. 
There is evidence of both “risk aversion” in 
most countries, notably in Spain, Austria and 
France, and of small “skewness affection”, no-
tably in Austria, Ireland and Denmark – some 
of which are countries with relatively com-
pressed wage distributions. The wage effects 
of expected sector-occupation specific job, 
on the other hand, is insignificant for many 
countries, including Spain in particular, pos-
sibly indicating the absence of any effective 
Table 38 – EU-level estimation results – Effects on gross hourly wages (in %)
Variable
Pooled 
regression 
model, 
controlling for 
dependence
Random effects 
panel data model
Heckman 
selection model
Personal characteristics
Gender (women=1) -10.86 -13.50 -9.38
Non-national (EU national) 5.23 2.84 5.46
Non-national (non-EU national) -1.78 -1.59
Age (in years) 2.22 5.76 2.76
Age squared -0.10 -0.02
Age cube
Education and skills
High-skilled 18.18 17.00 18.68
Medium-skille d 6.82 5.97 7.15
Job-specific training 7.90 4.08 8.31
Family background
Marital status (married=1) 3.25 2.63
Presence of children 1.51 0.20
Labour market history
Tenure in the job (in years) 1.71 1.41 1.65
Tenure in the job squared -0.10 -0.10 -0.12
Tenure in the job cube 0.00
Previous unemployment -3.05 -3.82 -3.22
Previous inactivity -0.10 -0.20 0.00
Duration of career previous Career interruption (in 
months) -0.70 -1.09 -0.66
Job characteristics
Supervisory job status 16.42 9.97 16.11
Intermediate job status 4.92 3.77 4.86
Part-time employed 2.63 7.90 2.68
Temporary contract -10.60 -6.57 -10.49
Employer characteristics
Public sector 7.47 6.40 9.14
Small firm -18.21 -9.70 -18.63
Large firm 5.87 2.53 5.98
Earnings and employment risk
Unemployment risk -25.10 -12.19 -8.18
Unemployment risk squared 297.89 95.62 21.96
Unemployment risk cube -70.57 -44.68 -17.81
Variance 19.60 5.34 20.13
Skewness -1.19 -0.30 -1.21
National or regional labour market conditions
Regional unemployment rate -0.40 -0.20 -0.37
Occupation dummies (ISCO-1) Yes Yes Yes
Sector dummies (NACE-2) Yes Yes Yes
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes
Wave dummies Yes -- --
Constant Yes Yes Yes
N 155,416 155,416 472,438
R2 0.7350 0.7228 --
F-test / Chi2-test 0.0000 0.0000 0.000
Source: Eurostat, ECHP, UDB version June 2003, waves 2-7 (1995-2000)
Notes: all coefficient estimates reported in the table are significant at the 5% level; selection equation includes as 
additional variables gender, nationality, education, marital status, number of children, unearned personal income and 
tax rates on low wage earners, all of which are found to be significant predictors of individual labour market supply 
decisions.
79 See also chart 84.
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compensation for employment risks. Among 
those countries for which significant results 
are obtained, two different patterns can be 
distinguished: first, an increasing employ-
ment risks/earnings profile, indicating that 
higher employment risk is effectively being 
compensated for by additional wage premia, 
and second, a decreasing profile, indicating 
that higher employment risk goes hand-
in-hand with additional wage penalties. 
Evidence for an effective compensation of 
employment risks could only be observed in 
the case of the UK. By contrast, in France, Italy 
and, to some extent Germany, sizeable wage 
penalties linked to higher risk of job loss seem 
to exist (chart 79).
Finally, in all Member States except Greece 
and Germany, there is evidence of a negative, 
albeit small, effect of regional unemployment 
rates on wages. In most Member States, 
wages further differ considerably between 
the regions, with peripheral region often hav-
ing lower wages than the capital region. This 
applies in particular to the UK, where employ-
ees in some regions receive up to 30% lower 
wages than their counterparts in London, 
after controlling for differences in personal, 
job and firm characteristics.
Conclusions
This chapter has highlighted both, the large 
variation in labour costs, wages and insti-
tutional settings across EU Member States 
and accession countries, and the common 
features in relative wage structures and wage 
determinants. The link between wages and 
productivity, both in levels and changes, has 
been analysed.
It has further provided empirical results on 
work incentives and disincentives as reflected 
by wage determinants at the individual level 
addressing in particular the question as to 
whether - and how - wage formation in the 
EU today compensates for labour market flex-
ibility and employment risks at the individual 
level. This question is of particular interest 
since flexibility and security, and employment 
protection in particular, might relate directly 
to wages - not least because monetary union 
and increased product market integration are 
likely to put further demands on both, wage 
formation and labour market flexibility. As 
a recent study argues, under these circum-
Table 39 – EU-level estimation results: quantile regressions – effects on gross hourly
wages (in %)
Variable 1st decile 1st quartile median 3rd quartile 9th decile
Personal characteristics
Gender (women=1) -8.06 -9.34 -10.68 -12.19 -13.24
Non-national (EU national) 3.36 2.22 0.90 5.44 8.33
Non-national (non-EU national) -1.29 -4.02 -3.54 -3.34 -2.96
Age (in years) 4.08 3.25 3.15 3.15 2.74
Age squared -0.10
Age cube
Education and skills
High-skilled 15.72 15.72 16.53 17.35 18.06
Medium-skilled 6.82 6.40 6.50 6.40 6.61
Job-specific training 6.29 6.93 7.36 6.40 8.00
Family background
Marital status (married=1) 4.29 3.67 2.43 1.31 1.31
Presence of children 1.31 1.51 1.51 1.92 1.31
Llabour market history
Tenure in the job (in years) 2.84 2.22 1.61 1.11 0.80
Tenure in the job squared -0.20 -0.20 -0.10 -0.10
Tenure in the job cube
Previous unemployment -1.98 -2.57 -3.34 -4.02 -4.59
Previous inactivity 0.70 -0.30 -0.40 -0.30 -0.50
Duration of career previous career 
Iinterruption (in months) -0.90 -0.70 -0.50 -0.40 -0.40
Job characteristics
Supervisory job status 11.40 13.77 15.72 17.59 19.84
Intermediate job status 4.08 4.39 4.60 4.81 5.87
Part-time employed -6.11 -1.09 2.53 7.25 12.98
Temporary contract -15.46 -11.31 -8.97 -7.69 -7.13
Employer characteristics
Public sector 10.96 7.90 6.08 4.81 3.36
Small firm -27.96 -21.65 -16.47 -11.49 -8.79
Large firm 4.71 4.92 5.87 6.08 7.14
Earnings and employment risk
Unemployment risk -18.70 -24.19 -26.88 -20.23 -18.29
Unemployment risk squared 187.77 246.25 250.78 137.74 117.06
Unemployment risk cube -64.16 -67.73 -64.08 -47.01 -45.77
Variance 6.61 9.86 18.41 34.85 53.73
Skewness -0.40 -0.60 -1.09 -1.69 -2.08
National or regional labour market conditions
Regional unemployment rate -0.40 -0.40 -0.40 -0.30 -0.40
Occupation dummies (ISCO-1) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector dummies (NACE-2) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Wave dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 155,416 155,416 155,416 155,416 155,416
Pseudo R2 0.5440 0.5548 0.5302 0.4950 0.4542
F-test / Chi2-test 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Source: Eurostat, ECHP, UDB version June 2003, waves 2-7 (1995-2000)
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into the labour market in the first place, 
and into economic activities that are key to 
productivity and economic growth, such as 
research and business services in particular. 
Notably in the case of Germany, labour mar-
ket participation of the low-skilled seems to 
be counteracted to some extent by high effec-
tive marginal tax rates and very low relative 
wages, notably in low productivity service 
sectors such as “Wholesale and retail” and 
“Hotels and restaurants”.81
Third, although wage structures are certainly 
not based simply on workers‘ productivity, but 
also reflect historical influences, social norms 
and managerial strategies of organisational 
stances the objectives of higher levels of em-
ployment and price stability may come “at the 
cost of greater volatility in employment“.80
Five main conclusions emerge from the 
analysis:
Firstly, while non-wage labour costs are a cru-
cial determinant of total labour costs, there is 
no simple relation between the two. In fact, 
the two countries with the highest gross 
hourly labour costs in Europe - Sweden and 
Denmark - are the countries with the highest 
and lowest share of non-wage labour costs, 
respectively. Moreover, the relative size of net 
wages, taxes and social security contributions 
differs significantly across countries. There-
fore, when interpreting the implied differ-
ences in wage levels, differences in tax rates 
and the financing of social security systems 
also have to be taken into account.
Second, there is evidence of significant wage 
differentiation across firms and industries. 
Wage differentiation across regions, however, 
is much less pronounced, notably in (west) 
Germany and Greece. While there are com-
mon features in the wage structures across 
Member States, with wages generally higher 
in high productivity industry and services, it 
remains questionable whether appropriate 
pecuniary incentives exist to attract people 
80 European Commission (2003), Wage formation and European integration, by Torbern M. Andersen, DG Economic and Financial Affairs, Economic Paper No. 188. This study argues that „inherent in the 
integration process are forces which tend to make wages less flexible which implies that more employment variability may follow, even though the average level of employment may increase. Stronger wage 
interdependencies and also nominal convergence may thus be beneficial for both the level of employment and the objective of price stability, but it may come at the cost of greater volatility in employment, 
that is, nominal convergence but real divergence.“
81 See also European Commission (2001), Differentials in service industry employment growth: Germany and the US in the comparable German American structural database, report by R.B. Freeman and R. 
Schettkat commissioned by DG Employment and Social Affairs, and Freeman and Schettkat (1999), The role of wages and skill differences in US-German employment differences, Jahrbücher für Nation-
alökonomie und Statistik. These papers do in particular not find any evidence for the so-called wage compression hypothesis, according to which the compression of wages on employment in low low-skilled 
industries could explain the lack of low low-skilled service sector jobs in Germany as compared to the US. The papers argue instead that non-wage labour costs affect prices more evenly across all skills groups 
in Germany, while falling disproportionately on higher wage employment in the US, thus causing significant differences in the relative costs of services from low low-skilled workers between Germany and 
the US.
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restructuring, there is evidence that wage 
bargaining systems in Europe allow wages 
to reflect productivity effectively, taking into 
account differences in skills, but appear to do 
less so for local labour market conditions and 
in particular regional productivity and unem-
ployment differences. While showing a gener-
al tendency towards decelerated wage growth 
as a reaction to the economic slowdown and 
to increased unemployment, in some Member 
States recent nominal wage growth has been 
slow to adapt to productivity growth.
Fourth, there is, on the one hand, strong 
evidence for traditional seniority- and 
tenure-based pay schemes in the European 
labour markets, indicative of strong internal 
labour markets that tend to offer long-term 
employment relationships and provide effec-
tive insurance against wage variations and 
employment risks.82 On the other hand, there 
is a considerable degree of flexibility in the 
way how European wage formation systems 
reflect differences in skills, but also factors 
as diverse as contract status, firm size, career 
interruptions, earnings risks and local labour 
market conditions.  Given persistent large 
differences in regional unemployment rates 
there are some doubts, however, in particular 
as to whether regional wage differentiation 
sufficiently reflects local labour market condi-
tions.
The extent to which these factors are reward-
ed differs considerably across the EU Member 
States. One example concerns the wages of 
employees in flexible employment relation-
Table 40 – Unadjusted and adjusted wage differentials (in %)
Gender Non EU High- skilled
Medium- 
skilled
Job-
specific 
training
Super-
visory
Inter-
mediate Public Part-time Temporary Small firm Llarge firm
Unadjusted
B -12% -26% 38% 9% 0% 45% 21% -12% -17% -21% -13% 36%
DK -13% -2% 65% 29% 0% 32% 6% -7% -20% -25% -18% 26%
D -21% -13% 115% 45% 0% 12% -12% -20% -37% 0%
EL -15% -2% 92% 15% 0% 72% 30% 59% 3% -34% -21% 39%
E -14% -28% 77% 25% 0% 121% 45% 42% -7% -40% -8% 70%
F -13% -33% 52% 21% 0% 61% 23% 27% -10% -40% -10% 26%
IRL -15% 84% 15% 0% 61% 36% 54% -19% -31% -30% 37%
I -6% -24% 89% 22% 0% 57% 25% 36% -3% -22% -4% 27%
NL -18% -37% 22% 10% 0% 53% 11% 16% -20% -30% 5% 30%
P -8% -22% 234% 50% 0% 121% 67% 95% -8% -24% -34% 85%
A -19% -25% 98% 41% 0% 56% 20% 13% -13% -24% -18% 30%
FIN -17% -14% 48% 4% 0% 42% 10% 6% -11% -27% -20% 32%
UK -21% 0% 47% 15% 0% 70% 14% 12% -11% -23% 14% 35%
EU -16% -6% 63% 18% 0% 80% 25% 19% -7% -34% -16% 39%
Adjusted
B -6% -3% 21% 6% 4% 14% 6% 4% 4% -5% -17% 7%
DK -7% -4% 12% 5% 5% 9% 2% -7% -4% -5% -13% 6%
D -13% -2% 13% 2% 8% 1% -4% -4% -55%
EL -8% -11% 15% 6% 7% 21% 7% 16% 12% -12% -10% 6%
E -12% -11% 11% 5% 3% 20% 6% 15% 8% -11% -15% 6%
F -9% -10% 23% 7% 6% 15% 5% 7% 8% -4% -10% 5%
IRL -11% 19% 26% 9% 5% 16% 5% 16% -6% -8% -26% 6%
I -9% -9% 24% 6% 5% 17% 4% 10% 17% -9% 13% 4%
NL -9% 0% 10% -1% 0% 18% 2% 4% -4% -16% -23% 5%
P -13% -14% 58% 12% 17% 27% 10% 16% -8% -9% -18%
A -14% 1% 18% 5% 6% 9% 3% 1% 3% -5% -20% 5%
FIN -14% -15% 14% 3% 6% 11% 4% 1% -1% -8% -20% 10%
UK -14% -4% 10% 6% 10% 20% 7% 6% 0% -8% 0% 6%
EU -11% -2% 18% 7% 8% 16% 5% 7% 3% -11% -18% 6%
Source: Eurostat, ECHP, UDB version June 2003, waves 2-7 (1995-2000)
Notes: Unadjusted wage differentials report the difference in average gross hourly wages across the respective categories. Adjusted wage differentials report the wage effect of the 
respective variable on gross hourly wages (in %), calculated from country-specific wage regressions, using the variables listed in table 34.
82 For a critical discussion, however, see also Jérôme Gautié (2003), The destabilisation of internal labour markets and its consequences on employment and wages in some OECD countries, Centre d‘Etudes de 
l‘Emploi, Paris.
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ships such as part-time or temporary work. 
While both of them are related to strong wage 
reductions in the Netherlands, for instance, 
much lower, though still negative wage ef-
fects on temporary employment go hand in 
hand with positive wage premia to part-time 
work in some other countries, notably France, 
Belgium and Austria.
Another example is the compensation of earn-
ings risks. There is in fact little evidence of any 
effective compensation for employment risks 
by means of additional wage premia.  The UK 
actually seems to be the only country in the 
EU with such risk compensation in place. 
At the same time, according to a standard 
classification, it has comparatively low levels 
of both, employment protection and active 
labour market policies.83 In other countries 
such as Denmark or Spain, the absence of any 
employment risk compensation mechanism 
could be explained by either high levels of 
social protection (as in the case of Denmark) 
or high levels of employment protection (as 
in the case of Spain) or both. Furthermore, 
in some Member States - notably France, 
Italy and Germany - there is evidence of quite 
strongly segregated labour markets, where 
those with the highest employment risk also 
face lower wages.
These findings are of particular importance 
in light of the above mentioned expectation 
that monetary union and increased prod-
uct market integration will lead to greater 
volatility in employment. Labour markets 
will have to increase their capacity to adapt to 
such greater volatility in employment and to 
manage structural change. Given the absence 
of other forms of effective risk compensa-
tion, and in line with the Lisbon Strategy, 
the further development of unemployment 
insurance systems and active labour market 
policies could be an appropriate response 
to strengthen transitional labour markets in 
Europe.
An alternative response - as indicated by the 
results for the UK - could take the form of sub-
stantial changes in pay structures, notably in 
the way wages compensate for the increases 
in labour market flexibility and uncertainty. 
It should be noted, however, that – in the case 
of the UK - this solution is also related to com-
83 See also Auer and Cazes (eds) (2003), Employment stability in an age of flexibility, Evidence from industrialised countries, International Labour Office, Geneva. Among the EU Member States, this clas-
sification shows up a contrast between the UK, which like the US, has both low employment protection and low social protection with France, Italy, Spain and Germany – all countries with relatively high 
employment protection and, in the case of France and Germany, also high social protection – or with Denmark – a country with comparatively low employment protection, but a very effective system of 
social protection.
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paratively high levels of persistence in low 
quality employment and poverty.
Last but not least, this chapter has shown that 
there is a need to consider wage distributions 
and the variation of wage determinants across 
the wage distribution and not just differences 
in average wages. As shown in a recent study, 
it is clear that the factors behind the gender 
wage gap vary considerably across the wage 
distribution, with remuneration effects preva-
lent in the lower part of the earnings distribu-
tion compared to more important selection 
effects in the upper part of the distribution.84 
Similar effects might be at play between na-
tionals and non-nationals, given the varying 
wage differentials between nationals and 
non-EU nationals by skills level. 
While this chapter has provided some impor-
tant insights into wage formation in Europe, 
further work is needed to acquire a better 
understanding of wage formation processes 
in Europe and their effects on employment 
performance. One issue for further research 
is the separation of employer and employee 
effects on wages, based on matched employ-
er-employee data. Another one is the analysis 
of wage adjustments over the business cycle 
and to external shocks. The wage effects of 
increased product market integration and 
globalisation also need to be analysed in 
more detail.
84 European Commission (2003), Methodological issues related to the analysis of gender gaps in employment, earnings and career progression, by Miriam Beblo, Denis Beninger, Anja Kunze and François 
Laisney, Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung, Mannheim.
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Annexes to chapter 3
Annex 3.1 – Definition of 
labour costs and wages and 
salaries
Labour costs are defined as the total remu-
neration, in cash or in kind, payable by an 
employer in return for work done, including 
wages and salaries and non-wage labour 
costs, i.e. the values of social contributions, 
actual or imputed, and taxes payable by the 
employer.
Wages and salaries are defined as the total re-
muneration, in cash or in kind, payable by an 
employer to an employee in return for work 
done, including the values of any social con-
tributions, income taxes, etc. payable by the 
employee even if they are actually withheld 
by the employer and paid directly to social 
insurance schemes or tax authorities, on 
behalf of the employee, but excluding social 
contributions and taxes by the employer.
Wages and salaries in cash include the follow-
ing kinds of remuneration:
• basic wages and salaries payable at regu-
lar intervals;
• enhanced rates of pay for overtime, night 
work, weekend work, disagreeable or 
hazardous circumstances;
• cost of living allowances, local allowances 
and expatriation allowances;
• allowances for transport to and from 
work;
• holiday pay for official holidays or annual 
holidays;
• commissions, tips, attendance and direc-
tors’ fees paid to employees;
• payments made by employers to their 
employees under saving schemes;
• exceptional payments to employees who 
leave the enterprise; and
• housing allowances paid in cash by em-
ployers to their employees.
Bonuses include:
• bonuses based on productivity or profits;
• Christmas and New Year bonuses exclud-
ing employee social benefits;
• ‘13th and 14th month’ pay (annual 
supplementary pay); and
• ad-hoc bonuses or other exceptional pay-
ments linked to the overall performance 
of the enterprise made under incentive 
schemes.
Wages and salaries in kind consist of goods 
and services, or other benefits, provided free 
or at reduced prices by employers, that can 
be used by employees in their own time and 
at their own discretion, for the satisfaction of 
their own needs or wants or those of other 
members of their households. Those goods 
and services, or other benefits, are not neces-
sary for the employers’ production process. 
For the employees, those wages and salaries 
in kind represent an additional income: they 
would have paid a market price if they had 
bought these goods or services by themselves. 
The most common are:
• price reductions obtained in free or subsi-
dised canteens or luncheon vouchers;
• own account and purchased housing or 
accommodation services;
• the services of vehicles or other durables 
provided for the personal use of employ-
ees;
• goods and services produced as outputs 
from the employer’s own processes of 
production, such as free travel for the 
employees of railways or airlines;
• the provision of sports, recreation or 
holiday facilities for employees and their 
families;
• transportation to and from work;
• crėches for the children of employees;
• bonus shares distributed to employees; 
and
• the value of the interest foregone by 
employers when they provide loans to 
employees at reduced rates of interest. 
Wages and salaries do not include: 
• expenditure by employers which is to 
their own benefit as well as to that of 
their employees, because it is necessary 
for the employers’ production process;
• allowances or reimbursement of employ-
ees for travelling, separation, removal 
and entertainment expenses incurred in 
the course of their duties; 
• expenditure on providing amenities at 
the place of work, medical examinations 
required because of the nature of the 
work, supplying working clothes which 
are worn exclusively, or mainly, at work; 
• accommodation services at the place of 
work of a kind which cannot be used by 
the households to which the employees 
belong – cabins, dormitories, huts and 
so on; 
• special meals or drinks necessitated by 
exceptional working conditions; 
• allowances paid to employees for the 
purchase of tools, equipment or special 
clothing needed exclusively, or primarily, 
for their work, or that part of their wages 
or salaries which, under their contracts 
of employment, employees are required 
to devote to such purchases;
• the amounts of wages and salaries 
which employers continue to pay to their 
employees temporarily in the case of 
sickness, maternity, industrial injury, dis-
ability, redundancy, etc. (these payments 
are treated as unfunded employee social 
benefits, with the same amounts being 
shown under employers’ imputed social 
contributions);
• other unfunded employee social benefits, 
in the form of children’s, spouse’s, family, 
education or other allowances in respect 
of dependants, and in the form of the 
provision of free medical services (other 
than those necessitated by the nature of 
the work) to employees or their families;
• employers’ social contributions; and
• any taxes payable by the employer on the 
wage and salary bill.
Source: Eurostat, ESA95
Annex 3.2 – Statistical 
information on earnings and 
labour costs 
Differing national systems of pay formation, 
industrial relations, taxation and social se-
curity, and the divergent ways in which pay-
related statistics are collected and presented, 
mean that comparisons between countries 
are sometimes hard to draw. General indi-
cations of recent developments, however, 
can be provided on a broad range of data, 
including both harmonised EU-level surveys 
and non-harmonised national data, although 
comparisons based on varying national data 
sources can be difficult. In any case, the sta-
tistics provided should be treated with some 
caution, and the limitations of the underlying 
databases should be taken into account.
- 119 -
Chapter 3 Wage structures and determinants in an enlarged Europe
Among the various sources containing har-
monised information on the structure and 
evolution of wages, earnings and labour costs 
in the EU and, in some cases also the acces-
sion countries, are:
• the Structure of Earnings Survey (SES). 
This survey has so far been an irregular 
structural enterprise survey, covering 
industry and services and excluding 
agriculture, public administration and 
enterprises with less than 10 employees 
in most EU Member States. In the future, 
it will have to be carried out every four 
years. The coverage of a number of sec-
tors is therefore either weak or missing, 
notably for Education, health and social 
services, Public administration and De-
fence, and Social and personal services. 
No information is provided on the self-
employed. Latest structural data from the 
Labour Cost Survey are available for the 
year 1995. The results of the latest survey, 
which was conducted in 2002, will be 
released in 2004. Some EU Member States 
additionally provide, on a voluntary ba-
sis, time-series data with annual average 
earnings, broken down by gender, work-
ing time status as well as broad sector and 
occupation,
• the Labour Cost Survey (LCS). This sur-
vey is another, so far  irregular structural 
enterprise survey, covering industry and 
services, and excluding in most EU Mem-
ber States agriculture, public administra-
tion and enterprises with less than 10 
employees. In the future, it will have to be 
carried out every four years. The coverage 
of a number of sectors is therefore again 
either weak or missing, notably of Educa-
tion, health and Social services, Public 
administration and defence, and social 
and personal services. No information 
is provided on the self-employed. The 
survey contains detailed information on 
the level and structure of labour costs, 
wages and salaries, working hours and 
employment at the national, regional and 
sectoral (NACE-2) level and by establish-
ment size. Latest structural data from the 
Labour Cost Survey (LCS) are available 
for the year 2000. In that survey, no data 
are provided for Belgium, Malta and Tur-
key. For Slovenia, data are only available 
for broad sectors (NACE-1),
• the European Community Household 
Panel (ECHP) and its successor, the EU-
database for Statistics on Income and 
Living Conditions (EU-SILC). The ECHP 
is based on harmonised EU-wide surveys 
for the years 1994-2001. Despite relatively 
small sample sizes, people employed in 
establishments with less than 10 em-
ployed are included, and all sectors of the 
economy are covered, notably the public 
sector. It contains particularly detailed 
information on earnings and income 
and allows that information to be linked 
to the personal characteristics of the job-
holders and to some important job and 
firm characteristics. It also allows indi-
vidual earnings mobility to be examined 
over time. Data collection for the ECHP 
stopped in 2001, and the survey will be 
replaced in all EU Member States and ac-
cession countries with a new instrument, 
EU-SILC
 By 2004, EU-SILC will be in place in 12 of 
the current EU Member States, excluding 
Germany, the Netherlands and the UK. 
Seven Member States will already start 
the survey in 2003. By 2005, all of the 
current EU Member States and most ac-
cession countries will have EU-SILC in 
place,
• some countries also provide, on an 
optional basis, earnings information in 
the Community Labour Force Survey 
(LFS). In addition to the relatively large 
sample sizes, this has the advantage - as 
in the case of the ECHP - that earnings in-
formation can be linked to personal, job 
and firm characteristics. Contrary to the 
ECHP, however, the LFS does not contain 
information on longer term labour mar-
ket transitions and earnings mobility in 
particular.
Information based on non-harmonised 
national data, including register data and 
matched employer/employee data, includes: 
• the Commission Services’ quarterly 
Conventional Earnings Index (CEI) (or, 
equivalently, wage development indica-
tor): This index follows the short-term 
development of basic wages and sala-
ries, including gross hourly earnings of 
manual workers in industry and gross 
monthly earnings of all employees in 
the whole economy. It is based on the 
most frequent earnings indices in the 
Member States. These indices are not 
harmonised and are based on national 
sample surveys, on administrative files or 
a mixture of both sources, and, therefore, 
involve national differences in coverage 
and definitions. While the use of different 
national concepts for compiling the indi-
ces can complicate the interpretation of 
the evolution of earnings, the index gives 
an indication of developments occurring 
in the conventional part of earnings,
• the quarterly Labour Cost Index (LCI): 
This index measures trends in average 
labour costs by units of labour input, with 
labour costs including gross wages and 
salaries, employers’ social contributions 
and taxes net of subsidies connected to 
employment, while not considering costs 
for occupational training or other costs 
such as those for canteens or recruit-
ment. Three indices are calculated: an 
index of total labour costs, one for gross 
wages and salaries, and one for non-wage 
labour costs. They show the short-term 
development of the total labour costs, 
wages and non-wage labour costs for 
employers. All three indices are aggrega-
tions by Eurostat of indices compiled by 
the National Statistical Institutes based 
on national statistics or administrative 
data, covering all market economic activi-
ties except agriculture, fisheries, forestry, 
education, health, entertainment, infor-
mation and personal services activities. 
Eurostat does not publish EU averages for 
the index of gross wages and salaries, 
• regular information from the European 
Industrial Relations Observatory (EIRO) 
on various aspects of wage formation 
and industrial relations. This relies on a 
large range of non-harmonised national 
data and expertise from national expert 
networks in the respective countries.
To improve the overall quality and coverage of 
earnings and labour cost statistics in Europe, 
Eurostat has recently started an initiative to 
develop an integrated system of earnings and 
labour cost statistics due to be ready in 2007. 
Based on the above data bases, both harmon-
ised and national, a system will be developed 
which combines regular structural infor-
mation on earnings and labour costs with 
short-term indicators on wage and labour 
cost trends, and which improves the linkage 
of individual-level information with that from 
enterprises and national registers.
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Annex 3.3 – Low and high paying sectors in the EU and the accession countries, 2000
Sectors with wages below 75% of average wage Rel. 
wage
Sectors with wages above 125% of average wage Rel. 
wage
DK none air transport
activities auxiliary to financial intermediation
manufacture of coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel
computer and related activities
extraction of crude petroleum and natural gas
129.6
129.7
136.1
136.3
142.9
D hotels and restaurants
tanning and dressing of leather
recycling
manufacture of food and beverages
retail trade, repair of personal and household goods
54.6
69.6
73.7
74.5
74.5
electricity, gas, steam and hot water supply
manufacture of other transport equipment
manufacture of radio, television and communication equipment
manufacture of chemicals and chemical products
manufacture of tobacco products
insurance and pension funding, except compulsory social security
manufacture of office machinery and computers
manufacture of motor vehicles
activities auxiliary to financial intermediation
manufacture of coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel
extraction of crude petroleum and natural gas
126.7
128.6
130.1
133.4
133.9
134.8
139.2
140.4
140.6
148.7
171.8
EL manufacture of wearing apparel
real estate activities
retail trade, repair of personal and household goods
manufacture of furniture
tanning and dressing of leather
manufacture of medical, precision and optical instruments
extraction of crude petroleum and natural gas
manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery and 
equipment
manufacture of textiles
58.3
58.5
60.1
61.4
64.1
66.8
68.8
70.2
74.2
collection, purification and distribution of water
mining of metal ores
insurance and pension funding, except compulsory social security
manufacture of other transport equipment
manufacture of tobacco products
post and telecommunications
financial intermediation, except insurance and pension funding
activities auxiliary to financial intermediation
electricity, gas, steam and hot water supply
air transport
manufacture of coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel
128.9
134.1
140.8
145.9
148.3
153.5
157.0
164.5
165.3
166.2
207.0
E other service activities
manufacture of wearing apparel
tanning and dressing of leather
hotels and restaurants
retail trade, repair of personal and household goods
57.9
60.3
65.1
70.6
73.6
manufacture of motor vehicles
manufacture of other transport equipment
manufacture of radio, television and communication equipment
manufacture of basic metals
water transport
mining of metal ores
collection, puriÞ cation and distribution of water
manufacture of chemicals and chemical products
insurance and pension funding, except compulsory social security
post and telecommunications
mining of coal and lignite; extraction of peat
manufacture of ofÞ ce machinery and computers
manufacture of medical, precision and optical instruments
activities auxiliary to Þ nancial intermediation
air transport
Þ nancial intermediation, except insurance and pension funding
electricity, gas, steam and hot water supply
extraction of crude petroleum and natural gas
manufacture of coke, reÞ ned petroleum products and nuclear fuel
127.6
127.7
127.7
135.2
135.7
135.7
138.3
144.0
150.1
153.0
154.8
162.3
165.6
169.4
170.9
200.3
201.3
211.9
231.0
F mining of coal and lignite; extraction of peat
retail trade, repair of personal and household goods
44.7
72.2
electricity, gas, steam and hot water supply
Þ nancial intermediation, except insurance and pension funding
insurance and pension funding, except compulsory social security
computer and related activities
extraction of crude petroleum and natural gas
research and development
128.7
131.1
147.7
149.0
167.9
301.8
IRL hotels and restaurants
retail trade, repair of personal and household goods
manufacture of wearing apparel
tanning and dressing of leather
manufacture of textiles
63.9
64.1
67.2
67.8
74.6
Þ nancial intermediation, except insurance and pension funding
manufacture of tobacco products
real estate activities
computer and related activities
insurance and pension funding, except compulsory social security
activities auxiliary to Þ nancial intermediation
125.8
142.3
153.0
154.0
156.7
175.2
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I hotels and restaurants
manufacture of wearing apparel
manufacture of wood, except furniture
tanning and dressing of leather
68.3
69.5
71.4
72.5
activities auxiliary to Þ nancial intermediation
research and development
manufacture of chemicals and chemical products
electricity, gas, steam and hot water supply
manufacture of coke, reÞ ned petroleum products and nuclear fuel
insurance and pension funding, except compulsory social security
Þ nancial intermediation, except insurance and pension funding
extraction of crude petroleum and natural gas
air transport
128.2
134.3
137.2
146.9
153.2
162.7
171.7
196.3
203.6
L hotels and restaurants
retail trade, repair of personal and household goods
manufacture of food and beverages
manufacture of furniture
manufacture of medical, precision and optical instruments
construction
sale, maintenance and repair of motor vehicles; retail sale of 
automotive fuel
54.9
57.5
64.2
64.3
66.2
66.6
73.2
collection, puriÞ cation and distribution of water
post and telecommunications
insurance and pension funding, except compulsory social security
research and development
electricity, gas, steam and hot water supply
activities auxiliary to Þ nancial intermediation
Þ nancial intermediation, except insurance and pension funding
131.3
135.1
138.9
145.9
148.5
160.8
176.1
NL hotels and restaurants
retail trade, repair of personal and household goods
manufacture of furniture
63.0
63.6
73.1
computer and related activities
collection, puriÞ cation and distribution of water
manufacture of tobacco products
manufacture of chemicals and chemical products
insurance and pension funding, except compulsory social security
electricity, gas, steam and hot water supply
research and development
Þ nancial intermediation, except insurance and pension funding
manufacture of coke, reÞ ned petroleum products and nuclear fuel
extraction of crude petroleum and natural gas
128.1
130.4
139.4
139.7
140.7
140.8
145.6
147.3
173.7
195.4
P manufacture of wearing apparel
hotels and restaurants
tanning and dressing of leather
retail trade, repair of personal and household goods
60.3
61.5
63.6
74.8
activities auxiliary to Þ nancial intermediation
manufacture of radio, television and communication equipment
electricity, gas, steam and hot water supply
research and development
Þ nancial intermediation, except insurance and pension funding
computer and related activities
manufacture of coke, reÞ ned petroleum products and nuclear fuel
131.1
137.6
140.7
144.1
148.0
152.2
218.9
A manufacture of wearing apparel
tanning and dressing of leather
manufacture of furniture
hotels and restaurants
manufacture of wood, except furniture
manufacture of textiles
retail trade, repair of personal and household goods
54.5
63.4
65.4
70.9
72.5
72.8
74.3
wholesale trade and commission trade, except motor vehicles
manufacture of other transport equipment
publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded media
manufacture of pulp, paper and paper products
research and development
supporting and auxiliary transport activities; travel agencies
manufacture of chemicals and chemical products
activities auxiliary to Þ nancial intermediation
water transport
computer and related activities
mining of metal ores
electricity, gas, steam and hot water supply
insurance and pension funding, except compulsory social security
Þ nancial intermediation, except insurance and pension funding
air transport
126.2
129.2
134.6
135.7
139.8
146.2
152.2
158.3
159.4
205.4
205.5
210.6
237.5
244.9
270.9
FIN hotels and restaurants
manufacture of textiles
manufacture of wearing apparel
tanning and dressing of leather
65.6
67.0
67.4
68.0
insurance and pension funding, except compulsory social security
manufacture of coke, reÞ ned petroleum products and nuclear fuel
activities auxiliary to Þ nancial intermediation
128.5
144.0
215.9
S hotels and restaurants
manufacture of wearing apparel
69.3
74.0
insurance and pension funding, except compulsory social security
computer and related activities
Þ nancial intermediation, except insurance and pension funding
activities auxiliary to Þ nancial intermediation
127.9
138.3
139.1
229.1
UK hotels and restaurants
manufacture of wearing apparel
retail trade, repair of personal and household goods
tanning and dressing of leather
manufacture of textiles
other service activities
land transport; transport via pipelines
59.1
62.1
65.1
65.4
73.1
73.9
74.3
manufacture of chemicals and chemical products
manufacture of coke, reÞ ned petroleum products and nuclear fuel
electricity, gas, steam and hot water supply
research and development
insurance and pension funding, except compulsory social security
air transport
manufacture of tobacco products
Þ nancial intermediation, except insurance and pension funding
computer and related activities
extraction of crude petroleum and natural gas
activities auxiliary to Þ nancial intermediation
130.9
134.0
135.2
137.9
141.2
147.5
159.8
166.5
173.8
186.6
224.1
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BG renting of machinery and equipment
sewage and refuse disposal
manufacture of wearing apparel
retail trade, repair of personal and household goods
tanning and dressing of leather
manufacture of furniture
other service activities
manufacture of wood, except furniture
hotels and restaurants
manufacture of textiles
recycling
health and social work
45.4
52.6
53.6
54.6
55.7
60.8
61.9
61.9
66.0
68.0
71.1
73.2
collection, puriÞ cation and distribution of water
manufacture of chemicals and chemical products
post and telecommunications
supporting and auxiliary transport activities; travel agencies
water transport
manufacture of basic metals
computer and related activities
mining of metal ores
air transport
mining of coal and lignite; extraction of peat
insurance and pension funding, except compulsory social security
Þ nancial intermediation, except insurance and pension funding
manufacture of tobacco products
electricity, gas, steam and hot water supply
manufacture of coke, reÞ ned petroleum products and nuclear fuel
126.8
132.0
135.1
137.1
137.1
152.6
164.9
168.0
174.2
175.3
180.4
189.7
193.8
213.4
239.2
CY manufacture of wearing apparel
manufacture of textiles
other service activities
health and social work
land transport; transport via pipelines
manufacture of furniture
manufacture of motor vehicles
tanning and dressing of leather
56.2
61.9
63.6
66.1
68.4
68.9
69.5
73.3
manufacture of tobacco products
activities of membership organisations
post and telecommunications
sewage and refuse disposal
electricity, gas, steam and hot water supply
education
computer and related activities
Þ nancial intermediation, except insurance and pension funding
manufacture of other transport equipment
air transport
manufacture of coke, reÞ ned petroleum products and nuclear fuel
131.9
132.7
133.0
138.9
153.8
154.4
156.2
163.0
166.0
185.9
234.7
CZ other service activities
manufacture of wearing apparel
tanning and dressing of leather
manufacture of textiles
60.9
62.3
67.6
72.6
electricity, gas, steam and hot water supply
wholesale trade and commission trade, except motor vehicles
manufacture of coke, reÞ ned petroleum products and nuclear fuel
air transport
insurance and pension funding, except compulsory social security
computer and related activities
activities auxiliary to Þ nancial intermediation
Þ nancial intermediation, except insurance and pension funding
131.7
134.5
142.0
149.8
167.3
168.0
177.6
178.3
EE other service activities
hotels and restaurants
retail trade, repair of personal and household goods
manufacture of wearing apparel
45.7
60.6
71.9
74.7
mining of coal and lignite; extraction of peat
supporting and auxiliary transport activities; travel agencies
publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded media
insurance and pension funding, except compulsory social security
water transport
computer and related activities
air transport
activities auxiliary to Þ nancial intermediation
Þ nancial intermediation, except insurance and pension funding
132.1
152.5
153.8
153.8
198.6
201.8
213.6
222.6
231.2
HU manufacture of wearing apparel
other service activities
tanning and dressing of leather
manufacture of wood, except furniture
hotels and restaurants
manufacture of furniture
retail trade, repair of personal and household goods
manufacture of textiles
56.4
57.2
59.1
59.5
60.3
62.3
64.6
68.9
manufacture of pulp, paper and paper products
manufacture of basic metals
insurance and pension funding, except compulsory social security
post and telecommunications
electricity, gas, steam and hot water supply
manufacture of chemicals and chemical products
air transport
computer and related activities
manufacture of coke, reÞ ned petroleum products and nuclear fuel
extraction of crude petroleum and natural gas
activities auxiliary to Þ nancial intermediation
manufacture of tobacco products
Þ nancial intermediation, except insurance and pension funding
127.6
130.0
133.9
138.9
153.3
158.0
170.4
182.5
190.3
194.6
195.3
213.2
214.0
LT manufacture of motor vehicles
hotels and restaurants
other service activities
manufacture of wood, except furniture
manufacture of wearing apparel
retail trade, repair of personal and household goods
tanning and dressing of leather
62.1
66.2
67.2
68.2
69.7
69.7
73.3
post and telecommunications
publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded media
other business activities
electricity, gas, steam and hot water supply
manufacture of chemicals and chemical products
supporting and auxiliary transport activities; travel agencies
activities of membership organisations
insurance and pension funding, except compulsory social security
computer and related activities
Þ nancial intermediation, except insurance and pension funding
activities auxiliary to Þ nancial intermediation
128.7
131.3
132.8
134.9
137.9
153.8
160.0
168.2
182.1
189.7
213.3
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LV retail trade, repair of personal and household goods
tanning and dressing of leather
recycling
hotels and restaurants
manufacture of rubber and plastic products
manufacture of wearing apparel
manufacture of furniture
56.6
61.5
63.6
64.7
65.2
70.6
73.3
water transport
manufacture of basic metals
publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded media
electricity, gas, steam and hot water supply
post and telecommunications
supporting and auxiliary transport activities; travel agencies
activities auxiliary to Þ nancial intermediation
air transport
renting of machinery and equipment
computer and related activities
Þ nancial intermediation, except insurance and pension funding
126.7
131.0
139.6
150.3
151.3
183.4
203.2
217.6
222.5
224.6
270.1
PL tanning and dressing of leather
manufacture of wearing apparel
other service activities
manufacture of wood, except furniture
retail trade, repair of personal and household goods
hotels and restaurants
manufacture of textiles
manufacture of furniture
48.8
52.0
61.1
66.4
66.7
68.4
68.4
69.0
post and telecommunications
electricity, gas, steam and hot water supply
renting of machinery and equipment
Þ nancial intermediation, except insurance and pension funding
extraction of crude petroleum and natural gas
manufacture of ofÞ ce machinery and computers
manufacture of tobacco products
mining of coal and lignite; extraction of peat
insurance and pension funding, except compulsory social security
manufacture of coke, reÞ ned petroleum products and nuclear fuel
activities auxiliary to Þ nancial intermediation
computer and related activities
air transport
135.4
137.4
140.1
147.7
147.7
149.1
165.2
171.9
173.4
176.9
194.4
200.3
301.5
RO other service activities
retail trade, repair of personal and household goods
tanning and dressing of leather
manufacture of wood, except furniture
manufacture of wearing apparel
manufacture of furniture
manufacture of textiles
hotels and restaurants
sewage and refuse disposal
manufacture of food and beverages
construction
33.7
52.5
54.5
55.4
59.4
63.4
63.4
67.3
67.3
71.3
74.3
activities of membership organisations
manufacture of basic metals
mining of metal ores
manufacture of radio, television and communication equipment
extraction of crude petroleum and natural gas
post and telecommunications
manufacture of coke, reÞ ned petroleum products and nuclear fuel
activities auxiliary to Þ nancial intermediation
electricity, gas, steam and hot water supply
supporting and auxiliary transport activities; travel agencies
insurance and pension funding, except compulsory social security
computer and related activities
manufacture of tobacco products
mining of coal and lignite; extraction of peat
air transport
Þ nancial intermediation, except insurance and pension funding
130.7
131.7
149.5
154.5
154.5
161.4
174.3
174.3
181.2
189.1
191.1
191.1
194.1
211.9
262.4
294.1
SK activities of membership organisations
tanning and dressing of leather
manufacture of wearing apparel
retail trade, repair of personal and household goods
manufacture of wood, except furniture
manufacture of textiles
58.1
66.2
68.9
69.8
71.6
71.6
wholesale trade and commission trade, except motor vehicles
manufacture of basic metals
extraction of crude petroleum and natural gas
supporting and auxiliary transport activities; travel agencies
manufacture of coke, reÞ ned petroleum products and nuclear fuel
Þ nancial intermediation, except insurance and pension funding
insurance and pension funding, except compulsory social security
renting of machinery and equipment
water transport
computer and related activities
activities auxiliary to Þ nancial intermediation
131.1
132.4
140.5
143.2
145.0
147.7
148.2
156.8
188.3
213.1
269.4
Source: Eurostat, LCS
Notes: no data available for Belgium, Malta and Slovenia, sector-specific average wage in percent of country-specific total average wage in industry and services.
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Introduction
The overarching objectives of the European 
Employment Strategy stressed in both the 
2003 Employment Guidelines and the Broad 
Economic Policy Guidelines85, are to create 
the conditions for full employment, improve 
quality in work and productivity and foster 
social cohesion and inclusive labour markets. 
These aims are fundamental to the Lisbon 
strategy. To achieve these goals it is widely 
recognised that the quality of education and 
training in Europe must be improved and 
that life-long learning must be encouraged. 
But effort to promote more flexible work 
organisations and facilitate labour mobility, 
both geographical and occupational, while 
taking into account the need for job security, 
is also crucial.
This is reflected in the strong focus in the 
Employment Guidelines 2003 (EGL 2003) 
on addressing change and promoting adapt-
ability and mobility in the labour market. In 
particular the provision of an appropriate 
balance between flexibility and security is 
seen as vital to support the competitiveness 
of firms, increase quality and productivity at 
work and facilitate the adaptation of firms 
and workers to economic change. In this 
context, access of workers to training is con-
sidered an essential element of the balance 
between flexibility and security. In order to 
facilitate the adaptability of firms and work-
ers to change, the EGL 2003 foresee a whole 
package of measures, related to working time 
arrangements, work organisation, access to 
training and career progression:
“Member States will review and, where ap-
propriate, reform overly restrictive elements 
in employment legislation that affect labour 
market dynamics and the employment of 
those groups facing difficult access to the 
labour market, develop social dialogue, foster 
corporate social responsibility, and undertake 
other appropriate measures to promote:
• diversity of contractual and working ar-
rangements, including arrangements on 
working time, favouring career progres-
sion, a better balance between work and 
private life and between flexibility and 
security;
• access for workers, in particular for low 
skill workers, to training;
• better working conditions, including 
health and safety (…);
• the design and dissemination of in-
novative and sustainable forms of work 
organisation, which support labour pro-
ductivity and quality at work;
• the anticipation and the positive manage-
ment of economic change and restructur-
ing.”
Looking at labour market integration and 
career development as discussed in detail in 
previous Employment in Europe reports86 
- low-skilled people in particular change 
between long-term unemployment or inactiv-
ity and intermittent temporary jobs and are 
at high risk of leaving the labour market in 
the long term. At the aggregate level, their 
fluctuation between generally low paid, low 
productivity employment and non-employ-
ment contributes only to a limited extent to a 
sustainable employment increase. It is there-
fore of particular importance to integrate 
or reintegrate those on the margins of the 
labour market into stable employment rela-
tionships - notably the young and low-skilled 
and people with care responsibilities.
This requires the availability of attractive 
work, offering suitable working time ar-
rangements, possibilities to reconcile work 
and family life, and opportunities for skills up-
grading and career advancement. In addition 
to financial incentives, career advancement 
and other quality elements working time flex-
ibility and job security are for many people 
key inducements to take up work and to stay 
in the labour market. While low wage employ-
ment, less regulation and more flexible work 
organisation – greater opportunities for part-
time work and flexible working hours – can 
make it easier both for people to join the la-
bour force and for firms to take them on, such 
increases in labour market flexibility need to 
be in line with the strong demand for high 
quality employment. Furthermore, they also 
need to be properly balanced by legitimate 
demands for job security.
Having discussed wages and their relation 
to productivity in the previous chapter, this 
chapter considers some other dimensions of 
quality in work – job satisfaction, education 
and training, labour market transitions, and 
working time arrangements - and assesses the 
extent of current labour market flexibility and 
security. Section 2 provides a short update on 
the evolution of job satisfaction and quality in 
work over the second half in the 1990s in the 
EU, with a particular focus on temporary em-
ployment. It also includes a short discussion 
of the role of industrial relations and social 
dialogue in relation to education, training 
and productivity. Section 3 further re-exam-
ines the role of quality in work for longer 
term labour market transitions in the period 
1995-2000 and provides evidence on employ-
ment stability and labour market flexibility in 
European labour markets. Section 4 discusses 
working hours and working time arrange-
ments in the EU and the accession countries, 
based on a specific ad hoc module on these 
issues to the 2001 Labour Force Survey (LFS).
85 See references in chapter 3.
86 See e.g. Employment in Europe 2001, chapter 4 „Quality in work and social inclusion“, and Employment in Europe 2002, chapter 3 „Synergies between quality and quantity in work“.
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Quality in work in 
European labour 
markets: an update
The concept of quality jobs rose to promi-
nence at the Lisbon Summit in March 2000 
which developed employment policy beyond 
the social protection, health and safety and 
equality agenda which had influenced it 
over the four decades since the Social Chapter 
came into being in 1961. Improving job qual-
ity is seen as important not just for the well 
being of workers but also to promote social 
inclusion and drive up employment levels. 
The European Commission identified 10 
‘dimensions’ of job quality in a Communica-
tion in 2001.87 For each of these, one or more 
indicators have been proposed – and adopted 
at the Laeken summit in December 2001 - as 
a means of assessing the quality of work in 
Europe and of monitoring its evolution over 
time.88 
While stating that there has been real prog-
ress on employment and confirming that the 
objectives of increasing employment rates 
and improving productivity and quality in 
work were interrelated and mutually sup-
portive, the 2003 Spring European Council 
recognised that “reaching the 70% employ-
ment rate Lisbon target by 2010 will require 
far-reaching structural reform aimed at full 
employment, higher productivity and quality 
in work”. It asked the European Commission 
to prepare a report on quality in work, review-
ing ongoing efforts to improve the quality of 
work, by the end of 2003.89
Previous Employment in Europe reports 
have analysed quality in work in the Europe-
an labour markets in detail. In these reports, 
it has been shown that not only wages, but 
also job security, access to training and career 
development are crucial determinants of 
both, subjective job satisfaction and objective 
job quality. While according to these criteria, 
the majority of jobs in the EU are of relatively 
high quality, up to a quarter of Europeans re-
main in jobs of relatively low quality, having 
either low pay, and/or a lack of job security, 
access to training or career development.
It was also shown that there are important 
cross-country differences in the persistence of 
low quality employment and in short- to mid-
term transitions between employment states, 
notably from low to high quality employment 
and from temporary to permanent employ-
ment. Relatively favourable transitions to 
higher quality employment in Denmark, 
Belgium, Austria, the Netherlands and Ireland 
contrast with much less favourable transi-
tion patterns in other Member States, most 
notably France, Germany, Italy, Greece and 
Spain. In all of the latter, a quarter or more 
of all those employed in low quality jobs in a 
given year were no longer in employment two 
to three years later, a majority of them having 
moved into unemployment.
Evolution of job satisfaction 
and job quality
Despite the strong employment performance 
observed in European labour markets in the 
second half of the 1990s, recent data on the 
evolution of job satisfaction and job quality 
– as defined in previous Employment in Eu-
rope reports – over this period do not indicate 
significant changes in quality in work. Only in 
Greece and Portugal, was there a significant 
decrease in the share of employees express-
ing low satisfaction with their type of work. 
On the other hand, job satisfaction seems to 
have deteriorated somewhat in Italy in the 
1996-2000 period. In the year 2000 in the EU 
overall, around 20% of all employees still de-
clared themselves dissatisfied with their job. 
Relatively high degrees of dissatisfaction in 
Greece, Italy, Spain and the UK contrast with 
very high shares (90% or more) of employees 
who are satisfied with their job in Denmark, 
France, Ireland, the Netherlands and, most 
notably, Austria (chart  80).
87 European Commission (2001), Employment and social policies: A framework for investing in quality, Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, COM(2001) 313 final, 20.06.2001
88 European Council (2001), Indicators of Quality in Work, Report by the Employment Committee to the European Council, 14263/01, 23.11.2001
89 European Council (2003), 2003 Spring European Council, Presidency Conclusions, Brussels, 20-21.03.2003
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Similar conclusions are obtained when as-
sessing objective job quality, using the clas-
sification of jobs suggested in Employment in 
Europe 2001. According to this classification, 
three main job types were distinguished: 
“high-quality jobs”, i.e. jobs which, in addi-
tion to reasonable pay, also offer either job 
security or access to training and career de-
velopment; low pay/low productivity jobs, i.e. 
jobs with gross hourly wages of less than 75% 
of the country-specific median; and “dead-end 
jobs”, i.e. jobs which, independently of their 
pay level, offer neither job security nor access 
to training or career development. The share 
of “low-quality jobs” in the EU remained 
virtually constant in the second half of the 
1990s. Although it is difficult to depict clear 
trends from the data, there are signs of im-
provements in a few Member States, notably 
Ireland, Austria and Belgium. It is probably 
more sensible, however, to compare the dif-
ferences in the levels across countries. Over 
the period 1995-2000, a quarter or more of 
all employees on average were in jobs of low 
quality in Spain, Portugal, Greece, the UK 
and Ireland, compared to less than 20% in 
Denmark (chart 81).
The role of temporary 
employment
In this context, temporary employment90 - i.e. 
employment on fixed- or short-term contracts 
- is of particular relevance, not least because 
job security and employment stability are key 
determinants of both job satisfaction and job 
quality. In fact, in most countries, temporary 
employment is in general not so much an 
outcome of personal choice, but more of 
choice restrictions.91 In the EU as a whole, 
more than half of all employees on temporary 
contracts – equivalent to 7% of all employees 
- would have preferred a permanent job but 
could not find one. Roughly a further third 
are in temporary employment because of 
education, training or probationary periods 
when starting a new job, while less than 10% 
of the temporarily employed declared that 
they want a temporary job, for the flexibility 
provided or as a means to fit with personal 
circumstances. In Spain and Cyprus, almost 
95% of all temporary employees declare 
themselves as involuntarily in temporary 
contracts. On the other hand, only in the UK, 
Ireland and Slovenia, did almost half of all 
temporary employees declare themselves as 
voluntarily on temporary contracts. Other 
countries with a sizeable fraction of 10% or 
more of all temporary employees declaring 
themselves as voluntarily so are the Nordic 
countries, the Czech Republic and, to a lower 
extent, the Netherlands and Belgium. Germa-
ny and Luxembourg stand out because almost 
all temporary employment in these countries 
is due to education, training or probationary 
periods (chart 82).
Temporary employment can potentially be 
a stepping-stone into longer employment 
relationships of higher quality, but often it 
has important and combined disadvantages 
in terms of job security, remuneration and 
training. In several countries, more than half 
of all temporary employees are on contracts 
of six months or less and are thus exposed 
to considerable employment risks. In the 
remarkable case of Spain, more than 60% 
of all temporary employees – equivalent to 
around 20% of all employees – work on the 
basis of temporary contracts with a length of 
six months or less. Also in Sweden and in sev-
eral accession countries (Slovenia, Hungary, 
Lithuania, Bulgaria, Slovakia) more than half 
of all employees have temporary contracts 
with short duration of six months or less. 
Contract length for temporary employment 
is, on average, much longer in Germany, 
Austria, Italy, Ireland, Portugal, Cyprus and 
Latvia. In all of these, more than half of tem-
porary employees have contracts of at least 
two years, possibly – as in the case of Austria 
and Germany - mainly related to education 
and training (chart 83).
90 Neither the LFS nor the ECHP provide information on temporary agency work. It should therefore be noted that temporary employment in this chapter generally refers to employment on the basis of 
contracts with fixed duration (fixed-term or short-term contracts). When using data from the ECHP, it also includes a small sample of people on casual work or work without any formal arrangement. For 
a comparative analysis on temporary agency work in the EU and its link to pay, working conditions and labour market integration, see e.g. Donald Storrie (2002), Temporary agency work in the European 
Union, European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, Dublin.
91 In the Labour Force Survey, employees on temporary contracts are asked to state the main reason for being in temporary employment. The response categories include: “I could not find a permanent job”; 
“I did not want a permanent job”; “I am in education or training”; and “I am in a probationary period”. The first of these categories is generally referred to as ‘involuntary in temporary employment’, the 
second as ‘voluntary in temporary employment’.
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Employees on temporary contracts are not 
only at considerably higher risk of job loss 
and labour market exclusion92 they also, as 
demonstrated in the previous chapter, receive 
lower wages than permanent employees with 
the same qualifications who are doing the 
same job. Such wage penalties on temporary 
contract work exist in all EU Member States, 
ranging from around 5% in France, Belgium, 
Austria, Germany and Denmark to more than 
10% in Spain and Greece, and to more than 
15% in the Netherlands. However, while in 
the southern EU Member States as well as in 
Belgium, Austria and France wage penalties 
for temporary work contrast with positive 
wage premia for part-time work, there are 
negative wage effects related to both types 
of flexibility – contractual and working time 
flexibility – for both men and women in 
Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Portugal and, 
most notably, the Netherlands, as well as for 
women in the UK (chart 84).
Finally, given the temporary nature of their 
employment relationship, temporary employ-
ees also receive less training in some cases, 
thus possibly compromising their employ-
ability in the longer run.
Quality of industrial relations 
and quality in work
As exemplified by both the strong difference 
in the provision of training in firms with 
and without negotiated agreements and by 
the important link between workplace or-
ganisation, quality in work and productivity, 
social dialogue in particular and industrial 
relations generally can play an important 
role in improving both, quality in work and 
productivity.
The role of education and training - including 
lifelong learning and adult (25-64) participa-
tion in education and training - for quality 
in work and productivity is well recognised. 
Nevertheless, as discussed in previous Em-
ployment in Europe reports, the incidence 
of adult learning and continuing vocational 
training remains rather low in many EU 
Member States, notably in the southern EU 
Member States and Germany. Continuing vo-
cational training, on the other hand is much 
more prominent in some of the countries 
with a strong employment performance in re-
cent years, notably the Nordic Member States, 
the UK and the Netherlands. There is, fur-
thermore, a strong variation in the access to 
training across age groups and skill levels in 
all countries, with training provision biased 
towards younger and high-skilled employees 
in larger firms.93
Negotiated agreements between the social 
partners are an important means to correct 
for this bias.94 Firms with negotiated train-
ing agreements not only provide training 
to more of their employees but also provide, 
on average, more intensive training to those 
participating in continuing vocational train-
ing (CVT) courses. In the EU overall, in en-
terprises with agreements more than half of 
all employees participated in CVT courses in 
1999, compared to only about a third in firms 
without agreements. Average hours spent in 
CVT courses by the participants throughout 
the year were nearly twice as high in firms 
with agreements (19 hours) as in firms with-
out agreements (10 hours). At the Member 
State level, a notable exception is Denmark, 
where both, incidence and average time spent 
in continuing vocational training are virtually 
the same in firms with and without negoti-
ated agreements. In the UK, while the shares 
of employees participating in CVT courses 
are also quite similar independently of the 
presence of an agreement between the social 
partners, average hours spent on continuing 
vocational training are significantly lower in 
firms without agreement (charts 85, 86).
Agreements on the provision of continuing 
vocational training contribute to reducing the 
strong discrepancies in the provision of train-
ing by firm size in all Member States, both 
with regard to training incidence and the av-
erage time spent in training (chart 87). At the 
EU level, in small firms without agreements, 
only 20% of employees receive continuing 
vocational training, with employees spending 
on average six hours in it. This contrasts with 
45% of employees in large firms who spend, 
on average, 11 hours a year on CVT courses. 
With agreements, 48% of the employees in 
small firms and 54% of employees in large 
firms benefitted from continuing vocational 
92 See Employment in Europe 2002, chapter 3 „Synergies between quality and quantity in work“ and additional evidence in the following section of this chapter. 
93 While this bias might reflect differences in private returns to education and training, it is likely to result in suboptimal human capital investments from an economy-wide point of view. The main reason 
is that social - or macroeconomic - returns to such investments generally exceed private – or microeconomic - ones, not least because of the close link between human capital investments and aggregate 
productivity increases. For further detail and related empirical estimates, see European Commission (2003), “Human capital in a global and knowledge-based economy”, study report by A. de la Fuente and 
A. Ciccone, Universitat Autonoma and Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona.
94 It is interesting to note that the European social partners agreed in 2002 a joint framework for action for the lifelong development of competencies and qualifications, thus underlining the importance of 
training agreements.
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training with virtually the same average time 
spend in training of 19 and 20 hours, respec-
tively in 1999.
Discrepancies in the provision of training by 
firm size exist in all Member States, notably in 
Belgium, Ireland, France, Italy, Greece, Spain 
and Portugal. In the latter four, less than 10% 
of employees in small firms without agree-
ments, and less than 40% of employees in 
small firms with agreements receive continu-
ing vocational training. In the three Nordic 
Member States, on the other hand, around 
40% or more of all employees in small firms 
without agreements, and less than 40% of 
employees in small firms with agreements 
do receive training. The differences in the 
provision of training between firms with 
and without agreement were smallest in the 
Nordic Member States, the Netherlands and 
Germany, and largest in Belgium, France and 
the southern EU Member States. In the par-
ticular case of Germany, while – compared to 
firms without agreements - firms of all sizes 
with agreements had generally higher train-
ing incidence in 1999, the relative differences 
with regard to both, training incidence and 
average time spent in training, by firm size 
persisted.
The above findings are in line with recent 
research. In particular in the case of the UK, 
it has been shown that unionised workers are 
more likely to receive training and also re-
ceive more days of training than non-union-
ised workers. In addition, workers covered 
by union agreements also tend to experience 
greater returns from training and faster wage 
growth.95
These findings are important, not least 
because training is known to increase both, 
employability and productivity. The effects of 
training on productivity have been shown to 
be economically large. Again in the particular 
case of the UK, the effect of raising the pro-
portion of workers trained in a sector by 5 
percentage points has been estimated at 4% 
with respect to the value added per worker, 
and at 1.6% for wages.96
Another important factor contributing to pro-
ductivity – and at the same time an important 
element of industrial relations - is workplace 
organisation. A number of case studies have 
been undertaken which show that new 
forms of work organisation, including new 
organisational structures, more flexible and 
less hierarchical working methods, stronger 
involvement of employees as well as new 
reward and performance measurement 
systems, tend to increase productivity and 
employer performance.97 More recent econo-
metric research based on matched employer-
employee data for Germany confirms these 
???
95 Alison L. Booth, Marco Francesconi and Gylfi Zoega (2003), Unions, work-related training, and wages: Evidence for British men, IZA Working Paper No. 737, Bonn
96 Lorraine Dearden, Howard Reed and John Van Reenen (2000), Who gains when workers train? Training and corporate productivity in a panel of British industries, Institute for Fiscal Studies, Working Paper 
No. 00/04, London.
97 See e.g. European Commission (1999), New forms of work organisation and productivity, study prepared by Business Decisions Ltd., DG Employment and Social Affairs, and European Commission (2002), 
New forms of work organisation, The benefits and impact on performance, CE-V/6-02-001-EN-C.
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findings. Flexible workplace practices are 
found to have economically important posi-
tive effects on labour productivity which are 
similar to those obtained for the US. These 
effects are, furthermore, rising over time.98
Labour market 
transitions and quality 
dynamics
To assess the extent to which low-quality jobs 
and temporary employment can integrate 
people into stable employment relationships, 
longer term transition rates from these job 
types have to be analysed. This section pro-
vides evidence on longer term labour market 
transitions over the 1995-2000 period, and on 
changes in transition rates over time, notably 
in transition rates between low and high 
quality employment.99 The section further 
provides results on longer term labour mar-
ket dynamics by type of employment, based 
on cluster analysis.
Persistence in permanent employment is high 
in all EU Member States, with 90% or more 
staying in a permanent job between 1999 
and 2000. On the other hand, as discussed in 
more detail in Employment in Europe 2002, 
transitions out of temporary employment 
vary strongly across the EU. While more than 
half of all temporary employees in 1999 were 
in a permanent job a year later in Austria, the 
Netherlands and Ireland, less than a third of 
temporary employees in Italy, Greece, Spain, 
France, Finland and Portugal managed the 
same.100 In all of these countries persistence 
in temporary employment over the two years 
was relatively high, with around half or more 
of all temporary employees in 1999 still in 
temporary employment a year later. 
Transitions in 1999/2000 from temporary 
employment into non-employment were 
highest in Finland and the UK, where more 
than a quarter of all temporary employees 
were not employed a year later. While the 
majority of temporary employees who were 
not employed had moved into inactivity in 
98 See Thomas K. Bauer (2003), Flexible workplace practices and labour productivity, IZA Working Paper No. 700, Bonn.
99 Results refer to the age group 15-64 unless stated otherwise.
100 For further analyses of the employment prospects of temporary employees, see also A.L. Booth et al (eds) (2002), „Temporary jobs: Stepping stones or dead ends?“, and related articles in: The Economic 
Journal, Symposium on temporary work, vol. 112 (480).
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the UK and also in Ireland, the Netherlands 
and Denmark, the picture was very differ-
ent for Germany, Austria, France, Finland 
and the southern EU Member States, where 
transitions from temporary employment into 
unemployment predominated (chart 88).
Similar observations can be made for transi-
tions out of low-quality employment. Year-to-
year transition rates from low to high quality 
employment were highest in Ireland, where 
almost 40% of all those employees in low 
quality jobs in 1999 had improved job quality 
one year later because of higher pay, a per-
manent contract status or access to training. 
Such improvements in job quality were much 
less common in Portugal, Greece and the UK, 
but also in France, Austria and Germany, 
where at most only one out of four employees 
in a low quality job in 1999 managed to gain 
access to a higher quality job in 2000. These 
differences notwithstanding, persistence in 
low quality employment was generally high. 
In fact, in all Member States, a majority of em-
ployees in low quality jobs – and around two 
thirds or more in Portugal, Greece, the UK, 
France and Austria - stayed in them between 
two consecutive years. Transition rates from 
low quality employment into non-employ-
ment exceeded 15% in Finland, Denmark, 
Germany, Spain, the UK and Ireland. In the 
case of the latter two countries, however, 
these transitions were predominantly into 
inactivity, not unemployment (chart 89).
Longer term labour market 
transitions
Longer term transitions over several years are 
the result not only of the above transitions 
out of temporary or low quality employment. 
They also reflect the transitions back from 
unemployment or inactivity into employ-
ment, and the stability of permanent and 
high quality jobs. Important differences in 
the extent and patterns of transitions back 
into employment exist: less than a quarter of 
the unemployed was unemployed for two sub-
sequent years in Denmark, while more than 
60% of all unemployed in Belgium, France 
and Italy  were. And while a third or more of 
all unemployed in 1999 had found an employ-
ment by 2000 in Denmark, Austria, Spain, the 
UK and Ireland, less than one quarter did in 
France, Belgium, Portugal, Italy, Germany 
and the Netherlands. Transitions back from 
inactivity into employment, moreover, were 
generally highest in those countries in which 
there is an important inflow from employ-
ment or unemployment into inactivity, most 
notably Denmark, the Netherlands, the UK 
and Ireland. In countries with relatively more 
important transitions into unemployment, 
and with higher persistence in unemploy-
ment – notably Germany, France, Belgium 
and Spain – on the other hand, transitions 
back from inactivity into employment were 
much less common. Finally, there is strong 
variation in the type of employment into 
which those previously unemployed or inac-
tive move: in Ireland, Austria and Denmark, a 
majority of people taking up a job move into 
permanent, high quality jobs. This is very 
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different in the other Member States, most 
notably France, Germany, Spain and the UK, 
where transitions out of unemployment or 
inactivity into employment predominantly 
translate into the take-up of low quality jobs 
(charts 90, 91).
As a result, over the six-year period 1995-
2000, transition patterns vary considerably 
across EU Member States. More than half of 
all temporary employees in all EU Member 
States, with the exception of the southern EU 
Member States, succeeded in moving to more 
stable contractual employment arrange-
ments. The most favourable longer-term tran-
sition patterns are observed for Austria, the 
UK and Ireland. On the other hand, important 
shares of temporary employees in 1995 were 
not in employment anymore five years later. 
In particular in Spain, Germany, France and 
Belgium, more than 10% of those in tempo-
rary employment in 1995 were unemployed 
five years later. In some of the Member States 
in which such long-term transitions into 
unemployment were much less significant, 
however, there were important transitions 
into inactivity instead, most notably in the 
UK, Ireland, the Netherlands, Denmark and 
the southern EU Member States. Germany 
and Spain are, the only EU Member States in 
which, transitions from temporary employ-
ment into both, unemployment and inactiv-
ity, each affected more than 10% of those in 
temporary employment in 1995 (chart 92).
Likewise, longer term transitions out of 
low quality or temporary employment over 
the period 1995-2000 were in general more 
favourable in Austria and Ireland as well as 
in the Nordic and Benelux Member States, 
while less favourable in France, Germany 
and the southern EU Member States. The 
only country where marked improvements 
in contract status – i.e. movement from tem-
porary to permanent jobs – is not matched 
by before improvements in job quality is the 
UK. Indeed, in the UK, favourable transitions 
from temporary to permanent employment 
contrast starkly with comparatively low rates 
of quality improvements: between 1995 and 
2000, only one third of those in low quality 
jobs improved the quality of their job, while 
more than 40% stayed in a job of low quality. 
It has to be noted, however, that transition 
rates of low quality employment into unem-
ployment are very low in the UK, in particular 
when compared to other Member States with 
similarly unfavourable rates of longer term 
quality improvements are Greece, Spain, 
France and Germany (chart 93).
One of the main reasons why, as in the case 
of the UK, the transitions from low to high 
quality could be less favourable than those 
from temporary to permanent employment, 
are differences in employment transitions 
by pay level. Actually, in most countries, 
persistence in the lowest earnings decile is 
relatively important, with 50% or more stay-
ing in the lowest earnings decile for two years 
in all Member States except Finland, Spain, 
Denmark, Ireland and Portugal. In the latter 
countries, more than 30% of employees in the 
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lowest earnings decile in 1999 improved their 
relative earnings position in 2000. By contrast 
pay improvements are much less common in 
Germany, Italy and Belgium. In these coun-
tries, less than 20% of the employees in the 
lowest earnings decile in 1999 succeeded in 
improving their relative earnings position in 
2000. In 1999/2000, in these countries - as 
well as in Finland and Spain - transitions of 
low wage earners into unemployment were 
more important than transitions into higher 
earnings deciles. These transition patterns 
are in general confirmed when looking at 
longer term transitions over the second half 
of the 1990s (table 41).
These cross-country differences in labour 
market transitions are also reflected in mea-
sures of employment stability and labour 
market flexibility over the whole period 1995-
2000 (see box 7).
Evolution of transition rates 
over time
There are, therefore, as demonstrated sig-
nificant differences across EU Member States 
with respect to all three types of transitions 
discussed above – transitions by contract 
type, job quality and pay level. Average year-
to-year transition rates out of temporary 
employment over the period 1995-2000 were 
most favourable in Austria, the UK, the Neth-
erlands, Belgium, Ireland and Denmark – all 
countries with above average transitions into 
permanent employment and below average 
transitions into unemployment. Much less 
favourable transition patterns for employees 
on temporary contracts were observed in 
Finland, Spain and France (chart 94).
With the notable exception of the UK, the 
transition patterns out of low quality jobs 
were relatively similar. The chances of quality 
improvements for those in low quality jobs 
were highest in Denmark, Belgium, Austria, 
Ireland and the Netherlands, while the risk 
of unemployment was also comparatively 
low. In the case of the UK, a low risk of un-
employment goes hand-in-hand with very 
low chances of quality improvements. France 
and Spain, together with Greece, are among 
the countries with the least favourable career 
opportunities for people in low quality em-
ployment. (chart 95).
Table 41 – Labour market transitions by pay level, 1999–2000
B DK D EL E F IRL I NL A P FIN UK EU
From 1st 
decile to … 
1st decile 59 46 55 60 34 54 38 59 52 63 48 44 56 53
2nd decile 9 25 12 13 12 19 20 11 18 13 12 12 13 14
3rd decile 4 3 5 4 8 4 7 4 3 8 7 6 6 5
4th-10th decile 4 4 4 6 7 4 8 4 6 2 13 6 5 5
Non-employment 24 21 24 16 39 19 26 21 20 13 21 31 20 23
From 2nd 
decile to …
1st decile 9 3 11 12 15 10 10 11 7 5 18 12 10 11
2nd decile 53 45 55 45 36 44 32 44 52 60 46 36 54 48
3rd decile 15 23 11 20 15 20 19 16 21 17 15 15 15 16
4th-10th decile 18 12 13 11 19 14 16 19 11 12 16 18 10 14
Non-employment 5 17 9 13 15 12 24 11 10 6 4 20 11 11
From 3rd 
decile to … 
1st decile 2 4 2 1 2 2 3 3 1 1 1 3 3 2
2nd decile 17 6 11 16 10 11 9 13 6 11 24 16 16 12
3rd decile 49 49 55 45 25 42 32 38 57 61 42 47 47 45
4th-10th decile 24 31 23 32 50 39 43 37 31 19 30 28 27 32
Non-employment 8 10 9 6 14 6 12 8 5 8 3 6 7 8
From 4th-
10th decile 
to … 
1st decile 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0
2nd decile 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1
3rd decile 3 2 2 3 5 3 3 5 2 1 4 4 3 3
4th-10th decile 92 92 92 92 88 91 90 89 95 93 89 90 92 91
Non-employment 3 4 4 4 5 5 5 3 3 5 5 4 4 4
From non-
employment 
to …
1st decile 5 9 6 3 5 5 5 3 6 6 5 7 4 5
2nd decile 3 6 4 3 4 4 7 2 6 3 3 7 3 4
3rd decile 2 5 3 2 2 2 4 1 3 2 2 3 3 3
4th-10th decile 4 10 5 3 5 5 7 3 7 6 9 7 6 5
Non-employment 87 71 82 89 84 83 77 91 79 83 81 76 84 84
Source: Eurostat, ECHP UDB version June 2003
Notes: no information available for Luxembourg and Sweden
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Box 7 – Employment stability, labour market flexibility and overall employment performance
There is strong evidence that differences across countries in the 
employment performance101, and the employment rate in particu-
lar, are linked to differences in quality in work and labour market 
dynamics. To illustrate this point, this box presents evidence on the 
patterns of labour market attachment, labour market flexibility 
and employment in the Member States over time. It compares em-
ployment, unemployment and activity rates over several years and 
within a calendar year, based on monthly calendar information102 
on the employment status within that year. Such comparisons 
are important since the standard measure of employment perfor-
mance – the employment rate – can hide very different labour 
market transition patterns over time.
When examining employment performance and labour market 
dynamics over the six-year period 1994-99, high shares of 90% or 
more of all men were employed in some year in the UK, Germany, 
Denmark and Portugal. On the other hand, in Finland, Belgium, 
Luxembourg, France and Italy, around 20% of all men had never 
been employed in the period 1994-99. Continuous employment 
over the whole period was most common in Austria, Denmark, 
Luxembourg and Portugal, where more than 60% of the men were 
in employment in all years. Persistence in employment was lowest 
in Germany, Finland, France, Italy and, most notably Spain, where 
only half or less of all men were in employment in all years, or, in 
other words, where half or more of all men were in unemployment 
or inactivity at least once. The countries in which at least 70% of 
all women were employed in some year include Germany, the UK, 
Portugal, Austria, Denmark and Finland. Only in the latter three, 
were more than 40% continuously employed throughout the pe-
riod 1994-99. Persistence in inactivity was highest in Spain, Italy, 
Ireland, Belgium and Luxembourg (table 42).
Important parts of these differences in employment patterns can 
be explained by differences in the longer term transitions out of 
temporary or low quality employment. More than half of all men 
in temporary employment in 1995 in France, Germany, Ireland, the 
UK, Italy and Spain were in unemployment in some year in the 
following four years. The share of women in temporary employ-
ment in 1995 who were unemployed in one of the following years, 
moreover, was much higher in all countries, reaching up to 70% in 
France and the Netherlands. This high incidence of unemployment 
notwithstanding, at EU average almost half of all men and more 
than 40% of all women in temporary employment in 1995 were in 
permanent employment five years later. Such transitions into per-
manent employment, however, remained below average for men 
and women in France, Italy, Greece and Spain, and for men also in 
Ireland, Denmark and Germany.
Similar evidence on important fluctuations between the various 
labour market states are obtained when analysing monthly infor-
mation from the ECHP. The UK is the EU Member State with the 
highest share of people who were in employment at least some 
time in 1998, 77% of men and 65% of women. On the other hand, 
countries such as Greece, Italy and Spain – as well as Belgium for 
men and Ireland for women - involved far fewer people in the la-
bour market, with less than two thirds of men and 40% of women 
at most employed some time in 1998. Together with Portugal, the 
UK is also the country with the highest share of people – both men 
and women – continuously employed throughout the whole year 
1998. Continuous employment rates were, on the other hand, 
particularly low for men in Finland and Spain – with half or less 
of all men continuously employed in 1998 – and for women in 
Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain, where less than 40% of women 
were continuously employed. In fact, only in Denmark, Finland, 
France, Portugal and the UK did the share of women in continuous 
employment exceed that of women in continuous inactivity over 
the year 1998. In Belgium, Luxembourg, Ireland, Italy, Greece and 
Spain, more than half of all women remained outside the labour 
force throughout the whole year (table 43).
Similar shares of people in employment at some point in time 
throughout a given year might well hide important differences 
in employment patterns within a year. In countries such as Ger-
many, Austria and Denmark, for example, similar shares of men 
(around 71%) were actually in employment at some point in 1998. 
In contrast to Denmark and Austria, however, in Germany there 
was significantly more fluctuation between labour market states. 
The share of men varying their labour market status at least once 
101 The findings in this section are based on the interim results of a study on the “Determinants of employment stability, career progression and labour market transitions” by Tor Eriksson, Michael Rosholm 
and Anna D‘Addio from the Aarhus School of Business, Aarhus University and the Higher Institute of Labour Studies (HIVA) at the Catholic University Leuven.
102 “Monthly information” on the labour market status is based on retrospective calendar data from the ECHP, while the “yearly information” refers to information at the time of the survey. Monthly informa-
tion is therefore possibly less reliable than the yearly one, notably due to potential problems of non-random attrition (people disappear systematically from the survey for one or more waves) – which can 
be accounted for through longitudinal weights - and recall errors. As to the latter, they can be present under many forms. Data can be biased by the “memory bias” of respondents. This effect can entail as 
a consequence that a very high share of spells begin or ends in the months preceding the survey. In addition, recall errors are thought to be the source of the “seam phenomenon”. This effect derives from 
the respondents’ tendency to project current circumstances backwards. Another potential source of bias is the so-called “time in sample” effect which implies that the higher the number of times individu-
als respond to a survey, the higher the probability that they know the questionnaire and try to minimise the time required to answer to questions. There is also considerable non-response regarding the 
retrospective calendar information. Non-response reduces the sample size and introduce a potential bias in the data. It should, finally, be noted that the relevant questions on the labour market status in the 
ECHP differ from those in the LFS. Empirical results on the basis of these two data sets are therefore not strictly comparable.
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throughout the year was 14% in Germany compared to 10% in Aus-
tria and Denmark. Furthermore, the share of those continuously 
in inactivity was significantly smaller in Germany (24%) than in 
Denmark and Austria (28%). As a consequence, the share of con-
tinuously employed men was much smaller, and that of men un-
employed at some time – or even throughout the whole year – was 
much higher in Germany. Other countries with relatively large 
shares of men affected by unemployment at some time throughout 
the year include Spain, Finland and France, and also the UK. The 
share of continuously unemployed men was highest in Spain and 
Italy. It was notably much smaller in Austria, Luxembourg, Den-
mark, Ireland and the UK and this - in the case of the latter three 
– despite relatively high shares of men in unemployment at some 
time throughout the year.
The highest shares of 10% or more of people with varying labour 
market states over the year is found in Germany, France, Spain, 
Finland, Ireland and the UK for men, and in Germany, Denmark, 
France, Finland, Spain, Ireland and the UK for women. These 
labour market fluctuations were generally higher among women 
than among men - with the exception of Germany, Austria, Ireland, 
Italy and Spain, notably due to transitions into and out of inactivity. 
In Ireland, Finland and the UK, more than 10% of all women fluctu-
ated between inactivity and employment, compared to 5% or less in 
Belgium and the southern EU Member States. 
Differences in employment rates across countries are thus not only 
due to differences in labour supply and labour force attachment. 
They also reflect differences in employment stability and labour 
market flexibility over time. The impact of higher fluctuations on 
the overall employment rate is unclear, though, as labour market 
Table 42 – Long-term employment stability and flexibility, 1995–1999
Employed in 
some years
Continuously 
employed
Employed in 
more than half the 
period
Employed one or 
two years only Never employed
Unemployed or 
inactive in some 
years
Unemployed in 
some years
Inactive in some 
years
Men
B 80.5 53.3 65.9 10.5 19.5 46.7 12.7 39.2
DK 92.6 61.5 75.9 8.8 7.4 38.5 16.7 29.7
D 89.6 50.0 70.2 11.6 10.4 50.0 22.8 38.4
EL 90.8 55.6 72.2 11.9 9.2 44.4 22.0 33.4
E 83.4 43.3 61.6 14.4 16.6 56.7 32.7 37.8
F 81.9 48.8 64.1 11.4 18.1 51.2 18.5 38.4
IRL 86.5 52.7 69.2 11.7 13.5 47.3 25.3 29.6
I 81.4 49.0 63.6 12.4 18.6 51.0 25.9 37.9
L 80.9 61.1 66.6 9.0 19.1 38.9 6.0 18.8
P 89.8 61.6 76.6 8.2 10.2 38.4 16.7 27.8
A 87.0 63.6 74.8 7.4 13.0 36.4 9.3 29.7
FIN 78.4 49.7 58.7 19.7 21.6 50.3 21.1 38.1
UK 90.8 57.8 77.5 8.8 9.2 42.2 17.1 32.1
EU 85.7 53.4 72.0 11.2 14.3 46.6 19.0 33.1
Women
B 60.1 31.8 42.1 13.1 39.9 68.2 19.8 59.2
DK 89.0 42.5 62.8 16.9 11.0 57.5 25.1 48.7
D 72.9 31.7 50.5 14.9 27.1 68.3 21.6 58.4
EL 60.3 21.7 35.6 18.2 39.7 78.3 28.3 71.4
E 50.3 16.2 25.1 19.1 49.7 83.8 30.5 76.8
F 68.2 31.8 46.1 14.8 31.8 68.2 23.9 54.6
IRL 59.7 20.6 36.6 15.4 40.3 79.4 12.2 74.7
I 51.7 24.5 33.3 13.6 48.3 75.5 24.2 69.7
L 55.6 30.6 37.1 12.7 44.4 69.4 4.8 50.7
P 75.4 38.0 55.6 13.5 24.6 62.0 19.4 54.5
A 71.1 41.6 50.1 14.0 28.9 58.4 10.1 53.7
FIN 77.5 42.9 52.0 25.5 22.5 57.1 21.6 45.3
UK 78.7 37.9 56.5 15.2 21.3 62.1 11.1 58.6
EU 67.0 29.7 52.0 15.9 33.0 70.3 19.4 59.7
Source: Eurostat, ECHP UDB version December 2002
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transitions may have a different impact on employment perfor-
mance in different countries and circumstances. In the case of 
the UK and Denmark, for instance, relatively high fluctuations go 
hand in hand with high overall employment rates and compara-
tively high employment stability. This seems to be different in the 
case of Germany, France, Ireland, Finland and Spain, where large 
fluctuations are linked to comparatively lower employment rates. 
In Portugal and Austria, furthermore, high employment rates co-
incide with relatively low fluctuations between the various labour 
market states.
There is some evidence that transition rates 
at EU level slightly improved over the second 
half of the 1990s. When comparing average 
transition rates before and after 1997 (i.e. 
for the periods 1995-97 and 1998-2000),103 
EU level transition rates from low to high 
quality employment had increased slightly 
from 24.5% in the mid 1990s to 25.5% at the 
end of the decade. In parallel, transition rates 
from low quality employment into unemploy-
ment had decreased by almost one and a 
half percentage points, from 8.5% to 7.1%. 
Improvements along both dimensions were 
most pronounced in Ireland and the Neth-
erlands - where the already above average 
Table 43 – Within-year employment stability and flexibility, 1998
Employed in some 
months
Continuously 
employed
Unemployed in some 
months
Continuously 
unemployed
Inactive in some 
months Continuously inactive
Varying employment 
states
Men
B 60.2 54.7 3.3 3.9 3.4 35.5 5.8
DK 71.1 62.1 5.0 0.6 6.1 27.5 9.8
D 71.6 59.2 8.9 3.1 7.5 23.5 14.1
EL 63.7 58.2 4.1 3.6 2.2 32.4 5.9
E 62.7 50.7 9.6 5.2 4.4 31.4 12.8
F 65.6 55.9 7.7 2.5 6.2 30.8 10.9
IRL 64.4 53.6 6.0 0.6 6.7 28.8 11.4
I 62.2 55.2 5.4 7.4 4.7 29.1 8.3
L 65.7 60.0 2.8 0.5 3.8 33.6 5.9
P 73.5 67.3 3.8 3.3 3.1 22.9 6.5
A 70.4 61.0 5.6 1.4 4.7 27.9 9.7
FIN 64.3 49.5 8.1 3.8 10.1 30.7 16.0
UK 76.8 66.2 7.1 1.6 7.5 20.0 12.2
EU 67.1 58.0 6.0 3.3 5.4 28.8 9.9
Women
B 42.7 36.1 3.3 6.4 5.2 50.2 7.2
DK 61.6 51.8 6.4 2.9 8.1 34.0 11.3
D 52.7 42.1 7.0 2.8 8.6 42.2 12.9
EL 34.9 29.0 4.3 4.1 2.6 60.5 6.3
E 34.1 24.9 7.2 4.6 3.7 60.7 9.8
F 53.1 42.9 7.4 3.7 8.0 41.5 11.9
IRL 40.3 29.4 2.6 0.7 9.4 58.7 11.2
I 36.4 30.4 3.6 6.2 3.8 56.8 6.6
L 45.2 36.7 2.7 0.5 6.6 54.2 8.5
P 58.4 51.3 4.0 2.6 4.3 38.5 7.6
A 49.2 41.3 4.3 1.1 5.7 48.8 8.7
FIN 61.2 41.8 9.4 3.5 14.7 33.9 20.8
UK 64.8 51.6 5.4 0.2 11.9 33.6 14.6
EU 48.8 39.2 5.2 3.0 7.1 47.2 10.6
Source: Eurostat, ECHP UDB version December 2002
Note: no data available for Sweden; no information on monthly employment status available for the Netherlands; the column headed “varying employment states” reports 
the share of people who, over the year 1998, changed between various employment states (employment, unemployment and inactivity); the difference to 100% indicates 
the share of people who were continuously in one of the three employment states over the full year
103 Since it is difficult to compare year-on-year changes in transition rates based on the data from the ECHP, average rates for the two periods indicated above are calculated in order to reduce the influence of 
statistical uncertainty and to increase the robustness of the results.
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employment stability and career prospects 
of low quality jobs further improved over 
the second half of the 1990s – as well as in 
Spain and Greece, albeit starting from a more 
unfavourable pattern of transitions out of low 
quality jobs.
Other countries with improved employment 
prospects of low quality jobs include Belgium, 
Germany, France and Italy. In the case of Por-
tugal, slight improvements in employment 
stability of those in low quality employment 
were countered by reduced prospects of mov-
ing into higher quality jobs. In Denmark, 
Finland and Austria, transitions out of low 
quality employment deteriorated somewhat 
with regard to both, employment stability 
and career prospects, but in these countries, 
transition rates out of low into high quality 
employment remain significantly above aver-
age. In the UK, finally, average transition rates 
remained very much unchanged over the two 
periods, with comparatively low transitions 
out of low quality jobs into both, unemploy-
ment and high quality jobs (chart 96).
Differences in the evolution of employment 
stability for those in temporary employment 
are one of the reasons for these cross-country 
differences in quality improvements over 
time. Transition rates into permanent em-
ployment improved in most Member States 
and in particular in Ireland, the Netherlands, 
Denmark, Spain and Belgium. In Germany, 
Austria, Greece and Finland, transition rates 
from temporary to permanent employment 
did not improve over the second half of the 
1990s. In some of these countries, as well as in 
Spain and France, there also continued to be 
a disproportional high risk of unemployment 
for those working on temporary contracts. 
While the southern EU Member States– with 
the exception of Greece – saw a strong decline 
in transitions from temporary employment 
into unemployment over the 1990s, the risk 
of unemployment in this group actually in-
creased in Finland, Greece, Austria and the 
UK (chart 97).
Labour market transitions by 
employment type: results from 
cluster analysis104
The above findings on transitions by job 
quality are confirmed when analysing longer 
term labour market transitions across similar 
groups by means of cluster analysis (see box 8 
for a description of the method). The purpose 
104 The findings in this section are based on the interim results of a study on the “Determinants of employment stability, career progression and labour market transitions” by the Aarhus School of Business, 
Aaarhus University and the Higher Institute of Labour Studies (HIVA) at the Catholic University Leuven.
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of this analysis was twofold: first, to char-
acterise different job types and their main 
determining factors on the basis of a whole 
range of labour market related variables in 
1995, including various dimensions of qual-
ity in work such as wages, working time, 
contract status and access to training; and 
second, to examine the performance of these 
distinct clusters over the period 1995-2000 in 
terms of employment stability and quality 
improvements. The analysis has been carried 
out separately for men and women.
When characterising different job types, 
one of the main questions is whether the 
above dimensions of job quality, and in par-
ticular contract type and access to training, 
are distinctive features of job types or not. 
Cluster analysis is an appropriate method 
to analyse this question for two reasons. 
First, it considers the full set of potentially 
relevant determinants without predetermin-
ing which variables are of relevance or not. 
Second, it allows an easy identification of the 
key variables determining the type of job: if 
the various clusters differ significantly with 
respect to some variable, then this variable 
is to be considered a crucial determinant of 
the respective job type; if, on the other hand, 
there is no significant difference in some vari-
able across clusters, this variable cannot be 
considered a distinctive job type feature.
The results of the cluster analysis at EU level, 
allowing for three distinct job types for men 
and women separately, are presented in ta-
ble 7. Results at Member State level are shown 
in table 51 in the annex. In fact, both of the 
above variables, contract type and access to 
training, appear to be distinctive job type 
features. Some further qualifications are in 
place, however, in particular since the results 
for men and women differ significantly.
For men, the three clusters obtained are the 
following:
1. a cluster of relatively highly paid and 
highly skilled full-time employees on 
permanent contracts - many of them in 
supervisory and intermediate positions 
- who are predominantly working in 
high-skilled, non-manual occupations 
or as clerks in larger firms in the public 
and service sectors. This cluster will be re-
ferred to as the “high quality employment 
cluster”;
2. a cluster of, on average, younger and 
relatively low-skilled full-time employ-
ees, many of which are in low paid and 
temporary job arrangements (fixed-term, 
short-term or casual work contracts) in 
non-supervisory functions without access 
to training, working mainly in skilled 
manual or unskilled occupations – and, 
in the case of Belgium, Denmark and 
Austria also as service workers - in small- 
and medium-sized private sector firms in 
agriculture or industry. This cluster will 
be referred to as “low quality employment 
cluster”; and
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3. a very small, heterogeneous cluster of, 
in general, younger temporary and part-
time employees in manual, service or 
elementary occupations in small firms 
or self-employment, mostly in the public 
and service sectors. In contrast to the 
much larger cluster above, employees in 
this cluster have relatively high access to 
training and, notably in the case of Ger-
many, Austria, Spain and Portugal, above 
average educational attainment. This 
cluster will be referred to as “part-time 
employment cluster”.
For women, the situation is somewhat dif-
ferent, with the following three clusters 
obtained:
1. a cluster of highly skilled women in 
supervisory or intermediate positions 
and high paid permanent employment 
with access to training, working in non-
manual, skilled occupations in the private 
sector; except for the UK, Ireland, France, 
Spain and Portugal, this cluster comprises 
not only full-time employees, but also 
women in part-time employment with 
the above characteristics. This cluster will 
be referred to as “high quality private sec-
tor employment”;
2. a cluster of relatively younger, highly 
skilled, highly paid women in non-manu-
al skilled occupations in the public sector 
with relatively high access to training; the 
common feature of this cluster across all 
Member States is work in the public sec-
tor, while the remaining job character-
istics differ considerably: women in this 
cluster are somewhat more often in part-
time employment (except in Belgium, 
the Netherlands, Austria and Portugal), 
in temporary employment and in non-
supervisory positions (except in Portugal 
and the UK). This cluster will be referred 
to as “public sector employment”; and
3. a large cluster of low-skilled women in 
low paid, short-term or casual employ-
ment without access to training, in man-
ual, low-skilled or unskilled occupations, 
mainly in small private sector firms in 
industry. This cluster will be referred to as 
“low quality private sector employment”.
As shown by the distinct job types for men 
and women described above, contract type 
and access to training are important criteria 
of job types classifications among both, men 
and women. This is not the case for variables 
such as working time, firm size or work in 
the public sector. While men in part-time 
employment are a very different category 
from full-time employed men - independently 
of other personal or job characteristics - part-
time work is a common feature across all 
of the clusters for women. Firm size is also 
more important for the classification of male 
employment. On the other hand, public sec-
tor employment – while being related to job 
classifications for both, men and women - is 
a much stronger determinant of job quality 
for women, defining one of the three clusters 
among women almost entirely.
The above identification of clusters is cer-
tainly of interest in its own respect. For the 
purpose of the analysis of quality in work 
and labour market transitions, however, it 
is further important to check whether the 
labour market transitions also differ across 
the various clusters or not. Such variation 
clearly is to be expected if the above dimen-
sions of job quality, and in particular contract 
type and access to training, also impact on 
employment stability and career prospects in 
the longer run. As can be seen from the transi-
tion rates into unemployment and inactivity 
by cluster at Member State level for the period 
1995-2000 there are in fact very significant 
differences in the longer term employment 
performance of the above clusters. In particu-
lar transition rates into unemployment were 
twice as high in the “low quality employment 
clusters” (cluster 2 for men and cluster 3 for 
women) compared with the “high quality 
employment clusters” (cluster 1 for men and 
clusters 1 and 2 for women). For men, the 
least employment stability was observed in 
the “part-time employment cluster” (cluster 
3). Not only were transitions for this cluster 
into unemployment four times higher than 
for the “high quality employment cluster”, 
but also transitions into inactivity were much 
more frequent.
The strongest impact of low quality employ-
ment on labour force attachment, though, 
was found for women. Among the women in 
the “low quality private sector employment 
cluster” (cluster 3) in 1995, almost one in five 
had moved into inactivity by 2000, compared 
to only around 10% in the two other clusters 
for which transitions into unemployment 
and inactivity were actually similar. It should 
be noted, however, that the “public sector 
employment cluster” includes a significantly 
higher share of fixed-term and temporary em-
ployees, which seems to offset the higher em-
ployment stability of permanent employment 
in the public sector, most notably in Belgium, 
France, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, 
Italy and Portugal – all countries with signifi-
cantly higher transition rates into unemploy-
ment for women in cluster 2. In France, Italy 
and Spain, more than 20% of women in clus-
ter 2 were not employed anymore five years 
later. Moreover, in all countries except the UK, 
20% or more of all women in the “low quality 
private sector employment cluster” (cluster 
3) in 1995 had lost or left their employment 
by 1999 – more than one third in Denmark, 
Germany and Spain (table 45).
Working hours 
and working time 
arrangements
This section provides evidence on another 
issue related to labour market flexibility and 
quality in work, working hours and working 
time arrangements. These are important ele-
ments on the flexibility agenda: flexible work-
ing hours and working time arrangements 
help firms to adjust effective employment 
to their production needs, while allowing 
employees to adjust work to their working 
time preferences, and in particular to other 
responsibilities such as care for children and 
other dependants. They are at the same time 
important elements of quality in work. In 
particular night work, overtime work and 
very long working hours may conflict with 
the aim to improve labour productivity and 
quality in work.
Against this background, the section reviews 
four issues: first, average usual working hours 
and overtime hours; second, the actual timing 
of work and the extent of work outside the 
core working hours; third, working time dis-
tributions; and fourth, the extent of flexible 
working hours and working time arrange-
ments.
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Average usual working hours 
and overtime hours
All EU Member States and accession countries 
have a statutory maximum working week of 
48 hours or less (on average over a reference 
period not exceeding four months) and set a 
minimum daily rest period of 11 hours per 
day and a daily hours limit of eight hours for 
night workers - in line with the EU directive on 
certain aspects of the organisation of working 
time.105 Statutory maximum working hours 
per week are set at 48 hours for the UK, 
Ireland, the Netherlands, France, Denmark, 
Germany and most accession countries. In 
Spain, Portugal, Austria, Finland and Sweden 
the limit is set at 40 hours and at 39 hours in 
Belgium. Statutory maximum working hours 
per day stand at 10 hours or below in most 
EU Member States. In Denmark, Italy, Ireland 
and the UK, as well as in most accession coun-
tries, they are fixed higher at 13 hours.
Collectively agreed normal working hours 
for full-time workers across the whole 
economy ranged from 35.7 hours in France 
Box 8 – Cluster analysis – Method of the K-means
The purpose of statistical methods known as “clustering methods” 
is to group individuals in a restricted number of homogeneous 
classes. This classification is automatic in the sense that the 
homogeneous classes (or “clusters”) are obtained by means of a 
formalised algorithm, and not by subjective or visual methods. In 
general, two types of classification methods can be distinguished: 
first, hierarchical methods (i.e. methods which produce continuing 
partitions into increasingly finer classes until a certain stopping cri-
terion is met), and second, non-hierarchical methods (i.e. methods 
which directly produce a partition into a fixed number of classes).
For the purpose of the analysis presented in this chapter, the second 
method was used. This method consists in grouping N individuals 
into K classes so that the individuals of the same class are as similar 
as possible, while the classes are as distinct as possible – based on 
some appropriate criteria for measuring the ‘proximity’ of the indi-
viduals of the same class and the ‘distance’ between different clus-
ters. The number K of clusters needs to be fixed in advance since, 
otherwise, the above problem can be solved easily by defining each 
individual as one separate cluster - obviously a solution which is 
completely useless from a practical point of view.
In mathematical parlance, the problem of “clustering” is one of 
partitioning a “cloud” of N data points into K disjoint subsets. A 
general algorithm for partitioning (or “clustering”) the data points 
into subsets is to minimise the variation of data points around 
some appropriate ‘gravity centre’ according to the so-called the 
sum-of-squares criterion  J xn j
n Sj
K
j
= −
∈=
∑∑ || ||µ 2
1
where 
is a vector representing the nth data point and  is the geometric 
‘gravity centre’ of the data points in the subset . When defining I1, 
I2,…., Ik the inertia (variance) within each class, calculated respect 
to the respective centre of gravity g1, g2,…, gk, homogeneous clus-
ters are obtained by minimising the sum of these variances, the 
so-called “within-variance” (or “intra-class inertia”) Iw= ∑k j=1 Ij. 
Sufficiently distinct clusters are obtained by maximising the disper-
sion of the set of K gravity centres g1, g2,…, gk around the point 
G, the centre of gravity of the total cloud of N individuals, called 
“inter-class inertia” IB = ∑ P j d2(gi ; g), where P j is the sum of the 
weights of the individuals belonging to the Jth class. The larger the 
value of IB, the better the separation of the clusters.
For some mathematical reason (theorem of Huygens), these two 
optimisation problems reduce to one, since the total inertia, I, of 
the cloud of N points around the gravity centre G is equal to the 
sum of the intra-class inertia and the inter-class inertia, i.e. I = Iw 
+ IB. Finding the maximum of IB is thus equivalent to finding the 
minimum of Iw since their sum is a constant. It is thus sufficient to 
characterise the best possible partition into K classes by minimising 
the “within-variance” Iw.
The technique employed for solving this minimisation problem 
is the so-called “method of the k-means”, or “method of iterative 
reallocation around some mobile centres”. This method is a fast 
and powerful iterative method based on the following principle: 
1. create randomly K clusters the centres of which are formed by 
K individuals drawn randomly among all N individuals; 2. assign 
each individual to the cluster of the closest “central individual”; 3. 
for each of the K clusters, recalculate the “gravity centre”, taking 
into account all allocated previously individuals; 4. then reallocate 
the individuals to another clusters with a closer “central individual” 
if necessary. These steps are repeated until a stopping criterion is 
met in the sense that there is no further change in the assignment 
of the individual data points to the clusters.
Since the results provided by this method depend on the clusters 
randomly defined at the beginning, software programmes foresee 
several automatic repetitions of the procedure for varying initial 
random draws, retaining for the table of results that repetition 
which maximises the between-inertia - i.e. ensuring that the clus-
ters are as distant as possible, while ensuring an optimal homoge-
neity inside them.
105 European Council (1993), Directive 93/104/CE concerning certain aspects of the organisation of working time
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Table 44 – Results of cluster analysis at EU-level (employment shares in % if not indicated otherwise)
Men Women
Total Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Total Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3
Age and education
Age (in years) 40.10 42.36 38.99 38.12 37.87 37.38 36.48 38.70
High skilled 19.2 48.5 4.3 19.4 19.6 32.3 38.2 2.2
Medium skilled 38.6 41.1 37.4 36.7 39.5 56.4 40.3 22.3
Low skilled 42.2 10.4 58.3 44.0 40.9 11.2 21.5 75.5
Job quality
Wage
Hourly wage (in euro) 11.08 16.65 8.16 9.64 8.96 11.32 11.28 5.79
Working time
Part-time 1.2 0.5 0.7 54.7 16.6 17.7 16.6 15.3
Contract type
Permanent 89.6 96.5 86.5 62.2 87.6 94.7 79.8 81.9
Fixed-term 6.2 2.4 7.9 21.2 7.6 3.8 15.8 9.5
Short-term 2.3 0.3 3.2 13.0 2.7 0.7 2.2 5.1
Casual 1.9 0.8 2.4 3.6 2.1 0.7 2.2 3.5
Job status
Supervisory 16.1 35.6 6.2 5.5 8.4 13.8 10.3 2.5
Intermediate 17.5 22.3 15.0 12.1 12.7 16.3 16.3 8.1
Non-supervisory 66.4 42.1 78.8 82.4 78.9 69.9 73.4 89.4
Employer-provided training
Training 17.1 29.7 10.8 22.4 20.2 25.3 42.6 9.7
Sector
Public sector 6.4 11.3 3.7 16.5 12.5 4.3 88.9 2.5
Agriculture 3.8 0.8 5.3 7.0 2.2 0.6 1.2 4.0
Industry 50.5 36.5 58.0 30.4 25.7 20.2 2.5 36.8
Services 45.7 62.7 36.7 62.6 72.2 79.3 96.3 59.2
Occupation
Manager 8.9 23.3 1.6 3.6 4.3 7.5 4.1 0.9
Professional 8.2 22.3 0.7 16.0 8.0 11.6 23.2 0.3
Technician 12.2 27.4 4.4 8.5 15.1 23.4 26.7 3.2
Clerk 9.4 14.1 6.9 8.0 27.2 41.0 19.4 14.2
Service worker 6.2 3.4 7.5 12.2 18.5 13.6 13.8 25.0
Skilled agricultural worker 2.0 0.2 2.9 4.7 1.0 0.2 0.6 2.0
Craft worker 28.7 6.4 40.5 19.7 7.3 1.0 1.2 15.6
Machine operator 15.7 2.2 22.7 12.7 6.0 0.9 0.8 12.8
Elementary occupation 8.7 0.6 12.8 14.5 12.6 0.7 10.3 25.9
Firm size
Very small firm 36.1 18.6 44.9 52.5 40.9 36.9 29.5 47.8
Small firm 17.7 15.0 19.1 15.8 17.6 17.2 19.7 17.6
Medium-sized firm 13.0 13.9 12.7 10.1 12.6 12.4 13.7 12.6
Large firm 17.2 24.0 13.7 13.2 15.9 17.8 16.2 13.7
Very large firm 18.8 33.8 11.3 9.0 15.2 19.2 23.8 9.3
Employment shares 1995
B 50.9 47.9 1.1 70.4 4.7 2.5
DK 55.7 42.7 1.7 59.0 21.8 19.2
D 34.7 64.8 0.5 55.3 10.1 34.6
EL 14.4 83.1 2.5 35.1 7.6 57.3
E 19.0 78.7 2.3 32.1 5.3 62.6
F 35.0 62.9 2.1 58.6 3.4 38.0
IRL 25.4 71.3 3.3 42.6 7.7 49.7
I 18.3 80.2 1.4 34.3 4.6 61.1
P 4.5 95.0 0.5 10.1 4.4 85.5
A 44.6 54.2 1.2 38.8 34.3 26.9
NL 60.7 37.1 2.2 71.5 6.8 21.6
UK 45.8 54.2 0 41.1 18.1 40.9
EU 33.2 65.4 1.4 44.5 11.1 44.3
Source: Eurostat, ECHP UDB version December 2002
Notes: clustering based on data for individuals employed in 1995; no data for Luxembourg, Finland and Sweden
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Table 45 – Transitions into unemployment and inactivity by cluster, 1995-1999
Men Women
Unemployment 1999 Inactivity 1999 Unemployment 1999 Inactivity 1999
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster3
B 0.6 4.3 6.1 6.2 19.1 3.3 3.4 13.1 6.0 14.2
DK 2.1 3.4 7.3 5.2 32.4 2.6 6.6 12.2 6.3 6.1 24.3
D 5.2 7.9 7.7 10.0 4.7 11.1 13.5 10.8 7.0 23.3
EL 3.4 6.3 4.6 10.3 13.2 4.6 4.9 2.4 7.9 7.0 1.8 24.4
E 2.7 8.8 8.9 6.2 8.9 8.3 8.1 5.2 12.5 6.5 17.0 15.5
F 3.6 4.1 14.7 6.3 6.6 17.5 5.4 12.9 7.2 8.4 25.0 13.0
IRL 0.4 1.5 24.1 4.2 5.7 2.4 5.3 8.1 5.7 18.5
I 1.8 4.5 24.2 10.9 10.3 29.8 2.0 9.9 8.8 11.0 10.2 19.7
NL 1.0 1.6 5.4 5.2 6.6 2.9 6.9 9.1 10.2 2.1 21.4
P 3.3 6.0 6.5 6.0 9.9 3.5 15.7 7.4 2.8 3.5 10.7
A 2.3 3.8 10.2 10.6 6.2 11.8 3.8 0.0 6.7 15.2 12.8 19.3
UK 0.4 2.0 -- 9.5 8.0 -- 0.6 2.0 13.7 10.0 15.8
EU 2.2 5.2 10.2 7.6 8.0 12.7 3.7 4.6 8.4 9.6 10.4 17.0
Source: Eurostat, ECHP UDB version December 2002
Notes: clustering based on data for individuals employed in 1995; no data for Luxembourg, Finland and Sweden; for Germany, no information on job status and sector available
Table 46 – Statutory maximum, average collectively agreed and usual weekly working hours in the EU Member States and accession
countries, 2002
Statutory maximum working 
hours per working week, 
2002
Average collectively agreed 
normal weekly hours,
2002
Average usual weekly working 
hours of employees,
2002
Average usual weekly working 
hours of full-time employees, 
2002
Average usual weekly working 
hours of part-time employees, 
2002
B 39 39.0 35.7 39.3 19.7
DK 48 37.0 34.8 39.1 22.7
D 48 37.7 35.2 39.9 18.5
EL 48 40.0 40.2 41 17.7
E 40 38.5 38.6 40.4 20.7
F 48 35.7 35.2 37.7 18.3
IRL 48 39.0 35.8 39.5 23
I 48 38.0 37.2 38.5 18.7
L 48 39.0 37.3 39.5 23.8
NL 48 37.0 30.1 38.9 20.9
P 40 39.0 39.3 40.3 21.8
A 40 38.5 36.6 40 19.2
FIN 40 39.3 36.9 39.2 20.6
S 40 38.8 36 39.9 20.6
UK 48 37.2 37.2 43.3 22.5
EU 38.5 36.1 40 18.8
Source: EIRO; Eurostat, LFS, 2002q2
Notes: for France and Austria, data refer to 2002Q1; no complete information available for the accession countries
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to 40 hours or more in Greece and most ac-
cession countries. Agreed normal working 
hours thus remained significantly below the 
statutory maximum in all countries except 
Belgium. The average number of hours106 
usually worked by the full-time employees 
in the EU was 40 hours in 2001, compared 
to the 38.5 hours negotiated by the average 
collective agreements. In all countries except 
Finland, Belgium and Italy, the average num-
ber of hours worked exceeded the collectively 
agreed working hours limit by at least half an 
hour and in Denmark, France and Germany 
the gap between the hours worked in prac-
tice exceeded the agreed hours limit by two 
hours or more. In the UK, however, this gap 
exceeded six hours.
Clearly, usual working hours vary more than 
collectively agreed hours, ranging from 30.1 
hours in the Netherlands to 40.2 hours in 
Greece among all employees, and from below 
39 hours in France, Italy and the Netherlands 
to 43.3 hours in the UK for full-time work-
ers. In the accession countries, usual weekly 
working hours are one to four hours above 
the EU average, ranging from below 40 hours 
in Lithuania, Cyprus and Estonia to 42 hours 
or more in Romania and Latvia among all em-
ployees, and from 39.5 hours in Lithuania to 
43.6 hours in Latvia for full-time employees . 
Differences in the incidence of overtime 
work contribute strongly to the observed 
cross-country differences in average weekly 
working hours. More than 10% of employees 
in all EU Member States except in Denmark, 
Ireland and the southern EU Member States, 
work overtime hours. Among the accession 
countries overtime is far less prevalent due in 
part to the considerably longer normal work-
ing hours. Only the Czech Republic, Slovakia 
and Slovenia have similar levels of overtime 
work to those observed in most EU Member 
States. 
The share of employees working overtime is 
highest in Austria, the Netherlands and the 
UK, where almost 30% of all employees work 
overtime, around 15-20% of all part-time 
workers, and 30-35% of all full-time workers. 
In all countries, part-time workers are less 
likely to work overtime. Finally, there is also 
a varying degree of the incidence of unpaid 
overtime: around 10% or more of all employ-
ees in the three countries mentioned above 
and in France and Belgium work unpaid 
overtime. In all of these countries as well as in 
Germany, half or more of all employees work-
ing overtime are not paid for it – certainly 
an important dimension of labour market 
flexibility, competitiveness and employment 
(chart 98).
106 Usual hours worked per week correspond to the number of hours the person normally works, including extra hours - paid or unpaid - normally worked (but excluding travel time to and from work and main 
meal breaks).
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The small difference between average usual 
working hours for all employed and for the 
full-time employed in the accession countries 
of up to one and a half hours is explained by 
two factors. Firstly, the average number of 
hours worked by part-time workers is con-
siderably higher in the accession countries. 
While ranging from 18.8 hours in Slovenia 
to 33.1 hours in Romania, average working 
hours for part-timers ranged from below 20 
hours in Belgium, France, Germany, Austria, 
Greece and Italy to more than 22 hours in 
Denmark, Luxembourg and the UK. Secondly, 
the employment shares of part-time workers 
remain below 10% in all accession countries, 
compared with 18% in the EU. They were 
highest in Poland, Lithuania and Romania, 
where around 10% of all employees were 
working part-time – more therefore than in 
the southern EU Member States.
With the exception of Slovenia, the Czech 
Republic, Slovakia and Cyprus, a majority of 
the few employees in part-time work would 
actually prefer a full-time job. This is most 
marked in Lithuania, Latvia, Romania and 
Bulgaria, where more than half of all part-
time employees describe themselves as invol-
untarily in part-time work. A similar situation 
applies in Greece, Portugal, Italy, Finland and 
Sweden where more than 25% of all employ-
ees in part-time employment state that they 
would prefer a full-time job, but could not 
find any. But this is different from the other 
EU Member States where a large majority of 
those in part-time work are so through choice 
or because of ongoing education or training, 
own illness or disability or family or other 
personal responsibilities. Three out of four 
part-time workers in the Netherlands, more 
than 60% in France, Luxembourg, the UK 
and Cyprus, and more than 40% in Denmark 
and Sweden are in part-time work voluntarily 
(chart 99).
In all countries, part-time working remains 
predominantly the preserve of women. As a 
result, average usual weekly working hours of 
men exceed those of women in all countries 
and by more than 10 hours a week in the 
Netherlands and the UK, and by three to seven 
hours in most other EU Member States. The 
differences in average working times between 
men and women are smaller in the accession 
countries, with men working between one 
hour more in Slovakia, Romania and Bulgaria 
and four hours in Poland.
In some countries there are also gender 
differences in the working time of full-time 
employees. This applies in particular to Den-
mark, Luxembourg, Italy, Ireland and the UK 
as well as Poland, where full-time employed 
women work, on average, 5-10% fewer hours, 
equivalent to two to four hours less per week, 
than men (chart 100). Among part-time em-
ployees, on the other hand, women tend to 
work on average longer hours, notably in the 
Nordic EU Member States, Germany and the 
UK. Only in the southern EU Member States, 
Poland and Romania do men in part-time 
work longer hours than women on average 
(chart 101).
There is also substantial dispersion of aver-
age usual working hours across sectors and 
occupations, for both full- and part-time 
employees. Variation of working times across 
sectors is strongest in the UK and Ireland, 
the southern European Member States and 
among the accession countries in Latvia, 
Romania and Poland. There is, on the other 
hand, comparatively less variation in average 
working hours across sectors in the Nordic 
EU Member States, Germany, Austria, the 
Netherlands as well as in the Czech Repub-
lic, Slovakia, Hungary and Slovenia, mainly 
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due to the relatively longer working hours 
in education in these countries. Variation in 
working hours is generally much higher in 
the services sector, except in the UK, Ireland, 
Luxembourg and Finland.
Working hours are generally longer in the 
services sector, compared to both industry 
and public administration, notably in the 
accession countries, but also in most EU Mem-
ber States, including Germany and Austria. 
In most countries, including the southern 
EU Member States, France, Luxembourg and 
Germany as well as in Latvia, Cyprus and 
Romania, working hours are, on average, 
actually longest in “Hotels and restaurants”, 
with working time in this sector exceeding 
the average by more than 5%. Other sectors 
with generally above average working hours 
are „Real estate, renting and business activi-
ties“, “Transport and communication” as well 
as “Construction”, particularly in Poland and 
Romania, but also in the UK, Ireland, Italy and 
Greece (chart 102 and table 49 in the annex).
As regards working hours by occupation, 
there is no clear pattern: while generally lon-
ger among managers and legislators, service 
workers and skilled manual workers, they 
tend to be lower among professionals, tech-
nicians and elementary occupations. There 
are remarkable differences across countries, 
however. In the southern EU Member States 
and in most accession countries - particularly 
Poland, Lithuania and Latvia - working hours 
of employees in high-skilled non-manual oc-
cupations remain significantly below those in 
other occupations and contrast with relatively 
long working hours among skilled manual 
workers, including agricultural workers. On 
the contrary, there are generally relatively 
long working hours among high-skilled non-
manual employees in Germany, Austria, the 
Benelux and Nordic Member States and, most 
notably, in the UK. The latter is an interesting 
case, as it is also the country with relatively 
the lowest working hours among low- and 
medium-skilled non-manual occupations, in-
cluding service and sales workers (chart 103 
and table 50 in the annex).
Among part-time workers, there is gener-
ally more variation in average working hours 
across sectors and occupations. Relatively 
shorter working hours can generally be ob-
served in “Hotels and restaurants” and “Edu-
cation”, while working hours are longer in 
“Public administration” and “Construction”. 
In the EU Member States, working hours of 
part-time workers in elementary occupations 
also tend to be much shorter than in other 
occupations, notably in the Netherlands, 
Denmark and Germany where average work-
ing hours in elementary occupations are less 
than 15 hours a week. Although the available 
data is quite scarce, in the accession countries 
part-time working hours also seem longer 
in general, exceeding those in the EU by five 
hours or more in some sectors and occupa-
tions. In fact, in the Czech Republic, Hungary 
and Poland – the only accession countries for 
which reasonably reliable and informative 
data on working hours of part-time workers 
exist – service workers and people in elemen-
tary occupations in part-time work have, 
on average, working hours of around 24-25 
hours, compared to 17-19 hours in the EU.
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Actual working times and work 
outside the core hours
As regards the actual timing of the work, large 
shares of European employees work shifts or 
work outside the core working hours, for 
example, in the evening or on weekends. 
Shift work is much more pronounced in the 
accession countries compared to the current 
EU Member States, with more than 25% of 
employees in Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia, 
the Czech Republic and Romania usually 
or sometimes on shift work. Among the EU 
Member States, it is most common in Finland 
and Sweden, where one quarter of all employ-
ees have to do shift work at least sometimes 
(chart 104). Shift work is generally more 
common among skilled manual occupations. 
While more common among men in the 
EU, in most accession countries the share of 
female employees doing shift work is similar 
to that of men.
Similarly, work outside the core hours107 is 
not uncommon in Europe. It is most pro-
nounced in the UK, the Netherlands, Italy and 
Spain where a third or more of all employees 
work outside core hours. It is, moreover, gen-
erally more common in manual or low-skilled 
services sector activities. In Spain in particu-
lar, more than half of all female services and 
sales workers work outside core hours. In the 
UK, Spain, the Netherlands and Estonia, fur-
thermore, more than half of all male services 
and sales workers work outside core hours. 
Italy, the Netherlands and the UK are also 
the only countries in which more than 30% 
of all high-skilled non-manual workers work 
outside core hours (chart 105). There is not 
necessarily a clear gender dimension to work 
outside core hours, with women less likely to 
work outside core hours than men in Ireland, 
the UK, Hungary and the Slovak Republic, 
while being much more likely to do so in 
Luxembourg, France, Belgium and Sweden 
(chart 105).
????
107 It should be noted that, while cross-country differences in core working hours and evening or night work may in part reflect cultural and climatic differences across countries, the statistics presented are 
based on harmonised survey questions in the LFS. The answer “usually” is meant to mean on at least half of the days worked (in the case of night and evening work) and on two or more Sundays (in the case 
of work on Sundays) in a reference period of four weeks preceding the interview. The answers should strictly refer to formal working arrangements. Thus employees who, on their own initiative, take some 
of their work home or who work at the place of business on Sundays are not included. In particular the definitions of evening and night vary considerably across surveys. Bearing this in mind, generally 
speaking, “evening work” can be considered to be work done after the usual hours of working time in the respective country, but before usual sleeping hours, while “night work” is work done during the 
usual sleeping hours.
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The most frequent way of working outside 
the core hours is by working in the evening or 
at weekends. In particular in the UK and the 
Nordic EU Member States, more than 20% of 
all employed declare that they work regularly 
in the evening. The share of those sometimes 
working in the evening is generally high 
across all countries, amounting to a third or 
more of all employed in Greece, Poland and 
the Czech Republic. In total, more than half 
of all employed claim to work in the evening 
at least sometimes in the UK and Greece. Also 
night work is not uncommon, with 10-20% 
of all employed working at least sometimes 
during the night in all EU Member States and 
accession countries. It is most common in the 
UK, where more than 20% of all employed 
work at least sometimes during the night, 
more than half of them regularly. Also in Slo-
vakia, more than 10% of all employed work 
regularly during the night. 
Finally, regular work on Sundays is most com-
mon in Latvia and Romania, both countries 
with long working hours and a high share of 
agricultural workers, and in the Nordic Mem-
ber States. In all accession countries, except 
Cyprus, and in Sweden, Denmark, the UK 
and Ireland more than 30% of all employed 
work at least sometimes on Sundays. These 
forms of work outside core working hours 
are much less common in Belgium, Luxem-
bourg, France, the Czech Republic and Cyprus 
– all countries in which less than 10% of all 
employed work regularly on Sundays, and 
less than 5% work regularly during the night 
(charts 106 and 107).
Working time distributions
When looking at the distribution of work-
ing hours of full-time employees, important 
differences in working time patterns can be 
observed (table 47). Between the lowest and 
the highest quantiles, working hours vary 
from 35 to 45 hours or more in most EU 
Member States and Cyprus and from 40 to 45 
hours or more in most accession countries. 
Countries with the least variation in work-
ing hours are Germany, the Netherlands and 
Finland - where working hours vary between 
36 and 42 hours only – and, in particular, 
in Luxembourg, Austria and Sweden where 
average working hours are almost constant 
at 38-40 hours across the whole working time 
distribution. Among the accession countries, 
Lithuania is the only country with a similarly 
compressed working time distribution (36 to 
40 hours).
In the EU, the variation in working hours 
is highest in the UK, with average working 
hours in the upper quantiles exceeding those 
in the lower quantiles by up to a staggering 20 
hours. More than half of all full-time employ-
ees in the UK work close to – or more than - 50 
hours a week on average, and average weekly 
working hours in the upper quartile of the dis-
tribution reach almost 60 for men and 50 for 
women. Average working hours at the top of 
the distribution exceed 40 hours per week in 
all countries except Luxembourg, the Nether-
lands, Austria and Sweden, reaching 50 hours 
or more for men in Ireland, and for both men 
and women in the UK.
While working time distributions in the acces-
sion countries are similar to those in the EU 
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Member States - with working times in Latvia 
similar to those in the UK – two important 
differences remain. Firstly, there are generally 
no significant shares of full-time employees 
working less than 40 hours per week. Sec-
ondly, the share of employees working very 
long hours – i.e. 48 hours or more a week 
– is significantly higher. The UK, where more 
than 20% of all full-time employees are work-
ing regularly more than 48 hours a week, is 
the notable exception. The share amounts 
to 5-10% in most accession countries (except 
Cyprus and Hungary), compared to below 5% 
in most EU Member States. Greece, Spain, 
Portugal, Denmark and Ireland are the only 
EU Member States with shares of full-time em-
ployees working long hours similar to those 
in the accession countries (chart 108).
With regard to the distribution of working 
hours, in all accession countries except 
Cyprus, Lithuania and the Czech Republic, 
Table 47 – Average working hours of full-time employees by quantiles and gender, 2001
Total Men Women
<10% 10-25% 25-50% 50-75% 75-90% <10% 10-25% 25-50% 50-75% 75-90% <10% 10-25% 25-50% 50-75% 75-90%
B 36 38 38 40 44 37 38 38 40 45 35 38 38 39 40
DK 37 37 37 40 45 37 37 37 41 48 35 37 37 37 43
D 36 38 39 40 42 36 38 40 40 45 35 38 39 40 40
EL 35 40 40 42 48 38 40 40 45 48 30 39 40 40 48
E 37 40 40 40 45 38 40 40 40 46 35 38 40 40 41
F 35 35 39 39 45 35 35 39 39 45 35 35 38 39 41
IRL 35 39 39 40 45 38 39 39 40 50 30 37 39 40 40
I 35 36 40 40 45 36 37 40 40 48 24 36 38 40 40
L 39 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 24 40 40 40 40
NL 36 36 40 40 40 36 38 40 40 40 36 36 38 40 40
A 38 38 40 40 40 38 38 40 40 40 38 38 40 40 40
P 35 40 40 40 45 35 40 40 40 45 35 35 40 40 42
FIN 36 38 38 40 42 37 38 40 40 45 35 38 38 40 40
S 37 40 40 40 40 38 40 40 40 40 37 38 40 40 40
UK 36 38 41 48 55 37 39 43 50 56 35 37 39 43 50
EU 38 39 40 41 44 39 40 40 41 45 36 37 39 39 41
BG 40 40 40 40 45 40 40 40 40 48 40 40 40 40 42
CY 35 38 38 40 45 38 38 38 40 48 35 38 38 40 45
CZ 38 40 40 40 45 38 40 40 40 50 38 40 40 40 43
EE 40 40 40 40 48 40 40 40 40 48 40 40 40 40 42
HU 40 40 40 40 44 40 40 40 40 48 40 40 40 40 42
LT 36 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 33 40 40 40 40
LV 40 40 40 45 55 40 40 40 48 60 40 40 40 42 50
PL 40 40 40 42 48 40 40 40 42 50 30 40 40 42 48
RO 40 40 40 40 48 40 40 40 40 48 40 40 40 40 48
SI 40 40 40 40 45 40 40 40 40 48 40 40 40 40 42
SK 40 40 42 42 42 40 40 42 42 48 40 40 42 42 42
Source: Eurostat, LFS, ad hoc module 2001
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average working hours in the lowest decile 
reach 40 hours, compared to values of be-
tween 35 and 38 hours in most EU Member 
States. As a consequence, there are far less 
significant differences in the working time 
distribution between men and women. In 
particular, average working hours in the 
lowest quantiles are the same for men and 
women, while generally lower for women 
than for men in many EU Member States. The 
gender differences in the upper part of the 
working distributions are, however, similar 
to those in most EU Member States - except 
those with a strongly compressed working 
time distribution – where average working 
hours at the top of the distribution for men 
exceed those of women by around five hours 
a week. Two important exceptions are Poland 
and Romania, where men and women work 
similarly long hours. Finally average working 
hours at the top of the distribution, exceed 45 
hours per week in all countries except Lithu-
Table 48 – Most frequent working time arrangements and working time flexibility by working time status and gender, 2001
Full-time employees Part-time employees
Men Women Men Women
Most 
frequent 
working 
time
Second 
most 
frequent Share
Most 
frequent 
working 
time
Second 
most 
frequent Share
Most 
frequent 
working 
time
Second 
most 
frequent
Share
Most 
frequent 
working 
time
Second 
most 
frequent
Share
B 38h 40h 63.7 38h 40h 57.4 20h 32h 25.7 20h 19h 32.7
DK 37h 40h 67.7 37h 40h 66.0 10h 15h 25.5 30h 32h 25.7
D 40h 38h 60.0 40h 38h 62.8 20h 10h 29.9 20h 30h 34.1
EL 40h 48h 69.2 40h 48h 65.5 20h 30h 38.4 20h 30h 35.3
E 40h 38h 77.0 40h 38h 77.5 20h 25h 52.3 20h 25h 45.1
F 35h 39h 57.8 35h 39h 59.7 20h 30h 34.1 20h 30h 28.3
IRL 39h 40h 63.5 39h 40h 57.8 20h 8h 34.2 20h 24h 36.6
I 40h 36h 69.6 40h 36h 72.1 20h 40h 38.2 20h 24h 42.9
L 40h 37h 88.4 40h 20h 87.2 20h 40h 46.5 20h 30h 52.7
NL 40h 38h 70.8 36h 40h 83.0 32h 8h 29.7 32h 20h 25.4
A 40h 38h 84.9 40h 38h 84.8 20h 30h 47.1 20h 30h 52.8
P 40h 35h 76.7 40h 35h 83.9 30h 20h 39.0 20h 25h 40.9
FIN 40h 38h 72.8 38h 40h 56.8 20h 30h 32.3 30h 20h 34.0
S 40h 38h 82.3 40h 38h 80.8 20h 30h 39.2 30h 20h 38.8
UK 40h 38h 22.7 38h 40h 28.2 20h 16h 17.5 20h 16h 17.2
EU 40h 38h 48.1 40h 38h 48.7 20h 30h 24.1 20h 30h 27.6
BG 40h 48h 85.0 40h 48h 85.2 20h 25h 40.9 20h 25h 51.7
CY 38h 40h 74.4 38h 40h 69.1 25h 20h 38.0 25h 20h 47.6
CZ 40h 38h 75.6 40h 38h 78.5 30h 20h 50.2 30h 20h 48.2
EE 40h 48h 83.5 40h 48h 82.8 20h 25h 59.6 20h 30h 60.6
HU 40h 50h 85.4 40h 42h 87.1 20h 30h 65.9 20h 30h 71.7
LT 40h 48h 82.9 40h 36h 83.3 20h 30h 62.5 20h 30h 65.0
LV 40h 48h 71.1 40h 48h 69.4 20h 24h 36.2 20h 24h 34.9
PL 40h 42h 72.7 40h 42h 73.5 20h 30h 40.6 20h 30h 48.3
RO 40h 48h 87.8 40h 48h 90.0 40h 30h 45.4 40h 20h 51.8
SI 40h 50h 86.4 40h 42h 88.5 20h 30h 62.3 20h 30h 59.7
SK 42h 40h 84.1 42h 40h 84.6 20h 30h 71.5 20h 30h 57.2
Source: Eurostat, LFS, ad hoc module 2001
Notes: The shares in the table indicate the share of employees with working times according to one of the two most frequent working times
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ania and reach 50 hours or more in Latvia, 
the Czech Republic and Poland for men, and 
in Latvia for women also.
Flexible working hours and 
working time arrangements
Another way to look at working time flex-
ibility is to assess the share of employees who 
are and are not covered by the most common 
working hours (table 48). In the EU, most full-
time employees fall into one of two working 
hour categories - either 40 hours a week or 
less than 40 (35, 36, 37, 38 or 39, depending 
on the country). Across the accession coun-
tries, the two most frequent working times 
are either 40 hours or more than 40 (42, 48 
or 50, depending on the country). The share 
of employees covered by the two respective 
categories above is generally high. Large 
shares of full-time employees generally work 
in one of the two most frequent arrange-
ments, with shares ranging from 60-80% in 
the EU Member States and from 75-90% in 
the accession countries. There is thus gener-
ally a higher working time flexibility in the 
EU Member States, notably in the UK, where 
less than a quarter of all full-time employees 
are covered by one of the two most frequent 
working week arrangements.
As expected, among part-time employees, 
there is much more variation in working time 
arrangements. In most EU Member States 
and accession countries, the most frequent 
total of hours worked a week by part-timers is 
20. The exceptions are Cyprus (25 hours), the 
Nordic Member States and the Czech Republic 
(30 hours), the Netherlands (32 hours) and 
Romania (40 hours). The shares of part-
time employees working according to the 
two most frequent working time patterns is 
much lower than among full-time employees, 
indicating the higher working time flexibil-
ity among part-time workers. Only in Spain, 
Luxembourg and Austria, as well as in most 
accession countries do half or more of all part-
time employees work in one of the two most 
frequent working time groupings. There is 
considerable higher working time flexibility 
in the other EU Member States. In Belgium, 
the Netherlands, Denmark, Germany, France 
and the UK in particular, 30% or less of all 
part-time employees work according to the 
two most frequent working time patterns.
There do remain, finally, important differ-
ences in flexibility of working time arrange-
ments, both across EU Member States and 
between the EU and the accession countries. 
In a large majority of countries, notably the 
southern EU Member States and the accession 
countries, fixed start and end times remain 
the predominant working time arrangement, 
covering more than three quarter of all em-
ployees. In Hungary, Greece, Slovenia, Portu-
gal and Spain less than 10% of all employees 
have some form of working time flexibility 
from either working time banking or other 
mutual agreements with their employer. On 
the other hand, more than 20% of all employ-
ees in the Nordic EU Member States, Germany 
and the UK benefit from working time bank-
ing, or, as in the case of Ireland and France, 
from other types of mutual agreements be-
tween employees and employers. In Germany, 
the UK, Ireland and France, half or more of all 
employees benefit from flexible working time 
arrangements, and in Ireland and France, 
interestingly, more than 20% of all employees 
declare that they can determine their actual 
working times themselves (chart 109).
Clearly, working time flexibility varies across 
occupations. While, on average in the EU, 
only half of all high-skilled non-manual 
employees have fixed working times, 65% of 
low- and medium-skilled non-manual and 
75% of skilled manual workers do. The high-
est shares of employees who have to work 
according to fixed start and end times are 
found among clerks, services workers, craft 
and related workers and machine operators. 
Flexible working arrangements are generally 
less common among low-skilled and manual 
occupations. They are also less common for 
women than for men. The only countries in 
which even among the low-skilled, manual 
occupations, a third of all employees or more 
have flexible working arrangements (work-
ing time banking, mutually agreed or self-de-
termined) are Germany, France and the UK. 
In the accession countries, by contrast, there 
is generally much less working time flex-
ibility in all skills groups, with around 80% 
or more of all employees in high-skilled non-
manual occupations covered by fixed working 
time arrangements, and 90% or more in other 
occupational groups.
On call work, finally, remains relatively un-
common, with less than 2% of all employees 
working on call. The highest shares of around 
4% are observed in the Netherlands and Lithu-
ania, and notably more than 10% of all Dutch 
women employed in skilled manual occupa-
tions are on call.
Conclusions
There is a wealth of flexible working arrange-
ments in European labour markets. This 
applies not only to labour market transitions 
between various labour market states, but 
also to other issues such as contractual flex-
ibility and working time arrangements. Con-
siderable shares of European employees work 
on temporary contracts or in part-time work. 
Many also work (unpaid) overtime or outside 
the core hours. There is, furthermore, a con-
siderable amount of fluctuations between 
labour market states over time, both within a 
given year as well as over longer time periods 
of several years. Although not discussed here, 
data on job tenure and on labour reallocation 
generally yield a similar picture of compara-
tively flexible European labour markets.108
At the same time, based on the characteristics 
examined, there is only little evidence so 
far that quality in work, and employment 
stability in particular, improved over the 
second half of the 1990s. Despite the strong 
employment performance observed in Eu-
ropean labour markets in the second half 
of the 1990s, recent data on the evolution of 
both, subjective job satisfaction and objective 
job quality, over this period do in many cases 
not indicate significant changes in quality in 
work. In some Member States, also transition 
rates into unemployment and persistence in 
low quality employment remained high.
Some improvements in transition rates 
out of low quality employment occurred in 
those Member States with quite favourable 
108 See e.g. Peter Auer and Sandrine Cazes (eds) (2003), Employment stability in an age of flexibility, Evidence from industrialised countries, ILO, Geneva
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labour market transition patterns – notably 
Denmark, Ireland, Austria, Belgium and the 
Netherlands - contrast with less favourable 
developments in other Member States. While 
transition patterns also improved consider-
ably in Spain and France, for example, the 
overall career opportunities of people in 
low quality jobs in these countries remained 
largely below average. Persistence in low 
quality employment further remained high-
est in the UK, while persistence in unemploy-
ment remained strong in several other EU 
Member States.
The balance between flexibility, on the one 
hand, and security, on the other - in combina-
tion with the need to improve the functioning 
of labour markets and quality in work - is a 
delicate one both for the existing and new 
Member States. Relatively high degrees of la-
bour market flexibility seem to be consistent 
with major shares of employees in insecure 
employment relationships and thus at high 
risk of job loss, as well as employees in low 
paid, low productivity employment without 
access to training or further career develop-
ment opportunities.
Higher flexibility can improve quality in work 
and contribute to a better employment per-
formance. Training, career development op-
portunities and other quality elements such 
as working time flexibility and job security 
are for many people key inducements to take 
up work and to stay in the labour market. Low 
wage employment, less regulation and more 
flexible work organisation - such as greater 
opportunities for part-time work and flexible 
working hours - can make it easier both for 
people to join the labour force and for firms to 
take them on. On the other hand, long work-
ing hours, regular work during the night and 
continuous overtime work can in some cases 
also be related to less favourable working 
conditions and work-related health problems, 
which in turn might impact negatively on 
labour productivity and quality in work.
Temporary employment, too - while potential-
ly a stepping stone into longer employment 
relationships of higher quality - in some cases 
has important and combined disadvantages 
in terms of job security, remuneration and 
training. Employees on temporary contracts 
are not only at considerably higher risk of 
job loss and labour market exclusion they also 
receive lower wages and less training than 
permanent employees with the same qualifi-
cations who are doing the same job.
Active labour market policies with a view to 
strengthening transitional labour markets 
– unemployment insurance systems and 
human capital investments in particular 
- are important ways to compensate for in-
creasing employment instability. Given the 
synergies between quality in work and overall 
employment performance further measures 
are needed to improve the quality in work 
at the company level, while retaining an 
appropriate balance between flexibility and 
security. This point is underlined by the fact 
that improvements in the career prospects 
of those in low quality employment were 
observed for those of the EU Member States in 
particular with the best employment perfor-
mance in the recent past, notably Denmark, 
Ireland, Spain, the Netherlands and Austria. 
Social dialogue and worker involvement play 
an important role in this respect, notably for 
improving quality in work and productivity of 
low quality jobs.
- 153 -
Chapter 4 Flexibility, security and quality in work
Annexes to chapter 4
Table 49 – Average usual weekly working hours of full-time and part-time employees in the EU and the accession countries by sector, 2002
Mining and 
quarrying
Manufac-
turing
Electric-
ity, gas 
and water 
supply
Construc-
tion
Wholesale 
and retail 
trade
Hotels and 
restaurants
Transport, 
storage 
and com-
munication
Financial 
intermedia-
tion
Real 
estate, 
renting and 
business 
activities
Public 
administra-
tion, social 
secu-
rity and 
defence
Education Health and 
social work
Full-time
B 39.6 38.9 40.5 39.7 40.3 40.5 39 40.7 39 33.6 39.3
DK 38.8 38.6 39.7 39.5 41.1 39.6 40.5 38.9 38.4 37.6
D 39.7 39.0 39.4 40.2 40.1 42.2 41.4 40.2 40.9 39.7 40.2 39.5
EL 41.5 42.1 40.2 42.6 43.2 45.9 43.9 40.4 41.6 39.9 29.8 39.6
E 40.5 40.8 40.4 40.9 41.6 43 41.3 40.3 40.5 38.4 35.8 39.0
F 38.2 37.4 36.3 38.1 38.1 41.1 37.9 38.3 38.8 37.8 33.9 37.7
IRL 40.1 41.0 40.0 40.5 41.0 39.8 40.0 38.7 32.2 38.7
I 40.5 40.3 39.3 40.9 41.4 42.5 39.9 38.8 39.5 36.6 28.4 37.4
L 40.3 40.2 40.0 42.5 40.0 39.9 39.2 39.4 35.4 38.8
NL 38.9 38.8 39.5 39.3 38.7 40.2 37.9 39.3 37.6 38.3 37.2
A 38.9 39.3 39.5 39.7 39.7 40.8 40.7 39.4 40.4 40.5 40.5 40.9
P 40.6 : 41.7 41.6 44.5 41.5 39.2 40.5 37.6 34.6 38.5
FIN 39.5 39.0 40.2 39.4 38.1 41.0 39.6 39.2 38.3 36.9 38.6
S 38.0 39.5 39.5 40.2 40.0 40.0 40.1 39.4 40.0 39.9 41.6 39.1
UK 52.7 43.4 42.3 45.1 43.2 42.8 45.6 41.5 43.4 41.7 44.1 41.4
EU 42.8 40.0 39.5 40.9 40.7 42.3 41.4 39.9 40.7 38.9 36.4 39.1
BG 40.3 40.9 40.4 41.8 42.3 43.0 41.5 40.6 41.2 40.6 38.9 40.2
CY 40.2 39.3 41.5 42.7 40.3 37.4 40.0 39.2 35.2 39.4
CZ 39.2 40.5 40.5 42.4 41.7 42.0 42.2 42.0 42.3 41.0 40.1 41.6
EE 40.6 41.9 41.8 42.0 42.5 40.8 37.2 40.7
HU 41.4 40.6 40.8 42.2 41.3 42.1 41.8 41.0 41.7 40.8 38.9 40.9
LT 40.3 40.0 41.0 41.1 40.4 41.6 40.0 40.0 40.0 33.4 38.5
LV 43.9 42.1 44.6 45.6 49.0 44.5 43.3 42.0 39.0 42.7
PL 41.0 42.5 40.8 45.0 43.5 43.4 43.4 41.4 42.8 41.5 31.5 40.3
RO 39.6 41.3 41.0 44.5 44.0 44.4 42.5 41.1 42.1 41.5 38.3 41.2
SI 41.1 40.4 43.1 41.7 42.4 43.0 41.6 41.9 41.0 40.4 42.0
SK 40.2 41.1 41.2 43.1 42.1 43.2 42.2 41.4 43.1 41.9 40.8 41.8
Part-time
B 25.2 22.5 19.1 24.4 26.4 22.6 21.9 19.8 24.2
DK 13.0 18.5 24.2
D 17.0 16.9 17.6 15.5 18.1 18.9 16.0 20.5 18.7 19.3
E 20.6 20.8 17.8 18.7 18.4 17.4 19.3
F 24.4 23.4 24.5 23.3 25.6 25.6 25.4 20.7 24.0
IRL 18.0 17.6 19.3
I 25.7 29.7 23.8 22.8 25.7 25.3 22.5 23 18.8 23.6
NL 21.6 22.2 16.1 14.4 19.1 22.5 19.7 25 22.1 20.9
A 22.0 19.6 21.9 22.4 22.2 21.1 20.0 22.6 22.6 22.8
FIN 22.5 21.6 18.6 : 21.5
S 21.8 20.5 17.1 20.6 20.6 21.9 23.7 25.5
UK 20.0 18.4 17.8 15.9 21.1 20.3 18.6 20.5 18.1 21.5
EU 20.3 20.3 18.9 17.3 20.6 21.2 19.0 22.3 19.3 21.7
CZ 26.6 26.2 23.5 24.3 21.6 22.8 22.0 24.1
HU 25.6 24.4
PL 24.6 24.8 25.6
Source: Eurostat, LFS, 2002q2
Notes: in the case of most accession countries, data are not available or unreliable blanks in the table indicate either unreliable or missing information; data for France and Austria 
refer to 2002Q1
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Table 50 – Average usual weekly working hours of full-time and part-time employees in the EU and the accession countries
by occupation, 2002
Legislators, 
senior officials 
and managers
Professionals Technicians 
and associate 
professionals
Clerks Service and 
sales workers
Skilled agricul-
tural workers
Craft and 
related trades 
workers
Plant and ma-
chine operators
Elementary 
occupations
Full-time
B 43.4 37.6 39.6 38.9 39.3 39.4 39.2 40.2 38.8
DK 44.8 40.1 39.0 37.2 38.2 41.8 38.4 39.8 37.6
D 43.8 41.2 39.4 39.3 40.2 40.5 38.9 40.4 39.4
EL 42.4 34.4 41.0 40.6 43.9 44.2 42.2 43.5 42.1
E 43.1 38.1 40.5 39.7 41.4 44.5 40.7 41.5 40.3
F 43.6 38.4 37.0 36.4 38.7 37.8 37.2 37.2 36.8
IRL 42.0 37.4 39.8 38.3 39.5 40.5 40.8 39.4
I 41.9 31.3 38.4 38.3 40.3 39.8 40.5 40.4 39.1
L 42.6 38.5 39.3 39.4 39.9 40.1 40.5 38.4
NL 39.5 38.6 38.4 38.4 38.4 39.3 39.1 40.1 38.6
A 41.5 40.9 40.0 39.5 40.2 43.3 39.4 40.2 40.0
P 43.0 36.9 38.5 39.0 42.0 45.5 40.9 41.5 39.9
FIN 42.0 38.4 38.9 37.8 38.9 39.9 39.7 40.6 38.3
S 41.6 40.7 39.8 39.5 39.2 41.5 39.8 39.4 39.5
UK 46.3 45.2 42.0 39.0 40.8 44.1 44.1 45.2 43.2
EU 44.3 39.5 39.2 38.6 40.3 41.0 39.9 40.7 40.0
BG 41.3 39.8 40.4 40.7 42.2 42.6 41.2 41.4 41.2
CY 44.1 37.6 39.9 39.0 41.9 39.6 41.1 40.6
CZ 44.9 42.0 41.1 40.1 41.2 41.7 40.7 41.4 40.3
EE 41.9 39.3 40.6 40.9 42.0 : 40.8 41.6 41.6
HU 41.8 39.7 40.7 40.5 41.7 41.7 41.1 41.2 40.6
LT 40.1 35.3 39.4 40.7 40.4 39.9 40.6 41.0 40.5
LV 43.4 40.9 42.4 42.2 46.5 43.7 46.4 43.0
PL 43.0 35.5 41.5 41.2 43.7 43.1 42.9 43.9 42.2
RO 43.0 40.1 40.7 41.3 44.1 44.2 41.6 42.4 42.5
SI 43.4 41.9 41.3 40.6 41.7 41.9 41.6 40.9
SK 43.0 41.5 41.3 41.3 42.7 42.7 41.6 41.6 42.0
Part-time
B 22.5 23.5 24.7 22.2 25.7 19.8
DK 19.1 23.4 21.7 18.6 13.7
D 21.3 19.5 20.1 18.5 17.8 17.8 17.5 15.9 14
EL 20.6
E 18.5 18.3 20.9 18.7 20.6 20.1 16.9
F 28.1 20.5 24.5 25.1 23.4 23.6 24.6 23.3 19.2
IRL 19.3 19.9 17.8 17.5
I 19.9 23.2 23.9 23.2 26.7 27.0 24.0
NL 25.8 23.5 22.1 19.0 16.4 22.9 22.1 12.4
A 22.5 24.0 22.5 22.2 22.3 22.2 21.7 19.3
P 20.0
FIN 18.3 19.4 21.1 22.7 18.2
S 23.2 23.6 21.5 23.6 21.4 21.6 18.7
UK 21.1 20.4 21.8 20.0 17.7 21.5 20.4 17.1
EU 23.1 20.9 21.7 20.8 19.1 21.8 20.7 16.7
CZ 20.0 24.3 23.6 26.3 26.3 25.8 22.9
HU 24.1 24.5
PL 25.1 25.5 24.1
Source: Eurostat, LFS, 2002q2
Notes: in the case of most accession countries, data are not available or unreliable; blanks in the table indicate either unreliable or missing information; data for France and Austria 
refer to 2002Q1
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Table 51 – Results of cluster analysis at Member State level (employment shares in % if not indicated otherwise)
Men Women
Hourly wage
(In euro)
Part-time Temporary Supervisory Training Hourly wage
(In euro)
Part-time Temporary Supervisory Training
Cluster 1
D 17.45 0.0 3.0 9.5 11.90 13.5 3.1 9.2
DK 22.76 0.5 5.2 48.4 64.0 17.73 15.6 3.8 26.0 65.7
NL 19.26 1.1 3.2 50.8 11.6 13.77 44.5 4.9 19.3 11.9
B 16.36 0.3 4.9 57.6 34.6 12.54 23.2 5.3 28.3 28.4
F 15.80 0.6 1.5 60.8 18.9 10.64 14.8 3.1 28.6 15.4
UK 15.85 0.2 3.0 66.9 45.2 11.29 0.8 3.3 55.3 42.2
IRL 15.89 0.1 4.1 63.6 28.9 9.67 18.5 9.9 43.8 30.9
I 12.05 0.6 2.0 60.4 22.5 8.18 14.2 4.9 25.7 17.0
EL 8.41 1.1 12.3 47.2 19.2 5.03 6.8 16.5 12.3 14.2
E 13.28 0.4 6.9 62.9 41.0 7.95 10.7 15.8 25.9 41.2
P 9.70 1.0 5.6 51.9 20.7 5.03 2.4 4.4 23.3 13.4
A 15.22 0.5 2.3 59.8 42.8 10.26 20.6 4.9 33.8 35.8
EU 16.65 0.5 3.5 57.9 29.7 11.32 17.7 5.3 30.1 25.3
Cluster 2
D 11.54 0.1 4.5 5.9 10.81 18.8 26.4 27.0
DK 15.70 0.8 16.2 21.0 38.9 15.58 16.3 22.8 25.3 69.5
NL 12.79 1.0 8.6 21.2 8.3 14.46 38.9 29.4 14.3 21.6
B 10.71 1.0 8.3 27.8 13.9 12.32 12.5 43.0 16.7 43.0
F 9.04 0.6 5.3 31.0 8.0 7.27 50.0 51.1 14.7 24.3
UK 9.13 0.3 3.9 27.7 27.5 11.82 1.8 10.4 51.3 61.5
IRL 8.63 1.2 9.6 21.6 11.3 11.46 25.2 38.3 23.6 36.8
I 7.17 1.0 11.8 22.3 6.7 7.52 14.6 34.1 4.4 20.8
EL 4.37 1.4 28.3 8.6 4.0 5.70 7.1 18.6 5.6 18.0
E 5.88 1.1 35.3 23.1 11.0 7.76 17.1 64.7 21.7 38.5
P 2.87 0.4 16.5 6.9 3.5 3.50 2.5 47.6 5.5 16.5
A 10.12 0.2 10.4 32.8 20.0 11.47 21.6 7.1 22.2 42.9
EU 8.16 0.7 13.5 21.2 10.8 0.00 16.6 20.2 26.6 0.0
Cluster 3
D 12.97 48.9 32.5 69.2 8.46 13.9 8.4 4.6
DK 15.15 61.2 33.3 14.3 40.0 13.31 13.7 21.1 8.4 36.3
NL 14.36 64.4 10.7 16.9 17.1 10.15 47.7 19.2 11.0 8.7
B 12.53 58.6 4.0 50.0 17.1 8.57 28.5 16.5 14.5 7.7
F 7.49 65.9 32.5 16.0 7.6 6.93 22.8 7.3 12.9 5.5
UK -- -- -- -- -- 7.33 1.6 4.1 22.7 23.9
IRL 9.80 53.7 39.7 15.9 23.8 6.32 29.1 24.5 13.8 11.7
I 6.42 45.7 56.5 13.4 10.1 5.77 14.2 20.6 9.8 5.3
EL 4.32 43.3 69.5 1.5 1.2 3.16 4.4 29.3 3.6 4.9
E 5.85 49.3 63.2 13.2 31.6 4.48 18.1 41.9 12.2 14.9
P 4.12 47.1 48.1 5.9 2.5 2.17 8.2 17.7 3.1 4.1
A 14.55 55.4 8.9 54.5 47.6 7.13 28.6 17.0 14.8 14.2
EU 9.64 54.7 37.8 17.6 22.4 5.79 15.3 18.1 10.6 9.7
Total
D 13.65 0.3 4.1 7.5 10.68 14.1 7.1 9.4
DK 19.66 1.4 10.3 36.2 52.9 16.54 15.4 10.7 22.9 61.0
NL 16.77 2.4 5.4 39.2 10.5 13.11 44.7 9.4 17.4 11.9
B 13.66 1.2 6.5 43.5 24.5 11.63 23.9 9.6 24.6 23.9
F 11.46 1.5 4.3 41.4 11.8 9.21 18.5 5.9 22.5 12.0
UK 12.25 0.3 3.5 45.9 35.6 9.80 1.3 5.0 41.4 38.2
IRL 10.59 2.5 9.0 32.6 16.2 8.21 24.0 19.1 28.1 21.9
I 8.07 1.4 10.4 29.4 9.6 6.72 14.2 15.4 15.3 10.1
EL 4.98 2.3 26.8 14.3 6.1 4.08 5.5 23.5 7.1 9.2
E 7.39 1.9 30.1 31.0 17.2 5.87 15.4 33.7 17.5 24.6
P 3.18 0.6 16.2 8.9 4.3 2.54 7.4 17.4 5.5 5.6
A 12.46 0.9 6.8 45.2 30.6 9.91 22.9 8.7 24.9 32.5
EU 11.08 1.2 10.4 33.6 17.1 8.96 16.6 12.4 21.1 20.2
Source: Eurostat, ECHP UDB version June 2003
Notes: clustering based on data for individuals employed in 1995; no data for Luxembourg, Finland and Sweden; for Germany, no information on job status and sector available
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Introduction
The population of the European Union is get-
ting older. Employment among older people 
aged 55-64 is low and improvements in the 
employment rate have been modest to date. 
Also, many withdraw from the labour force at 
relatively early ages. These are common fea-
tures of the EU labour market that, linked to 
low birth rates and increasing life expectancy, 
further exacerbate the burden on social pro-
tection systems. They also represent a consid-
erable challenge for the current population 
in employment who need to become more 
productive to help maintain the increase in 
living standards for the whole population.
The EU has set itself two important objectives 
concerning the employment of older people1. 
Firstly the Stockholm European Council of 
March 2001 agreed that at least half of the EU 
population in the 55-64 age group should be 
in employment by 2010. The Barcelona Euro-
pean Council of March 2002 then concluded 
that efforts should be stepped up to increase 
opportunities for older workers to remain in 
the labour market. To meet this objective it 
proposed that, a five-year delay in the aver-
age age at which people withdraw from the 
labour force should be sought by the end of 
the decade.
The aim of this chapter is to gain a deeper un-
derstanding of the labour market situation of 
older workers, in the EU and acceding coun-
tries, as well as of the challenges ahead to 
reach the Stockholm and Barcelona targets. 
Particular attention will be given to the rela-
tionship between the two targets, as a follow 
up to the Commission’s working paper: “The 
Stockholm and Barcelona targets: Increas-
ing employment of older workers and de-
laying the exit from the labour market”.110 
Exit from the labour force should be under-
stood in purely labour market terms as the 
transition from active to inactive life at ad-
vance ages. Some of the main reasons behind 
low employment of older workers and their 
early exit from the labour force will be exam-
ined in the context of sectoral employment de-
mand and educational attainment levels. This 
chapter will provide some evidence of the 
importance of three key elements which were 
recently highlighted in the new Employment 
Guidelines111 related to health and safety at 
work, flexible forms of work and continuing 
training. While recognising the existence of 
many other determinants providing impor-
tant incentives for people to exit the labour 
force, in particular financial considerations 
related to pension entitlement,112 including 
early retirement, an analysis of these would 
go beyond objectives of this chapter.113 
Demographic context
The total population of the EU15 is ageing fast 
because of low birth rates that are well below 
the level necessary for the replacement of 
generations - and increasing life expectancy 
(chart 110). The total population is expected 
to increase until the early 2020s, after which 
it should start falling. For those of working-
age (15-64), both the actual number of people 
in the population as well as the median age 
are increasing. From 2010, the ageing process 
in the working-age population should start 
slowing down, partly because of the impor-
tant number of outflows of older people 
relative to inflows of young entrants. This 
will lead to a contraction in the working-age 
population and it will start shrinking from 
then on, thus reducing the potential labour 
supply.
An ageing population does not necessarily 
mean an ageing labour force. Currently, the 
ageing of both the total population and the 
active population moves in the same direc-
tion. However, since the late 1970s Europe 
has witnessed a stark reduction in participa-
tion of older workers leading to an artificial 
rejuvenation of the labour force despite an 
increase in the median age of the total popu-
lation. In parallel, there was a reduction in 
participation of younger workers but because 
this group was numerically smaller it only 
partially offset that rejuvenation.
The number of workers (both employees and 
self-employed) leaving the labour force and 
going into retirement will increase markedly 
over the coming years as a result of the ageing 
of the EU population and the baby-boomer 
generation reaching retirement age. This 
will increase the costs of financing pension 
systems and of health care systems. 
Already in the short-term, the population aged 
55-64 is forecast to rise strongly at about 1.4% 
per year between 2002-2010. This implies that 
employment of older workers has to grow 
above that rate to keep their employment rate 
(the ratio of employment to population) in-
109 <http://europa.eu.int/european_council/conclusions/index_en.htm>
110 <http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/employment_analysis/age_en.htm>
111 <http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/employment_strategy/guidelines_en.htm>
112 In March 2003, the European Council enclosed the Joint Report by the Commission and the Council on adequate and sustainable pensions. One of the 11 common objectives that were fixed at the Laeken 
European Council of December 2001 within the context of the open method of co-ordination on pensions is about extending working lives in order to contribute to maintaining the financial sustainability 
of pensions. Based on the examination of the national strategy reports submitted by Member States, the Report concludes that working longer represents an important way of increasing employment rates 
in general and, thus, a major contribution to improving the financial sustainability of pension systems in a context of demographic ageing. The Report looks at the financial incentives to retire early and 
reviews incentive effects of tax/benefit systems with a view to making them more employment-friendly: <http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/soc-prot/pensions/index_en.htm>
113 Factors that can affect the retirement decision include, for instance, the existence of special early retirement schemes, unemployment transfer schemes, disability pensions, occupational pensions, the 
existence of private pensions, the statutory age of entitlement to a full pension, the minimum age of entitlement to pension, the pension’s accrual profile (accumulation rates), the actuarial adjustment 
factor, the pension‘s net replacement rate (the ratio of the pension to be received relative to the income from work before retirement) and the change in the pension‘s net wealth (change in the additional 
contributions from working an additional year plus the foregone pension from delaying retirement relative to the value of the pension to be received over the remaining retirement period).
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creasing. Currently, the employment rate for 
older workers in the EU15 is just about 40% 
(compared to 58% and 62% in the US and 
Japan, respectively). More than 57% of older 
people are inactive (i.e. not seeking work) 
and the remaining 3% are actively looking for 
a job but remain unemployed. 
The population of people over 65 years of age 
will also increase sharply. Contrary to the 
55-64 group (where employment increases 
can ease financial constraints resulting from 
demographic ageing) the vast majority (97%) 
of over 65-year olds are inactive. Indeed, the 
level of labour market participation of this lat-
ter group remains one of the main differences 
between the US and the EU, representing 3% 
in the latter compared to almost 12% in the 
former. It seems clear that the achievement 
of the Barcelona objective of increasing the 
average exit age from about 60 to 65 by 2010 
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will require an increase in participation for 
the group of 60-64 year-olds and, possibly 
lead to an increase in participation for 65-69 
year-olds.
As participation and employment fall with 
age, demographic ageing increases the effort 
needed to raise the employment rate of older 
workers. Already today, those aged 55-64 in 
the 15-64 working-age population is about 
17% and it is forecast to increase significantly 
in the coming years (chart 111). As a knock-
on effect, this will lead to an increase in the 
old-age dependency ratio - the population 
aged 65+ as a percentage of the working-age 
population (15-64), which stood at about 25% 
in 2002- and in the total economic dependen-
cy ratio - the share of the non-employed to the 
employed population.114 In 2002, only 52% 
of the population over 15 years of age was in 
employment and this figure falls to 43% if the 
total population including those under 15 is 
considered. 
Future developments in economic dependen-
cy will be driven by two main factors: popula-
tion ageing, which will increase the ratio of 
the non-working to the working population, 
and the success or otherwise of economic 
and labour-market policies in raising the em-
ployment rate across all age groups. If these 
policies are successful they will help offset to 
some extent the automatic increase in depen-
dency resulting from demographic change.
Meeting the Stockholm Objective is important 
from an economic point of view. About 60% 
of 55-64 year-olds are inactive but inactivity 
is as high as 97% for those above 65. Both 
groups are becoming more numerous, not 
least because of positive developments related 
to increased life expectancy. Yet, as discussed 
later in the chapter, on average people with-
draw from the labour force at the age of 60. 
At EU level, life expectancy at the age of 60 is 
about 24 years for women and 19 years for 
men (chart 112). In a context where people 
live on average for 20 years after withdraw-
ing from active life, increasing participation/
employment as well as delaying exits from 
the labour force will become crucial to reduce 
the mounting pressure on social protection 
systems.
The EU’s total population will continue to 
show positive growth for some years, mainly 
due to positive net migration and increasing 
life expectancy. In acceding countries, life 
expectancy is much lower than in the EU and 
both natural increase (births minus deaths) 
and net migration are currently negative. 
This should bring forward the point at which 
the total population will start declining in 
an EU with 25 members. Whereas the mean 
age of the population in acceding countries 
increases more rapidly (age faster) than in 
the EU, the average age of the population in 
acceding countries is currently lower. Thus, 
EU enlargement should slow the ageing of 
the population in the short and medium term 
but increase it in the long term. Moreover, 
because there are fewer births and people do 
not live as long as in the EU, the economic de-
pendency ratio in acceding countries is below 
the EU’s. Nevertheless, although dependency 
in the EU will be reduced following enlarge-
ment, it should start increasing from about 
2010 as a result of declining working-age 
populations in both regions. Therefore, the 
need to increase participation and employ-
ment as well as keeping the labour force in 
active life longer will also become crucial in 
an EU with 25 members.
The Stockholm target: 
recent employment 
trends and prospects for 
older workers
The 2001 Stockholm European Council 
agreed “to set an EU target for increasing the 
average EU employment rate among older 
women and men (55-64) to 50% by 2010”.
In 2001 four countries - Denmark, Portugal, 
Sweden and the UK - were above the 50% 
threshold while in Belgium, France, Italy, 
Luxembourg and Austria less than a third of 
older people were at work. Since 1997 trends 
have diverged significantly among Member 
States. The employment rate for older work-
ers increased significantly in Finland (10 per-
centage points), the Netherlands, Denmark, 
Ireland, Spain and Sweden. Of those Member 
States where the levels are very low, France 
114 Also, the old-age economic dependency ratio, which may be defined here as the population aged 65+ as a percentage of the occupied population aged 15-64, stood at about 39% in 2002. In other words, for 
every person in employment aged 15-64 there are 0.4 persons over the age of 65, most of whom are inactive.
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and Belgium showed some limited improve-
ment and Italy, Luxembourg and Austria no 
improvement at all. In Greece and Germany 
there was a decline in the employment rate 
of older workers over this period. It will be 
shown later in the chapter that Member 
States where employment among older work-
ers is low also have a low average exit age 
from the labour force (table 53).
Employment rates for older workers in-
creased modestly during 1997-2001 but went 
up strongly in 2002 (chart 113). During 1997-
2001, the population  in the 55-64 age class 
went up by an annual 0.4% and employment 
for this group rose by 1.8% per year. This led to 
a corresponding increase in the employment 
rate of about 0.5 percentage points every year. 
In 2002, the population increased strongly 
(by about 1.5%) and employment went up by 
a remarkable 5.4%, leading to an increase in 
the employment rate of 1.5 percentage points 
in just one year. In absolute terms, 10% of the 
total employment creation was accounted for 
by employment of older workers during 1997-
2001 but their share represented as much as 
80% in the year 2002.
In no Member State did the employment rate 
for older workers decline in 2002. At the EU 
level it rose quite sharply, particularly due 
to very positive results in two large Member 
States (France and Italy) where employment 
for older workers was low and improvements 
were very modest until 2001. Germany, the 
EU’s most populous Member State which ac-
counts for 25% of all the older workers in the 
EU, did not show any clear sign of improve-
ment in 2002. This appears also to be the case 
in Belgium and Austria. 
Although the performance in 2002 is quite 
exceptional by EU standards, the period 1997-
Table 52 – The Barcelona and Stockholm targets (2001)
Stockholm target Barcelona target
Employment rate of older
workers in 2001
Change in employment rate of
older workers 1997-2001
Average exit age from the
labour force in 2001
Total Men Women Total Men Women Total Men Women
B 25.1 35.1 15.5 3.0 3.5 2.5 57.0 57.8 55.9
DK 58.0 65.5 49.7 6.2 2.8 9.4 61.8 62.1 61.0
D 37.9 46.5 29.5 -0.2 -1.1 0.7 60.7 60.9 60.4
EL 38.0 55.0 22.5 -3.0 -4.1 -2.2 59.6 61.2 57.7
E 39.2 57.9 21.8 5.2 6.7 3.6 60.6 60.7 60.2
F 31.9 36.2 27.8 2.9 2.9 2.8 58.1 58.2 58.0
IRL 46.8 64.7 28.8 6.5 5.9 7.2 62.9 63.1 62.0
I 28.0 40.4 16.2 0.1 -1.6 1.4 59.4 59.6 59.2
L 25.6 35.9 15.2 1.7 0.5 2.4 56.8 57.5 55.3
NL 39.6 51.1 28.0 7.6 6.7 8.1 61.0 61.1 60.8
A 28.9 40.1 18.4 0.7 -0.3 1.5 59.5 59.9 58.5
P 50.1 61.3 40.2 1.8 -1.7 4.4 62.1 62.1 61.6
FIN 45.7 46.6 45.0 10.1 8.5 11.6 61.5 61.5 61.3
S 66.7 69.4 64.0 4.1 4.3 3.6 62.1 62.2 61.9
UK 52.3 61.7 43.1 4.0 3.4 4.6 62.0 63.0 61.0
EU 38.8 48.9 29.1 2.4 1.6 3.0 59.9 60.5 59.1
Source: Eurostat, LFS
Note: annual averages for employment rates.; see annex 1 for the methodology underlying the calculation of the average exit age from the labour force.
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2001 also showed some improvement in in-
creasing employment for older workers. One 
of the possible explanations for the increase 
in participation of older workers in most 
Member States could be the growing num-
ber of people who opt to continue longer in 
employment but reduce the number of hours 
they work. At the EU level, part-time work 
among older workers has increased at an an-
nual rate of over 4% compared to just 1% for 
full-time employment. Half the employment 
creation for older workers during 1997-2001 
is accounted for by increases in part-time em-
ployment. This has also led to an increase in 
their share of part-time work in total employ-
ment. In 2001, 22% of older workers aged 55-
64 had part-time work (more if one excludes 
the self-employed) – with the remaining 78% 
being in full-time employment (chart 114). 
Half the part-timers did not want a full-time 
job (i.e. voluntary part-time)115 and part-time 
employment among women (42%) remained 
well above that for men (9%).116
Overall, total net employment creation in the 
EU amounted to about 12.5 million between 
1995-2002, 60% of which was accounted for 
by the increase in the labour force (7.7 mil-
lion) and 40% by unemployment reduction 
(4.8 million). Net employment creation for 
older workers during the same period was 
about 2 million equivalent to 16% of the total 
employment creation. 
Mainly because of the 2002 performance, the 
employment rate of older workers reached 
about 40% for the EU15 as a whole, 10 per-
centage points below the Stockholm target. 
To understand the implications in terms of 
employment creation, one needs to be aware 
that an increase of 10 percentage points in the 
employment rate depends on both employ-
ment growth and population growth. The 
employment effort needed to reach an em-
ployment rate of 50% by 2010 is magnified by 
the fact that the population in this age group 
is projected to increase by 12% over the next 
eight years to more than 5 million. To take ac-
count of demographics, the EU15 would need 
to increase employment of older workers by 
almost 7 million between 2002 and 2010 with 
2.6 of this total required purely to counteract 
the effect of ageing.
An increase in employment of those in the age 
group 55-64 by 7 million would correspond to 
an annual increase of about 900,000 a year. 
The Stockholm target could be met if the 
2002 employment increase for older workers, 
achieved in the context of overall low employ-
ment growth, could be maintained until 2010. 
The contribution to the increase in employ-
ment of older workers in 2002 of the biggest 
economy in Europe – Germany - was as low 
as 1%. A change in trend in Germany would 
improve prospects of achieving the EU target.
For the EU15, the employment rate of older 
workers aged 55-64 stood at just below 39% 
in 2001, compared to a rate of 73% for the 46-
55 year-olds. The latter will be aged 55-64 in 
2010. Because of the projected growth in the 
population of the age-group 55-64 between 
2001 and 2010117, about two thirds of the 
46-55 age group who were in employment 
in 2001 need to remain at work at least until 
2010 if the 50% employment rate target is to 
be reached. This would represent an impor-
tant change relative to past performance, 
when only half of those aged 45-54 and in 
employment in 1991 were still at work 10 
years later, at the age of 55-64.
One of the most visible differences between 
acceding and existing EU members relates 
to the formers’ generally lower employment 
rates among older workers (table 53). In the 
EU15 only 40% of the population aged 55-64 
were at work in 2002, yet this was still sig-
115 It should be noted that there are various reasons for a person to work part-time so the fact that half of them did not want a full-time job does not mean that the other half do. According to the EU Labour 
Force Survey (LFS), the distinction between full-time and part-time work is made on the basis of a spontaneous answer given by the respondent (in this context, country and industry specific differences 
in the number of hours worked are only used to detect implausible answers). The reasons for a part-time job being taken are: person is undergoing school education or training; own illness or disability; 
person could not find a full-time job (involuntary part-time); person did not want a full-time job (voluntary part-time); looking after children or incapacitated adults; person with a part-time job but giving 
no reason, and person with a part-time job because of other reasons.
116 For more detail, see chapter 4 “Flexibility, security and quality in work”. 
117 The population of 55-64 year-olds in 2001 was about 42 million. According to Eurostat’s population projections the population of the group 55-64 in 2010 will be almost 14% larger than that of the same 
age-group of 2001. Because of the strong demographic component, the increase in employment to achieve 50% of older people at work by 2010 would need to be of over 7.5 million between 2001 and 2010. 
Thus, employment will need to rise from just above 16 million in 2001 to slightly below 24 million in 2010. Using 2002 spring LFS data, which shows an increase in employment for older workers of about 
0.9 million, the level needed to reach the 50% employment rate target by 2010 would remain below 7 million.
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nificantly higher than for the group of the 10 
acceding countries (about 30%). Given that 
their population of 55-64 year-olds will only 
represent 15% of the total enlarged EU popula-
tion of older people, the overall employment 
rate for this age group in the EU25 should 
decline by between 1 to 2 percentage points.
The ranking of countries showing very low 
employment rates for older workers will also 
change in an EU with 25 members. If enlarge-
ment happened today, Slovakia, Hungary and 
Poland would share bottom positions with 
Luxembourg, Belgium, Italy, Austria and 
France.
Inactivity among the 
older population 
The employment rate of older workers 
remains very low and raising it to 50% repre-
sents the most challenging Council objective 
for the EU in the coming years. In 2001, only 
39% of the population aged 55-64 was in 
work, around 3% was unemployed and 59% 
was inactive. 
Increasing labour participation is one of the 
conditions for reaching the employment 
rate targets set by the 2000 Lisbon and 2001 
Stockholm European Councils. The necessary 
increases in labour supply needed for the ac-
complishment of these targets will necessarily 
come from pulling into the active population 
some of those who are currently inactive. An 
inactive person can be broadly defined as 
someone outside the labour force (neither 
employed nor unemployed) who is not ac-
tively seeking employment or is not immedi-
ately available for work. An understanding of 
some of the reasons why older people are pre-
dominantly inactive (i.e. not seeking work) 
is crucial for analysing the extent to which 
participation increases can be attained.
In 2001, there were 42 million people aged 
55-64 in the EU15; about 16 million were 
in employment, just over 1 million were 
unemployed and 25 million were inactive. 
The inactivity rate (i.e. the mirror image of 
the activity/participation rate) represented 
as much as 59% of this population age group. 
Comparatively, older workers (55-64) repre-
sent only 10% of total employment (15-64) 
but older people (55-64) account for as much 
as a third of all inactive (15-64) in the EU15. 
Among the inactive it is possible to distin-
guish different groups. Some of them are 
closer to the labour force than others. There 
are, for example, passive job seekers, who 
are seeking work but do not qualify as unem-
ployed because they did not seek work in the 
previous four weeks of the survey using an 
active job search method, or are not immedi-
ately available for work in the next two weeks. 
There are also discouraged workers who do 
not seek work because of the belief that no 
work is available. Other groups of inactive in-
clude those who have retired, those declaring 
personal or family responsibilities, those who 
are ill or have a disability, those in education 
and training, or those who have other or no 
reasons for not seeking work. 
Some of these inactive want to work. Al-
though they may be limited by the extent of 
constrained choices, the willingness to work 
is lower for older people than for prime age 
people. Still, according to the LFS, almost 
6% of the inactive (3% of the older worker 
population) within the 55-64 group would 
nevertheless like to have work (chart 115). If 
these were added to the labour force today the 
activity rate of older workers would increase 
by more than 3 percentage points. There are 
also the unemployed (already in the labour 
force) who are actively seeking work and im-
mediately available. If both these groups were 
to be in work, 2.5 million additional people 
aged 55-64 would join the existing occupied 
population and the employment rate of older 
Table 53 – Employment and participation rates of older workers in 2002 (preliminary results)
Employment rates
(% population aged 55-64)
Activity rates
(% population aged 55-64)
Total Male Female Total Male Female
EU15 40.1 50.1 30.5 42.8 53.4 32.5
B 26.7 36.1 17.6 27.8 37.6 18.4
DK 57.8 64.5 50.4 60.4 67.0 52.9
D 38.4 47.1 29.9 43.0 52.3 33.9
EL 39.7 56.0 24.4 41.4 58.1 25.5
E 39.7 58.6 22.0 42.7 62.2 24.4
F 34.8 39.3 30.6 36.7 41.8 31.9
IRL 48.1 65.1 30.8 49.3 66.7 31.6
l 28.9 41.3 17.3 30.2 43.0 18.1
L 28.3 37.9 18.6 28.3 37.9 18.6
NL 42.3 54.6 29.9 43.3 55.8 30.6
A 30.0 39.8 20.9 31.8 42.9 21.5
P 50.9 61.2 41.9 52.9 63.5 43.5
FIN 47.8 48.5 47.2 52.1 53.0 51.2
S 68.0 70.4 65.6 71.2 74.3 68.2
UK 53.5 62.6 44.7 55.4 65.4 45.7
AC1O 30.5 41.2 21.4 33.1 45.0 23.0
AC12 31.6 41.1 23.5 34.0 44.6 25.0
EU25 38.7 48.9 29.1 41.4 52.3 31.1
EU27 38.5 48.5 29.0 41.1 51.8 31.0
CY 49.2 67.0 32.1 50.8 68.8 33.7
CZ 40.8 57.3 26.0 42.5 59.4 27.3
EE 51.6 58.4 46.5 55.7 63.7 49.8
HU 26.6 36.7 18.5 27.5 38.2 18.9
LT 41.6 51.5 34.1 46.9 59.8 37.2
LV 41.7 50.5 35.2 46.3 57.1 38.2
PL 26.1 34.5 18.9 29.1 38.7 20.9
SI 24.5 35.4 14.2 25.2 36.7 14.5
SK 22.8 39.1 9.5 26.9 46.3 11.1
BG 27.0 37.0 18.2 31.8 43.7 21.5
RO 37.3 42.7 32.6 37.9 43.9 32.8
Source: Annual averages based on LFS, Eurostat.
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workers would go up by 6 percentage points. 
This would represent half of the increase 
needed between 2001 and 2010 to reach the 
50% employment rate target by the end of 
the decade.
In recent years more than half, on average, 
of the EU older workers (aged 55-64) who 
had been in employment before but were 
no longer occupied, declared that retirement 
- both early and normal - was the main reason 
for not currently being at work. The next 
two most common reasons related to “own 
illness or disability” and “dismissed or made 
redundant”. 
Half of the total number of inactive aged 55-
64 declared that they do not seek employment 
because of retirement reasons (chart 116)118. 
Also, about 15% of the total inactive aged 55-
64 in the EU in 2001 have no previous work 
experience (a quarter in the case of women 
and only 2% in the case of men) and their 
educational attainment levels are low. About 
90% of the inactive with no work experience 
have less than upper secondary education 
completed and are therefore classified as 
low-skilled, compared to those with work 
experience, where only half can be described 
as low-skilled. 
Obviously, the increase needed in participa-
tion does not necessarily have to come from 
bringing the older inactive into the labour 
force. Increasing activity rates for older people 
is likely to be more a question of keeping older 
workers in the labour force longer. Many still 
withdraw at relatively young ages. 
The Barcelona target: 
delaying the average exit 
from the labour force
The 2002 Barcelona Council concluded that 
“a progressive increase of about five years in 
the effective average age at which people stop 
working119 in the European Union should be 
sought by 2010”. In other words, it requires 
118 It is worthwhile to recall here that „retirement“ is an additional LFS reason for „not seeking employment“. These old inactive people may receive a pension but this does not imply the opposite for others still 
in the labour force. 
119 “Stop working” is interpreted as the act of withdrawing from the labour force (employment or unemployment) into inactivity - as many people are actively seeking employment and are available for work 
at these ages.
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an increase of five years in the average age 
at which older workers withdraw from the 
labour force into inactivity. The withdrawal 
from the labour force mirrors the trend of the 
activity rate of older workers.
Based on activity rates by individual year 
squarterly LFS data, the model to calculate 
the average exit age from the labour force 
(see Annex 1) is built on probabilities for 
individuals in each same age cohort to stay 
active in period t (compared to period t-1). 
The probability distribution ranges between 
50 (equal or above 50 years of age), below 
which the probability of staying active is 
100%, and 70 (equal or higher than 70 years 
of age) where the probability of remaining 
active is assumed to be 0%.
Under these assumptions, the results show 
that the average exit age from the labour 
force for the EU was 59.9 years in 2001, the 
first year for which the necessary data to 
perform these calculations were available120. 
Thus, to meet the Barcelona target the bulk 
of exits should be delayed until the age of 65 
by 2010. A wide variety of exit ages are observ-
able across Member States, ranging from the 
lowest in Belgium and Luxembourg to the 
highest in Ireland. However, no country has 
an average exit age above the required EU-
wide average of 65. The 2001 results show 
that, in all countries, men exit the labour 
force on average about 1.5 years later than 
women (chart 117).
The results from this model do not refer to the 
effective retirement age. Instead, they provide 
an estimate of the average exit age from the 
labour force for an active person aged be-
tween 50 and 70, regardless of whether they 
are receiving a pension or not121. Therefore, 
the average exit age from the labour market 
may be higher than the average age of effec-
tive retirement into pension. 
For the current EU15 members, a very simple 
simulation shows that to reach the Barcelona 
target about two thirds of those who were 
between 46 and 55 years-old in 2001 should 
still be active (in the labour force) in 2010 
when they will be 55-64. This contrasts with a 
comparable cohort of 1991 of which only half 
remained active between the ages of 55-64 in 
2001. This implies that between 24-26 million 
people of the 38 million 46-55 year-olds in the 
labour force in 2001 would need still to be ac-
tive in 2010, which represents an increase of 
7-9 million compared to the labour force aged 
55-64 of 2001. 
More explicitly, the average exit age in the EU 
was 59.9 in 2001. At the age of 60 the actual 
activity rate was approximately 36%. At the 
age of 65 the activity rate stood at about 10%. 
The scenario simulates a five-year shift in the 
activity rate corresponding to the average exit 
age in 2001 (36%). This activity rate would 
now represent the minimum EU activity rate 
for a 65 year-old in 2010. The fall in the activ-
ity rate between those aged 56 in 2001 (the 
65 year-olds nine years later in 2010) and the 
minimum activity rate for those aged 65 in 
2010 is assumed to be linear. The reduction in 
the speed of the fall in the activity rate from 
62% (activity rate of 56 year-olds in 2001) 
to 36% (activity rate of 65 year-olds in 2010) 
would result in an overall increase in the 
activity rate for the 55-64 age group. This in-
crease in participation is then weighted by the 
projected population of the 55-64 year-olds in 
2010 to obtain a rough estimate of the labour 
force of older workers in that age group re-
quired in 2010 (about 24-26 million).
This simple simulation should be seen as 
indicating an order of magnitude rather than 
120 The 2001 calculations are based on annual averages of the activity rates by single age from the quarterly Community LFS 2000 and 2001. Due to the unavailability of quarterly LFS data, comparable estimates 
for previous years cannot be provided. 
121 The Labour Force Survey (LFS) includes people receiving a pension but who are at work (at least one hour in the reference week). This happens when pensioners work part-time (e.g. to complement their 
pensions) and depending on the existing regulations governing the possibility to combine work and retirement. The LFS would also include older workers receiving a pension while being unemployed. There 
are also self-employed and family workers who stay active until relatively high ages.
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giving an exact number for at least three rea-
sons. Firstly, the Barcelona target does not im-
ply a fixed number of active people to be in the 
labour force by 2010, as the average exit age is 
based on the relative performance of different 
successive cohorts resulting from changes in 
participation between one year and another 
rather than on the level of participation as 
such. Secondly, this simulation looks only 
at the 55-64 age group to highlight better 
the similarities between the Stockholm and 
Barcelona targets, while changes in participa-
tion at the upper (65-69) and lower (50-54) 
boundaries of the exit age will alter the results 
in different ways. Thirdly, uneven activity pat-
terns in the single-age cohorts of the age-class 
55-64 will also lead to a change in the average 
exit age from the labour force. To understand 
the workings of the model better, different 
scenarios are presented in Annex 2.
Older workers in acceding countries with-
draw earlier from the labour force than 
in most of the existing EU Member States. 
Preliminary results from the exit model show 
that of the 10 acceding countries, the average 
exit age is above the EU’s in Cyprus, Estonia, 
Latvia and Slovenia and below it in the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland and Slo-
vakia. The inclusion of these countries today 
(using 2001 data) would reduce the EU15 exit 
age from 59.9 to 59.6. Generally speaking, 
their average exit age from active life is now 
slightly lower than in the EU15. 
In many of the acceding countries participa-
tion was traditionally very high. For instance, 
the activity rate for 55-64 year olds in Poland 
back in 1970 was as high as 72% and had 
dropped to 30% 30 years later. In 2002, the 
activity rate for older workers in acceding 
countries stood at 33% compared to 43% in 
the EU15. The ongoing restructuring process 
has led to a decline in activity rates from 
the high levels of the late 1980s and early 
1990s that has mostly affected older workers. 
Contrary to the EU where participation has 
since then increased for older workers, it is 
likely that the fall in activity rates in acceding 
countries, on average, has led to a parallel 
decline in the average exit age from the la-
bour force.122 Also, the apparent consistency 
between low employment rates and low exit 
ages from the labour force observed in EU 
Table 54 – Life expectancy at the age of 60 and average exit age from the labour force in the 
EU and Aceeding countries (AC10)
Life expectancy at 60 In 2000
Average exit age from the labour
force in 2001 (měn and women)Men Women
B 19.3 23.8 57.0
DK 18.9 22.3 61.8
D 19.2 23.4 60.7
EL 20.1 23.1 59.6
E 19.8 24.5 60.6
F 20.2 25.3 58.1
IRL 18.3 21.9 62.9
I 19.7 24.1 59.4
L 19.3 24.1 56.8
NL 19.1 23.4 61.0
A 20.0 23.9 59.5
P 18.5 22.6 62.1
FIN 19.2 23.6 61.5
S 20.7 24.3 62.1
UK 19.4 23.0 62.0
CY 19.5 22.7 62.3
CZ 17.0 21.2 59.2
EE 15.4 20.9 61.1
HU 15.3 20.2 57.9
LT 16.8 21.9 57.8
LV 15.3 20.8 62.2
PL 16.7 21.4 56.6
SL 17.6 22.7 61.5
SK 15.9 20.6 57.9
EU15 19.3 23.7 59.9
Source: Life expectancy, demographic stati stí es, Eurostat. l, 1996; EU, CY, 1997; D, E, EL, F, 1999; remaining 
countries, 2000. Average exit age from the labour force, methodology, DG Employment and Eurostat. See Annex 1.
122 For older workers (aged 55-64), who have been in employment before but are not occupied now, “retirement” was the single most important reason (70% of them) quoted for not having been at work in 
2002.
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Member States may not hold entirely in all 
acceding countries because of their higher 
unemployment rates.
Moreover, life expectancy at the age of 60 is 
clearly below that of the EU (table 54). In rela-
tive terms, people in acceding countries spend 
less time in inactivity after withdrawing from 
the labour force than their EU counterparts. 
Their population is still younger than in the 
EU but ageing faster. Thus, although EU cur-
rent members are in a comparatively worse 
situation in terms of the economic costs of 
pension systems today, the need to delay exits 
from the labour force will soon be essential in 
acceding countries.
Complementary and 
different aspects of 
the Barcelona and 
Stockholm targets
The Barcelona and Stockholm target for 
older workers are broadly complementary 
(chart 118) - they both require an increase in 
participation.
But there are some differences. The Stock-
holm target is about increasing the level of 
employment of those aged 55-64. This can 
be achieved by reductions in both unemploy-
ment and inactivity rates for older people and 
is monitored through the employment rate. 
The Barcelona target is about delaying the 
age at which individuals withdraw from the 
labour force into inactivity and is monitored 
by changes in the activity rate. As the latter 
is calculated looking only at those who are 
active (in the labour force), countries such 
as the Netherlands for example, with low par-
ticipation rates for older workers could have 
relatively higher exit ages. 
The Stockholm target relates to the perfor-
mance of the age-specific group of 55-64 year 
olds over time. The Barcelona target relates to 
the comparison of the relative performance 
of different cohorts in relation to slowing 
down the natural fall in their activity rate 
as they grow older (i.e. delaying exits). For 
instance, to determine whether the exit age 
will increase or decrease in 2002 what mat-
ters is not so much the increase in the activity 
rate in 2002 compared to 2001 but the rela-
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tive performance of the 2001 cohorts in 2002 
compared with the performance of the 2000 
cohorts in 2001. If the expected natural fall 
in the activity rate (as one gets older) for the 
50-70 cohorts of 2001 is less strong than for 
the cohorts of 2000, then the average exit age 
should increase.
The model to calculate the average exit age 
from the labour force also includes the un-
employed (6% of the 55-64 year-old labour 
force in EU15). Contrary to statistics on 
unemployment benefit recipients who may 
include people in de facto early retirement, 
the unemployed here considered are actively 
seeking employment and are immediately 
available for work (ILO concept). Thus, they 
have not decided to stop working and leave 
the labour market in the Barcelona sense. 
These unemployed may go back to employ-
ment when jobs become available.123 With a 
few exceptions (Denmark, Germany, Finland, 
Austria and Sweden) unemployment rates for 
older workers are below those of prime-age 
workers (25-54). In all Member States, how-
ever, the probability of older workers once 
they become unemployed remaining so for 12 
months or longer (long-term) is significantly 
higher (60%).
The employment rate for older men is low 
(49% in 2001), but substantially higher than 
the 29% rate for women in the same year. The 
employment gap stands above 20 percent-
age points. Moreover, men generally exit the 
labour force at a later age than women. At 
the EU level the average exit age in 2001 was 
60.5 for men and 59.1 for women. This gap 
seems narrow considering that older inactive 
women (71%) significantly out-numbered 
older inactive men (51%). The explanation 
lies in the fact that significantly more women 
than men have never previously been in the 
labour force and the exit age unequivocally re-
lates to withdrawals from it. In Italy or Spain, 
for instance, exit ages of men and women are 
broadly similar although the gender-gaps in 
the participation of older people are among 
the highest in the EU. Thus, not only do low 
activity and employment rates not have to be 
in contradiction with relatively higher exit 
ages but also substantial gender differences in 
activity rates can co-exist with small gender 
differences in exit ages from the labour force.
The Stockholm target refers to those aged 55-
64. To monitor the average age of withdrawal 
from the labour force, the age threshold 
to measure the Barcelona target should be 
broader (50-70). The 50-54 age group needs 
to be included because from the age of 50 it 
is possible to observe significant falls in par-
ticipation – and transitions from the labour 
force into inactivity are already high. The 
activity rate for 50 year-olds in the EU was 
79% in 2001 but had dropped to 65% for 55 
year-olds in the same year. Also, those above 
65 in the labour force are also included in the 
calculation, almost two thirds of whom are 
self-employed and family workers.
Different scenarios showing the consistency 
between the Stockholm and Barcelona targets 
are presented in annex 2. 
Past developments in 
participation of older 
workers
To give a historical perspective of how partici-
pation for different groups and gender have 
evolved during the past 30 years, one can look 
at the change in activity rates between 1970 
and 2000 using data from the International 
Labour Organisation (chart 119).
123 For instance, in Germany the employment rate for older workers is below the EU average but the exit age is above average - this can be partly explained by the high (12%) unemployment rate for this group 
of workers.
Table 55 – Activity rates (% population aged 55-64) 
1970 1980 1995 2000 
Total Men Women Total Men Women Total Men Women Total Men Women 
B 39.1 67.7 13.5 38.2 64.7 14.1 23.9 34.9 13.5 27.1 37.5 17.1 
DK 60.2 88.2 34.2 58.0 76.0 41.3 54.6 70.3 40.2 58.2 66.7 49.0 
D 51.9 80.7 31.3 47.8 69.8 33.0 42.9 54.4 31.5 42.9 52.4 33.5 
EL 45.6 74.8 19.3 44.0 71.9 20.3 42.4 61.8 24.7 40.2 57.1 25.0 
E 47.6 81.4 18.6 47.0 76.2 21.2 35.6 54.0 18.6 39.5 59.0 21.4 
F 50.8 68.1 35.5 53.5 68.6 40.1 31.9 36.5 27.5 32.1 36.0 28.3 
IRL 55.6 88.8 21.5 49.8 81.7 19.2 42.3 64.4 20.2 46.5 65.1 27.9 
1 39.5 66.0 15.5 37.7 61.2 17.3 29.5 46.4 14.1 29.0 42.8 16.1 
L 36.3 58.5 16.7 30.2 47.2 16.6 23.7 35.1 12.7 27.0 37.9 16.4 
NL 44.0 76.4 14.8 38.5 63.3 16.1 30.0 41.1 19.0 39.0 51.2 26.7 
A 41.4 64.1 24.4 37.0 56.8 23.6 30.8 44.0 18.7 30.5 43.6 18.1 
P 45.6 83.6 13.7 50.0 70.9 32.0 47.2 63.0 33.4 52.4 64.5 41.8 
FIN 54.3 68.2 43.5 46.6 53.1 41.7 42.9 44.6 41.4 45.8 47.3 44.4 
S 59.5 82.4 37.3 66.6 79.5 54.3 65.1 68.6 61.9 68.6 72.1 65.2 
UK 59.2 87.7 33.8 61.8 84.2 41.4 51.3 62.4 40.7 53.0 63.4 42.9 
EU15 49.9 76.9 27.3 49.1 71.2 30.7 39.1 51.4 27.4 40.7 51.5 30.2 
Source:  ILO, „Economically Active Population Estimates and Projections: 1950-2010“ for 1970 and 1980. Eurostat, LFS, for 1995 and 2000.
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Participation for prime age women (aged 
25-54) increased strikingly in all 15 Member 
States, ranging from Finland that had the 
lowest yet still very significant increase, to 
Portugal, with the highest. At the EU level, the 
prime age female activity rate of 44% in 1970 
had risen to about 72% 30 years later. There 
has been a slight beneficial knock-on effect 
for older women (aged 55-64) of this extraor-
dinary performance, but their labour force 
participation has been affected to a much 
lesser extent. Their activity rate increased 
in all Member States except for Austria and 
France, where there was a significant decline. 
At the EU level, the overall increase was mod-
est; it was up by about 3 percentage points.
A cross-sectional chart showing the female 
activity rate by age today will give the impres-
sion that the activity rate for women falls 
quite significantly before the age of 50, partic-
ularly so in countries where the female labour 
force has grown faster. Participation tends to 
fall with age but the activity pattern shown by 
women over 50 today is markedly different 
from that of younger women starting work 
today. The latter are highly educated and 
already have and will continue to have much 
higher levels of participation than previous 
generations. Rather than illustrating activity 
rates falling before the age of 50, the graph 
shows the contrast between generations of 
women: a highly educated group with high 
activity rates and a less educated group which 
is less active in the labour market.
For men, the evolution is quite the opposite. 
Participation fell in all 15 Member States by a 
similar degree. Unlike for women, the activity 
rate for prime age men in 1970 was as high 
as 97% and despite a fall, still remains well 
above 90% 30 years on. Together with the 
sharp increase in participation for prime age 
women, one of the most staggering features 
of the labour market over the past 30 years 
has been the important reduction in the num-
ber of male older workers (aged 55-64) in the 
labour force.
The EU activity rate for older male workers 
was as high as 77% in 1970 (table 55). In 
2000, only about 52% of the population of 
55-64 year olds was in the labour force. Not 
only was the population in this group increas-
ing quite rapidly (0.6% per annum), but also 
the labour force was decline even faster (-0.8 
per annum). The largest falls in participation 
of male older workers were seen in France, 
Belgium and Germany.
It is of interest to examine to what extent 
declining participation for older workers has 
affected the average age of withdrawal from 
the labour force. However, historical quarterly 
LFS data by single years are not available and 
these would be needed to analyse exits based 
on the annual probability model. These exits 
can be proxied by looking at participation 
developments by cohort, constructed by 
combining cross-sectional data at regular 
intervals. Existing Eurostat LFS data makes it 
possible to follow the 45-49 cohort of 1986 for 
12 Member States (EU12)124 up to 2001 when 
they were 60-64 year-old (chart 120).
Participation starts falling sharply from the 
age of 50. The evolution of the male cohort 
clearly reflects this trend. In 1986, 45-49 year-
old men had activity rates above 90%. As this 
cohort aged, differences between countries in 
participation widened to between 49-79% for 
the 55-59 age group and between 11-56% for 
the 60-64 age group. The decline was stron-
gest in France, Luxembourg, Belgium and 
Italy and slowest in Portugal, Ireland, Spain, 
the UK and Denmark. 
For the female 1986 cohort, participation falls 
less sharply although the starting levels were 
also much lower. In contrast to men, differ-
ences between countries narrowed. In the EU, 
the lowest levels of labour force participation 
for the 45-49 1986 female cohort were those 
of Spain and Ireland. This cohort remained 
in the labour force longer reaching activ-
ity rates above the EU average 15 years later. 
The strongest declines occurred in Belgium, 
124 Eurostat LFS data in the starting year is not available for Austria, Sweden and Finland. 
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France, Luxembourg, Italy, Germany and the 
Netherlands. In Denmark and the UK, where 
the starting activity rate was very high, the 
decreases were also among the highest. 
To assess changes in performance across co-
horts, the generation of individuals aged 45-
49 in 1986 is compared to the preceding same 
age cohort who were 45-49 in 1981 and the 
subsequent cohort who were 45-49 in 1991. 
Developments for the male cohorts gener-
ally show little change, although two Member 
States stand out. In the Netherlands par-
ticipation for the 55-59 and 60-64 age groups 
increased significantly over the successive 
cohorts and the reduction in the speed of the 
fall of the activity rate was strong. In Italy, 
by contrast, the decline in participation was 
sharp for the 1986 and 1991 cohorts.
For the female cohorts it is important to 
distinguish between the increase in the level 
of participation and the speed of the decline 
as they get older. Younger generations of 
women have activity rates higher than their 
predecessors. At the EU level, the activity rate 
of the 45-49 1991 cohort is higher than for the 
1986 and 1981 cohorts. However, as shown by 
the parallel lines (similar slopes), the speed of 
the reduction in participation as they get older 
is broadly similar across the three cohorts. As 
the average exit age depends on the relative 
numbers of those leaving to those staying, it 
could well be that this strong generational 
shift does not translate into a significant 
positive change in exit behaviour - a higher 
exit age - while it will certainly increase the 
female employment rate. It would all depend 
on the speed of the decline in participation at 
the end of the working life (i.e. if this offsets 
the increase in the activity rate from the gen-
erational push).
In Denmark, a marked positive trend of 
younger female cohorts staying longer in 
the labour market seems to have occurred 
- there was both an increase in the level and 
a flattening of the line indicating a slowdown 
in the speed of the fall for the 1991 cohort. 
Although less marked, such an apparent shift 
for women has also occurred in Ireland, the 
Netherlands and to a certain extent in Ger-
many and Portugal.
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The role of educational 
attainment levels
When do older workers leave 
the labour market?
In general, the higher the educational level, 
the higher the employment and activity rates 
and the lower the unemployment rate. 
EU-wide, the total employment rate (15-64 
age-group) for those who have completed 
tertiary education (high-skilled) was 83% 
in 2001. People having completed upper sec-
ondary education (medium-skilled) showed 
an employment rate of about 70%, whereas 
fewer than one in two of those with less than 
upper secondary education (low-skilled) was 
in work in 2001 (chart 121).
The employment rate for high-skilled older 
workers aged 55-64 was twice as high (61%) 
as for the low-skilled (31%). This sizeable 
difference pertains to both men and women 
(chart 122). Although the employment rate 
for women is below that of men for every edu-
cational level, the probability of older women 
who have completed tertiary education being 
in employment compared to older women 
with less than an upper secondary education 
is comparatively greater than for older men. 
In other words, low-skilled older women seem 
to be at a greater disadvantage when it comes 
to employment than low-skilled older men. 
Not only do older workers in acceding coun-
tries have very low employment rates, but 
also disparities between those who have com-
pleted tertiary education and those with less 
than upper education secondary are stark. 
For the group of 10 acceding countries, the 
employment rate of low-skilled older workers 
is as low as 19% (14% for women) whereas for 
high-skilled workers it is about 56% (45% for 
women). In addition, in the context of ever-
increasing demand for a more qualified work-
force and the ongoing restructuring process 
which has heightened disparities between 
the low and the high-skilled, one of the most 
important tools to cope with these changes, 
training, is generally under-utilised. 
In addition to having lower employment and 
participation rates overall, low-skilled older 
workers also leave the labour force earlier 
than their high-skilled counterparts. In other 
words, not only do activity and employment 
rates increase the higher the educational 
levels, but also the average exit age from the 
labour force is higher.
The probability model used to calculate aver-
age exit ages from the labour force by gender 
also allows, with certain limitations, the aver-
age exit age to be calculated by educational 
attainment levels. These ages have been 
calculated for those in the labour force having 
completed tertiary education (high-skilled), 
upper secondary education (medium-skilled) 
and lower secondary or no education (low-
skilled).
At the EU15 level, the average exit age for the 
high-skilled was estimated at 62.3 years in 
2001. For medium-skilled workers the aver-
age exit age was estimated at 60.3 years and 
for low-skilled workers at 58.7 years. As will 
be shown, this is due not to a shorter, more 
compressed employment career for the low-
skilled but rather to a working life that starts 
a few years earlier than for the high-skilled.
When did today’s older 
workers start working?
Based on the available empirical evidence, the 
fact that low-skilled workers start working 
earlier is indisputable. According to the ISCED 
educational classification used by Eurostat 
in the EU Labour Force Survey, low-skilled 
workers refer to persons in employment who 
have completed less than upper secondary 
education. High-skilled workers are those 
who have completed tertiary education tak-
ing a few additional years after the end of 
compulsory education (typically at age 15-16) 
to do so. Clearly, the fact that there are almost 
no high-skilled workers aged 15-19 in employ-
ment in the EU and that about 60% of them 
are low-skilled (40% medium-skilled) shows 
Table 56 – How old were you when you began your working life, that is started your first job or business?
55-64 35-44
Average
age total men women low skilled high skilled total men women low skilled high skilled
EU 18.7 18.2 19.3 18.0 21.2 19.8 19.6 20.1 18.6 22.0
D 18.5 18.7 18.2 17.4 20.7 19.6 19.7 19.6 19.4 21.1
DK 16.7 16.6 16.8 15.4 19.5 18.8 18.4 19.2 17.3 21.0
NL 20.8 19.5 22.4 20.7 22.5 21.8 20.7 23.0 21.7 23.4
B 19.5 19.1 20.0 17.8 22.3 20.5 20.1 20.9 17.7 22.6
F 19.0 19.1 18.9 17.6 25.6 20.6 20.2 21.1 19.3 24.4
UK 17.4 17.8 17.1 16.3 19.2 19.0 19.3 18.7 17.0 20.5
IRL 17.2 17.2 17.2 16.3 20.1 17.7 17.9 17.5 16.8 20.0
I 20.8 19.0 22.9 19.9 26.6 21.2 21.0 21.5 19.5 27.4
EL 22.2 20.0 24.9 21.6 24.2 21.8 20.8 22.9 20.4 24.5
E 17.6 15.5 20.1 16.7 21.3 18.4 17.6 19.2 16.6 21.9
P 17.7 15.2 20.0 17.0 23.2 18.2 16.5 19.9 17.0 23.6
A 16.4 15.8 17.0 16.8 23.4 17.4 17.2 17.6 16.6 24.0
FIN 18.1 17.4 18.9 16.7 21.4 19.9 19.7 20.1 17.0 22.0
Source: ECHP (variable: PE039), UDB, version June 2003, wave 7 (2000).
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that the latter start working earlier than the 
former.125. 
Low-skilled workers start working and 
withdraw from the labour force earlier than 
their high-skilled counterparts, but do today’s 
low-skilled older workers – who are close to 
their average exit age from the labour force 
fairly represent the cohort of young workers 
back in 1960? If they do it would be possible to 
establish that these low-skilled workers have 
been in the labour force for as many, or pos-
sibly more, years than the high-skilled.126
In 1960, the activity rate of the people aged 15-
19 was as high as 63% (chart 123). Two issues 
should be highlighted. First, participation for 
this group then was as high as for prime age 
workers (the 25-54 age group). Secondly, all 
of these workers aged 15-19 were medium- 
and low-skilled. 
Participation for the different groups of 15-19 
year-olds has declined in the past 40 years. 
What is important to note, however, is that 
the activity rate of the 1960 15-19 cohort was 
high and that it increased all along as they 
grew older to the extent that 55-59 year-olds 
in 2000 had an activity rate of 57% which 
was not much below what they had 40 years 
earlier at the age of 15-19. While recognising 
that participation for this cohort also includes 
medium and high-skilled, it is evident that 
because activity rates for prime age workers 
have been on the rise, such high rates would 
not be possible without the low-skilled being 
part of it. The labour force of the 15-19 1960 
cohort in 2000 (at the age of 55-59) repre-
sented as much as 80% of the labour force of 
this back in 1960.
The European Community Household Panel 
allows the average age at which people began 
their working-life to be calculated. The results 
show that among today’s (2000) 55-64 year-
olds, low-skilled workers were at work at the 
age of 18, three years earlier than their high-
skilled counterparts. Country differences 
are large (some reflecting the existence of 
apprenticeship systems) but the difference 
is most marked for France where those with 
less than upper secondary education, the low-
skilled, started working-life eight years earlier 
than those who had completed tertiary educa-
tion, the high-skilled (table 56). 
At the EU level, about half the low-skilled aged 
55-64 in 2000 began working before the age 
of 16 (chart 124). For the 35-44 year-olds of 
2000, the proportion of low-skilled at work 
before the age of 16 was less than a quarter. 
Empirical evidence also shows that as years 
go by, and depending on country-specific 
ages of compulsory education, all educational 
groups started working life a bit later than 
before (although this is more marked for the 
high-skilled). 
It is important to note that there are some 
high-skilled workers who have been active as 
early as some of the low-skilled. ECHP results 
show that as many as 13% of the high-skilled 
aged 55-64 in 2000 started their working life 
before the age of 16 - maybe by combining 
education with work. Thus, even though 
the bulk of people in employment before 16, 
who are now close to exit age, are low-skilled, 
there are still a number of high-skilled work-
ers who have been in the labour force for at 
least 40 years.
The evidence presented shows that while, 
at the EU level, the average exit age for the 
low-skilled is about three years below the 
high-skilled, this is compensated for by the 
fact that their working life also started three 
years earlier (chart 125). More importantly, 
one could even argue that low-skilled work-
ers, on average, are in the labour force for 
a longer period than high-skilled workers. 
The 2001 estimates from the model suggest 
that low-skilled workers withdraw three to 
four years before the high-skilled. Given that 
compulsory education ends at the age of 15-
16 and that completion of studies leading to 
tertiary education requires no less than four 
years (i.e. a progressive increase in the age of 
completion of tertiary studies), it is therefore 
reasonable to assume that the low-skilled 
spend more years of active life than the high-
125 For the whole group of 15-24 year-olds in employment in 2001, 36% were low-skilled, 54% medium-skilled and only 10% were high-skilled. In terms of the population in the same age group (including inac-
tive and unemployed), the shares were 49%, 44% and 7%, respectively.
126 With the EU LFS it is not possible to quantify the number of years a person has been in employment before they withdraw from the labour force. The only available characteristic is related to time spent with 
the current employer. Also, because of lack of historical educational data (ISCED) in the EU LFS before 1992, some simple assumptions will have to be made to establish such a relation.
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skilled before they definitively withdraw from 
the labour force. As the self-employed, which 
includes almost a quarter of all older workers 
aged 55-64, are more likely to remain active at 
higher ages than employees, those with low 
qualifications have probably spent the longest 
period of activity of all groups.
Different patterns in participation are not 
limited to the comparison between the high- 
and the low-skilled. Even among the latter, 
participation developments for the 15-19 
cohort were different in 1960 and in 1992. As 
mentioned earlier, the activity rate of the 1960 
15-19 cohort was more than twice the rate of 
the equivalent 1992 cohort. Both cohorts 
were mainly made up of low-skilled workers 
and participation increased in both although 
to a very different extent, due to contrasting 
starting levels. In 1970, the activity rate for 
the 1960 15-19 cohort (72%), at the age of 25-
29, was almost as high as the activity rate of 
the 1992 15-19 cohort of low-skilled workers 
10 years later in 2002 (77%), at the age of 25-
29. This suggests that low-skilled workers of 
the beginning of the 1990s joined the labour 
force later than low-skilled workers 30 years 
earlier. The fact that the increase in participa-
tion for the former was much steeper than 
for the latter does not allow any conclusions 
to be drawn as to whether the 1992 cohort 
will withdraw later from the labour force. 
This will only be known in about 30 years 
from now. What it does clearly show is the a 
priori disadvantage of the 1960 15-19 cohort 
if the average exit age be pushed towards 65 
by 2010 because of the high share of active 
aged 15-19 in the population back in 1960 
compared to the comparable group of low-
skilled workers of 1992. 
Low-skilled workers are part of the economy 
and contribute importantly to the work of 
other skills groups. Labour force participa-
tion shall continue to increase as a necessary 
condition to reach the Lisbon targets. As most 
of the inactive are low-skilled, one could also 
expect an increase in the activity rate for this 
group, should the right conditions be there 
(i.e. removing obstacles for them to join the 
labour force as well as the existence of labour 
demand).
The apparent connection between today’s 
(mainly) low-skilled older workers - whose 
average exit age was estimated at about 59 in 
2001 - and the young workers of 1960 raises 
other relevant issues. From an economic 
point of view it would be questionable to as-
sume that increasing the average exit age to 
65 by 2010 for all groups in an indiscriminate 
way would have the same positive effect on 
raising productivity. Arguably, productiv-
ity would increase more if more high-skilled 
older workers are kept in the labour force 
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than low-skilled workers. Also, as low-skilled 
workers spend at least as long, if not longer, as 
the high-skilled in active life, raising their exit 
age to 65 would clearly extend their working 
life even further. 
Another aspect of quality that is often over-
looked is health. The 1999 ad-hoc module to 
the LFS on “work-related health problems and 
accidental injuries” shows that, adjusting for 
age and gender, the standardised prevalence 
rate of work-related health problems increase 
with age (chart 126). A breakdown by occu-
pational structure reveals that musculo-skel-
etal disorders mostly concern service workers 
and elementary occupations. In contrast, the 
incidence of stress-related health problems 
is more predominant for high-skilled, non-
manual occupations. This is particularly 
important in the context of work organisa-
tion and working time flexibility. If quality 
concerns related to health are not taken into 
account, there could be an unwanted loss in 
labour productivity as a result of an expected 
increase in the number of working days lost. 
Moreover, and also partly because of the age-
ing of the labour force, the margin for the EU 
to meet the Stockholm and Barcelona targets 
will be squeezed and the objectives of higher 
employment and delayed withdrawals would 
be put at risk.
Finally, some national studies show that, in 
addition to sex and region, life expectancy 
also depends on the socio-professional char-
acteristics of the individual as well as on 
their educational attainment levels. Those 
having completed tertiary education have a 
life expectancy above the average population, 
and therefore higher than the low-skilled, and 
also lower mortality rates (for the 45-64 age-
class). Thus, the fact that the low-skilled exit 
earlier than the high-skilled from the labour 
force does not say anything about the length 
that both groups would spend in inactive life 
once they have withdrawn. It would therefore 
be inaccurate to say that the low-skilled will 
draw from public pensions for a longer period 
than the high-skilled.
Training and its 
relationship with the 
average exit age from the 
labour force
As shown earlier, participation and employ-
ment for older workers and average exit 
ages are higher the more “formally” qualified 
the person is. Initial levels of educational at-
tainment cannot alone explain the average 
withdrawal from active life. Arguably, labour 
demand changes and the need for certain 
specific type of skills to adapt to new demand 
patterns becomes more important. Training 
in this context emerges as a powerful tool for 
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employers to increase the average productiv-
ity of their workforce. This is important for 
older workers, for whom evidence points to 
significantly lower training levels (5%) than 
for prime-age workers (chart 127). Only in the 
Nordic countries and the UK, does the share of 
older workers in training exceed 10%.
Moreover, the high-skilled receive more 
training than the low-skilled. According to 
the 2001 LFS, less than 2% of older workers 
aged 55-64 with at most upper secondary 
education received training in the four weeks 
preceding the survey. For older workers hav-
ing completed tertiary education, the share 
was five times higher (about 10%). 
One plausible explanation for the low level of 
training received by older workers could be 
the generally low average exit age from the 
labour force. There are some empirical signs 
to support this statement. For the majority of 
Member States, the share of workers above 
50 in the labour force who are participating 
in education and training is greater where 
the average age of withdrawal from active to 
inactive life is higher (chart 128).127
However, the causality could also go in the op-
posite direction (i.e. lack of training resulting 
in lack of marketable skills and lower demand 
for them). In fact, the graph raises two ques-
tions: are older workers staying longer in em-
ployment because training to meet demand 
for particular skills has increased their em-
ployability and productivity?; or, is training 
provided because employers do not expect 
an early withdrawal from the labour force of 
their employees and decided to invest in them 
foreseeing a longer pay-off time period?
Research128 shows that ageing increases 
training efforts by employers for younger 
groups because they become numerically 
less important/costly (compared to older 
groups) rather than being imposed by the 
need to cope with hypothetical declining 
productivity in the future. It also shows that 
there isn’t any significant increase in training 
efforts for older workers because retirement 
limits the time span pay-off period. Indeed, 
reforms aimed at delaying the age at which 
older workers withdraw from the labour force 
into inactivity are likely to raise incentives for 
life-long learning.129
There could be another reason that older 
workers receive less training than prime-age 
workers related to the higher job-mobility 
of the latter compared to the former (chart 
129). Some of the underlying benefits in 
savings should show in lower recruitment 
and training costs for older workers. In 
2001, almost 70% of older workers in the EU 
had been with the same employer for more 
than 10 years, compared to just above 40% 
for prime age workers. Moreover, less than 
2% of older workers aged 55-64 already in 
employment were looking for another job, 
compared to more than 5% of prime age 
employees. It could be argued that lower job 
mobility (increased employment stability) 
and the consequent increase in the know-
how of the employee could also have positive 
effects on their productivity, which in turn, 
would diminish the need or justification for 
more training. Undoubtedly, more experience 
should lead to higher productivity, which, all 
other things being equal, could compensate 
for a lower training level.
There is no empirical evidence that older 
workers are more or less productive than 
other age groups. If they were less produc-
tive, then training should provide some of the 
tools needed to reverse the trend. The OECD’s 
International Adult Literacy Survey (IALS) 
provides an important piece of empirical 
evidence to show the relationship between 
age, productivity and training. Its analysis 
suggests that literacy skills measured by 
the IALS are a key determinant of worker’s 
productivity and that these skills improved 
with practice and deteriorated if not used. As 
a result, evidence proves that the productivity 
potential of older workers is not impaired by 
age but by skills obsolescence – something 
that can be corrected through training. 
127 The share of workers above 50 years of age in the labour force is used for comparability reasons with the average exit age from the labour force, for which the age-bracket refers to 50 to 70 years of age.
128 “Ageing of the labour force: which implications for productivity, training or wages at a macro level?” Didier Blanchet, INED and INSEE.
129 “Increasing employment: The role of later retirement”. OECD Economic Oultook 72.
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Sectoral employment 
structure for older 
workers
At the EU level, more than 7% of total employ-
ment for older workers (55-64) is accounted 
for by employment in agriculture (chart 130). 
While this age group has a share of about 10% 
of total employment in the EU, it accounts 
for as much as 20% of total employment in 
agriculture.
Older workers are not only over-represented 
in agricultural activities, they also unequivo-
cally out-number other groups when it comes 
to their employment share in more knowl-
edge-intensive sectors such as “Education”. 
There are significant differences in the sec-
toral pattern of employment of older workers 
across Member States but their specialisation 
in both “Agriculture“ and “Education“ seem 
to be common to all Member States with the 
exception of Greece and Portugal for the latter 
sector. 
With the sole exception of “Agriculture”, 
older workers today are not clustered 
around declining sectors, at least at the EU 
level. Another claim lacking any empirical 
backing is that younger workers and older 
workers are substitutes130. The fact that 
exits of older workers (55-64) and inflows 
of younger workers (15-24) do not occur in 
the same sectors suggests that this is not the 
case. Both changes in their specific sectoral 
employment structure as well as absolute 
growth rates over the past few years show 
that, although to a different degree, the posi-
tive or negative sign of employment change is 
generally the same for young and older work-
ers - except for “Hotels and restaurants” (chart 
131). Employment growth for older workers 
in most service sectors over the period 1997-
2001 superseded that of prime age workers. 
More specifically, growth was comparatively 
stronger in “Financial intermediation”, “Real 
estate, renting and business activities”, “Edu-
cation” and “Health and social work”. Clearly, 
these cannot be said to be declining economic 
activities. 
Furthermore, changes in labour supply will 
also affect future demand in some of these 
sectors. “Education” and “Health and social 
work” are particularly relevant in this respect. 
Demographic ageing is increasing the de-
mand for “Health and social work”. Also, the 
need for more education will increase labour 
demand in this sector. In the long run, higher 
educational levels of the youth population 
will translate into higher participation in the 
labour force at more advanced ages, which 
should also lead to a higher employment rate. 
As discussed earlier, not only do many of the 
older population who are currently not in em-
ployment have relatively lower educational 
attainment levels but also those in employ-
ment with low qualifications withdraw from 
the labour force earlier than their higher 
skilled counterparts.
By combining cross-sectional data at five-year 
intervals using spring LFS data, one can iden-
tify developments in sectoral employment 
patterns for older workers during 1997-2002. 
The cohort of workers aged 50-54 in 1997 is 
followed five years later in 2002 (at the age 
of 55-59). Almost 30% of the employment de-
cline in the 50-54 1997 cohort is accounted for 
by “Manufacturing”, followed by “Wholesale/
retail trade”, “Transport” and “Public admin-
istration”. In addition to these, “Health and 
social work” and “Education” also declined 
quite significantly in absolute terms for the 
1997 cohort of 55-59 year-olds (chart 132).
If the sector represents an important share 
of employment of older workers, the actual 
number of people leaving that sector as a per-
centage of the total number of older workers 
leaving is going to be higher than in sectors 
where their share is relatively smaller. Isolat-
ing the size-effect for the 50-54 1997 cohort, 
the same four large sectors (plus “Financial 
intermediation”) that account for the bulk of 
the number of exits in absolute terms are also 
at the top in relative terms. For the 55-59 1997 
cohort, “Manufacturing”, “Construction” and 
“Financial intermediation” were the sectors 
where the employment decline was greater 
in relative terms. For both cohorts of work-
ers, more than 80% of those who were not in 
130 In an address to the International Labour Conference, Geneva, 87th Session 15 June 1999 Mr. Amartya Sen, Nobel Laureate in Economics said: „There are many big issues to be faced in scrutinizing the 
proposals for revising the retiring age. That is a very big issue and I do not want to address it so off-handedly but I am just pointing out how conflicts are often seen when none might exist ... indeed, the 
combination of the gut reaction to the effect that the source of the problem of an ageing population is that the old cannot work with the gut reaction that the young must lose jobs if the older people did 
work is to provide a hopeless impasse which rides just on unexamined possibilities, based on a simple presumption of conflict that may or may not actually exist. I am afraid quite a lot of thinking on labour 
economics is really governed by presumption of conflicts which have not been thoroughly examined.“ 
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employment five years later had only upper 
secondary education or less. 
As Employment in Europe 2002131 showed, 
economic restructuring has had a heavy 
impact on the labour markets in accession 
countries. While a significant increase in 
employment in services has been achieved, it 
has not yet been sufficient to fully compensate 
for the ongoing adjustment of the important 
agricultural and industrial sectors, which 
remain the main employers in the acceding 
coutries. With the exception of Cyprus and the 
Czech Republic, employment rates are gener-
ally below the EU’s, and high unemployment 
is widespread in Bulgaria, Slovakia, Poland 
and Lithuania.
Low employment rates for older workers in 
many of the new Member States can be partly 
explained by the adjustment process within 
agricultural and industrial activities. Restruc-
turing in agriculture is expected to continue. 
Its importance in their economies remains 
significantly greater than for the EU132 and 
even more so for older workers. For the 10 
acceding countries as a whole, over 20% of 
employment of older workers is accounted for 
by agriculture (over a third for the accesion 
countries)compared to 7% for the EU’s older 
workers (chart 133).133 Structural adjustment 
is likely to continue after membership as 
the high share of agricultural workers is not 
usually reflected in a proportionately higher 
share of gross valued-added, with productiv-
ity levels very much below the EU’s. 
The service sector has been the main driving 
force for job creation in acceding countries, 
although there is still great potential for 
increasing employment in services to levels 
comparable to those of the EU. Increasing 
wealth should lead to higher demand for ser-
vices such as financial and business activities, 
hotels and restaurants and social services. It 
can also be expected that, as in the EU, more 
demand in services will also come from 
increases in female participation and popu-
lation ageing, which will stimulate demand 
for care provision, recreational activities and 
health care.
Conclusions
The population of the EU is ageing rapidly. 
Employment among older peoples is low and 
improvements in the employment rate 
have been modest to date. Moreover, many 
withdraw from the labour force at relatively 
early ages. Since the late 1970s Europe has 
witnessed a stark reduction in participation 
of older workers leading to an artificial rejuve-
nation of the labour force despite an increase 
in the median age of the total population. Cur-
rently, the ageing of both the total population 
and the active population moves in the same 
direction. 
As the baby boomers generation reach retire-
ment age, the number of workers leaving the 
labour force and going into retirement will 
increase markedly over the coming years. 
This, together with low fertility rates, below 
the level necessary for the replacement of 
generations, and increasing life-expectancy, 
will negatively affect the Member States’ 
ability to finance pension and health care 
systems as well as increase their cost. These 
features are also putting pressure on those in 
employment to be more productive in order 
to maintain rising living standards for the 
whole population.
In a context where people live for 20 years 
after withdrawing from active life, increas-
ing participation/employment will become 
crucial. To address these issues, The EU has 
set itself two important objectives: to increase 
the employment rate of older workers to 50% 
by 2010 (Stockholm target) and to delay by 
five years the age at which older workers 
withdraw from the labour force by 2010 (Bar-
131 <http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/employment_analysis/employ_en.htm>
132 Moreover, in many central-eastern acceding countries the importance of the industrial sector is also greater than that in the EU. Despite the dynamism of manufacturing in recent years overall net job 
creation has been subdued or negative because contraction in some sub-industries outweighed the employment gains in others.
133 Also, one of the particular differences between some of the accession countries and the EU is employment above the age of 65 and the large numbers of older workers working in agriculture, particularly 
self-employed and family workers. In the EU there is a large number of agricultural workers above 65, but the service sector remains the main employer.
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celona target). The employment rate for older 
workers in the EU15 stood at 40.1% in 2002 
(50.1% for men and 30.5% for women). The 
average exit age from the labour force was 
59.9 years in 2001 (60.5 for men and 59.1 for 
women). The March 2003 European Council 
concluded that working longer represents 
an important way of increasing employment 
rates in general and, thus, a major contribu-
tion to improving the financial sustainability 
of pension systems.
Because of the strong projected increase in 
the population of the age-group 55-64, meet-
ing the Stockholm target for the EU15 would 
require an increase in employment of older 
people of about 7 million between 2002 and 
2010 (900,000 a year). Although evidence 
suggests that 2002 showed a marked im-
provement in employment for older workers, 
between 1997-2001 the EU only managed an 
increase in employment of older people of 
about 250,000 a year. About half of this in-
crease was accounted for by part-time jobs.
The employment rates for older workers 
in acceding countries (at arround 30%) 
are generally much lower than in existing 
Member States (40%). Moreover, disparities 
in the employment rate between those who 
have completed tertiary education (56%) 
and those with less than upper secondary 
(19%) are stark. Older workers in acceding 
countries also withdraw earlier from the 
labour force than in most of the existing EU 
Member States. Because labour force partici-
pation continues to decline their average exit 
age from the labour force, which is currently 
below the EU’s, is likely to fall further. Life 
expectancy is also lower than in the EU. While 
acceding countries generally have younger 
populations compared to the EU, these are 
ageing more rapidly. 
The employment rate for high-skilled older 
workers aged 55-64 was twice as high (61%) 
as for the low-skilled (31%). Low-skilled older 
workers also leave the labour force earlier 
(about three years) than their high-skilled 
counterparts. At the EU15 level, the average 
exit age for the high-skilled was estimated 
at 62.3 years in 2001. For medium-skilled 
it was estimated at 60.3 years and for low-
skilled workers at 58.7 years. This is due not 
to a shorter, more compressed employment 
career for the low-skilled but rather to a work-
ing life that starts a few years earlier than for 
the high-skilled. 
Evidence shows that among today’s 55-64 
year-olds, low-skilled workers were at work 
at the age of 18, three years earlier than their 
high-skilled counterparts. At the EU level, 
about half of today‘s low skilled older workers 
began working before the age of 16. Results 
also show that even though the bulk of people 
who started to work before 16, and who are 
now close to exit age, are low-skilled, there 
are still a number of high-skilled workers 
who have been in the labour force for at least 
40 years. 
Older workers today are not clustered around 
declining sectors. They are also over-repre-
sented in knowledge-intensive sectors such 
as education. Moreover, sectoral employment 
growth for young and older workers, as well 
as changes in their specific employment 
structure, move in the same direction, which 
suggests that they are not employment substi-
tutes but rather complement each other.
In addition to reforming early retirement 
schemes and ensuring that it pays to remain 
active in the labour market, this chapter has 
looked into three important elements high-
lighted in the new Employment Guidelines. 
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Firstly, evidence suggests that work-related 
health problems increase with age. Mus-
culo-skeletal disorders mostly concern service 
workers and elementary occupations, where-
as the incidence of stress-related health prob-
lems is more predominant for high-skilled, 
non-manual occupations. This underlies the 
importance of measures to improve work-
ing conditions and to pay more attention to 
health and safety in the workplace. 
Secondly, the increase in employment of 
older workers in the past years is related 
to higher incidence of part-time work. At 
the EU level, part-time work among older 
workers increased at an annual rate of over 
4% compared to just 1% for full-time employ-
ment. Half the employment creation for older 
workers during 1997-2001 is accounted for by 
increases in part-time employment. This has 
also led to an increase in the share of 55-64 
year-olds in part-time work, currently repre-
senting about 22% of their total employment. 
This indicates that promoting more flexible 
working time arrangements may be a better 
way of striking a balance between work and 
private life which is more in line with the 
needs of older people.
Thirdly, the chapter provides evidence that 
older workers receive less training than 
prime-age workers. Also, low-skilled older 
workers account for lower training levels 
than high-skilled older workers. There is a 
relationship between workers staying longer 
in the labour force and training provision. 
Generally, the higher the average exit age 
into inactivity, the higher the shares in educa-
tion and training for the labour force of older 
workers. The cause-effect in this relationship 
is not clear. On the one hand, older workers 
may remain in the labour force because train-
ing to meet demand for particular skills has 
increased their employability and productiv-
ity. In this case, measures aimed at increasing 
training would have a positive effect in keep-
ing older workers longer in the labour force. 
On the other hand, evidence also suggests that 
the reason older workers receive less training 
is because employers know that they will not 
be in the labour force long enough to benefit 
from the expected productivity increases. In 
this case, reforms aimed at delaying the age 
at which older workers withdraw from the 
labour force into inactivity are likely to raise 
incentives for life-long learning. This sug-
gests that measures aimed at increasing both 
training for the older population and keeping 
them longer in the labour force would need 
to go together.
Finally, there is no empirical evidence that 
older workers are more or less productive 
than other age groups. OECD analysis also 
shows that the productivity potential of older 
workers is not impaired by age but by skills 
obsolescence – something that can be cor-
rected through training.
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Annexes to chapter 5
Annex 5.1 – Methodology “average exit age from the labour force”134
The input data
Starting points are the activity rates per age and year coming from the EU quarterly Labour Force Survey (Eurostat). The activity rates taken into 
consideration are the average over four quarterly observed rates in the year considered. ‘Spring’ data (quarter 1 or 2) are used in case EU-LFS data is 
not available for all quarters. The data quality (sample sizes) for higher ages in some countries makes it necessary to smooth artificially the decline 
of activity rates linearly from age 65 to age 70 so that at age 70 the active population in terms of the model is zero (linear “melt-away” hypothesis). 
In such cases, it is also necessary to consider the moving average over the ages 64-66 instead of the actual activity rate at 65.
The model
The model considers the relative changes of activity rates from one year to another at a specific age, that is, the conditional probability to stay in the 
labour market at a specific age in a specific year:
(1) 
p a age year a age year page year
stay
age year, ,( , ) / ( , );= − − ≤1 1 0     
stay ≤1
In cases where the relation given in (1) would exceed 1, a 100% probability to stay on the labour market is assumed in order to keep the counter 
probability of not staying in the labour market from being negative.
Consequently, the conditional probability not-to-stay on in the labour market at the age specified is:
(2) 
p page year
not stay
age year
stay
, ,
−
= −1
The probability of still being in the labour market at a certain age is equal to the overall probability of staying in the labour market from the theo-
retical starting age up to the age specified (minus one). In terms of the model, the starting age is set to 50 years: it is assumed that up to the age of 
49 years nobody will have left the labour force. The unconditional probability to be still in the labour market at a certain age (for example, 64) is 
then:
(3) 
p p p p pyear
be
year
stay
year
stay
year
stay
year64 50 51 52 53, , , , ,= ⋅ ⋅ ⋅
stay
year
stay
year
stayp p⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅62 63, ,
Finally, the unconditional probability of withdrawing from the labour market at a certain age is equal to the overall (unconditional) probability of 
still being in the labour market at this age, see equation (3), times the conditional probability of exiting from the labour market at this particular 
age, see equation (2):
(4) 
p p page year
be but not stay
age year
be
age year
not stay
, , ,
− − − −
= ⋅
It is assumed that from a certain age, the probability of still being part of the labour force is zero (no labour force for the age 70 years and over). 
That is, at the maximum age of 70, everybody who is still in the labour market will withdraw. Under this assumption, the age-specific unconditional 
probabilities of withdrawing from labour market page year
be but not stay
,
− − −
 from 50 to 70 will add up to 100%. 
Finally, in order to obtain an overall average age of withdrawal, the specific ages are weighted by their probability of withdrawal at these ages. The 
contribution of each age from 50 to 70 is given by p ageage year
be but not stay
,
− − −
⋅×⋅
. 
Summing up over all ages considered leads to the average age of withdrawal from the labour market
(5) 
age
age year
be but not stayp age
=
− − −∑ ×
50
70
,
134 The methodology to calculate an average age of withdrawal based on changes in participation rates (dynamic approach) is described in the OECD-paper “Labour market and social policy – occasional papers 
No. 49 Age of withdrawal from the labour force in OECD countries”, by Peter Scherer, DEELSA/ELSA/WD(2001)2, 11 January 2002. The formal description can be found on the pages 12 – 14. The approach 
is modified so as not to take five-year-age clusters but to consider single ages.
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Annex 5.2 – Consistency 
between the Stockholm and 
Barcelona targets
The average exit age from the labour force is 
based on a probability model that considers 
the relative changes in activity rates (from the 
quarterly LFS) for single-year cohorts from 
one year to another. As said earlier, the model 
assumes that the probability of remaining in 
the labour force at the age of 49 is 100% as the 
active are modelled to withdraw only from 
the age of 50 onwards and the probability of 
being in the labour force at the age of 70 is 
0% as no active are assumed to be left in the 
labour force at the age of 70.
Generally speaking, if the activity rate for a 
specific cohort at a specific age goes up, then 
the probability of that cohort staying in the 
labour force increases and, consequently, the 
probability of it leaving at that age goes down. 
This increases the probability of withdrawal 
from the labour force at a later age (table 57).
By way of illustration, sensitivity analysis 
will show how the average exit age from the 
labour force relates to the employment rate 
of older workers. The actual methodology to 
calculate the former can be found in annex 1. 
Data for the years 2000 and 2001 are used for 
the calculation of the average exit age from 
the labour force in 2001 for the individual 
cohorts aged between 50 and 70 in 2000. 
The performance of the 2000 cohorts led to 
an average exit age of 59.9. The scenarios 
presented below show how the model would 
react to changes in the activity rate of specific 
2000 cohorts one year later in 2001, while 
keeping unchanged the activity rates of the 
remaining cohorts. For simplicity reasons, 
the increase in the activity rate will be applied 
to the 2001 age group as if they represented 
the 2000 cohort one year later. Changes 
in participation for four age groups will be 
considered: 50-54, 55-59, 60-64 and 65-69. 
The first and the last represent the lower and 
upper boundaries of the average exit age from 
the labour force although they have been ag-
gregated to age-classes of five years (instead 
of single years) for the purpose of the exer-
cise. The two middle age groups are common 
to both indicators (i.e. the employment rate of 
older workers and the average exit age from 
the labour force).
1) An increase of 1 percentage point in the 
activity rate of each of the five  age classes 
of the group of 50-54 year-olds is assumed for 
the year 2001.
Because of this change, the conditional prob-
ability of 50-54 year-olds staying in the labour 
force goes up. This has not affected the condi-
tional probability for those above 54 staying 
active, which remains unchanged. As a mir-
ror image, the probability of the 50-54 group 
not staying active and becoming inactive falls 
by the same degree. The unconditional “cu-
mulative“ probability of still being active goes 
up for the 50-54 year-olds as well as for the 
other three groups up to the age of 70. The un-
conditional probability of being in the labour 
force at a specific age  but to withdraw from it 
at that age is the product of the unconditional 
probability not having withdrawn before that 
age and the conditional probability of being 
Table 57 – Steps for the calculation of the average exit age from the labour force in the EU15 in 2001
Activity rate data Conditional probability to stay
Condltlonal probability 
NOT to stay
Unconditional probability 
to be still in the labour 
force
Unconditional probability 
to be still In the labour 
force but to leave
Average exit age from 
the labour force
Age / Year 2000 2001 Age / Year 2001 Age / Year 2001 Age / Year 2001 Age / Year 2001 Age / Year 2001
48 82.3 82.0 48 48 0.0% 48 100.0% 48 48
49 80.5 80.6 49 100.0% 49 0.0% 49 100.0% 49 0.0% 49 0.00
50 79.0 79.3 50 98.5% 50 1.5% 50 98.5% 50 1.5% 50 0.76
51 78.0 78.2 51 98.9% 51 1.1% 51 97.4% 51 1.0% 51 0.53
52 75.8 76.2 52 97.7% 52 2.3% 52 95.2% 52 2.2% 52 1.14
53 735 73.3 53 96.7% 53 3.3% 53 92.1% 53 3.1% 53 1.65
54 69.8 70.2 54 95.5% 54 4.5% 54 87.9% 54 4.1% 54 2.22
55 666 65.1 55 93.2% 55 6.8% 55 81.9% 55 6.0% 55 3.27
56 62.0 62.3 56 93.4% 56 6.6% 56 76.5% 56 5.4% 56 2.98
57 58.7 57.8 57 93.1% 57 6.9% 57 71.2% 57 5.3% 57 2.99
58 53.0 53.0 58 90.4% 58 9.6% 58 64.4% 58 6.9% 58 3.95
59 47.1 48.3 59 91.2% 59 8.8% 59 58.7% 59 5.7% 59 3.33
60 33.0 35.6 60 75.6% 60 24.4% 60 44.3% 60 14.3% 60 8.53
61 27.6 27.8 61 84.3% 61 15.7% 61 37.4% 61 7.0% 61 4.21
62 241 24.3 62 88.1% 62 11.9% 62 32.9% 62 4.4% 62 2.74
63 194 19.8 63 82.0% 63 18.0% 63 27.0% 63 5.9% 63 3.70
64 16.3 16.4 64 84.5% 64 15.5% 64 22.8% 64 4.2% 64 2.66
65 94 9.7 65 59.6% 65 40.4% 65 13.6% 65 9.2% 65 5.95
66 7.3 7.3 66 78.4% 66 21.6% 66 10.7% 66 2.9% 66 1.93
67 6.0 6.4 67 87.4% 67 12.6% 67 9.3% 67 1.3% 67 0.89
68 5.2 5.4 68 90.4% 68 9.6% 68 8.4% 68 0.9% 68 0.60
69 4.5 5.1 69 98.3% 69 1.7% 69 8.3% 69 0.1% 69 0.10
70 37 3.9 70 0.0% 70 100.0% 70 0.0% 70 8.3% 70 5.75
71 34 3.6 71 0.0% 71 100.0% 71 0.0% 71 0.0% 71 0.00
Source: average exit age from the labour force, methodology, DG Employment and Eurostat. See annex 1.
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inactive at that age. The former has increased 
from the age of 50, the latter only fell for the 
50-54 year olds. The product, therefore, is 
lower for the 50-54 group but higher from 
age 55 upwards. Because the unconditional 
probability of the active aged 50-54 leaving 
the labour force is lower now, the probability 
of the active aged over 54 entering inactivity 
(at a later age) is higher. As the probability of 
leaving the labour forcefrom 55 onwards has 
increased the average age of withdrawal into 
inactivity also rises.
Because the increase in participation occurs 
for the 50-54 year-olds, the resulting higher 
average exit age has not led to a higher em-
ployment rate for those aged 55-64, which 
remains unchanged.
2) The activity rate for each of the five indi-
vidual ages of the group 55-59 is increased by 
1 percentage point.
The conditional probability of staying in 
the labour force for 55-59 year-olds goes up 
but the conditional probabilities of the age 
groups 50-54 and 60 and above staying ac-
tive remain unchanged. The probability of 
the 55-59 group becoming inactive falls. The 
unconditional cumulative probability of still 
being active goes up from the age of 55, both 
for 55-59 year-olds and for those aged 60 and 
over. Because the unconditional probability 
of the active aged 50-54 leaving the labour 
force has not changed and the probability of 
55-59 year-olds becoming inactive has gone 
down, then the probability of the active over 
59 year-old going into inactivity at a later age 
is higher. This leads to an increase in the aver-
age exit age from the labour force.
Because the increase in participation occurs 
for the 55-59 year olds, a higher average exit 
age is also translated into a higher employ-
ment rate for those aged 55-64, assuming 
that not all of the increase in the activity rate 
is explained by an increase in the unemploy-
ment rate.
3) The activity rate for each of the five indi-
vidual ages of the group 60-64 increases by 1 
percentage point.
The conditional probability of 60-64 year-olds 
staying in the labour force has gone up but the 
conditional probabilities of the 50-54, 55-59 
and 65-69 staying active remain unchanged. 
The probability of the 60-64 year olds becom-
ing inactive falls. The unconditional cumula-
tive probability of still being active increases 
from the age of 60, both for 60-64 and 65-69 
year-olds. Because, the unconditional prob-
ability of withdrawing from the labour force 
has not changed for 50-59 year-olds and the 
probability of becoming inactive has gone 
down for 60-64 year-olds, then the probabil-
ity for the active aged at least 65 going into 
inactivity at a later age is higher. This leads to 
an increase in the average exit age from the 
labour force.
Because the increase in participation occurs 
for the 60-64 year-olds, a higher average 
exit age and a higher employment rate for 
older workers (in the 55-64 age group) are 
complementary if some of the increase in the 
activity rate feeds through into an increase in 
the employment rate. 
4) The activity rate for each of the five indi-
vidual ages of the group 65-69 increases by 1 
percentage point.
The conditional probability of 65-69 year-olds 
staying in the labour force goes up but the 
conditional probabilities of staying active 
below 65 (50-54, 55-59 and 60-64) remain 
unchanged. The probability of the 65-69 
year-olds becoming inactive falls. The uncon-
ditional cumulative probability of still being 
active increases from the age of 65. Because, 
the unconditional probability of withdrawing 
from the labour force has not changed for 50-
64 year-olds and the probability of becoming 
inactive for 65-69 year-olds has gone down, 
then the probability of the active above 69 go-
ing into inactivity at a later age is higher. This 
basically forces everyone to leave the labour 
force at the age of 70 (also one of the assump-
tions of the model) and leads to an increase in 
the average exit age. 
For clarity reasons aggregations of five-year 
groups have been used. In reality, the increase 
of 1 percentage point for 65 year-olds also 
increases the probability of leaving the labour 
force above that age, and so on with 66, 67, 
68 and 69 year-olds. The increase for each of 
these individual weightings will also increase 
the overall average exit age.
Because the increase in participation occurs 
for the 65-69 year-olds, a higher average exit 
age does not lead to a higher employment rate 
for older workers in the 55-64 age group. 
If instead of an increase of 1 percentage point 
for each of the age classes a 1 percentage point 
reduction in the activity rates was simulated, 
then the average exit age would go down in 
all four cases. Assuming that participation 
and employment move in the same direction, 
the employment rate of older workers (those 
aged 55-64) would also decline in the second 
and third case. 
The same four age groups (50-54, 55-59, 60-
64, 65-69) can be considered to simulate the 
effect on the average exit age and on the em-
ployment rate that results from both positive 
and negative changes in activity. Because of 
the numerous combinations that are possible, 
just two additional cases will be considered.
5) The single age activity rates increase by 
1 percentage point for the 50-54 group and 
decline by 1 percentage point for the 60-64 
group.
The conditional probability of staying in the 
labour force for 50-54 year-olds increases 
and the conditional probability of the 60-64 
year-olds being active falls. For the other two 
groups (55-59, 65-69) it remains unchanged. 
The unconditional cumulative probability of 
being active goes up from the age of 50 and 
the probability of not staying active falls for 
the group 50-54 (as in case 1). In parallel, 
the probability of not staying active increases 
for the group 60-64, despite the increase in 
the overall cumulative probability of being 
active from the age of 50 that overlaps the 
group 60-64. The positive or negative sign 
of the change in the average exit age will be 
determined by whichever of these effects is 
stronger. The increase at the lower boundary 
is stronger because the cumulative increase in 
the unconditional probability of leaving the 
labour market after 54 (from 55) outweighs 
the increase in the conditional probability of 
leaving at the age 60-64 as well as the fall in 
the unconditional probability of leaving at a 
later age. Consequently, the average exit age 
increases.
Despite the overall increase in the average 
exit age, the employment rate of older work-
ers aged 55-64 goes down, since participa-
tion falls for 60-64 year-olds and remains 
unchanged for the 55-59 group.
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6) The activity rates of the single age classes 
of the group 55-59 increase by 1 percentage 
point and those of the groups 60-64 and 65-69 
go down by 1 percentage point.
The conditional probability of staying in the 
labour force for 55-59 year-olds goes up and 
for the 60-69 group falls. The unconditional 
cumulative probability of still being active 
goes up from the age of 55 (as in case 2), both 
for 55-59 year-olds and for those aged 60 and 
over (overlapping the 60-69 year-olds). Be-
cause the unconditional probability of being 
inactive for 55-59 year-olds has gone down, 
then the probability for the active above 59 
(from 60) going into inactivity at a later age 
is higher. In parallel, because the conditional 
probability of leaving the labour force for 60-
69 year-olds has increased, the unconditional 
probability of withdrawal at a later age has 
fallen. In this particular case the fall at the 
upper boundary for each of the single age-
cohorts between 60 and 69 outweighs the 1 
percentage point increase for 55-59 year-olds, 
leading to a decline in the average exit age. 
Despite the overall decline in the average exit 
age, the employment rate of older workers 
goes up, since the increase of 1 percentage 
point in the activity rate of 55-59 year-olds 
more than offsets the decline in the activity 
rate of 60-64 year-olds as they are still numeri-
cally more important.
Different scenarios have been made to il-
lustrate how the average exit age from the 
labour force and the employment rate of older 
workers relate one to the other. If participa-
tion increases, the employment rate of older 
workers (55-64) will also increase if unem-
ployment does not fully explain the change 
in participation (i.e. if higher/lower activity 
rates go hand-in-hand with higher/lower em-
ployment rates). The results would also seem 
to show that the change in the average exit 
age from the labour force will be positive if 
participation increases across all single age 
cohorts and it will be negative if it declines in 
all single age cohorts. If the activity rate falls 
in some cohorts but increases in others, the 
overall effect is more unpredictable although 
the model can explain the relative contribu-
tions of each of them in determining the aver-
age age of withdrawal.
The conclusions from this analysis, however, 
would only pertain to the performance of the 
2000 cohorts over time. As stated earlier, the 
average exit age from the labour force in 2001 
refers to the performance of the 2000 cohorts 
in 2001. The average exit age in 2002 would 
refer to the performance of the 2001 cohorts 
in 2002. In dynamic terms, to determine 
whether the exit age will increase or decrease 
in 2002 what matters is the relative perfor-
mance of two different cohorts: those of 2001 
compared with those of 2000. That is, the 
interest lies in how much better, in terms of 
delaying exits into inactivity, will perform the 
2001 cohorts compared to the 2000 cohorts 
and not in the performance of the 2000 co-
horts two years later in 2002. Participation 
tends to decrease steadily from about the 
age of 50. If the expected natural fall in the 
activity rate of the 50-70 cohorts of 2001 is 
less strong/steep than for the cohorts of 2000, 
then the average exit age should increase.
The relationship with the employment rate of 
older workers is not simple. Let‘s assume an 
increase in participation for the age group of 
55-64 year olds between 2001 and 2002 and 
that this is fully absorbed by an increase in the 
employment rate. For the Stockholm target, 
this means that the number of 55-64 year olds 
employed in 2002 relative to their population 
is higher than the number of 55-64 year olds 
employed in 2001 relative to theirs. This in-
crease in the employment rate of older work-
ers would translate into a positive change in 
the average exit age if the performance of 
the 2001 cohorts resulting from the increase 
in the activity rate of the 55-64 age group 
between 2001 and 2002 was better than for 
the 2000 cohorts one year earlier. One should 
not forget that that the average exit age will 
also depend on the relative performances of 
the 50-54 and 65-69 cohorts of 2000 and 2001 
and to what extent these do not offset the rela-
tive performance of the 55-64 cohorts.
At the EU level, age specific activity rates are 
increasing. The activity rate of 55-64 year olds 
was lower in 2000 than in 2001, and in 2001 
was lower than in 2002. The same applies to 
the employment rate. These developments, 
however, do not necessarily lead to an in-
crease in the average exit age from the labour 
force. The Stockholm target relates to increas-
ing employment for the age-specific group 
of 55-64 year olds over time. The Barcelona 
target relates to the comparison of relative 
performance of different cohorts in terms of 
slowing down the natural reduction in their 
activity rate as they grow older (i.e. delaying 
exits).
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Introduction
Due to demographic and economic imbal-
ances between the North and South, more 
sustained immigration flows are likely. 
They may help reduce the labour shortages 
that are already noticeable in the EU, due to 
changing demographics and skills structures, 
and contribute to spreading the effects of the 
demographic change between 2010 and 2030 
over a longer period of time.
The relationships between immigration, 
integration and employment was examined 
by the Commission in a recent Communica-
tion135 (box 9). At its Thessaloniki session of 
June 2003, the European Council discussed 
this Communication. It stressed the need to 
explore legal means for third country na-
tionals to migrate to the Union, taking into 
account the reception capacity of the Member 
States, within the framework of an enhanced 
co-operation with the countries of origin 
which would prove beneficial for both sides. 
It also called for an accurate and objective 
analysis of these issues, which should help 
develop and promote policy initiatives for 
more effective management of migration in 
Europe. The present chapter is a first response 
to the analytical requirements expressed by 
the European Council.
Immigration trends in 
the EU 
One of the widely documented trends in mi-
gration in the post-war period is the growth of 
immigration in the reconstruction years and 
during the period of strong economic growth. 
Immigrants were recruited abroad through 
targeted schemes and bilateral agreements 
– often with countries related with the host 
country through historical links – to work in 
industries for which a sufficient number of 
nationals could not be recruited. This type of 
labour immigration is generally considered to 
have stopped after the oil crises in the 1970s.
More recently labour migration has again 
attracted a lot of attention. An important 
distinction to make between the first post-
war immigration surge and that of recent 
years is that countries in southern Europe 
which were among the source countries from 
where labour was recruited are now among 
the group of European countries that contem-
plate facilitating labour immigration.
One of the reasons why the issue of labour 
immigration is particularly sensitive is that 
the intended schemes devised for the return 
of labour immigrants from the post-war 
influx did not work as planned. Many la-
bour immigrants stayed in Europe and their 
families joined them. Family reunion, also 
called secondary migration, has contributed 
strongly to immigration into the EU in the 
last two decades. The major part played by 
secondary migration over other types of im-
migration (examined in more detail below) 
has led many countries to impose a variety 
of restrictions. 
Chart 134 illustrates how immigration of 
foreign nationals into the EU area increased 
steadily over the 1980s to reach an absolute 
annual level of immigrants higher than that 
of the US. The fall of the Iron Curtain spurred 
immigration and caused immigration flows 
that in some countries reached peaks un-
equalled to this day. In Germany, for example, 
immigration in 1992 was almost two times as 
high as in 2001. 
Efforts by some countries to control immi-
gration in the 1990s met with some success 
despite a rebound in the latter part of the 
decade. This upsurge appears much stronger 
in some countries, for example Belgium, Italy, 
the Netherlands and the UK, than in others, 
such as France, Germany and Luxembourg.
Chapter 6 Immigration and employment in the EU
135 Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on immigration, integration and employ-
ment, COM(2003)336, 03.06.2003
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For a significant part at least, the sharp 
increase in immigration in Greece, Portu-
gal and Spain can be accounted for by the 
unprecedented regularisation campaigns 
involving more than 1.5 million people in 
just a few years.136 Greece dealt with 722,000 
illegally employed immigrants on its territory 
in two naturalisation rounds between 1997 
and 2001. Over the same period Spain regu-
larised 302,000 illegal immigrants and Por-
tugal 142,000. These countries are not alone, 
however, in organising large-scale amnesties. 
Italy added 462,000 people to its stock of legal 
immigrants between 1996 and 1998. Belgium 
and France also organised regularisation 
campaigns between 1997 and 2000 affecting 
52,000 and 78,000 people respectively.137 
The increase may, therefore, possibly be a sta-
tistical artefact. The number of immigrants 
on the territory would not have increased, but 
the regularisation would have been reflected 
in national migration statistics. As illegal im-
migrants are mainly low-skilled, such large 
scale regularisation rounds imply some accep-
tance of an immigration structure that may 
not correspond to the immigration policy as 
defined by the Member States concerned.
The key components of immigration are 
immigration for employment, family re-
union and search for asylum. Their relative 
importance in the overall immigration flow 
varies over time. Attempts to restrict immigra-
tion after the sizeable labour immigration 
through guest worker schemes of more than 
30 years ago did not always have much effect 
on secondary migration. The same is true for 
the restrictions in immigration which were 
implemented in some countries in 1992 and 
1993. 
Comprehensive information on the relative 
importance of the three key components of 
immigration is available for 2000 only. Em-
ployment can be seen as the most frequent 
reason of entry for immigrants in only two 
countries, (chart 135). For a selected number 
of Member States, the chart gives the relative 
importance of employment, family reunion, 
asylum and other reasons for immigrants to 
enter the country in the total immigration in 
2000. In 61% of the cases, employment was 
the reason of legal entry in Italy, 46% in Por-
tugal and 36% in Spain. In the case of Spain, 
however, family reunion may be as important 
as migration for employment, if not more. 
In the UK, employment was reported as the 
reason for entry in 27% of the cases, as was 
family reunion. This latter motive came first 
as an explanation for migration in Sweden 
(50%), France (40%), Denmark (36%) and 
Finland (33%). 
Family reunion is also the main reason 
for immigration in the US.138 In 2001, it ac-
counted for 62% of the total versus 17% for 
employment-related immigration and 10% 
for asylum. It is reported that foreign-born 
workers constituted nearly half of the net 
increase in the US labour force between 1996 
and 2000.139 
One of the factors explaining the growing im-
portance of immigration for employment is 
the tendency observed in several countries to 
attract highly skilled workers to sustain their 
economic expansion. An important element 
of this was temporary immigration - par-
ticularly of IT specialists - facilitated through 
special schemes, such as those introduced 
in France, Germany and the UK or through 
exceptions to standard immigration laws, 
for example in the Netherlands, where other 
professions also benefitted.140 The economic 
conditions did not only favour highly quali-
fied professionals, the demand for low-skilled 
workers also increased. The recruitment of 
low qualified workers from third countries 
is often regulated through seasonal visas. The 
use of temporary foreign labour supply has 
increased markedly in many countries.
136 For a more detailed description of these trends see: Trends In International Migration, SOPEMI 2002, OECD Paris, 2003.
137  Source: OECD op cit.
138  See Developments in International Migration to the United States: 2002, U.S. Department of Labor 
139  see Abraham T. Mosisa, The role of foreign-born workers in the US economy Monthly Labor Review, May 2002 
140  Immigration is due to the situation in countries of origin as well as to the needs of host countries. An analysis of the so-called push factors would have exceeded the scope of this chapter, but further work in 
this area is of prime importance to support the mainstreaming of immigration in external and development policies (see box on the Commission Communication).
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Table 58 gives an indication of the increase 
in the use of temporary foreign labour supply 
for a selected number of EU Member States in 
the period 1992 to 2000. For Germany and the 
UK the table shows significant seasonal and 
temporary immigration. Despite the small 
absolute numbers, temporary immigration 
is considerable in Sweden in the context of 
the size of its economy. In France, there was 
a shift from predominately seasonal work in 
1992 to a more balanced situation in 2000. 
Whereas the inflow of temporary workers 
showed a noticeable increase over the period, 
inflows of seasonal workers fell sharply until 
1998 before starting to increase again. Gener-
ally, however, the importance of seasonal 
and temporary work does not appear very 
significant. On the whole, most recent data 
point towards an increase in the number of 
temporary and seasonal workers. This looks 
to be particularly true for seasonal workers 
in Germany. 
Years of immigration have led to a significant 
foreign presence within the EU Member 
States. According to national data compiled 
by OECD, Austria, Germany and Belgium have 
the highest share of people with a foreign 
nationality, from 10.3% in Austria to 9.1% in 
Belgium. This compares with a 10.4% share 
of foreign-born residents in the total popula-
tion of the US.141 The share of foreigners is re-
ported to be low in Greece, Finland, Portugal, 
Spain and Italy, ranging from 1.6% in Greece 
to 2.3% in Italy. However, this information 
does not appear to reflect fully the regularisa-
tion operations referred to above. Chart 136 
shows that the share of foreigners in other 
countries lies somewhere in between.
Across the Member States the distribution of 
foreigners in the total labour force is broadly 
in line with the population share of foreign-
ers. In most Member States, the share of non-
nationals is lower in the labour force than in 
the population as a whole. This is the case in 
Belgium, Germany and Austria where it lies 
between 8% and 10%, in the Netherlands 
and Sweden, where it is about 4%, and in 
Italy, Finland, Spain and Denmark, where 
non-nationals account for 1% or 2% of the 
labour force. On the other hand, non-nation-
als are at the least equally as represented in 
the labour force as in the total population in 
France (6%), Ireland, Greece and the UK (3% 
to 4% ) and Portugal (2%). These differences 
may reflect the relative importance of family 
reunion in total immigration in the Member 
States.142 
The presence of foreign illegal workers, that 
has through the years become more or less 
important in some Member States, means 
that these labour force numbers are under-
estimates. It is, however, impossible to say by 
how much, as data on people apprehended 
during illegal border crossings do not help 
in estimating the scale of illegal immigration. 
It is considered that only a minority crosses 
the border illegally. Many come with a valid 
visa, but overstay. Others work when their 
visa only allows for tourism or study. Others 
remain after their asylum applications have 
been rejected. A better indication of the illegal 
foreign presence may be the large-scale regu-
larisation programmes and amnesty rounds 
referred to above.
141  These data are not strictly comparable as foreign-born persons may have acquired the nationality of their country of residence (box 10). It is also to be noted that here all foreigners living in Member States 
are concerned. In most of the chapter, data refer to non-EU nationals only.
142 For a more detailed description of these trends see: Trends In International Migration, SOPEMI 2002, OECD Paris, 2003.
 Table 58 – Entries of seasonal and other temporary workers for selected countries 1992, 1997–2000
1992 1997 1998 1999 2000
France Seasonal workers 13.6 8.2 7.5 7.6 7.9
Others 4.5 4.5 4.3 5.8 7.5
Germany Seasonal workers 212.4 226.0 207.9 230.3 263.8
Others 120.2 41.7 36.1 43.8 67.8
Italy Seasonal workers .. .. .. 18.7 24.5
Sweden Grants for temporary permits .. .. .. 15.0 19.4
UK Seasonal workers 3.6 9.3 9.4 9.8 10.1
Others 52.0 80.4 89.4 98.1 124.0
Source: OECD SOPEMI 2002.
Note: Sweden, Grants for temporary permits mainly apply to seasonal workers.
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Box 9 – The Commission Communication on Immigration,  Integration and Employment
On 3rd of June 2003, the Commission adopted a Communication 
on Immigration, Integration and Employment (COM(2003)336). 
This reviews integration policies at national and at EU level, looks 
at the role of immigration in the context of demographic change, 
and suggests ways to promote integration of immigrants.
The three main policy messages emerging from this Communica-
tion are as follows:
1. Increased immigration flows are not only likely due 
to “push“ factors, they become also increasingly neces-
sary to fill the needs of the labour market as EU employ-
ment is likely to start falling after 2010.
Even if the Lisbon targets set for employment were met by 2010, 
and assuming no increase in net migration, an overall decline of 
employment could be expected after 2010 as a result of demograph-
ic change. The fall in the number of employed people between 2010 
and 2030 might be of the order of 20 million workers for EU25. 
Labour and skills shortages are already noticeable in a number of 
sectors and they will tend to increase across the board.
From an economic viewpoint, this decline of employment will 
impact negatively on economic growth. To compensate for the 
decrease in employment and achieve sustained economic growth, 
the EU economy would require a drastic increase in productivity. 
However, it is questionable whether such increase in productivity 
growth will occur.
Having said this, the Commission is not claiming that immigration 
can fully compensate for the impact of demographic ageing on 
the labour market. To address the consequences of demographic 
ageing, the EU must first tap into its existing human resources. 
Promoting labour force participation and increasing productivity 
are essential for meeting the Lisbon objectives of increased employ-
ment, social cohesion and economic growth. Immigrants currently 
residing in the EU can make an important contribution. 
However, in the context of an ageing and shrinking working-age 
population, more sustained immigration flows appear increas-
ingly likely and necessary. This should be clearly recognised and 
the EU should prepare for future immigration in an effective and 
responsible way.
2. The EU must achieve better integration of immi-
grants. This is a key condition for success in preparing 
for future immigration.
In this context, the EU must first strengthen the legal channels for 
immigration. It must replace illegal immigration by legal immigra-
tion.
Secondly, the difficulties in securing economic and social integra-
tion of new immigrants and the persisting issues in relation to 
residing immigrants, including descendants, are a major barrier to 
the achievement of the Lisbon goals in relation to employment and 
social cohesion. Better integration is a matter of social cohesion, a 
pre-requisite for economic efficiency and a political necessity.
A holistic approach to integration is therefore needed, which en-
compasses the key elements of the integration process: access to the 
labour market, education and language skills, housing and urban 
issues, health and social services, social and cultural environment 
but also civic and political rights. 
3. The EU can and should take the necessary initiatives 
to provide a more coherent framework at EU level
The EU as a whole must become more efficient in developing 
policies to ensure the integration of current and future immi-
grants. Since Tampere and Lisbon in particular, the EU has a range 
of instruments to ensure that the right framework is in place. 
While integration measures remain primarily the responsibility of 
the Member States, the Commission should intensify its efforts in a 
number of areas to provide a more coherent European framework 
for integration and to ensure that the contribution of immigrants 
is fully realised.
This requires mainstreaming the issue of immigration in existing 
policies and instruments at EU and national level on the one hand, 
and reinforcing coordination of national integration policies on the 
other hand.
Mainstreaming immigration requires that it is adequately dealt 
with in the employment and social cohesion aspects of the Lisbon 
strategy. This is particularly the case for the European Employment 
Strategy, the Social Inclusion Process and the strategy to combat 
discrimination. 
To take the example of the Employment Strategy, the revised 
employment guidelines endorsed by the Council have given more 
attention to the issue of immigration: Member States should take 
into account labour market aspects of immigration when address-
ing change and promoting adaptability and mobility in the labour 
market (guideline 3). They should also give full consideration to 
the additional labour supply resulting from immigration (guideline 
5). They should finally foster the integration of immigrants and in 
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Box 10 – Naturalisations make evaluating the labour market performance of immigrants 
difficult
When a foreigner acquires the nationality of the host country he 
or she is no longer included in the statistics on foreigners, that 
is non-national residents. The naturalisation policies vary signifi-
cantly among EU Member States. In Belgium there is a possibility 
for speeding up the naturalisation process (the so-called “Snel Belg 
Wet”) whereas the eligibility criteria in Austria, for example, are 
quite strict. The conditions for naturalisation are reflected in the 
number of persons acquiring the nationality of the country as a 
percentage of the stock of foreign population, the naturalisation 
rate.
Once foreigners acquire the nationality of the country it is usually 
no longer possible to distinguish them statistically and to monitor 
their labour market performance. However, the Netherlands have 
introduced a terminology to distinguish between people of foreign 
origin, naturalised or not, of different generations.
Table 59 – Average number of acquisitions of citizenship of the 
host country 1995–2000
Average number of
acquisitions of citizenship
1995-2000
For comparisons:
stock of third country
nationals in 2000
Austria 17,830 597,000
Belgium 25,149 300,000
Denmark 9,919 148,000
Finland 2,469 43,000
France 82,918 2,203,000
Germany 106,296 5,271,000
Greece 928 381,000
Ireland 1,101 94,000
Italy 7,442 ..
Luxembourg 533 23,000
Netherlands 64,200 450,000
Portugal 807 159,000
Spain 11,778 623,000
Sweden 36,439 293,000
UK 51,940 1,740,000
Source: Eurostat, International Migration and Asylum Statistics and LFS.
Notes 
Belgium Estimates based only on data for 1995 and 1999.
France Estimates based only on data for 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998 and 1999.
Greece Estimates based only on data for 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998.
Ireland Estimates based only on data for 1995, 1998, 1999 and 2000.
Italy Estimates based only on data entry for 1995.
Sweden Estimates based only on data for 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999 and 2000.
particular aim to achieve a significant reduction in each Member 
State in the unemployment gaps between non-EU and EU nation-
als, according to any national targets (guideline 7).
Mainstreaming is also to be carried out in other relevant policy 
fields, so as to provide a comprehensive and consistent framework 
for action: external relations, development, trade, enterprise, edu-
cation, research, statistics, etc. 
As regards cohesion policy, the Communication states that it will 
be important to seize the opportunities of the mid-term review of 
the current programming period and of the discussion of the next 
period to take better into account the challenge of immigration in 
terms of jobs and social inclusion, particularly as regards access to 
employment, investment in human capital (education and train-
ing) and the regeneration of deprived urban areas. Important 
policy lessons can be drawn from the EQUAL initiative143. 
Reinforced cooperation in integration policies at EU level will also 
take the form of a more systematic exchange of experiences in a 
number of priority domains identified in the Communication, 
in particular introduction programmes for newly arrived immi-
grants, language training and participation of immigrants in civic, 
cultural and political life.
The Commission will prepare an annual report on progress made 
with the development of the common immigration policy. It will 
draw on the information provided from the wide range of different 
EU policies and initiatives affecting immigrants. The adoption of 
the first report is planned for 2004.
143 1.500 EQUAL development partnerships have already been established since 2001. For the period 2001 - 2006, 127 million Euro is available for actions aiming at combating racism and xenophobia in relation 
to the labour market and 153 million Euro in relation to asylum seekers.
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Labour market 
performances of third 
country nationals
One of the main concerns about immigrants 
is their integration in the host societies. This 
chapter deals with integration into the labour 
market. Immigrants will have achieved 
integration when their labour market perfor-
mance is similar to that of the native popula-
tion. The basic information to make possible 
an assessment of the degree of labour market 
integration of migrants is provided by the EU 
Labour Force Survey.
The Survey distinguishes between EU and 
non-EU nationals as moves from one Member 
State to another are defined as mobility and 
not migration. The information analysed in 
this section must therefore be distinguished 
from the one in section 1 based on SOPEMI 
data which put together non-EU nationals 
and nationals of other Member States.
The employment rate of non-EU nationals 
is on average much lower than that for EU 
nationals (13.8 percentage points lower in 
2002) (table 59). The gap is 30 percentage 
points in Belgium (i.e. employment rate of 
EU-nationals is 30 percentage points higher 
than for non-EU nationals). It exceeds 20 per-
centage points in Denmark, the Netherlands, 
Sweden and France, and 10 percentage points 
in Germany, Finland and the UK. Smaller dif-
ferences are reported for Ireland and Luxem-
bourg. The employment rates are about the 
same for EU and non-EU nationals in Austria 
and lower for EU nationals than for non-EU 
nationals in Portugal, Spain and Greece. No 
data are available for Italy.
The gap is wider for women (17.6 percent-
age points) than for men (10.0 percentage 
points), and for prime-age workers (20.0 
percentage points) than for the young (6.3 
percentage points) and the older workers (9.5 
percentage points). In each of the three work-
ing age categories, non-EU national women 
are more at a disadvantage than men. Among 
young men in particular, the employment 
rate of non-EU nationals (43.8%) is not far 
below that of their EU national counterparts 
(46.0%).
In 2002, the unemployment rate was more 
than twice as high among non-EU nationals 
than for EU nationals. In all Member States 
for which information is available except 
Greece, non-EU nationals performed less well. 
There are no data for Ireland, Italy, Luxem-
bourg and Portugal. The biggest differences 
were reported for Belgium (33.5% for non-EU 
nationals versus 6.3% for EU nationals) and 
France (24.9% against 8.1%).
The information available on wages shows 
also that non-EU nationals and particularly 
women are at a disadvantage. The non-ad-
justed wage gap between EU nationals and 
non-EU nationals in 2000 amounted to 6 per-
cent. The gap rose to 10 percent for women 
versus 4 percent for men.
Despite definitional problems, a comparison 
can be attempted between the situation of 
migrants in the EU and in the US.144 Contrary 
to the situation in the EU, the US employ-
ment rate in 2000 was almost as high for 
foreign-born (66.7%) as for natives (67.2%). 
US foreign-born men were far more likely to 
Table 60 – Employment and unemployment rates by nationality 1992 and 2002
Employment rates
EU nationals Non-EU nationals
1992 2002 1992 2002
B 57.4 60.6 31.2 30.7
DK 74.8 77.2 53.5 49.8
D 67.1 66.5 59.0 51.2
EL 53.6 56.3 55.3 68.4
E 49.1 58.3 54.2 67.1
F 61.0 63.9 42.2 43.2
IRL 50.9 65.1 42.8 58.2
L 61.5 64.0 62.1 57.1
NL 64.7 75.3 35.5 48.6
A* 68.2 68.2 70.9 67.4
P 66.0 68.5 51.2 76.1
F* 59.9 69.2 42.6 54.4
S* 71.7 74.9 41.1 49.9
UK 68.6 72.1 52.9 57.3
EU available 62.6 66.4 51.5 52.6
Unemployment rates
EU nationals Non-EU nationals
1992 2002 1992 2002
B 6.3 6.3 24.5 33.5
DK 9.1 4.2 16.0 13.0
D 6.1 8.1 10.4 16.2
EL 8.0 9.9 14.2 9.6
E 17.8 11.0 16.2 15.6
F 9.7 8.1 26.2 24.9
IRL 15.4 4.3
L 2.0 2.3
NL 5.2 2.5 23.3 5.7
A* 4.1 4.5 7.6 10.0
P 4.1 4.7
FIN* 17.1 10.4 28.6 22.1
S* 8.6 4.8 27.3 15.0
UK 9.7 4.9 17.1 10.0
EU available 9.1 7.1 16.0 15.8
Source: Eurostat, LFS, spring results
Notes: Nationality characteristic not available for Italy from the Community LFS. Earliest available LFS data for Austria, 
Finland and Sweden refer to 1995. Employment rates defined as employed aged 15-64 as a percentage of the popu-
lation of the same age-group. Unemployment rates defined here as unemployed aged 15-64 as a percentage of the 
labour force of the same age-group. Unemployment rates for non-EU nationals in Ireland, Luxembourg and Portugal 
are unreliable and thus, not shown. 
144 see Abraham T. Mosisa, op. cit. for US data, and footnote 6.
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be employed (76.8%) than their native-born 
counterparts (71.0%). The negative gap for 
women was less than half that in the EU 
which does not take naturalised persons into 
account. The unemployment rate was only 
marginally higher for US foreign-born (4.2%) 
than for native-born (4.0%).
On the other hand, in terms of wages, the 
disadvantage affecting US foreign-born 
appears to be far more significant than 
that experienced by EU non-nationals. The 
unadjusted wage gap amounts to 24 percent 
in the US case (with a higher wage gap for 
men (29 percent ) than for women (19 per-
cent )) versus 6 percent  for the EU. It must 
be noted, however, that US calculations are 
based on the median of weekly wages while 
the EU results are computed from the mean of 
hourly wages. If migrant workers had shorter 
working weeks than nationals, this would be 
reflected in wage gaps for the US but not for 
the EU.
Integration can only be assessed over time. 
The message from the last 10 years is at 
best mixed. The employment rate of non-EU 
nationals increased by 1.1 percentage points 
to 52.6% between 1992 and 2002, but that 
of EU nationals increased by 3.8 percentage 
points to 66.4% over the same period. The 
discrepancy is due to a fall during the reces-
sion of 1993/1994 that was bigger for non-EU 
nationals (-4.4 percentage points between 
1992-94) than for EU nationals (-1.3 percent-
age points). Since 1994, the improvements 
have been similar (5.5 percentage points for 
non-EU nationals and 5.1 percentage points 
for EU nationals).
During the recession of 1993/94, the employ-
ment rate of non-EU nationals fell most sharp-
ly in Denmark (-21.5 percentage points), 
Spain (-9.1 percentage points) and Germany 
(-5.8 percentage points). On the other hand, 
it increased in Greece and Ireland (by 4.7 and 
2.8 percentage points respectively). In these 
two countries, the situation also improved for 
EU nationals, but to a more limited extent (0.4 
and 1.8 percentage points).
Between 1994 and 2002, particularly strong 
improvements for non-EU nationals were re-
corded in Portugal (27.8 percentage points), 
Table 61 – Employment rates of EU nationals and non-EU nationals, 1992-2002
EU nationals 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
B 57.4 56.9 56.7 57.3 57.2 58.0 58.3 60.2 61.9 60.7 60.6
DK 74.8 72.9 73.1 74.4 74.6 76.3 76.2 77.3 77.1 76.6 77.2
D 67.1 65.8 65.5 65.7 65.2 64.8 64.9 65.9 66.4 66.7 66.5
EL 53.6 53.5 54.0 54.4 54.8 54.7 55.3 55.1 55.6 55.3 56.3
E 49.1 46.6 45.9 46.7 47.5 49.1 50.8 53.5 56.0 57.4 58.3
F 61.0 60.4 59.8 60.5 60.7 60.4 60.9 61.4 62.6 63.6 63.9
IRL 50.9 51.3 52.7 54.2 55.0 56.5 59.8 62.7 64.7 65.2 65.1
L 61.5 61.0 60.2 58.7 59.2 60.1 60.4 62.0 63.2 63.2 64.0
NL 64.7 64.6 64.9 65.5 66.6 68.6 70.4 72.1 73.8 74.9 75.3
A 68.2 67.4 67.1 67.5 68.3 67.9 67.8 68.2
P 66.0 64.4 62.9 62.5 62.4 63.4 66.9 67.5 68.2 68.6 68.5
FIN 59.9 60.6 62.1 63.6 67.7 68.4 69.4 69.2
S 71.7 70.9 69.6 69.8 71.7 72.2 75.1 74.9
UK 68.6 67.8 68.2 68.6 69.1 70.1 70.7 71.1 71.8 72.2 72.1
EU available 62.6 61.5 61.3 62.2 62.3 62.7 63.5 64.6 65.7 66.3 66.4
Non-EU nationals 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
B 31.2 29.9 29.0 26.9 29.1 27.2 28.7 27.5 33.7 31.6 30.7
DK 53.5 36.1 32.0 42.6 43.4 43.2 47.4 45.0 50.0 46.8 49.8
D 59.0 55.9 53.2 52.7 49.4 46.7 48.0 50.0 51.2 52.6 51.2
EL 55.3 55.5 60.0 61.5 62.9 64.3 66.7 65.9 64.8 65.2 68.4
E 54.3 52.1 45.1 53.6 52.6 48.8 59.7 66.2 59.5 66.1 67.1
F 42.2 41.8 38.9 40.7 39.6 37.1 40.5 40.5 42.0 44.0 43.2
IRL 42.8 42.0 45.6 41.5 40.4 42.3 44.9 44.8 44.9 56.5 58.2
L 62.1 60.5 60.2 51.5 56.4 53.0 55.7 52.1 53.3 58.9 57.1
NL 35.5 32.8 32.8 30.0 32.8 37.6 37.6 33.7 44.7 49.3 48.6
A 70.9 66.2 67.3 66.3 66.9 67.7 68.2 67.4
P 51.2 57.9 48.3 47.3 54.9 64.8 61.3 63.6 72.3 67.9 76.1
FIN 42.6 51.6 46.4 37.1 46.7 48.1 48.4 54.4
S 41.1 34.0 33.5 37.1 38.4 42.7 53.7 49.9
UK 52.9 51.3 48.1 50.5 50.2 60.3 54.9 52.7 54.6 54.6 57.3
EU available 51.5 49.6 47.1 48.8 46.2 45.9 47.9 48.6 50.6 52.4 52.6
Source: Eurostat, LFS, spring results
Notes: Nationality characteristic not available for Italy from the Community LFS. Employment rate defined as employed aged 15-64 as a percentage of the population in working-age 
(15-64).
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Spain (22.0 percentage points), Denmark 
(17.8 percentage points), the Netherlands 
(15.8 percentage points), Ireland (12.6 per-
centage points) and Finland (since 1995, 11.8 
percentage points). Noticeable advances were 
registered in the UK (9.2 percentage points), 
Sweden (since 1995, 8.8 percentage points) 
and Greece (8.4 percentage points). 
On the other hand, progress was below 
average in France (4.2 percentage points) 
and Belgium (1.6 percentage points), and 
further falls were reported in Germany (-2.0 
percentage points), Luxembourg (-3.1 per-
centage points) and Austria (since 1995, -3.5 
percentage points). The contrast between the 
turnaround in Spain and Denmark and the 
continuous deterioration in Germany is strik-
ing as are the sustained increases throughout 
the decade in the employment rates of non-EU 
nationals in Ireland and Greece.
Strictly speaking however, integration into 
the labour market should be assessed by 
comparing the increases in employment rates 
of non-EU and EU nationals over a given time 
span instead of looking at non-EU nationals 
only. Between 1994 and 2002, the relative sit-
uation of non-EU nationals clearly improved 
in half of the Member States, but not in the 
four with the largest population. In Portugal 
and Denmark, the employment rate for non-
EU nationals increased more than 10 percent-
age points above the rates of EU nationals. 
The increase was 5 percentage points, in 
Spain, Greece, Sweden and the Netherlands. 
It was small in Finland and hardly noticeable 
in France and in Ireland where the employ-
ment rates of EU and non-EU nationals rose 
equally strongly. The relative position of non-
EU nationals deteriorated in the UK, Belgium 
and the three Member States that registered 
falling employment rates of non-EU nationals 
between 1994 and 2002, namely Germany, 
Austria and Luxembourg.145
Table 62 – Unemployment rates of EU nationals and non-EU nationals, 1992-2002
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
B 6.3 7.5 9.1 8.7 9.0 8.4 8.7 8.0 6.0 5.7 6.3
DK 9.1 10.6 7.8 6.8 6.7 5.1 4.9 5.0 4.3 4.1 4.2
D 6.1 7.2 8.1 7.6 8.3 9.3 9.2 8.3 7.5 7.4 8.1
EL 8.0 8.7 9.1 9.2 9.9 9.8 10.9 12.0 11.3 10.4 9.9
E 17.8 22.3 24.4 22.8 22.4 21.0 18.9 15.7 13.9 10.3 11.1
F 9.7 10.8 11.9 11.2 11.6 11.9 11.3 11.3 9.6 8.0 8.1
IRL 15.4 15.9 14.8 12.2 11.9 10.4 7.8 5.8 4.4 3.8 4.3
L 2.0 2.1 3.3 2.9 3.0 2.4 2.4 2.1 2.1 1.5 2.3
NL 5.2 5.8 6.6 6.6 6.1 5.2 4.1 3.4 2.6 2.1 2.5
A 4.1 4.8 4.6 5.0 4.3 4.3 3.6 4.5
P 4.1 5.4 6.9 7.3 7.6 6.9 4.9 4.8 4.0 4.0 4.7
FIN 17.1 15.6 14.9 13.0 11.6 11.0 10.1 10.4
S 8.6 9.0 9.8 8.5 7.2 5.1 4.5 4.8
UK 9.7 10.3 9.5 8.6 8.1 7.0 6.1 6.0 5.5 4.6 4.9
EU available 9.1 10.5 11.1 10.3 10.5 10.3 9.6 8.8 7.7 6.7 7.1
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
B 24.5 31.3 34.7 37.4 30.8 34.7 34.2 35.8 30.7 26.7 33.5
DK 16.0 36.1 32.9 26.9 21.4 24.5 12.7 16.5 13.5 11.3 13.0
D 10.4 15.2 18.6 17.0 18.6 20.8 19.8 18.9 15.5 15.1 16.2
EL 14.2 17.0 14.3 14.7 14.4 13.4 13.2 12.4 11.3 11.2 9.6
E 16.2 17.8 27.8 24.8 25.7 23.9 18.4 14.3 18.2 15.2 15.6
F 26.2 27.7 32.9 29.4 32.5 32.6 31.4 30.5 27.9 25.4 24.9
IRL
L
NL 23.3 28.4 30.8 32.9 24.3 22.5 18.4 18.5 10.1 5.3 5.7
A 7.6 11.4 12.0 10.7 9.4 9.9 8.8 10.0
P
FIN 28.6 28.3 29.7 43.9 27.6 33.3 30.1 22.1
S 27.3 36.3 37.6 31.8 28.4 22.0 14.9 15.0
UK 17.1 18.5 20.5 17.2 17.0 7.4 12.0 11.4 12.0 10.6 10.0
EU available 16.0 19.5 23.0 20.2 22.6 22.0 20.6 19.8 17.0 15.6 15.8
Source: Eurostat, LFS, spring results
Notes: Nationality characteristic not available for Italy from the Community LFS. Unemployment rate defined here as unemployed aged 15-64 as a percentage of the active population 
(labour force) aged 15-64. Unemployment rates for non-EU nationals in Ireland, Luxembourg and Portugal are unreliable and thus, not shown.
145 The OECD contrasts evolutions in the countries of old immigration, where economic growth should favour first the employment of nationals, and new immigration countries (southern Europe and Ireland) 
where migrants would benefit from the start (see Trends in International Migration, SOPEMI 2002)
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An examination of unemployment data 
confirms the lessons drawn from the analy-
sis of employment. During the 1993/1994 
recession, the unemployment rate of non-EU 
nationals grew much faster (from 16% in 
1992 to 23% in 1994) than the one of EU na-
tionals (from 9.1% to 11.1%). Since 1994, the 
unemployment rate decreased more for non-
EU nationals (-7.2 percentage points) than for 
EU nationals (-4.0 percentage points), but 
the unemployment rate of non-EU nationals 
remained at least twice as high as that for EU 
nationals throughout the period.
A systematic analysis at country level would 
have limited value for unemployment as data 
are missing for four Member States and the 
broad pattern of evidence is in line with that 
observed for employment. Wide differences 
can be observed between countries, with 
the unemployment rate of non-EU nationals 
in 2002 being more than five times or 27.2 
percentage points higher than that of EU 
nationals in Belgium, while the reported dif-
ference is only 3.2 percentage points in the 
Netherlands. 
To sum up, situations vary greatly at country 
level but, for the EU as a whole, there has been 
no sizeable improvement in the relative situ-
ation of non-EU nationals as far as both em-
ployment and unemployment is concerned 
since the deterioration recorded during the 
1993/1994 recession.
On average, non-EU national women were 
less affected by the 1993/1994 recession 
than men. Between 1992-94, their employ-
ment rate fell by only 2.1 percentage points 
compared to 6.0 percentage points for men. 
Since 1994, their employment rate has also 
increased rather more than that of men (6.5 
versus 5.8 percentage points). Nevertheless 
the employment rate of EU-national women 
rose still faster between 1994 and 2002, so 
that the gap between the employment rates 
of EU and non-EU nationals increased by 0.7 
percentage points over that period for women 
while for men it decreased by 2.8 percentage 
points.
On this basis, it can be argued that migrant 
women are lagging behind in labour market 
integration. However, southern Europe is a 
striking exception as the female employment 
rate is higher for non-EU nationals than for 
EU nationals in Spain, Greece and more re-
cently Portugal (no data available for Italy). 
Both rates are also similar in Austria (58.0% 
versus 61.4%) according to 2002 data. The 
sharp differences between northern and 
southern Europe need to be investigated 
further. Possible determinants could be the 
origin of migrants (box 11) and the relative 
importance of migration for family reunion. 
An analysis of employment by age and quali-
fication is possible at EU-level for the period 
1995-2002.146 Data show that the employment 
rate of non-EU nationals increased mainly for 
prime-age workers (+4.0 percentage points). 
The rise is more limited for younger workers 
(+2.6 percentage points) as no progress was 
recorded among young women. The situa-
tion of older workers has deteriorated (-1.2 
percentage points) as the employment rate 
of older men fell. 
On the other hand, the employment rate of EU 
nationals has increased for men and women 
of all age groups. Therefore, since 1995, the 
relative position of non-EU nationals has 
deteriorated sharply for older workers and 
slightly for young people while no difference 
was observed in the relative position of the 
prime age group.
The employment rate of the low-skilled has 
fallen marginally for non-EU nationals while 
it has increased slightly for EU nationals. For 
the medium-skilled, the employment rate 
increased for both groups, but more for EU 
nationals than for non-EU nationals. Among 
highly qualified workers on the other hand, 
the employment rate increased faster for non-
EU nationals (6.9 percentage points) than for 
EU nationals (2.0 percentage points). Conse-
quently, the gap between the employment 
rate of high-skilled, non-EU nationals and 
that of EU nationals fell by about 5 percentage 
points. This reduction applied equally to both 
women and men. 
In 2002, the employment rate of non-EU 
nationals was consistently lower than that 
of EU nationals for all ages and qualifications, 
and significantly more so for women than for 
men.147 The gap increased with qualifications 
to reach 10.3 percentage points for highly 
Table 63 – Female employment rates of EU and third country nationals 1992 and 2002
Female Employment rates
1992 2002
EU
nationals
Non-EU
nationals
EU
nationals
Non-EU
nationals
B 45.5 17.4 52.3 18.1
DK 70.7 50.2 73.5 42.7
D 56.8 43.3 60.3 39.8
EL 36.2 40.1 42.4 50.7
E 31.7 42.3 43.7 56.8
F 52.4 22.6 57.7 29.1
IRL 36.8 33.1 55.3 47.5
L 46.2 44.9 52.0 44.5
NL 51.8 25.9 66.7 40.2
A* 59.3 59.1 61.4 58.0
P 55.8 30.9 61.2 63.2
FIN* 58.2 49.6 67.5 46.8
S* 70.8 39.5 73.5 45.3
UK 61.4 45.5 65.9 47.4
EU available 51.8 36.8 58.8 41.2
Source: Eurostat, LFS, spring results
Notes: Nationality characteristic not available for Italy from the Community LFS. Earliest available LFS data for Austria, 
Finland and Sweden refer to 1995. Female employment rate defined as women employed aged 15-64 as a percent-
age of the female population in working age (15-64).
146 Data are not available for Italy, nor for the Netherlands in 1995.
147 The difference was less than one percentage point for low qualified young people.
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non-manual) while the opposite is true for 
non-EU nationals
There may be a correspondence between the 
skills or occupational and the sectoral distri-
butions of non-EU nationals. The proportion 
of non-EU nationals in “Hotels, restaurants 
and private households” is far above that of 
EU nationals. To a smaller extent, this is also 
true for “Manufacturing” “Construction” and 
“Business services”. Altogether, some 60% 
of the non-national workers were employed 
in these sectors in 2002. On the other hand, 
the proportion of non-EU nationals was lower 
than the one of EU nationals in “Agriculture”, 
“Financial services”, and “Health and social 
work”149. The analysis of the growth and em-
qualified men and 22.3 percentage points for 
highly qualified women.148 The employment 
rate of the highly qualified, non-EU nationals 
was indeed only moderately higher (by 4.4 
percentage points) than for the medium-
skilled, while there was a sharp difference for 
EU nationals (11.8 percentage points). Among 
non-EU nationals, the gender gap in the em-
ployment rate for each qualification level is of 
the order of 20 percentage points, whereas it 
is only 6.8 percentage points for high-skilled 
EU nationals. There are also some differences 
with regards to unemployment rates. Men 
and women of third country nationality 
have similar unemployment rates for each 
qualification level, except for the high-skilled 
group where women tend to be unemployed 
more often than men. Among EU-nationals, 
however, women at all educational levels 
have higher unemployment rates. 
The gap between the overall employment 
rates of non-EU and EU nationals is only 
partly accounted for by lower employment 
for workers of all skills levels. In addition the 
distribution of skills between non-EU nation-
als is less favourable than for EU nationals. 
In occupational terms, half of the non-EU 
nationals in employment are low-skilled 
(unskilled manual and low- or unskilled 
non-manual) while this is the case for less 
than a third of the EU nationals (chart 137). 
In addition, for EU nationals, the proportions 
of high-skilled is larger than that of medium-
skilled (skilled manual plus medium-skilled 
148 By contrast, in the US, the employment rate of high skilled foreign foreign-born residents is broadly equal to the one of natives for men and some 10% percent below for women. See Abraham T. Mosisa 
op.cit.. 
149 As well as in public administration, defence and education, which has an institutional explanation.
Table 64 – Employment rates for EU nationals and non-EU nationals by gender, age and qualification, 1995 and 2002
Employment rate for EU-nationals in 1995 Employment rate for non-EU-nationals in 1995
Low 
qualified
Medium 
qualified
High 
qualified Total
Low 
qualified
Medium 
qualified High qualified Total
Young men 15-24 35.6 50.5 53.8 42.3 36.0 56.1 - 38.3
Young women 15-24 27.0 45.4 54.4 37.1 26.1 46.7 - 30.4
All young men and women 15-24 31.5 47.9 54.1 39.7 30.8 51.3 - 34.3
Prime-age women 25-54 51.7 69.2 81.6 64.6 35.0 50.4 48.9 39.6
Prime-age men 25-54 79.9 87.6 92.2 86.3 69.4 73.9 71.8 69.6
All prime-age men and women 25-54 64.5 78.8 87.3 75.4 51.0 64.9 62.0 55.5
Older men 55-64 43.6 48.0 63.8 47.8 37.8 - - 42.0
Older women 55-64 26.4 32.9 53.2 27.8 - - - 20.3
All older men and women 55-64 33.8 41.4 60.3 37.5 31.1 - - 33.9
All women in working-age 15-64 40.7 60.1 76.4 52.9 31.7 48.5 47.5 36.0
All men in working-age 15-64 61.2 75.2 85.6 71.4 57.1 69.2 69.1 60.1
All men and women in working-age 15-64 50.2 67.9 81.5 62.2 44.0 60.8 60.0 48.8
Employment rate for EU-nationals in 2002 Employment rate for non-EU-nationals in 2002
Low 
qualified
Medium 
qualified
High 
qualified Total
Low 
qualified
Medium 
qualified High qualified Total
Young men 15-24 36.5 58.0 61.8 46.0 38.7 54.1 - 43.8
Young women 15-24 26.6 52.1 62.3 40.3 23.4 42.4 - 30.4
All young men and women 15-24 31.9 55.1 62.1 43.2 30.9 48.1 - 36.9
Prime-age women 25-54 53.8 74.4 84.7 71.1 36.2 56.7 60.0 46.2
Prime-age men 25-54 81.3 88.6 93.0 87.8 68.1 76.0 78.8 73.0
All prime-age men and women 25-54 66.9 81.6 89.0 79.5 50.8 67.5 69.3 59.5
Older men 55-64 45.9 50.1 64.7 51.7 34.5 - - 40.3
Older women 55-64 27.1 37.9 56.1 33.0 - - - 22.7
All older men and women 55-64 35.1 44.5 61.5 42.2 27.2 - - 32.7
All women in working-age 15-64 41.2 65.4 79.9 58.8 31.5 52.5 57.5 41.2
All men in working-age 15-64 61.9 77.6 86.7 74.0 56.5 70.5 76.4 64.0
All men and women in working-age 15-64 51.1 71.6 83.4 66.4 43.4 62.4 66.9 52.6
Source: Eurostat, LFS, spring results 2002
Notes: Employment rates in the EU in 1995 do not include the Netherlands nor Italy; in 2002, only Italy is excluded. Qualifications according to the ISCED educational classification: 
Low qualified (less than upper secondary education); medium qualified (upper secondary education completed); high qualified (tertiary education completed).
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ployment prospects of these various sectors 
should be pursued further.
There is a high probability that the disadvan-
tage of non-EU nationals as regards the skills 
or occupational structure will continue unless 
more is done as regards education. Among 
non-EU nationals, 35.1% of the population 
aged 18-24 had lower secondary education 
at most and were not in further education or 
training, in 2002. This was the case for only 
16.7% of EU nationals.
On the other hand, the skills level of third 
country immigrants is on average higher for 
recent arrivals than for people who arrived 
a number of years ago. The share of high-
skilled immigrants has gone up from between 
15% and 18% in the period from 1986 to 1993 
to 25% in 2001. At the same time, the share 
of immigrants with low skills levels has de-
creased steadily from over 60% in 1986 to un-
der 42% in 2001. The majority of immigrants 
who entered the EU in 2001 had medium or 
high skill levels (chart 139).
This higher skills levels of recent immigrants 
has not translated into an improved position 
in the labour market. Rather, performance 
seems related to the number of years spent 
in the host country. Immigrants who arrived 
in 1992 showed an employment rate of over 
65% in 2002, while for those who arrived in 
2001, the employment rate was only 45%. It 
can also be seen that activity rates are lower 
and that unemployment rates are higher for 
recent arrivals.
One can assume that immigrants that have 
lived in a country longer have had more time 
to adapt, speak the host language, learn the 
right skills and acquire valuable work expe-
rience. This could explain what looks like a 
gradual improvement in the labour market 
performance of immigrants as the time spent 
in the host country increases.
It would be instructive to try and link the em-
ployment situation of cohorts of immigrants 
to the relative importance of labour immigra-
tion in the total inflow. The higher the share 
of immigrants in any cohort who have been 
recruited for employment purposes and the 
lower the share of refugees and secondary 
migrants (in the context of family migration) 
the more likely that cohort may be to perform 
well on the labour market.
Conclusions
The increasing flows of immigrants for em-
ployment and family reunion as well as of 
refugees in the last 20 years have concerned 
all Member States, although to a varying ex-
tent. They raise questions about the relative 
importance of pull and push factors, and the 
correspondence between the policies of the 
host countries which often tend to favour the 
immigration of skilled workers, and reality. 
The growth of seasonal and temporary immi-
gration, the pros and cons of regularisation 
and the ways to tackle illegal immigration 
- 196 -
Chapter 6 Immigration and employment in the EU
are other complex political issues requiring 
improved assessments of the situation in the 
various Member States.
The examination of the integration of mi-
grants and their offspring into the labour 
market has shown that performances vary 
widely among host countries as well as 
countries of origin. On the whole, the perfor-
mance of non-EU nationals appears to have 
deteriorated more than that of EU nationals 
during the last recession, and the discrepancy 
in terms of employment and unemployment 
rates has not been significantly reduced 
afterwards. This raises the question of what 
is going to happen during the ongoing sharp 
slowdown.
Among non-EU nationals, women and older 
workers in particular are lagging behind. 
There is some deterioration in the situation of 
the low- and medium-skilled non-EU workers 
which makes the high rate of school drop-out 
among non-EU nationals particularly worry-
ing.
High-skilled workers tended to close the 
employment gap, but their disadvantage 
remains particularly significant. Next to 
discrepancies at every occupational level, the 
lower employment rate of non-EU nationals is 
also accounted for by the fact that their whole 
occupational distribution tends to be skewed 
towards low skills despite improvements in 
the skills of newcomers. Integration policies 
will have to take into account the fact that 
finding a job appears to be less related to the 
skills level of immigrants on arrival than to 
the experience acquired over the years in the 
host country.
The reviewed evidence shows that improv-
ing the integration of immigrants already 
established in the EU is the first priority. 
This fits within the European Employment 
Strategy which aims to mobilise all existing 
EU resources to fulfil the objectives set in Lis-
bon, notably by promoting the integration of 
people at a disadvantage in the labour market. 
This should lead to a significant reduction in 
the unemployment gaps between non-EU and 
EU nationals that exist in the Member States, 
as called for in Employment Guideline 7.
This chapter is meant to contribute to the 
analysis of immigration in the framework 
of the European Employment Strategy. Work 
should continue on the part that immigration 
can play in addressing labour shortages and 
bottlenecks, as referred to in Employment 
Guideline 3. In addition, a forward-looking 
approach to immigration is needed today to 
Table 65 – Employment and unemployment rate for EU-nationals and non-EU-nationals in 2002
Employment rate for EU-nationals in 2002
Low qualified Medium qualified High qualified
Young men and women 15-24 31.9 55.1 62.1
Prime-age women 25-54 53.8 74.4 84.7
Prime-age men 25-54 81.3 88.6 93.0
Older men and women 55-64 35.1 44.5 61.5
All women in working-age 15-64 41.2 65.4 79.9
All men in working-age 15-64 61.9 77.6 86.7
All men and women in working-age 15-64 51.1 71.6 83.4
Employment rate for non-EU-nationals in 2002
Low qualified Medium qualified High qualified
Young men and women 15-24 30.9 48.1 52.0
Prime-age women 25-54 36.2 56.7 60.0
Prime-age men 25-54 68.1 76.0 78.8
Older men and women 55-64 27.2 46.7 49.4
All women in working-age 15-64 31.5 52.5 57.5
All men in working-age 15-64 56.5 70.5 76.4
All men and women in working-age 15-64 43.4 62.4 66.9
Unemployment rate for EU-nationals in 2002
Low qualified Medium qualified High qualified
All women in working-age 15-64 11.6 7.5 4.9
All men in working-age 15-64 9.2 6.4 3.9
All men and women in working-age 15-64 10.2 6.9 4.3
Unemployment rate for non-EU-nationals in 2002
Low qualified Medium qualified High qualified
All women in working-age 15-64 19.5 14.6 12.7
All men in working-age 15-64 19.7 14.2 10.2
All men and women in working-age 15-64 19.6 14.4 11.3
Source: Community Labour Force Survey, Spring results 2002, Eurostat.
Notes: Nationality characteristic not available for Italy from the Community LFS. Unemployment rate defined here as unemployed aged 15-64 as a percentage of the active population 
(labour force) aged 15-64. Qualifications according to the ISCED educational classification: Low qualified (less than upper secondary education); medium qualified (upper second-
ary education completed); high qualified (tertiary education completed).
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prepare for the socio-demographic challenges 
of tomorrow. Full consideration should be 
given to the potential contribution of immi-
gration to the labour supply, in accordance 
with Employment Guideline 5. The trend 
towards a shrinking working age population 
in Europe in combination with various push 
factors in the developing countries is likely to 
generate a sustained flow of immigrants over 
the coming decades helping to fill the needs of 
the EU labour markets. 
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Box 11 – Employment performances by nationality.
The EU Labour Force Survey contains information on the nation-
ality of respondents. On this basis, employment rates can reliably 
be computed at EU level, including by gender, for the nationalities 
most represented as shown below.
For US nationals and those of the Balkan countries overall perfor-
mances are broadly similar to those of EU nationals. On the other 
hand, the gap is at least of 20 percentage points for nationals of 
Turkey, the Russian Federation and the Magrehb, with Polish work-
ers in an intermediate situation. 
Discrepancies between men and women are less pronounced than 
for EU nationals in the cases of Croatia, Bosnia Herzegovina and 
the Russian Federation. For the other nationalities it is much more 
striking.
The combination of low average employment and high gender gap 
result in an employment rate below 40% for Russian, Turkish and 
still more Magrehbi women. It is also for these nationalities that the 
male employment rate is the lowest ranging from 61 to 50%.
Table 66 – Employment rates of third country nationals in 2002
 Most numerous nationality groups (ranked by highest 
to lowest employment rate)
Total Men Women
USA 71 82 59
Croatia 68 71 65
Albania 64 79 47
Bosnia Herzegowina 62 68 57
Poland 58 75 49
Turkey 47 61 32
Russian Federation 43 50 39
Morocco 40 56 21
Algeria 39 53 22
EU nationals 66 74 59
Source: Eurostat, LFS, spring results
Note: List drawn on the most numerous working-age populations (15-64) of non-
EU nationals living in the EU.
